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The Rhodes Historical Review

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The Dynamics of Opportunism and Religion in the World of El Cid

Andrew Bell

The conquest of Toledo in 1085 by the armies of King Alfonso VI of Castile (1040–1109) has long been recognized as an important event in the Christian Reconquest of Muslim Spain. Following the death of Almanzor (938–1002) and the eventual collapse of the Cordoban Caliphate in 1031, the unity of Muslim Spain became fragmented by the rise of independent rival states (known as Taifa kingdoms). The fragmentation of Muslim Spain enabled the Christians armies in the North to advance, producing a “dramatic shift in Christian-Muslim relations [that] encouraged the process of Christian reconquest.”¹ Recognizing the instability of these Taifa kingdoms, the Christian kingdoms of Spain began to exploit their Muslim neighbors by exacting tribute. During much of this period of constantly shifting alliances, Christians and Muslims appeared more concerned with surviving and earning profit than waging war upon kingdoms of the opposing faith. With the fall of Toledo, however, this Christian-Muslim relationship shifted once again. The conquest of Toledo by the armies of King Alfonso precipitated the arrival of the religiously orthodox

Almoravids from North Africa in 1086 and divided Christian and Muslim kingdoms along more purely religious lines. This paper examines three important accounts relating to the life of Rodrigo Diaz (El Cid)—the Historia Silense, the Historia Roderici, and the Chronica Aderfonsi Imperatoris—and suggests that while the majority of the eleventh century may be characterized by political opportunism and ambition, Alfonso’s conquest of Toledo helped to polarize the political landscape of medieval Spain and gave rise to the roots of Spanish Crusader ideology.

The Historia Silense is a chronicle written by an author who identifies himself only as a monk of the domus seminis ("house of the seed"), a location that has traditionally been associated with the Benedictine monastery of Santo Domingo de Silos in Castile. Although this work primarily recounts the reign of Ferdinand I (1037-1065) of Castile, it also contains discussions about the fall of the Visigoths and the Caliphate of Cordoba. Most importantly, the manuscript discusses the reign of Almanzor during the Cordoban Caliphate. In its description of Almanzor (or “al-Mansur,” as it is also spelled) and his “dreadful defeats of the Christians,” the Historia Silense emphasizes the overwhelming strength of the Caliphate of Cordoba and implies that its subsequent disintegration into smaller more fragile kingdoms is what enabled Spanish Christendom to rise to prominence. Specifically, the Historia Silense discusses Almanzor’s continuous military assaults on the majority of eleventh-century Spanish Christendom, including the kingdoms of Pamplona and Leon. The document portrays invasions into the northern kingdoms as highly destructive, claiming that Almanzor “laid waste cities and castles, depopulated all the land until he reached the coastal regions of

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3 Ibid., 34.
western Spain and destroyed the city of Galicia where St. James is buried.” The *Historia Silense* explains that Almanzor and his armies enjoyed “such license…to assault the frontiers of Christians for twelve successive years” and that “he profaned whatever was sacred with his audacity; and at the end he made the whole kingdom submit to him and pay tribute.” The account suggests that Almanzor’s forays into the north were largely unopposed; it also lays bare the inherent feebleness and gross vulnerability of the Christian kingdoms. After the death of Almanzor, the *Historia Silense* focuses on the actions of King Alfonso V and reveals that he was “a very vigorous enemy of the Moors” and “pursues them with vigorous hatred.” Thus, since the Christian kingdoms only managed to raise significant resistance in the years after Almanzor’s death, the *Historia Silense* implicitly alludes to the importance to the Christians of the fall of the Caliphate of Cordoba. It suggests that the fragmentation of the previously cohesive Moorish state into Taifa (meaning ‘party’ or ‘faction’) kingdoms is what enabled the Christians to oppose their historic enemy.

The author of the *Historia Silense* concisely illustrates the willingness of the Taifa kingdoms to form partnerships with Christians in the wake of the Caliphate’s collapse, depicting a new Muslim-Christian dynamic. After the death of Almanzor and the ineffectual reign of Hisham III (1027-31), the centralized government of al-Andalus dissolved into a number of independent principalities known to historians as Taifa kingdoms. During this *fitna* (“time of trouble” or “time of civil wars”), numerous warring generals and politicians seized power and endeavored to create

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4 Ibid., 36.
5 Ibid., 38.
6 Ibid., 39.
their own principalities from the corpse of the fallen Umayyad dynasty, fracturing al-Andalus into over twenty Taifa kingdoms. While the rulers of these new minor kingdoms were of dissimilar backgrounds, they all apparently possessed “a keen awareness of the opportunities for self-advancement that the demise of the centre presented.” This clearly forced the Taifa kingdoms into conflict with one another for control over limited resources. Since the acquisition of resources inherently renders others unable to use them, continuous attempts to incorporate new territory made “each Taifa kingdom the enemy of its neighbor.” Additionally, the armies of the Taifa kingdoms appear very small and seem largely comprised of mercenary forces, limiting the military viability of these nations. Thus, likely recognizing the precariousness of their own military weakness and the need to assimilate new territory, the rulers of the Taifa kingdoms continuously sought to ally themselves with their Christian neighbors, potentially supplementing their own forces with Christian contingents. The author of the Historia Silense exemplifies this by discussing the treachery of Ramiro, son of Sancho the Great of Navarre and ruler of Aragon (1035-63). The author reveals that Ramiro “entered into an alliance with some of the neighboring kings…Zaragoza, Huesca, and Tudela” against his brother, Garcia of Navarre (1035-54). Since these Taifa kingdoms allied themselves with Ramiro, they likely intended to benefit from this coalition. While it is unclear exactly what it was that they hoped to gain, the mere existence of this alliance strongly indicates that the Taifa kingdoms

10 Ibid., 602.
11 Ibid., 158.
12 Historia Silense, 42.
lacked the means to achieve their objectives unassisted, exposing the vulnerability of the Taifa kingdoms and the necessity of their reliance on the Christian kingdoms.

Through the portrayal of Fernando I (c. 1015-1065), the *Historia Silense* enables one to infer the motivations behind the Christian north’s willingness to aid the Taifa Kingdoms and the dynamics of this interfaith relationship. Essentially, the *Historia Silense* informs the reader that the Muslim King of Toledo wished to earn the protection of King Fernando I and “made his way very humbly to [Fernando I’s] presence and steadfastly besought his Excellency to accept gifts” and “said that both [Fernando] and his kingdom were commended to Fernando’s lordship.”\(^{13}\) In addition, the *Historia Silense* claims that, in response, “King Fernando, though he thought that the barbarian king spoke insincerely, and though he himself was entertaining designs of a far different nature, nevertheless for the time being accepted the treasure.”\(^{14}\) Based on this excerpt, the payment of “*parias*” (monetary tribute) evidently provided the Christian kings with the incentive to protect Taifa kingdoms.\(^{15}\) In addition, since the Taifa King of Toledo (and by extension other Taifa kings) clearly must rely on the military strength of Christians to secure his realm, this indicates that the Taifa kings failed to make a concerted effort to either supplement their limited mercenary armies with locally recruited troops or urge their subjects to participate in the *jihad*.\(^{16}\) By attempting to either obtain new resources or maintain control over their established holdings, the Taifa monarchs merely filled the coffers of Christians, while increasing their security in appearance only,

\(^{13}\) Ibid., 54-55.

\(^{14}\) Ibid.


\(^{16}\) Ibid., 602-4.
draining their assets and failing to truly cure the ailments of their state.

While the *Historia Silense* does discuss the fragility of the Taifa kingdoms and Fernando I’s conquest of Muslim lands, the document largely represents the Taifa period as an era that may be characterized by opportunity rather than religious zeal. From the Moorish perspective, the era was “dominated by rivalries and mergers.” Taifa kings fought with their neighbors for power and prestige. In these squabbles, Muslims apparently viewed Christians as both an enemy to be assuaged with money and as a purchasable asset to employ against their enemies. Clearly, if it furthered their goals, then Muslims were willing to work with Christians. Supporting the *Historia Silense*’s portrayal, the Taifa kingdoms of Saragossa and Toledo both allied themselves with Christian forces and fought over the city of Gudalajara. Similarly, the *Historia Silense*, through the exploits of Fernando I, illustrates the willingness of Christian Kings to exploit the weakness of the Taifa kingdoms. Fundamentally, in the *Historia Silense*, Fernando I displays a desire to mercifully spare Taifa kingdoms in exchange for tribute that is likely representative of the majority of the Christian kings, claiming that Fernando I “gave to the supplications of the king of the Moors” and “received gifts” for his generosity. Furthermore, by accepting tribute from Taifa states, the Christian Kings dramatically weakened them allowing Christians to enjoy the ability to simultaneously gain annual financial support and increase their holdings through the conquest.

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17 Ibid., 604.
20 *Historia Silense*, 56.
of these destabilized Taifa states, like Coimbra. This implies that the Christian kingdoms were “more inclined to tax than to conquer” these Taifa states. Clearly, the potential for monetary compensation and territorial acquisition superseded the religious motivations of Christians or Muslims to expel each other from the peninsula.

The anonymous Historia Roderici (“History of Rodrigo”) supports these paradigms of Christian exploitation and shifting alliances during the Taifa period. According to the Historia Roderici, the Cid “went [with King Sancho] to Zaragoza and fought with the Aragonese king at Graus.” While the Historia Roderici does not expound on this conflict, it is known that King Fernando I ordered his son Sancho to travel to Zaragoza and reinforce its Muslim leader, al-Muqtadir, against the “territorial aggrandizement of the Christian Aragonese.” This implies that Fernando I was either allied with or receiving tribute from Zaragoza, which illustrates a Christian kingdom’s readiness to face another in pursuit of its own interests. The Historia Roderici later confirms that Christian kings still extracted tribute from Muslim kingdoms during the second half of the eleventh century asserting that “King Alfonso sent [the Cid] as his ambassador to the king of Seville and the king of Cordoba to collect the tribute due him.” Additionally, when the Cid attempted to acquire the parias on behalf of King Alfonso, the Cid learned that “the king of Granada and his Christian allies” were advancing upon the Taifa kingdom of Seville with malevolent intent. Since this would clearly impede the collection of the parias and would be inconsistent with

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21 Ibid., 51.
22 Hugh Kennedy, “Muslim Spain and Portugal,” 605.
23 Historia Roderici, in The World of El Cid, 100.
24 Ibid., 100.
25 Ibid., 102.
26 Ibid., 103.
the interests of King Alfonso, the Cid and his forces joined the king of Seville in the defense of his nation, resulting in combat between two armies that were comprised of both “Christian and Saracen.”

Fundamentally, the Historia Roderici accurately represents the truly mercenary and opportunistic nature of the period by answering the question of how a warrior earned a living. Based on the Historia Roderici, mercenary warriors received their livelihood from their lord, serving as his vassal. By distinguishing himself on the battlefield, the lord would “value the [warrior] with great esteem and affection” and likely provide the mercenary with a portion of the spoils of war. Thus, a mercenary knight truly benefitted from war and conflict. Since alliances constantly changed and territorial struggles were always being waged in the eleventh century, it was, as one historian has put it, “the golden age for warriors and princes.” Rodrigo Diaz, the focus of the Historia Roderici, epitomizes this golden age. First, the Historia Roderici describes Rodrigo as “a professional soldier” and as a man who made his living from military service and warfare. The account depicts the existence of a symbiotic relationship between a vassal and his lord. The king “maintains” his vassal and, in return, his vassal fights for him. Exemplifying this, King Sancho raised Rodrigo from boyhood and trained him in the art of war. In return for the likely support of a lord, Rodrigo “distinguished himself among all the other warriors of the king’s army and bettered

27 Ibid., 103.
28 Ibid., 101.
29 Ibid.
30 Angus MacKay, Spain in the Middle Ages: From Frontier to Empire, 1000-1500 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1977), 19.
himself thereby,” which implies that greater success on the battlefield likely equated to more privileges and increased monetary benefits.\textsuperscript{33} The potential for monetary gain and increased fiscal security are what helped motivate a warrior to remain loyal to a lord. The \textit{Historia Roderici} illustrates this by asserting that the Cid chose to serve numerous other masters after the death of [King Sancho], including King Alfonso VI of Castile (the suspected murderer of King Sancho).\textsuperscript{34} As the Cid transitioned between lords, he did not discriminate based on religious faith, pledging his allegiance to both Christians and Muslims.\textsuperscript{35} Further demonstrating the opportunism of the age, the Cid and his mercenary army, following his second exile from Castile, captured the Taifa Kingdom of Valencia.\textsuperscript{36} The conquest of Valencia, in this ultimate display of ambition, effectively transformed the Cid from mercenary vassal into “an independent ruler of a principality.”\textsuperscript{37} Nor was Rodrigo Diaz unique.\textsuperscript{38} In the \textit{Historia Roderici}, many warriors crossed cultural and religious boundaries; the Cid was simply one of the most successful.

Before the conquest of Toledo, the ease with which individuals were able to cross physical frontiers in the \textit{Historia Roderici} indicates that cultural boundaries in the eleventh century were neither religiously inflexible nor religiously exclusive. The \textit{Historia Roderici} reports that the Cid simply crossed into Zaragoza, a foreign Muslim land, after his exile from Castile. Upon his arrival, Al-Muqtadir welcomed him and permitted him to “contentedly” reside at Zaragoza.\textsuperscript{39} After numerous battles in the

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{33} Ibid., 101.
  \item \textsuperscript{34} Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{35} Ibid., 105.
  \item \textsuperscript{36} Ibid., 134-38.
  \item \textsuperscript{37} Richard A. Fletcher, \textit{The Quest for El Cid} (London: Hutchinson, 1989), 4.
  \item \textsuperscript{38} Ibid., 4.
  \item \textsuperscript{39} \textit{Historia Roderici}, 105-106.
\end{itemize}
service of the Taifa kingdom of Zaragoza, Rodrigo received a request from King Alfonso VI, asking him to return back to Castile. Rodrigo assented and left Zaragoza. Upon his return, the Cid, however, learned that King Alfonso intended to expel him when he arrived in Castile. In response, Rodrigo swiftly reversed his course and traveled back to Zaragoza.\(^{40}\) Essentially, the ability to swiftly traverse the established borders of Christian and Muslim kingdoms demonstrates their inherently permeable nature. Further, while the *Historia Roderici* does not mention this, King Sancho similarly sent his brother and Rodrigo’s lord, Alfonso VI, into exile in Tulaytula, the Taifa of Toledo.\(^{41}\) Through al-Mamun (the Taifa King of Toledo), Alfonso experienced the culture of Toledo, “attending court banquets, playing *mangala*, and heard Andalusian poetry.”\(^{42}\) While in exile, King Alfonso walked among the Moorish people of Tulaytula, “wandering in pleasure gardens, watched Mozarabic craftsmen, Jewish physicians, and Muslim astronomers interact in a lively court with al-Mamun.”\(^{43}\) By allowing Alfonso to remain in his kingdom and witness the daily lives of his people, al-Mamun included him in his culture. Clearly, these Muslim leaders have not only permitted Alfonso and Rodrigo to enter their lands, but, more importantly, expressed a willingness to extend their hospitality to men of different faiths.

The *Historia Roderici* strongly suggests that the majority of the eleventh century may be characterized by a lack of religious polarization. Primarily, the eleventh century was neither an emphatic struggle between Christians and Muslims nor an ideological proving ground for the most correct faith. By examining the language of the *Historia Roderici*, the reader

\(^{40}\) Ibid., 109.  
\(^{41}\) *The Arts of Intimacy*, 32.  
\(^{42}\) Ibid., 32.  
\(^{43}\) Ibid.
discovers a distinct absence of religiously-based hatred or any religiously motivated animosity toward Muslims. For example, while the *Historia Roderici* does occasionally insult Muslims by referring to them as “barbarians,” this affront to their character neither possesses vitriol nor serves as a commentary on their faith.\(^{44}\) Similarly, when the Cid faced the forces of Muhammad, the nephew of King Yusuf, he informed his troops to “not quail before the enemy numbers [because] today the Lord Jesus Christ will deliver them into [their] hands.”\(^{45}\) Clearly, although the Christian faith is an indisputable element of the *Historia Roderici*, it does not, however, overtly influence the document or its commentary.

The respect and admiration that the Cid receives from Moors in the *Historia Roderici* reinforces the absence of any clear-cut religious polarization. After Rodrigo is expelled from Castile, he traveled to Zaragoza, “was received with great honor and treated with much respect,” and chose to pledge his allegiance to the king of Zaragoza, al-Muqtadir.\(^{46}\) During Rodrigo Diaz’s “contended” stay in Zaragoza, al-Mu’tamin, al-Muqtadir’s son, grew “very fond of Rodrigo and set him over and exalted him above all his kingdom and all his land, relying upon his counsel in all things.”\(^{47}\) In exchange for al-Mu’tamin’s favor, the Cid “served him faithfully and guarded and protected his kingdom and his lands.”\(^{48}\) The Cid served al-Mu’tamin so well and defended his land with such vigor that “al-Mu’tamin showered him gifts” and the people of Zaragoza “received him with the greatest honor and respect.”\(^{49}\) This description of events portrays a societal situation

\(^{44}\) *Historia Roderici*, 140.

\(^{45}\) Ibid., 141.

\(^{46}\) Ibid.

\(^{47}\) Ibid.

\(^{48}\) Ibid.

\(^{49}\) Ibid., 106.
that is in stark opposition to both the crusader ideology and movement of the later centuries. In essence, by gaining entrance into a Muslim kingdom, the Cid’s entrance into a Muslim Taifa kingdom, as a Christian warrior, implicitly proves that the secular boundaries of the eleventh century were not defined by faith. In addition, the Cid clearly accomplished more than simply gaining admittance into a Muslim country. He seems to have risen to prominence in the court of al-Mu’tamir and obtained the acceptance of the Muslim citizenry. Thus Rodrigo Diaz, as Christian in eleventh-century medieval Spain, appears to have earned the love and loyalty of a Muslim community primarily through vigilance and dedication to his knightly vows. If this account is accurate and the kingdom of Zaragoza is representative of the majority of Taifa kingdoms, then societal recognition and approval was not religiously discriminatory and, therefore, faith did not solely determine the society’s perception of an individual.

This Muslim-Christian dynamic fundamentally changed with Alfonso VI’s conquest of the Toledo in 1085. After Alfonso VI reclaimed his ancestral lands of Leon and Castile, he swiftly moved to claim a portion of Navarre, the land of his recently murdered cousin, Sancho Garces IV, in 1076. This acquisition enabled him to assume “a hegemonic position” over the other Christian kingdoms of Spain. Recognizing the need to consolidate his alliances and ensure the economic viability of his tribute-payers, Alfonso VI aided al-Qadir, the Taifa King of Toledo, in his attempt to regain control of the destabilized kingdom of Toledo. In return, Alfonso VI received even larger parias and a great number of fortresses within the reach of Leon,

51 Ibid., 169.
which further expanded his territory.\textsuperscript{52} Shamed by this Christian presence within the Toledan borders and suffering under increased economic strain, the citizens of Toledo rebelled against al-Qadir. This forced Alfonso VI, endeavoring to secure his tributary, to lay siege to Toledo in 1084 and eventually conquer it in 1085, enlarging the kingdom of Leon-Castile “by as much as a third to occupy an area more than twice the size of England.”\textsuperscript{53} While the rewards of the Alfonso’s military success were great, the “psychological consequences of the conquest were possibly even greater still.”\textsuperscript{54} For both Christians and Muslims, the fall of Toledo represented far more than the first major victory against the Moors since al-Tariq’s invasion in 711. For Christians, this triumph was of a distinctly Christian nature and it was an “act that was imbued with immense symbolic significance,” because Toledo was originally the capital of the ancient Visigothic kingdom.\textsuperscript{55} From the Muslim perspective, Alfonso’s continuous conquests and general expansion directly challenged the status quo of the eleventh century and culminated with the loss of Toledo. Essentially, his actions indicated that the “free-for-all” nature of the Taifa period may soon end in favor of a religiously-based warfare.\textsuperscript{56} Thus, in the face of a changing political landscape, Alfonso VI’s conquest “precipitated a general crisis” in al-Andalus and “concentrated in the minds of Taifa kings.”\textsuperscript{57}

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\item \textsuperscript{52} Ibid., 169.
\item \textsuperscript{53} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{54} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{55} Ibid., 172.
\item \textsuperscript{56} Angus MacKay, \textit{Spain in the Middle Ages: From Frontier to Empire, 1000-1500} (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1977), 27.
\item \textsuperscript{57} D. E. Luscombe, and Jonathan Simon Christopher Smith, \textit{The New Cambridge Medieval History} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 172.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
The arrival of Yusuf ibn Tashufin and his army of Almoravids in the late eleventh century forced the Taifa kingdoms to coalesce along religious lines. Acknowledging the rising Christian threat and fearing for their own security as independent states, the Taifa kingdoms, in desperation, begrudgingly accepted Almoravid aid beginning in the 1080s. While some of the Taifa kingdoms had previously requested the assistance of the Almoravids, the conquest of Toledo by Christian forces is what finally galvanized Yusuf and the Akmoravids into action. In June of 1086, Yusuf and his army crossed the Straits of Gibraltar and moved inland. The entrance of the Almoravids into medieval Spain represented a real threat to the Christian states. Primarily, the Almoravids “aspired to live a life of religious purity and were committed to extending the frontiers of Islam by jihad, or holy war.” Clearly, the Christian kings likely recognized the religious austerity and fanatical devotion to the doctrines of Islam that differentiated Yusuf ibn Tashufin and Almoravids from the normal Taifa kingdoms, one that they could neither easily defeat nor bribe. Thus, acknowledging the severity of the Almoravid threat, King Alfonso VI grew greatly concerned and, according to the Historia Roderici, was “determined to bring them to battle.” Alfonso’s urgent need to halt the Almoravid advance prompted him to recall the Cid, asking the Cid to “go as quickly as possible...and to merge his own forces with the royal army in bringing help to the king.”

Although the Historia Roderici claims that King Yusuf was “terrified” of King Alfonso and chose to “retire secretly from the region” when confronted by Alfonso, the Almoravids, in reality, easily defeated the combined Christian army of Leon-

60 Historia Roderici, 129.
61 Ibid., 129.
Castile, forcing the Christians of Spain to regard them as a greater danger than any Taifa kingdom.\textsuperscript{62} The Almoravids, however, believed the Christians suitably cowed and chose not to press their military advantage, retreating to their native Morocco.\textsuperscript{63} In response, the Christian kings of Spain strengthened their alliances in the face of this Muslim menace and thus, the weakened Taifa kings pleaded with Yusuf and the Almoravids to return. Upon his return, Yusuf attempted to conquer Toledo and Aledo, but his assaults failed. Greatly displeased by the lack of support from the Taifa kings and the continuous squabbling that prevented them from presenting any sort of a united front against the Christian north, Yusuf of the Almoravids “resolved to make himself master of al-Andalus” and, by 1094, all of the western Taifa kingdoms were assimilated into the Almoravid empire. Fundamentally, this unification of Muslim Spain, by its very nature, compelled the Christian kingdoms to more firmly ally themselves with other Christians in this fluctuating political landscape.

The \textit{Chronica Aderfonsi Imperatoris} (“Chronicle of Emperor Alfonso”) is another early twelfth-century Christian account that implies that, after unifying al-Andalus, the Almoravids vicious war against the perceived enemies of Islam encouraged Christians to view all Muslims as their enemy. In 1086, the Almoravids attempted to conquer numerous territories, specifically Toledo. Eventually, recapturing Toledo became the Almoravid’s primary focus and was subjected to numerous siege attempts, forcing Alfonso VI to keep a large portion of his forces at Toledo. Although Alfonso VI worked tirelessly to inhibit the advance of the Almoravids, he was largely unsuccessful, resulting in the deaths of many Christians. Growing desperate, Alfonso endeavored to ally himself with Barcelona, Aragon, and the city-states of Genoa and Pisa in order to recover Valencia and distract

\textsuperscript{62} Ibid., 130.

the Almoravid juggernaut. The Almoravids had inflicted such horrible casualties upon the Leonese-Castilian army that, in 1100-1101, Pope Paschal II “had to send letters warning would-be Spanish crusaders to the Holy Land not to abandon the peninsula.” These losses left a long lasting impression upon the people of Christian Spain. Thus, through the description of Alfonso VII (1105–1157), grandson of Alfonso VI, the Chronica Aderfonsi Imperatoris depicts a “deepfelt sense of revenge.”

According to the Chronica, after consolidating his realm, Alfonso VII announced that “he would invade the land of the Saracens in order to conquer them and avenge himself upon King Tashufin (emir of the Almoravids from 1143-1145),” seeking redress for “invading the land of Toledo, killing many leaders of Christians, razing the castle of Aceca to the ground and putting all the Christians they had found to the sword.”

Thus, Alfonso VII campaigned against the Muslims, “raiding to the left and right” and “burning it as he went.” In response, the Almoravids waged a more brutal war against Christians, “sparing none of their regions” and cutting off the heads of Christian knights in order to disseminate them throughout Spanish Christendom. Further, both Muslims and Christians began to take enemy combatants and civilians captive for the purpose of enslaving them. Therefore, the Christians and Muslims, viewing the other as the source of their suffering, slowly grew to despise each other, forcing the kings of both faiths into a constant conflict with one another.

64 Ibid., 187.
65 Ibid., 188.
67 Ibid., 178.
68 Ibid., 179.
69 Ibid., 221,237.
70 Ibid., 248.
The language of the *Chronica Aderfonsi Imperatoris* illustrates the entrenchment of the beginnings of the crusader ideology in early twelfth century Christian Spain. Unmistakably, *Chronica* possesses a conspicuously religious quality. As the author describes the numerous battles and struggles between Muslims and Christians, he appears to have intentionally imbedded many biblical allusions into the text, including, II Maccabees, II Samuel, and others.71 Accompanying these biblical references, the figures of God and Jesus Christ are a highly pervasive element of the *Chronica Aderfonsi Imperatoris*, describing the sins of the Muslims and God’s watch over the blessed Christians. In the *Chronica* Christians firmly believe that “God seeth all” and Christian kings are depicted choosing to carry relics of Jesus Christ into battle with them, like the King of Aragon’s cross made of “salvation-giving wood.”72 Additionally, the document describes Moors as an “evil pestilence,” apparently believing that “their life was wicked and, thus they were defeated” and “they did not recognized the lord and rightly perished.”73 On account of their supposed godlessness, the *Chronica* asserts that the Moors are “rightly doomed.”74 These passages indicate that Christians of the early twelfth century fought with Muslims not only over the possession of territory, but also over religious claims. By presenting the wars between nations as a Muslim-Christian conflict rather than as a clash of individual kingdoms, it appears that religion has greatly influenced the nature of these previously territorial confrontations, galvanizing crusader ideology for future combats.

As the twelfth century progressed, “warfare against the Muslims was presented as a distinctly important and kingly

71 Ibid., 182-183.
72 Ibid., 183,186.
73 Ibid., 153.
74 Ibid.,
activity.” While Christian expansion was largely halted during the reign of the Almoravids, their eventual collapse in the twelfth century initiated a second Taifa period and, once again, permitted Christians to capitalize on this instability. After the disintegration of the second Taifa period, the Almohads of North Africa assume control of al-Andalus. Their arrival, like the Almoravids before them, forced Christians to join together against their Muslim enemies, eventually resulting in the defeat of the Almohads at the Battle of Las Navas de Tolosa in southern Spain 1212. Therefore, while the issue of faith was not the primary impetus for Iberian conflicts during the majority of the eleventh century, the capture of Toledo resulted in the rise of the peninsula’s early religious-based skirmishes, which largely forced Muslims and Christians to clash. By 1252, Christians had reclaimed much of Muslim Spain and the kingdom of Granada remained the only independent Muslim state left in Iberia.

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75 Ibid., 154-55.
76 MacKay, Spain in the Middle Ages, 183.
“The Bombs in Vietnam Explode at Home”¹: Intersections of the Vietnam War and the American Civil Rights Movement

Kimberly Harn

In Dispatches, journalist and war correspondent Michael Herr’s chronicle of his experiences in the Vietnam War, he soberly observes that “the death of Martin Luther King intruded on the war in a way that no other outside even had ever done.”² Just as the April 4, 1968 assassination of America’s most prominent African-American civil rights leader influenced the experience of war, the Vietnam War interacted in a very tangible way with the African-American civil rights struggle. As two of the pre-eminent historical events shaping mid-twentieth century America, the intersections of the civil rights movement and the Vietnam War are many. The responses of civil rights activists to the war represent a microcosm

of the Vietnam conflict’s divisive and often traumatic impact on the nation’s social fabric. The views of civil rights activists on Vietnam reveal one significant facet of the “nexus of civil rights, foreign relations and race studies,” brought into focus by the Vietnam War. This analysis will interrogate the anti-war responses of civil rights leader Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., the student organization SNCC (Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee), and other voices of anti-war dissent within the civil rights struggle from the mid to late 1960s. More so than any other factor, the experience of working in the civil rights movement provoked and framed activists’ interpretations of the Vietnam conflict. For King and SNCC, the realities of American racial injustice as well as their direct organizing experiences in the civil rights struggle became the decisive factors in the formation of their anti-war ideologies.

Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. is the emblematic figure of the civil rights movement, embodying a prophetic voice of moral and spiritual consciousness for the American nation. King’s contribution represents only one, albeit significant, perspective among the multitude of individuals dedicated to the civil rights struggle. In broad strokes, the civil rights movement can be defined during the 1950s and 1960s as a primarily African-American struggle, employing a framework of non-violent, collective action against legalized racial segregation and discrimination in the United States. Despite his prominence, King’s vocal opposition to the Vietnam conflict, culminating in his 1967 speech “Beyond Vietnam: A Time to Break the Silence,” was fiercely criticized for overstepping the limits of his authority by linking foreign and domestic policy. In his arguments, King identified what one

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4 Martin Luther King Jr., speech, “A Time to Break the Silence,” April 4, 1967, Riverside Church, New York, New York, in ed. Karin L. Stanford, If We Must
scholar refers to as the “salience of race in U.S. foreign and domestic relationships.” King was not alone; more polarizing figures such as Malcolm X, Muhammad Ali, and even moderates such as Ralph Bunche, a black American foreign service veteran, began to ask hard questions about the role of race in Vietnam. In his final public speech in September of 1969 Bunche asked, “Would the United States be engaged in that war if the North Vietnamese and the National Liberation front were white?” Even for figures closely associated with the establishment like Bunche, by the late 1960s the Vietnam War prompted widespread critical evaluations of the role of race and racism in domestic and foreign policy.

Assessing the responses of the many critics of King’s “A Time to Break the Silence,” biographer Taylor Branch explains that “American public discourse broadly denied King the standing to be heard on Vietnam at all.” In part, the wide-spread condemnation of King’s anti-war stance has contributed to the interpretation (in both contemporary accounts and historical scholarship that opposition to Vietnam contributed to factionalism and the decline of the civil rights movement. Did the linking of race, foreign policy, and domestic policy by King and other activists represent a radical break with the civil rights movement’s ideological framework? In short, the answer is no. However, to more fully understand opposition to Vietnam as congruent (rather than in conflict) with the larger trajectory of the civil rights movement, it is necessary to explore the historical relationship between domestic race reform and foreign policy. Although the

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5 Plummer, 2.


relationship of race with domestic and foreign policy was notably controversial during the Vietnam War era, it had been confronted in a substantial manner by African-American race reformers throughout the twentieth century.

Scholars date some of the earliest correlations of American racial injustice and foreign policy to the discourse surrounding the Philippine theater of the Spanish-American War of 1898. In *How Far the Promise Land?*, however, historian Jonathon Rosenberg begins his historical survey of the relationship between American race reform and foreign policy with World War I. A useful starting point for interpreting King’s, SNCC’s, and other activists’ responses to Vietnam, Rosenberg’s work asserts that from World War I to the Vietnam War “committed reformers perceived and interpreted global developments and incorporated such matter into their campaign in an effort to help realize their dreams and aspirations at home.”

Two major intellectual currents informing what Rosenberg terms “color-conscious internationalism” prove especially significant in assessing the Vietnam Era. First, Rosenberg argues that until the Vietnam War most race reformers believed that the United States had a special leadership role to promote democracy abroad, which could be fully realized if racial justice was achieved at home. Second, black race reformers over the course of the twentieth century linked racial oppression in the United States to oppression worldwide, imagining an international community of humankind embarking on a cooperative “global reform project.”

According to Rosenberg’s interpretation, among the casualties of the Vietnam War (in the context of African-

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10 Ibid., 11.
11 Ibid., 6.
American race reform) was the sincere belief in the benevolent potential of American foreign policy. By the end of the Vietnam War, a sense that “the immorality of the United States overseas had become an inevitable consequence of the immorality of the United States at home,” had become African-American race reformers’ dominant interpretation.¹²

Rosenberg predicates his argument almost exclusively on the basis of discourse produced by the NAACP (National Association for the Advancement of Colored People). While his argument valuably situates the nexus of race relations, domestic, and foreign relations as a historical entity, it is equally important to confront the limitations of Rosenberg’s claims. In the anti-war responses of some civil rights activists, Vietnam represented only further proof of their long-held imperialist critiques, while for others opposition to Vietnam reflected a more recently developed response to the systemized nature of anti-black racism arising from direct participation in the civil rights movement. For this former group, which included activists often considered politically “radical,” such as the Nation of Islam’s Malcolm X or Paul Robeson, the Vietnam War did not alter but merely confirmed their worldviews.

Before engaging with King and SNCC’s anti-war position in greater depth, it is necessary to briefly examine Paul Robeson and Malcolm X’s views of the Vietnam War in order to better situate the former two within the spectrum of responses to the Vietnam conflict. More than ten years before the massive troop escalations of 1965 and King’s first public statement in opposition to the war, Paul Robeson had publically criticized American involvement in Vietnam. A civil rights activist, singer, actor, athlete, and political radical, Paul Robeson was a dynamic and internationally known figure in early to mid-twentieth century America. As the battle raged between Vietnamese nationalists and

¹² Ibid., 228.
French colonial forces at Dien Bien Phu, Robeson published his March, 1954 column in *Freedom* magazine on the growing American involvement in Indochina. He warned that even as the French admitted defeat in the fight against Vietnamese nationalist forces, “Eisenhower, Nixon, and Dulles are insisting that Vietnam must be re-conquered and held in colonial chains.”

Robeson’s anti-colonial critique of the United States’ presence in Indochina rejected the notion of an American democratic mission abroad as imperialistic hypocrisy. Defying Rosenberg’s thesis, Robeson’s trajectory illustrates that there were voices that did not need to confront the limitations of the moderate civil rights movement’s successes in the 1960s to confirm the American nation’s immorality at home and abroad.

The context of the Cold War was fundamental for Robeson’s and other activists’ opposition to the Vietnam War. In essence, Robeson’s views on Vietnam amount to a rejection of the Cold War consensus thinking which fueled American involvement in Vietnam. Drawing a series of binary divisions across the globe—Democracy/Communism, Good/Evil, Freedom/Totalitarianism—Cold War thinking perpetuated a vehement anti-communism an American mainstream that both dominated and distorted reality. This same logic, which characterized Vietnam as a front in the U.S.’s global containment struggle, was used to label civil rights activists’ opposition to anti-black racial discrimination as communist.

In his column, Robeson expressed a simmering discontent with the larger project of the Cold War and placed domestic issues of racial injustice within a global context. Cold

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13 Ibid., 378.
War geopolitics similarly shaped Robeson’s formulation of African-American identity as a marginalized group. He refers to the fact that “we negroes have a special reason for understanding what going is on over there.”\(^{15}\) Forming the basis of this sense of solidarity with other oppressed, non-white people was an understanding that Black Americans were in a colonial relationship with the white majority. Articulating a sense of international solidarity with non-white people, Robeson expressed a theme that would be echoed in other civil rights activists’ opposition to the war—that the situation of racial oppression allowed Black Americans to understand Vietnam from a particular critical perspective. In sum, Robeson’s imperialist critique of Vietnam and his identification of Black Americans with other non-white, oppressed peoples constitute two of the fundamental ideological pillars of civil rights activists’ opposition to the Vietnam War in the decade to come.

More than ten years after Robeson’s 1954 column, Malcolm Little (Malcolm X) addressed the topic of the Vietnam War in his January, 1965 speech at the New York City Militant Labor Committee Forum. He speaks plainly—Vietnam in his estimation is quite simply “a shame.”\(^{16}\) Gaining notoriety as Nation of Islam leader, Elijah Muhammad’s lieutenant (he left the Black Muslims in 1964), Malcolm X was one of the foremost advocates of Black Nationalism and Black Power before his assassination in February, 1965. Malcolm X had established his opposition to Vietnam years before. In a brief January, 1965 speech he


undermined the alleged justifications for the war. Even the government architects of the conflict “feel embarrassed” by Vietnam.  

Referring to these politicians and policy-makers, Malcolm remarks that “they are trapped, they can’t get out;” they are held hostage to the Cold War logic, which in spite of the impossibility of victory, makes withdrawal an unacceptable defeat at the hands of international communism. Furthermore, he acknowledges that binary Cold War thinking equates patriotism with unquestioning support for the war. For those who dissent, “they say that, we’re anti-American, or we’re seditious, or we’re subversive.” Like Robeson, Malcolm X’s challenge to Cold War logic (his opposition to Vietnam falling within the larger context of his activism) contributed to his misleading characterization in the traditional historical narrative as a radical, dangerous counterpart to moderate reformers such as King.

Malcolm’s association with Black Power is essential to understanding the significance of his anti-war opposition. As historian Peniel Joseph argues, Black Power (one of the most frequently misinterpreted movements in twentieth century America) is not the violent off-shoot and tragedy of the civil rights movement. Rather, it articulated plans for a comprehensive and radical restructuring of American society. The movement’s willingness to use violence as self-defense has been distorted into its defining characteristic. As they confronted uncomfortable realities about the ingrained nature of anti-black racism in America, Black Power thinkers such as Malcolm X understood racism and imperialism to be the fundamental structural realities of the American nation. Therefore, as Joseph highlights, for Malcolm

17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
20 This argument is made in Joseph’s book Waiting ‘Til the Midnight Hour (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 2006).
X “the links between the local and the international were self-evident.” In the global context of anti-colonial liberation struggles across Africa and Asia, American military intervention in Vietnam for Malcolm X (like Robeson) was only another instance of the American system of racism and imperialism at work.

Understanding Robeson and Malcolm X’s opposition to the Vietnam War not only contextualizes the response of King, and SNCC, but plants the larger pattern in which the lens of race reform generated critical evaluations of foreign and domestic spheres as products of the same systemic problems. Many of the themes to be discussed in King, and SNCC’s anti-war discourses—the sense of American hypocrisy in waging war in Vietnam for ideals of justice and democracy denied to Black Americans at home, global solidarity with oppressed, non-white people and a systemic critique of American institutions—reaffirmed Robeson and Malcolm X’s criticisms of the conflict. Frequently associated with political radicalism, both Robeson and Malcolm X’s responses to the war challenge binary notions of moderate/radical civil rights activism and illustrate that attitudes toward the war in Vietnam were inextricably related to the Black American experience. While that it not to say that all Black Americans opposed the war, clear-headed individuals thinking about racial injustice easily forged a link between foreign and domestic forms of oppression.

By the time of Malcolm X’s January, 1965 speech, Martin Luther King had grown increasingly critical of the entrenchment of racism in American society and institutions. In the final years of his life, he adopted what one historian of the NAACP terms “an increasingly radical public position in both domestic and foreign

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21 Joseph, 8.
policy.”  

In a speech at the August, 1965 SCLC (Southern Christian Leadership Conference) meeting, King affirmed that “few events in my lifetime have stirred my conscience and pained my heart as much as the present conflict which is raging in Viet Nam.”

Refusing to place blame, or even “to argue the military or political issues involved,” King nevertheless strongly advocated for all sides in the conflict to come to the “conference table.”

Stirred by his moral commitment to non-violence, this early, cautious statement indicates that Vietnam was a long-standing concern for King, only increasing as U.S. involvement escalated from 1965 onward.

Two years later, in his famous April 4th, 1967 speech “A Time to Break the Silence” at New York’s Riverside Church, King broke from the calculated caution of the SCLC statement, conveying his reservations about the war with a much greater sense of urgency. At Riverside, King offered an eloquent and powerful condemnation of U.S. policy in Vietnam, justifying his opposition to the war on the basis that there was a “very obvious connection” between the civil rights movement and the Vietnam War.

He articulates a deep compassion for the Vietnamese people and a remarkably accurate assessment of the political and military situation of the country. First and foremost, however, King

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22 Peter J. Ling, “Uneasy Alliance: The NAACP and Martin Luther King,” in Long is the Way and Hard (Fayetteville, AR: University of Arkansas Press, 2009), 73.


24 Ibid.

25 Martin Luther King Jr., “A Time to Break the Silence,” 236.

26 King aptly summarizes the military and political situation in “Question and Answer Period Following Beyond Vietnam Speech,” April 4, 1967, Martin Luther King Jr. Papers Project, Stanford University,
addressed and was interested in his “beloved nation” and its moral health.\textsuperscript{27} The speech presented three initial concerns with the war compelling King to break his silence, which directly emerged from the types of day-to-day conflicts he encountered as a prominent civil rights leader. The first was the devastating effect of the war on domestic social policy; Johnson’s expansive social project, the War on Poverty, was “broken and eviscerated as if it were some idle political plaything of society gone mad on war.”\textsuperscript{28} One of the fruits of the civil rights struggle for legal reform, the War on Poverty and other progressive domestic policies were sacrificed as funds were diverted toward military escalation in Vietnam. Secondly, King cited the “cruel irony” that Black soldiers fight alongside white soldiers “for a nation that has been unable to seat them together in the same schools.”\textsuperscript{29} African-American soldiers, over represented in both the ranks and casualties of Vietnam, fought for the defense of ideals that went unrealized in United States. King’s third initial concern recognized the emergence of Black Power discourse, largely in poor, urban black ghettos by mid-decade. Attempting to justify non-violent methods to these “desperate, rejected and angry young men,” King struggles with his own hypocrisy: “I could never again raise my voice against the violence of oppressed in the ghettos without having first spoken clearly to the greatest purveyor of violence in the world today—my own government.”\textsuperscript{30} State violence, whether employed to uphold racial inequality in the United States or to “contain” the spread of communism in Vietnam resulted from the same unjust, oppressive, and morally corrupt system of power. For King, one cannot

\textsuperscript{27} Ibid., 1.  
\textsuperscript{28} Ibid., 236.  
\textsuperscript{29} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{30} Ibid., 237.
condemn young, marginalized black men as violent without recognizing that they are the product of a nation that had not only violently excluded its black citizens since its inception but continued to use violence against both American and non-American individuals.

Informed by his decades working in the black freedom struggle, King’s opposition to the war nevertheless transcended the black/white civil rights movement. Riverside, in particular, offers a much more universal critique of U.S. involvement; King speaks not only as an American citizen, but as a self-identified member of the West. King inserts the Vietnam conflict into its larger historical moment. “These are revolutionary times,” King exclaims, asserting that “to get on the right side of the world revolution, we as a nation must undergo a radical revolution of values…the edifice…needs restructuring.” Referring to the global systemic forces of “poverty, racism and militarism,” King argues that racial injustice in American and the war in Vietnam are products of the same institutional problems. Channeling conceptual frames present in Robeson and Malcolm X’s views on Vietnam, King’s systemic, imperialist critique of the war furthermore communicates a clear idea of global solidarity between non-white people. According to SCLC leader and anti-war activist, James Bevel, “the welfare of non-white peoples in this nation is inextricably linked with the welfare of non-white people around the world.” The common legacy of oppression served as the source of King’s identification with the transnational, non-white community.

31 Ibid., 241.
32 Ibid.
For King, Vietnam was symptomatic of the overarching moral and spiritual sickness of the American nation. The moral dimensions of the war were pressing: “it should be incandescently clear that no one who has any concern for the integrity and life of American can ignore the present war.”\(^{35}\) King’s moral critique of the war, while not as dramatic, for example as Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) president James Potter’s denunciations of the total moral bankruptcy of American policy abroad, begins to approach a total rejection of the benevolent potential of American foreign policy. For Potter, Vietnam “had severed the last vestige of illusion that morality and democracy are the guiding principles of American foreign policy.”\(^{36}\) King’s calls for the “radical revolution of values,” are arguably just as damning.\(^{37}\) Although King’s use of the language of morality to interpret and ultimately condemn the Vietnam War was controversial, to dismiss these views as radical is simply a misinterpretation. When gauged in the larger context of his civil rights activism and his dedication to racial and human justice, Riverside appears entirely congruent with his non-violent methodology. If King opposed violence as both an instrument of oppression and as a means of resistance, then it is only logical that he would similarly oppose the use of violent military force in the international sphere.

King’s increasingly vocal opposition to Vietnam elicited a fierce response from mainstream media outlets and black moderates. In response to the Riverside speech, a New York Times editorial, transparently entitled “Dr. King’s Error,” accused the leader’s anti-war politics of diverting attention and energy away

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\(^{35}\) Martin Luther King, “A Time to Break Silence,” 237.


from the cause of racial justice. Proposing that the Vietnam War and civil rights are “two public problems that are distinct and separate,” the editorial rejects King’s systemic critique, presupposing that racial justice is possible through reform of the status quo. Prominent African-American journalist and Kennedy Administration insider, Carl Thomas Rowan, echoed the sentiments of *The Times* editorial: “King’s speech at Riverside Church…put a new strain and new burdens on the civil-rights movement.” According to critics such as Rowan, outspoken opposition to the war imperils the entire civil rights project by isolating the movement’s most powerful establishment allies, including U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson. These types of criticisms essentially articulated a policy of “segregated silence.” For critics, it was precisely King’s status as a prominent African-American civil rights leader that should have prevented Riverside. King (along with Robeson and Malcolm X) would have argued that it was exactly for these same reasons, namely, his identity as an African American and his direct experience laboring for racial justice, which necessitated his condemnation of the Vietnam conflict.

Dr. King’s vocal criticism of the war stands as the most well-known individual instance of opposition to Vietnam within the civil rights movement. On an organizational level, however, groups working within the ranks of the moderate civil rights

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39 Ibid.
40 Carl Thomas Rowan, “Martin Luther King’s Tragic Decision,” in *If We Must Die: African American Voices on War and Peace*, ed. Karin L. Stanford (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2008), 246.
movement began a shift by mid-decade toward more radical ways of thinking about American racial reform and by extension the Vietnam conflict. The Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), a student organization founded in 1960, was one such group. In the early 1960s, SNCC was one of the primary organizing groups involved in direct action protests. Orchestrating sit-ins, freedom rides, voter registration campaigns across the South, 1964’s Freedom Summer and deeply involved in other landmark events such as the 1963 March on Washington, SNCC had splintered into factions by mid-decade as the Black Power discourse adopted by some members isolated many others. In this context, SNCC’s anti-war position aligned to a large degree with their organizing experiences and historical trajectory.

One crack in SNCC’s belief in moderate civil rights reform emerged from the group’s experiences during the 1964 Freedom Summer. As they mobilized white and black students in massive voter registration campaigns across Mississippi, SNCC members directly confronted the virulent institutionalized racism, which had disenfranchised African Americans living in the American South. The federal government’s failure to protect SNCC members during Freedom Summer—climaxing in the infamous murders of one black, and two white volunteers in Neshoba Country, Mississippi—fostered a rising sense of frustration with the federal government and the tactics of the moderate civil rights movement. On the heels of the Freedom Summer, the 1964 Democratic Convention’s snubbing of the SNCC’s Mississippi Freedom Democratic compounded these resentments. As the war in Vietnam escalated and urban rioting erupted throughout the nation, the election of Stokely Carmichael as SNCC president in Spring 1966 confirmed the organization’s adoption of Black Power as its guiding ideology.42

42 Peniel Joseph, 130.
Historian Benjamin Harrison dismisses SNCC’s turn towards the “militant rhetoric” of Black Power as a result of youthful naiveté and the lack of “long-term commitment.” This is a profound misrepresentation of SNCC’s path toward Black Power, which was fundamentally rooted in the experience of grassroots organization. As SNCC leader James Foreman explained, the community organizing experience transformed members into “full time-revolutionaries.” Black Power disavowed the strategy of reform and non-violent resistance, articulated black racial consciousness, and rejected the integrationist and non-violent methods typically associated with the Civil Rights movement. Undoubtedly Black Power represented a significant shift for SNCC, but it was compatible with the organization’s historical development. As SNCC member Jean Wiley recalled: “In the Southern context in those rural counties, it [Black Power] made absolute sense to go for a power base. It was really what we were trying to do anyways, we just didn't call it that.” It follows that Black Power was “to a considerable degree both congruent with, and a product of, its longstanding commitment to working with local people.” Like Peniel Joseph, historian Hasan Kwame Jeffries aims to re-think and re-interpret Black Power: Jeffries emphasizes the continuity between SNCC’s Black Power and its earlier incarnations. Disillusionment stemming from the Freedom Summer and the rejection of the National Democratic Freedom Party largely contributed to the rise of Black Power. Inspiration from leading Black nationalists, such as Malcolm X, was another factor in this shift. However, in

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43 Harrison, 263.
44 As quoted in Hall, “The NAACP and the Challenges of 1960s Radicalism,” 79.
Jeffries’ reading, SNCC’s 1965-1966 Lowndes County, Alabama experiment organizing independent black political parties in this rural county outside of Selma, AL was the primary impulse shaping SNCC’s Black Power ideology. When understood from a bottom-up, community organizing perspective, SNCC’s Black Power represented a pragmatic political strategy rather than menacing rhetoric or violent militancy.47

Vietnam was deeply implicated in Black Power’s condemnation of the United States’ government. At the same time, SNCC’s frustrated efforts to realize racial justice through existing legal structures are reflected in its anti-war attitudes. Although individuals within SNCC opposed the war as early as 1964, and SNCC participated in an SDS organized 1965 peace march, a desire to avoid diverting attention and resources away from the cause of civil rights limited the organization’s public opposition to the war. Black Power eliminated these reservations. Reflecting on Lowndes County, Stokely Carmichael remarked that blacks would have “to confront the question of Vietnam.”48 The January 6, 1966 “SNCC Statement of Vietnam” expressly links the government’s aggression in Vietnam with the failure to ensure freedom for black Americans. Denouncing the government’s “hypocritical mask”—engaging in foreign wars to protect freedoms, which Black Americans lack—SNCC asks, “where is the draft for the Freedom fight in the United States?”49

Beyond draft resistance, the document places the government’s failure to pursue racial justice in the United States in the context of a global disregard for nonwhite people. “The United States government has been deceptive in claims of concern for the freedom of the Vietnamese people,” in the same way that it “has been deceptive in claiming concern for the freedom of the colored people in such other countries…and in the United States itself.”

SNCC’s statement, like Robeson, Malcolm X, and King, creates a community of non-white people, reading solidarity into the experience of Black Americans and Vietnamese peoples perpetuated by U.S. government. On this basis, SNCC rejects the notion of American exceptionalism abroad, regarding foreign policy as a product of the same racist power structure that impedes racial justice in the United States.

Although nominally focused on the conflict in Vietnam, the statement is more concerned with the racial situation in the United States; the war is viewed from the same interpretive frameworks used to understand American racial inequalities. At the heart of SNCC’s critique is the U.S. government’s failure to enforce existing laws, both internationally and domestically. Connecting violence in Vietnam with violence in the United States, the 1966 statement argues that “the murder of Samuel Young in Tuskegee, Alabama is no different from the murder of people in Vietnam, both…sought and are seeking to secure rights guaranteed them by law.”

In this way, SNCC appropriates the Vietnam War using the terms and debates of its struggle for racial justice. The 1966 statement locates the origins of the Vietnam conflict within the inconsistent and racially prejudicial policies of the United States government. The first official statement from a civil rights

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50 Ibid., 13.
51 Ibid., 14.
organization against the war, the 1966 document indicates that SNCC’s opposition to the war was very much molded by their organizing work in the American South as “victims of violence and confinement executed by U.S government officials.”52 That is not to deny the sincere concern for the suffering of the Vietnamese which motivated SNCC and anti-war protestors in general. Nevertheless, the dominant impulse that informed this critique was not the influence of radical political ideologies or even a profound knowledge of the conflict in Vietnam, but rather as SNCC leader Bob Moses aptly summarizes: “our criticism of Vietnam policy does not come from what we know of Vietnam, but from what we know of America.”53

By the summer of 1967, SNCC had more fully developed the global framework of their Vietnam opposition. Like Malcolm X and Robeson, SNCC’s Black Power ideology was deeply inspired and informed by the anti-colonial, liberation struggles occurring across Africa during the mid-twentieth century as reflected in the position paper “The Indivisible Struggle Against Racism, Apartheid and Colonialism” presented by SNCC at the International Seminar on Apartheid Racial Discrimination and Colonialism in Southern Africa in Lusaka, Zambia in the summer of 1967. Although the document focuses on the specific racial justice issues relevant to the Southern African context, the inclusion of Vietnam in this discourse indicates the importance of the conflict in SNCC’s global-vision. Compared with the 1966 statement, the paper’s most notable innovation is the adoption of the language of human rights. On its opening page, the document states that “SNCC has never visualized the struggle for human right in American in isolation from the world wide struggle for

52 Ibid., 13.
human rights.” The interest in human rights emerged from SNCC’s identification based on the global solidarity of oppressed, non-white people and from an understanding of racial oppression as indivisible. SNCC thus emphatically did not see “racism in the U.S.A. as a domestic issue.” In this way, the abandonment of poverty programs in American ghettos implicates the war in Vietnam in the same way that the conflict “militates against any possible constructive action by the U.S.A in other areas of Latin America, Asia, and Africa.”

Even as SNCC discourse on Vietnam adopted the language of human rights, it began to utilize a more aggressive, militant tone. Quoted in the appendix of position paper is SNCC leader Rap Brown’s response to the aggression of the Klu Klux Klan against African-American residents in Prattville, Alabama in June, 1967:

We extend a call for black brothers now serving in Vietnam to come home to the defense of their mothers and families. This is their fight….It appears that Alabama has been chosen as the starting battleground for America’s race war. This is both fitting and appropriate. For next to America’s Vietnam action, Alabama polls the highest death toll of black men.

Vietnam is an extension of the warzone at home. While the Black Power framework undoubtedly contributed to this more extreme

55 Ibid., 6.
56 Ibid., 2.
assessment of the situation at home, violence in Prattville, Alabama or in Vietnam was by no means a new phenomenon but rather reflected the long history of violence employed against black Americans at home and non-white people abroad. In SNCC’s opposition to Vietnam, the linking of domestic and foreign spheres was not radical but only a reflection of reality.

The NAACP’s response to Vietnam serves as an instructive counterpoint to King and SNCC’s opposition to the conflict. As perhaps the most prominent American civil rights organization, the NAACP has been harshly criticized for its failure to adopt an official anti-war position until 1969. The national-level NAACP’s hesitance to criticize American involvement in Vietnam is commonly attributed to the organization’s closeness to the president, patriotism, and anti-communism. As important a factor was the nature of the NAACP’s organizing experience. Although the assertion that NAACP’s failure to formulate a clear Vietnam policy constituted tacit support for the war is a matter of debate, the group’s conservatism on Vietnam is frequently linked to the close relationship between NAACP President Roy Wilkins and President Lyndon Johnson. A seasoned veteran of civil rights, Wilkins advocated “process” over “protest” and was committed to negotiating reform within the white power structure rather than rejecting it. In Wilkins’ legalistic and pragmatic strategy for the NAACP, an antiwar stance would divert energy and resources away from the civil rights struggle.

Recent scholarship has attempted to nuance the NAACP’s relationship with the Vietnam War to a great degree, drawing distinctions between national and local branches of the NAACP. For many civil rights organizations including SNCC, the SCLC, and the NAACP, individual opposition to the conflict preceded official organizational anti-war positions. King’s SCLC similarly struggled to formulate an official position on the war, fearful of injuring the civil rights cause. National and local-level NAACP offices were often in disagreement over the war. For example in 1966 even as the national NAACP remained silent, local NAACP branches in Lynchburg, Virginia and Greenwich Village, New York began to publicly condemn the Vietnam War. That organizational conservatism on a national level was met with more vocal antiwar sentiments on a local level is explained by the fact, as historian Simon Hall states that opposition to the war grew “directly from the experiences of activists themselves.” For those working at the grassroots level, very tangible frustrations fostered challenges to the NAACP’s national, legalistic strategy and shaped nascent anti-war attitudes. Just as King’s and SNCC’s formulations of an ideological framework opposing the war emerged from their direct experiences in the civil rights movement, the NAACP’s adherence to a legalistic strategy of reform precluded its ambivalence toward the war.

Many of the most vocal opponents of the Vietnam War within the civil rights movement had been silenced by the late 1960s. By the mid-1960s Paul Robeson had adopted a quieter existence, prompted by his numerous conflicts with the establishment as well as serious health problems. Malcolm X was

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61 Harrison, 269-270.
63 Hall, “The NAACP and the Challengess of 1960s Radicalism,” in Long is the Way and Hard, 78.
assassinated in 1965. By 1966, SNCC, as one history of the organization bluntly explains, had “ceased, in any programmic sense, to exist.” King was assassinated on April 4, 1968 in Memphis, Tennessee, one year to the day of his Riverside speech. Anti-war opposition, in contrast, had a very different fate. By the late 1960s and early 1970s, American public opinion increasingly began to turn against the war. Although individuals in moderate organizations expressed dissent with Vietnam much earlier, by 1969 and the early 1970s conventional civil rights organizations would begin to officially endorse positions much akin to King’s Riverside speech. In October, 1969, the NAACP cautiously supported the anti-war movement’s Vietnam Moratorium Committee (VMC); but as with most moderate American opponents of the war, it did not actively participate in the anti-war movement’s mass protests. In light of these developments, a direct correlation between growing opposition to Vietnam and factional decline is probable. However, reducing the link between Vietnam and factionalism in the civil rights movement to a causal relationship amounts to a vast oversimplification. King and SNCC’s decline in the late 1960s did not directly result from opposition to the war; rather the intersections of these two events were far more complex.

A September 19, 1969 Time article entitled “Black Power in Viet Nam” concluded with the menacing warning that “Viet Nam may prove a training ground for the black urban commando of the future.” Employing evocative and racially-coded imagery of young, violent black soldiers training in the jungles of the Third

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World, the *Time* article feeds directly on the pervasive fears that armed black nationalists inspired among white moderates. However, as the anti-war positions of King and SNCC substantiate, the presence of violence within the Black Power movement was not, as *Time* darkly insinuates, an import from the war in Vietnam. Although Black Nationalism drew inspiration from the armed liberation struggles occurring across the Third World, its refusal to pursue racial justice through the prescribed “moderate” strategies and its willingness to use violence in self-defense reflected a home-grown reality: the extent to which violence and the threat of violence underpinned white supremacy across the United States.

Entrenched in the struggle for racial justice, civil rights activists directly confronted systematized racial oppression in America—an encounter which would mold, to a large degree, their worldview. Thus, for Martin Luther King Jr. and SNCC, as their visions of racial justice collided with the limits of moderate and legalistic approaches, the civil rights movement became the “training ground” for opposition to the war. These voices of discontent with American policy in Vietnam during the mid to late 1960s constitute only a segment of the web of intersections between the Vietnam conflict and civil rights. Nevertheless, they represent a point of access which illustrates that during Vietnam and other moments in the American history, race reform, domestic policy and foreign policy intersected in ways that do not neatly conform to the master narratives of the American nation.
Colonial Narratives: Visions of Pre-Islamic Algeria in the *Revue Africaine*, 1870-1896

Daniel Williford

Founded in 1856, the *Revue Africaine* was an academic journal sponsored by the Société Historique Algerienne and dedicated to the production and dissemination of historical knowledge relating to North Africa. In its early years, the journal included articles on a diversity subjects ranging from Arab classical music to Berber tribal organizations. Over the course of the 1860’s, however, the *Revue* gradually came to focus on pre-Islamic archaeology, although issues continued to address a variety of other topics, particularly European contact with North Africa from the seventeenth century onward and episodes from the French conquest. Since the transition toward primarily publishing studies on pre-Islamic archaeology happened gradually over the course of the 1860’s, 1870 represents an appropriate starting point for discussing this trend. 1897 also marked a change in direction for the *Revue* as the first year that the journal included an article written by a contemporary Muslim scholar. From this point onward, the Société Historique regularly published studies that conveyed the perspectives of Muslim academics and the number of articles dealing with Arab-Islamic subjects increased accordingly.
The larger political context of this period from 1870 to 1896 included Algeria’s transition to civilian rule, the demographic and territorial expansion of the settler community, and the 1871 insurrection in Kabylia. At the beginning of civilian rule in 1870, contributors to the *Revue* had already begun to produce articles that manipulated France’s Roman connection to reflect the goals of Algeria’s rapidly expanding *pied-noir* community. During this period, as Patricia Lorcin has observed, “the paternalism of the occupying military force was replaced by settler politics with economic interests...as its fulcrum.” Land grabs and the displacement of local populations by settlers, which intensified in the aftermath of the revolt in Kabylia, produced a community-wide need for historical justification. At the same time, the new civilian administration set out to reduce the administrative boundaries which separated colony from metropole, working to transform Algeria into an integral part of France.

Scholarship on the relationship between colonialism and the production of archaeological and historical knowledge about the ancient Maghreb has tended to focus on the connection established between Rome and France in French academic discourse. Patricia Lorcin, for example, has identified what she

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1 In 1870, Europeans in Algeria numbered around 236,000. By 1900 the settler population had grown to about 621,000. Patricia Lorcin, “Rome and France in Africa: Recovering Colonial Algeria’s Latin Past,” *French Historical Studies* 25, no. 2 (Spring 2002): 312.


4 Lorcin affirms that “with the advent of the civilian regime in 1870, the drive to assimilate the institutions of the colony to France accelerated. Financially, politically, educationally and judicially the ties between metropolis and colony were strengthened.” Ibid., 8.
refers to as “the trivalent significance of Rome as a cultural idiom for French domination: justification, admiration, and emulation….” In her analysis, Lorcin highlights multiple phases in the construction of the Roman-French connection, from the role of classical texts in shaping the colonial project during the early years of occupation to the exploitation of “Latin” heritage by proponents of a pied-noir community identity towards the end of the nineteenth century. At all stages of its development, “France’s appropriation of Rome and its legacy” led to the exclusion of Algeria’s local populations both from a significant place in the historical narrative and from a contemporary role in the cultural life of the colony. For the most part, however, Lorcin skips over the period from 1870 to 1890, moving directly from the use of Rome as a model for the military administration in Algeria to the latinité of Louis Bertrand. Unlike Lorcin’s, this study will focus on the construction of a historical narrative incorporating the presence of Berbers, Phoenicians, and Romans rather than on the singularity of Roman North Africa as a foundational myth for the settler community. Massimiliano Munzi has examined a distinct but related phenomenon which took place in colonial Libya during Italian rule. He argues that, “archaeology played a fundamental role in building the ideology of the historical right of Rome to

6 Ibid., 297-323.
7 Ibid., 327.
8 A novelist, historian, and member of the Académie Française, Louis Bertrand drew on the works of French archeologists working in Algeria such as Gsell and Berbrugger to develop the notion of Latinity, an ideology that portrayed the European settler community as the historical antecedent of the Roman Empire in Africa and as a source of spiritual and racial renewal for contemporary France. Ibid., 313.
Libyan land.” Moreover, Munzi has noted that Italy borrowed heavily from earlier French discourse on the parallels between Roman rule and their own mission in North Africa as well as from archaeological methods and approaches developed in Algeria and later in Tunisia. David Prochaska has emphasized how the construction of an Algerian historical narrative played a role in debates about the existence of the Algerian nation:

First of all, colonialist historians stress that earlier conquerors of Algeria—Phoenicians, Romans, Arabs, Turks—were exploitive, alien invaders who so disrupted Algerian society that by 1830, when the French came, no Algerian “nation” could be said to exist (if there ever had been one).

However, Prochaska’s interpretation as it relates to the construction of a pre-Islamic narrative by French historians fails to do justice to the connection between the positive aspects of Roman and Phoenician colonization and France’s own “civilizing” presence in colonial Algeria.

In an 1870 issue, the Revue Africaine identified as its goals the “compiling, studying and disseminating in a special publication of all information belonging to African History, especially that which relates to Algeria” as well as “the conservation of historical monuments.” In this mission statement, members of the Société Historique Algérienne asserted their authority over both the historical narrative and the physical space of Algeria. Contributors set out to gather information about Algeria’s past, interpreting data

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10 Ibid., 74-80.
through a colonialist lens then diffusing it under the semi-official aegis of the Société Historique. Taken together, their studies form a complete narrative of early Algerian history, one which contains political discourses justifying France’s presence in the region while invalidating the territorial/historical rights of the local and particularly Arab population. I will argue that the focus on pre-Islamic history and archaeology in *La Revue Africaine* from the years 1870 to 1896 represented an attempt to portray Algeria’s Arab Muslims as usurpers in what had once been a Berber, Phoenician, and Roman land. In doing so, scholars both associated France’s presence in the region with the pre-Islamic rulers of Algeria and imagined the French colonial project as the fulfillment of a continuous march toward civilization. More than a simple justification for colonization, this process transformed the physical and historical space of Algeria in academic discourse. In addition, by promoting a historical narrative which emphasized the shared heritage, intellectual spirit, and ethnic origins of the colony and metropole, contributors to the *Revue* reimagined Algeria as France’s southern shore, a province albeit with some regional particularities not unlike the Languedoc or the Basque Country. This construction of Algeria’s historical space supported the efforts of the new civilian administration to integrate the colony’s institutions into the larger French political system as well as the goals of the expanding settler community.¹³ Addressing the aspirations of the settlers by analogy in archeological works on the prior colonization of North Africa was part of co-opting the community’s interests, of defining the place of the *pied-noirs* (albeit in relatively positive terms) in colonial Algeria. Linking settlers to Roman or Carthaginian colonists was a way of

¹³ Lorcin has pointed out that the first decades of civilian rule in Algeria witnessed a general intensification of archeological activity in the colony. Lorcin, “Rome and France in Africa: Recovering Colonial Algeria’s Latin Past,” 313.
fashioning a role for them in the defense of Western civilization in Algeria, connecting their presence in Algeria to discourse on the mission civilisatrice. Discounting local sources, French archaeologists like those published in the Revue cast themselves as the sole purveyors of knowledge concerning Algeria’s past. The fact that they dealt directly with the material remnants of pre-Islamic civilizations placed these scholars in a unique position to reconceptualize Algeria as belonging to the same spatio-historical realm as France.

Lorcin has observed that the creation, classification, and proliferation of colonial knowledge had the impact of “reconstructing the geological, geographical and historical space of the colony in the legal and intellectual terms of the colonizing power.” Archaeology as a discipline plays a unique role in this process by imposing interpretations on both physical and historical space. When dealing with the question of narrative, archaeology can be used to establish the impression of progression or regression by drawing comparisons between the remains of various material cultures. The following passage from the Revue, with its associations between ancient ruins and geographical representations, serves an example of how this historical narrative was rhetorically grafted onto the physical space of the Algerian landscape:

14 This notion of France’s mission to civilize, which justified colonization on the basis of the presumed technological and “cultural” progress of the colonized, played an essential role in supporting the policies of the military and later civilian administrations in Algeria. For discussions of the mission civilisatrice see Mathew Burrows, “‘Mission Civilisatrice’: French Cultural Policy in the Middle East, 1860-1914,” The Historical Journal 26 (1986):109-135; Alice Conklin, A Mission to Civilize: the Republican Idea of Empire in France and West Africa, 1895-1930 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997).
15 Ibid., 36.
The caverns of its coasts and its valleys hold the remnants of the man’s first steps on the globe; dolmens tower over the summits of its hillsides; the ruins of Roman monuments stretch across its plains; the rubbish of Muslim constructions have succeeded the relics of Christian Africa….”

The link between geographical and historical space took on a special significance in the notion of the *translatio imperii*. This concept of the gradual movement of civilization and political power from East to West, which had its roots in the Middle Ages, found a clear expression in the construction of the Algerian historical narrative. In its most typical manifestation, the *translatio imperii* traced the transfer of cultural and political dominance from Greece, to Rome, to the Western European nations. A slightly altered version of the *translatio imperii* was echoed in the French vision of Algerian history. Civilization in the form of culture and technology was introduced and maintained in North Africa by the Phoenicians, the Romans, and the French respectively. According to this logic, the Arab conquest represented not only a lacuna and a period of stagnation or regression, but also the interruption of an identified historical process (the movement of cultural dynamism and political power from East to West), a sort of historical anomaly. For much archaeological and historical scholarship published in the *Revue Africaine*, the notion of the *translatio imperii* constituted part of the subtext against which the “facts” of Algerian history were judged and interpreted. By separately examining the profile of the journal as well as studies published on Roman and pre-Roman Algeria, a coherent sense of how the construction of an Algerian historical narrative became intertwined with the political aspirations of the French colonial establishment emerges.

Profile of the Journal: Intellectual Context and Membership

1869 constituted a turning point in the particular history of the Revue Africaine with the death of the Société Historique’s founder and long-time president, Adrien Berbrugger. Since his arrival in Algeria in 1835, Berbrugger had become an avid complier of scholarly material about the colony, working as an archaeologist, a librarian, and an editor. His enthusiasm led to the creation of the Revue as a repository for colonial knowledge, a role it would continue to fill after his death. During his final years as the Société’s president, Berbrugger published far more articles in the journal than any other single contributor. His archeological work set a number of precedents for scholars who wrote for the Revue during the first decades of civilian rule. For example, he presented an idealized vision of Algeria’s Roman past, drawing on archeological research to visually reconstruct an ancient Algeria of “opulent farms and sumptuous villas…spread out in large numbers across the land.”17 In his studies of Roman ruins, Berbrugger also tended to emphasize how the Arabs borrowed from and failed to improve upon Roman advancements.18 For the most part, his method consisted of combining detailed physical descriptions of ruins and inscriptions found at particular sites with a close reading of classical sources (an approach that characterized the work of later contributors to the journal as well). In addition, Berbrugger’s academic work reflected a long tradition of intellectual debate between “Romanist” and “Germanist” interpretations of French history. This debate, which intensified over the course of the early nineteenth century, pitted intellectuals like Fustel de Coulanges, who believed that French law, customs, and national spirit could be

traced back to the Roman Empire against those who emphasized the contributions of Germanic tribes who settled in Gaul.19 “Romanist” assertions concerning the Latin origins of French civilization laid the groundwork for the French/Roman connection that was to take on new symbolic importance in the works of archeologists like Berbrugger who studied the history of France’s new North African empire.20 At the same time, archaeological studies like those published in the Revue by Berbrugger and his successors, which emphasized Roman grandeur through descriptions of monumental ruins, reinforced the appeal of the “Romanist” interpretation for intellectuals writing about French national heritage.

The membership of the Société Historique over the last quarter of the nineteenth century illustrates a profound connection between knowledge and power in the colonial context. Supporters included colonial bureaucrats, wealthy colons, military men, and even members of the clergy. Following Berbrugger’s death, the Société’s presidency circulated among the major contributors to the Revue, typically falling to scholars such as Auguste Cherbonneau, a leading Orientalist and founder of the Société Archéologique de Constantine or Henri-Delmas de Grammont, a French officer in numerous colonial campaigns, turned expert on the history of pre-colonial Algiers.21 Maréchal Jacques Louis Randon, who served as the Governor-General of Algeria from 1851 to 1858 held the status of a founding chairman (president-

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fondateur) in the Société until his death in 1871. Later governors-general, such as Jules Cambon would be listed as honorary chairmen (presidents d’honneur), filling a primarily symbolic role and lending official legitimacy to the Revue. The journal could also boast of an official subscription from the Bureau of Public Instruction, the Government General of Algeria, and the General Councils of Algiers and Oran. A relatively small group of historians and archaeologists were responsible for the major studies published on pre-Islamic Algeria. Among these, Émile Masqueray a historian, anthropologist, and linguist who analyzed Roman ruins in the Aurès Mountains before becoming the director of the École des Lettres in Algiers and Ernest Mercier, a military interpreter and twice-elected mayor of Constantine were representative of the general profile of academics involved with the Revue. Their careers reflected both a commitment to scholarly work and a close relationship with the colonial government. Numerous French officers also published archaeological studies, often based on small finds near the posts where they were stationed. Others such as General Louis Faidherbe, who had also served in La Guadeloupe and as the Governor of Senegal, and Colonel Paul Flatters, who would famously die in combat against the Touregs, became regular contributors. With clear ties to the colonial establishment, these individuals produced works dealing with pre-Islamic history and archaeology which justified and supported the aspirations of the colonial government to strengthen the official ties binding Algeria to France.

Scholarship on Pre-Roman Algeria: Berber Origins and Phoenician/Carthaginian Influence

Pre-Roman archaeological and historical studies published in the *Revue* nearly all agree on two main points: the Indo-European origins of Algeria’s Berber inhabitants and the civilizing influence of Phoenician colonization in North Africa. Due in part to the development of the Kabyle Vulgate during this period, the favorable image of Algeria’s Berbers in colonial discourse carried over into archaeological and historical studies of their ancient ancestors.25 The relatively positive image of the Berbers as the original inhabitants of Algeria found in the *Revue* can also be traced to the Berberophilia of Cardinal Lavigerie, an influential religious and intellectual figure and an honorary member of the Société Historique.26 Building on ethnographic studies of blond-haired, blue-eyed Berbers in the Greater Kabylia region, historians examined various classical sources in an attempt to establish the European origins of the Berber people. For example, Louis Rinn considered the possibility of a Berber/Greek connection, when he noticed similarities between a ritual dance performed by a Berber tribe in the Ouurlaga area and a Greek tradition described by Callimachus.27 Observing this dance he “thinks involuntarily either of Bellerophon or of the Celtic God of flames, the brilliant Heal.”28 Another scholar, Oscar Mac-Carthy traces one group of Berbers who settled near Tlemcen back to an ancient tribe known as the

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28 Ibid., 235.
Dryites. Based on references in Ptolemy, Mac-Carthy puts forth the hypothesis that this tribe’s name is a derivative of the term *druide*, thus linking them to a possible Celtic migration from the Iberian Peninsula. Similarly, General Faibherbe identifies the, “Libyans [as] the most ancient inhabitants of the Atlantic region, [a] brown variety of the white European race” and “Berber [as] the language of the Libyans.” To support these theories on the origins of the Berbers, certain archaeologists went in search of physical proof of an ancient European presence in Algeria. Some believed to have found such evidence in the so-called “Celtic” sepulchers found throughout the colony. Oppetit, whose work was also published by the Société Historique de Constantine, analyzed these “Celtic” tombs as traces left by tribes from Northern Europe who arrived in Algeria around 1500 BCE and were later subsumed by invading oriental peoples to form the Berber race. Scholars such as Colonel Flatters compared dolmens and menhirs scattered across the countryside to “the traces of the druidic religion…as in Brittany,” thus affirming the shared, Celtic heritage of Algeria and a region of metropolitan France. Ernest Mercier came to the same conclusion regarding the culture which had produced these monuments, and additionally called into question Ibn Khaldoun’s earlier hypothesis that the Berber peoples were originally from

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30 Ibid.
Canaan as “supported by no certain proof.” Archaeologists exploited the presence of “Celtic” dolmens resembling those found throughout Western Europe, implicitly suggesting the shared origins of Algeria and metropolitan France.

Contemporary Algeria served as a constant point of reference for studies which dealt with the origins of North Africa’s earliest inhabitants. Inscriptions found on funeral monuments throughout the Algerian countryside written in a script that has today been labeled Libyco-Berber were another source of interest and debate for the Revue’s contributors, particularly General Faibherbe. His work on Libyco-Berber script (which he refers to as Numidic script) connected this writing system to that currently used by Algeria’s Touregs. The primary point of contention was whether the “indigenous” population of North Africa, called either Libyans or Numidians, had developed this system as well as their impressive capacity for monument building independently or due to influence from Phoenician or Roman civilization. Faidherbe, for example, believed that these inscriptions, because of their style and quality, could not have dated from before the Roman period. The implication, however, was that Algeria’s original inhabitants had been particularly receptive to civilizing influences, a view also reflected in Gauvault Saint-Lager’s portrayal of one Berber tribe in the Ain-Toukria region as having maintained some of its Roman customs adopted during Antiquity until the present. Scholars also used archaeological analyses of Libyan inscriptions to assert the European heritage of Berber people. For example, Rinn’s study of

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35 For insights on Libyco-Berber script see Werner Pichler, Origin and development of the Libyco-Berber Script (Cologne: Köppe, 2007).
36 Faidherbe, 87.
37 Ibid., 80.
Berber origins sought out similarities between Indo-European tongues and the language of Algeria’s “original” inhabitants based on examples taken primarily from Libyco-Berber script as well as from modern Berber speakers.\(^{39}\) Contemporary Algeria was also a point of reference in studies which combined anthropology and ethnography with references to classical texts on pre-Roman Algeria, to reinforce theories on the European origin of the Berbers. Elsewhere in his study, Rinn draws a parallel between the use of indigo and ocher body paint by modern-day Touaregs and a similar practice among first-century BCE Gaels mentioned by Cesar.\(^{40}\) He also suggests that, “twenty-three centuries ago, Africa had, just as today, its nomads and its sedentary peoples; these were the Numidians and the Mores, people of Aryan race, having conserved their national traditions.”\(^{41}\) This focus on “national traditions,” reminiscent of Renan’s theory of nationhood, coupled with the claim to European ethnicity establishes an analogy between the first phases of civilization’s development in France and in Algeria. The underlying implication of portraying Berbers as a Celtic people similar to “nos ancêtres les Gaulois” was that Algeria’s origins resembled those of metropolitan France. Furthermore, Berbers’ position in the historical narrative as kind of a raw material, a people with a génie receptive to the influence of civilizing powers like Carthage and Rome, echoed the dominant “Romanist” view of France’s own beginnings as a nation of Celtic racial stock mixed bound together by Roman traditions.

A fascination with Phoenician and later Carthaginian influence reveals that the *Revue’s* contributors typically viewed


this period as the beginning of “civilization” in North Africa. Colonel Flatters, for example, characterized Phoenician settlements in Algeria as prosperous outposts of a “mère-patrie,” a term notably reminiscent of the language of French colonization. This “advanced” presence from the East supposedly “gave birth, from a distance, to the first seeds of classical civilization for many barbarian peoples.” Even areas not directly touched by Phoenician/Carthaginian occupation were described as benefiting from the nearby presence of “civilization.” Frédéric Lacroix identified Carthaginian advances, particularly in the realm of agricultural technology, as among the first examples of the use of a rationalist approach in North Africa. According to Lacroix, the original inhabitants of Algeria existed in a state of “pure savagery” before undergoing the “influence of Punic civilization.” In the Revue, the Phoenicians themselves were linked to the cultural “advancements” of the ancient Greeks and were thus represented as part of the narrative of the progression and diffusion of Western civilization. One article points out that much of Phoenician art found in the Mediterranean seems to correspond to an archaic Greek style adopted and adapted by Phoenician colonists before the third century BCE. Another refers to finds of Phoenician statues apparently designed from Greek models. Moreover, Phoenician commercial ventures in their territories were frequently discussed in similar terms and presented with similar justifications as those accompanying France’s mis en valeur of natural resources.

42 Flatters, 240.
43 Ibid., 239.
in Algeria. Flatters noted for example that, “the exploitation of mines in the hands of their [the Phoenicians’] representatives underwent all the more considerable development since the natives had hardly dreamed of concerning themselves with it.”

Henri Tauxier’s understanding of the exclusive commercial relationship between Phoenicia and its colonies can also be associated with aspects of France’s economic policy toward her empire. In addition, contributors portrayed the Phoenician/Carthaginian presence as part of the continuous narrative of civilization’s progress in North Africa of which Rome was the next phase (an interpretation linked to the *translatio imperii*). Archaeological investigations of the Roman capital Caesarea, such as the one performed by B. Verneuil and J. Bughnot, stressed the city’s origins as the Carthaginian Iol, which the Romans transformed into a large metropolis. Similarly, Lacroix in his study of ancient agricultural methods in North Africa, emphasized the fact that the rationalization process begun by the Carthaginians was taken over, refined, and continued by the Romans without interruption. Indeed, while some studies of Phoenician/Carthaginian colonization drew comparisons to French projects in Algeria, scholars in the *Revue* emphasized above all the role of this period in having planted “the seeds of ancient civilization” to be brought to fruition under Roman rule.

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48 Flatters, 240.
Scholarship on Roman Algeria: Appropriation and Preservation

The importance of Rome as a “cultural idiom” can be understood in terms of a cyclical relationship with the French colonial project in Algeria. During the initial conquest, classically trained French officers frequently relied on Latin authors as sources of information about the land and the people with whom they came into contact. Later, historians and archaeologists probed the historical record, examining certain aspects of Roman colonization to argue the advantages or drawbacks of various colonial policies. To a certain extent, admiration of the Roman Empire even played a role in the shaping of French colonial ambitions in North Africa.

As colonialism evolved in Algeria, however, academic studies began to promote a particular vision of Roman Imperialism in North Africa which resembled France’s own understanding of its colonial presence and mission. Both of these tendencies are reflected in the Revue, although by the mid-1870’s the latter seemed to have taken a firmer hold. This phenomenon of portraying Roman colonization in North Africa in terms of the history and ambitions of French colonialism reflected shifts in the concentration of political power in Algeria during this period, in particular the growing importance of the settler community.

Studies in the Revue described the Roman colonization of North Africa in ways that resembled the narrative of European settlement in Algeria. Referring to the period directly following Roman pacification, De Verneuil and Bughnot asserted that “from Hispania, from Gaul, from Italy, the colons flooded into Africa, anxious to beckon of this fecund soil the riches, which it provides in agriculture and commerce.”52 Another article on the city of Constantine mentions how the Romans carried out, “the work of

colonization...enriched Cirta [ancient site of Constantine] with magnificent structures, and called there numerous Greek and Roman immigrants.”

53 These portrayals of Roman settlements in North Africa drawing colonists from across Mediterranean (whereas in reality immigration appears to have been limited) primarily reflect the link these authors hoped to establish between Rome and the pied-noir community. Occasionally scholars made explicit references to this connection by direct comparisons to colonial settlers. Lacroix remarked for example that during antiquity “Sowing was done in autumn...for the old masters of Africa must have noticed, like our current colons, that cereals sown late...often failed.”

54 Veiled justifications for the appropriation of farmland owned by Algerians on the basis of the French policy of mis en valeur also appear in the journal. For example, Émile Masqueray affirms that, “the Romans exploited themselves their pastoral wealth, and did not leave it to dry up in the hands of the indigènes.”

55 Scholars such as Tauxier focused on the strict dichotomy established between Roman settlers and the indigènes, recounting the frequent clashes between “barbarian” tribes and colonial patrols in the Algerian countryside (also a common occurrence in the early decades of French occupation in Algeria).

56 His discussion of tensions between Roman colonizers and “barbarians” on the outskirts reveals another important aspect of the association between the French and Roman colonial enterprises: the notion of settler communities existing in the border space of civilization as a bulwark against local populations. Lorcin

has pointed out that “civilization versus barbarity was an attractive concept to the European population,”57 due in part to the fact that it represented a subtle reworking of the *mission civilisatrice*. Drawing analogies between outposts of Roman settlement and *pied-noirs* farmers in rural Algeria, the *Revue’s* contributors depicted both groups as defending civilization and spreading it to the local population by a gradual process of transmission (i.e. association), rather than a concerted effort at assimilation. Scholars thus characterized Roman settlers as having a clear role to play both in relation to the local population and to the greater empire. De Verneuil and Bughnot state that, “The Latins who were transported there [to Algeria] had to, through their relationship with the *indigènes*, prepare them, little by little, through their contact, to later accept their definitive union with the Empire.”58 Lacroix in particular emphasizes the importance of so-called “border colonies” as “foyers of civilization.”59 In his view, these “border colonies” were mainly composed of Roman veterans from the African campaigns who turned to cultivating the newly conquered territory. Such a depiction echoed the early stages of French colonization in Algeria, when Resident General Bugeaud’s administration, believing that military discipline was a necessity in adapting to the harsh conditions of colonization, encouraged large numbers of veteran colonial soldiers to settle permanently.60 In each of these instances, the reimagining of Rome’s colonial presence in North Africa to reflect developments in the nature of

French colonialism illustrated the narrative connection that scholars in the *Revue* drew between the two Empires. Furthermore, this connection both established the historical legitimacy of the settler community and supported France’s colonial project on the basis of a past precedent.

Archaeological studies of Rome’s legacy also allowed scholars to project their vision of a continuous Western civilization onto the physical space of Algeria. The permanence of Roman ruins and monuments across the Algerian countryside was contrasted with the movement of “nomads who seem to flee within their own domain,” and whose territorial rights were thus called into question. This permanence was key to affirming the timelessness and atemporality of Western civilization in North Africa, which was described as only superficially marked by centuries of Arab occupation. From a military perspective, Roman permanence became a model to be admired, as for one officer of the Bureau des Affaires Indigènes who remarked that, “these last vestiges of Roman domination showed to the modern world with what power Rome could occupy the most isolated places, since these ruins still remain.”

Recalling the arrival of French troops in the city of Auzia, Achille Robert recounts how they were struck by the “numerous vestiges of roman domination...columns, capitals, a large number of inscriptions.” Mac-Carthy, in his catalogue of Algerian antiquities provides a complete list of discovered Roman sites with their Latin names alongside contemporary equivalents. By recovering this Roman labeling of Algerian geography and

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conjuring images of ancient settlements, scholars transposed their visions of a reconstructed historical reality on the Algerian landscape. Surveying the site of ancient Thamgad, one archaeologist sought to visualize “all the colonnades in place, the Temple’s, the Theater’s, the Curia’s…to reestablish by reflection the disappeared statues.” This reimagining of Algeria’s physical space through the archaeologists’ lens helped imply that North Africa had never ceased being truly Roman and that France’s territorial integration of the region represented its return into the Western fold (the culmination of the *translatio imperii*). While calling into question the validity of local sources, contributors to the *Revue* did not hesitate to cite members of the local population to support their notion of the timelessness of Roman legacy. For example, Masqueray on a field study near Khenchela remarked that “the Arabs themselves are impressed and tell us, showing us their stone houses whose walls are still standing: ‘Your ancestors must have believed that they would live forever.’” The permanence of Roman achievements was also understood in terms of a technological legacy. Scholars described architectural methods developed by the Romans, which supposedly survived into the present-day and continued to be used by the indigenous population. Describing the masonry of a funeral chamber, Albert Delvoux recognizes that, “this system is still practiced, in our time, by the indigenous masons.” Similarly, an earlier text republished in the *Revue* discusses how mosques in Algiers were constructed “according to the Ancients’ architectural rules,” implying the continuation of Roman influence on the city’s development after

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66 Emile Masqueray, “Ruines Anciennes de Khenchela (Mascula) à Besseriani (Ad Majores),” 448.

the Arab conquest.\textsuperscript{68} Focusing on agricultural technology, Lacroix mentions a type of thresher invented during antiquity which the “indigènes” continue to use in the present-day.\textsuperscript{69} Depicting the ancient milling practices of these “indigènes,” he observes that, “they ground their wheat under a rock and made bread as they still do today, by simply putting the dough under hot ash.”\textsuperscript{70} These assertions serve a double purpose, highlighting the continuity of Roman achievements while at the same time suggesting the stagnation of “indigenous” peoples and their lack of contribution to the advancement of civilization in Algeria.

The preservation of ruins and monuments, especially those left from the Roman period constituted one of the Société Historique’s acknowledged aims. By positioning themselves as protectors of deteriorating or despoiled sites, archaeologists asserted their authority over Algerian territory. Following an awe-stricken description of the Roman amphitheater of El’Djem, Alphonse Devoulx laments that “this gigantic monument…will finish by succumbing to the blows of ineptitude and barbarity…the Arabs…will insensibly destroy this amazing vestige of the Ancients’ splendor.”\textsuperscript{71} Similarly in a study of Roman irrigation, Arab nomads with their “herds and pickaxes” are described as having fundamentally altered the character of the land, rendering it unsuitable for agriculture.\textsuperscript{72} Scholars frequently discussed the need for preservation in reference to the “destructive” changes brought to the whole of Algeria by the Arab conquest. In the middle of an


\textsuperscript{70} Ibid., 110.


\textsuperscript{72} Emile Masqueray, “Ruines Anciennes de Khenchela (Mascula) à Besserian (Ad Majores),” 445.
archaeological analysis of the Roman capital, Caesarea, Verneuil and Bughnot lamented that, “Islamism changed the appearance of this country, wiped out all but the last vestiges of Roman civilization and of a just and enlightened religion, to substitute barbarity and the shameful doctrines of fatalism which rob man of his most noble privileges.”73 The Société Historique frequently commended archaeologists whose work led to the seizure of sites considered in need of preservation, though such areas were often either owned or used by the local population. A news bulletin describing the efforts of one archaeologist near Aïn-bou-Dib affirmed that, “M. Grenade-Delaporte ceaselessly merits the recognition of scholars by salvaging the vestiges of antiquity from barbarian destruction.”74 Defending the physical remnants of North Africa’s Roman past, archaeologists justified French territorial control and projected preservation efforts into the realm of the mythical clash of East and West. Putting an end to the millennia of dilapidation of ancient monuments and desolation of farmland under the Arabs was equated to putting an end to the decay of civilization in North Africa.

Conclusion

The study of works published in the Revue Africaine recalls Edward Saïd’s observation that “texts can create not only knowledge but also the very reality they appear to describe. In time such knowledge and reality produce a tradition…whose material presence or weight, not the originality of a given author, is really responsible for the texts produced out of it.”75 Scholars in the Revue projected their particular interpretations of Algerian historical and physical space onto the reality of the colonial

74 “Bulletin” Revue Africaine 183 (May 1887): 240
situation in Algeria, thus becoming participants in the creation of this reality. Their narrative of Algerian history owed its efficacy to an emphasis on the march of civilization, the constant progression from Berber, to Phoenician, to Roman times, interrupted by the Arab conquest but reestablished by France. According to such a vision, Algeria’s Arabs were an historical anomaly, while the French became the restorers of a civilization whose permanence was embodied by the monumental ruins present throughout the country. In the context of increasing land acquisition by European settlers at the expense of the local population, this particular narrative served to justify the territorial claims of the pied-noir community. At the same time, scholars adopted an approach to writing North African history, which drew analogies between the historical experiences of France and Algeria, placing them in the same historical space and affirming the feasibility of integrating the colony into the administrative body of the metropole.

While not the focus of this study, it is significant that the construction of a historical narrative in academic studies published in the Revue resonated in other branches of colonial discourse in Algeria. In his study of Bône’s pied-noir community Prochaska remarks, “the tendency of the French to highlight Bône’s Roman past…at the expense of the city’s Muslim past. This tendency is illustrated graphically in the juxtaposition of Roman ruins and the French-built basilica on… [a] postcard [from a Bône suburb].”

In the literary domain, Louis Bertrand in particular drew his inspiration from archaeological studies to “[formulate] a historical narrative which displaced and relativised the indigenous Islamic culture, relegating it to the status of simple hiatus in the history of the ‘Latin race’ in North Africa.” Also, though this study has primarily discussed how France’s association with the Roman

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76 Prochaska, 222.
77 Peter Dunwoodie, Francophone Writing in Transition: Algeria 1900-1945 (New York: Peter Lang, 2005), 249.
Empire reflected colonial ambitions in Algeria specifically, it is essential to note that this connection also expressed France’s larger imperial ambitions in and beyond the Mediterranean. As Paul Silverstein has point out, “the French colonial state could claim itself as the rightful guardian of the true Latin Mediterranean unity,” thus justifying an expansionist colonial policy across the region.

Many of the paradigms for analyzing colonization in Antiquity constructed by archaeologists and historians like those publishing in the Revue have survived in the modern-day discipline. In 1978, Yvon Thérbert observed that “encouraged by shared Christianity, more than a millennium of Islamic history has been glossed over in much (French) archaeological and historical work.” Decolonizing archaeological studies of the Mediterranean has proved a slower process than political decolonization. However, scholars have begun to question many of the fundamental precepts which characterized colonial approaches to ancient North African history. Among these, the notion that “advanced” presences such as Carthage and Rome spread their cultures throughout the Mediterranean without undergoing the influence of local populations has been increasingly challenged in recent years. Theories on the process of hybridization in colonial situations have led to a fundamental reevaluation of old theories concerning the spread of “civilization,” and above all to a greater appreciation for the impact and the resilience of local cultures.

81 Ibid., 308-309.
About the Editors:

Jane Barrilleaux is a junior history major and philosophy minor from Larose, Louisiana. She is president of Phi Alpha Theta, and is also involved in SIGN Club, Peer Assistants, the Search Advisory Council, and her sorority, Alpha Omicron Pi. She will do Honors Research next year, and plans to attend graduate school to earn a PhD in European History.

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**Andrew Bell** is a junior history student, with a concentration in Roman History, from Philadelphia, PA. In addition to Phi Alpha Theta, Andrew has been active in the Sigma Nu fraternity, the Rhodes Singers and the Rhodes Jazz Band. Andrew also works closely with campus official to improve and ensure the continuity of gender relations on campus and is collaborating with Rhodes faculty on a book about leading a successful college lifestyle, work to begin summer 2011. After graduation, Andrew plans to attend Law School and intends to become an international business attorney.

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The Dynamics of Opportunism and Religion in the World of El Cid
Andrew Bell

The eleventh century in Spain is an important transitional period in the history and historiography of the Christian Reconquest of Muslim Spain. This paper examines three different Christian accounts from the late eleventh and twelfth centuries and endeavors to demonstrate that there was a relative lack of religious polarization until the recapture of Toledo in 1085 and the subsequent arrival of fundamentalist Almoravids from North Africa. Analysis and discussion of these contemporary sources suggests that the world of El Cid (d. 1099) can best be characterized by opportunism and ambition rather than strict religious divisions.

“The Bombs in Vietnam Explode at Home”
Intersections of the Vietnam War and the American Civil Rights Movement
Kimberly Harn

This paper explores the nexus of race, domestic and foreign relations at the juncture of two of the most dynamic historical developments of mid-century America: the Vietnam War and the Civil Rights Movement. Examining the antiwar responses of an individual civil rights leader, Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., and a civil rights organization, the SNCC (Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee), in addition to other voices of dissent, I argue that the civil rights movement provides a unique interpretive framework for the Vietnam conflict. Traditional narratives have often dismissed civil rights activists’ opposition to the war as a product of radicalism. According to these interpretations, opposing the war ultimately detracted from the cause of racial justice. In contrast, this paper argues that activists' linking of domestic and foreign realms in opposition to Vietnam directly resulted from their experiences working within the struggle for racial justice. Thus, the landscape of the civil rights movement and the direct organizing experiences in this struggle for racial justice proved to be the most decisive factor shaping civil rights activists’ opposition to the Vietnam War.

Colonial Narratives
Visions of Pre-Islamic Algeria in the Revue Africaine, 1870-1896
Daniel Williford

Colonial Narratives examines the creation of historical narratives of pre-Islamic Algeria in archeological studies published in the Revue Africaine from 1870 to 1896. The Revue, an academic journal sponsored by the Société Historique Algerienne and dedicated to the production and dissemination of historical knowledge relating to North African represented the perspectives of scholars and military officers connected to the French colonial administration in Algeria. Studies of the material and cultural legacies of the Berbers, Phoenicians, and Romans produced by archeologists writing for the Revue excluded Islamic Arabs from a significant role in the region’s historical development. By reconstructing ancient North Africa in academic discourse, contributors to the journal reimagined the physical and historical space of Algeria.