Geopolitics on Ice: The Effect of Climate Change on the International Balance of Power in the Arctic Circle

Analysis of the Rose Revolution Through the Value Systems Approach

From Partisan to Peacemaker and Back: AIPAC’s Influence on the U.S. Stance in the Israel-Palestine Conflict

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Letter from the Editor

Dear Readers,
I would like to explain the title of this journal and how, from this title, the purpose of this journal is revealed. In Latin, *modus* is a word meaning "mode," or "manner," perhaps familiar to you from the popular legal phrase *modus operandi*, or simply M.O. Vivendi translates as "way of life," making the title of this journal, *Modus Vivendi*, a phrase that means "mode of life," or more colloquially, "way of life." We scholars of international relations and political science use this phrase to mean a political agreement which is reached, often temporarily, to allow conflicting parties to live in peace with one another. This phrase reveals the purpose of this journal, a publication in which multiple viewpoints and topic areas coexist, bringing about a peace between the issues of the world. *Modus Vivendi* is proud to be one of the few undergraduate international relations journals in the country and owes a great debt to the hard work and support of the Rhodes College International Studies Department and the Rhodes College chapter of Sigma Iota Rho. As a student journal, we also owe our existence to the persistence, grit, and excellence of the students of international relations at Rhodes College. Without them, we would have nothing to publish! Also, we would like to thank the professors and advisors who have cultivated our love of learning, encouraged our international interest, and equipped us with the skills necessary to critically analyze and evaluate the most important issues of international relations.

Without them, we would also have nothing to publish!
We are excited that this year’s journal, our twenty-fourth volume, represents perhaps the most diverse and compelling range of issue areas yet. From the geopolitics of the Arctic and the revolutions of Central Asian states to the international politics of interest groups, the effect of domestic policy on controversial issues such as gun violence, and the results of the use of paramilitary contractors, this edition truly is the coexistence of scholarship promised by our title, *Modus Vivendi*. The authors published in this year’s publication represent the most talented and passionate international relations scholars Rhodes College has to offer. I would like to extend a message of congratulations to these authors: Logan Rogers, Grady Vaughan, Aemal Nafis, Laura Eckelkamp, Mitchell Koenig, and Claire Rickard.

While it is true that there would be nothing to publish without the students and faculty of the Rhodes College International Studies Department, it is also true that without the committed editors that comprise this year’s editorial board, there would be no *Modus Vivendi*. I would like to thank these editors for their tireless drive: Meredith Clement, Dylan Craddock, Hallie Green, Mitchell Koenig, and Laurie Williams. Special thanks are also in order for Kim Stevenson and Professor Chen for their guidance and support.

Most of all, I would like to thank you, the reader, for your dedication to knowledge and your excellence of scholarship.

*Jordan Giles*  Editor-In-Chief, 2018
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Geopolitics on Ice: The Effect of Climate Change on the International Balance of Power in the Arctic Circle

Logan Rogers

In December of 2017, the Trump administration released its National Security Strategy; outlining to Congress and the world what the key security concerns of the United States were in the eyes of its chief executive. In a drastic departure from Obama-era security goals, the Trump administration articulated several new, primary focuses for the security of the state. The main threat was determined to be the rising world powers of Russia and China, and their revisionist goals for the current world order. Maintaining the United States trade supremacy also became a part of Trump’s “America First” strategy, calling for an end to the supposed unfair trade practices that have hindered the growth and power of the United States. One of the most significant changes came from what was omitted from the strategy: climate change is no longer considered a threat to the safety of America, domestically or abroad. For the Trump administration, this was a fairly predictable pattern. The administration and the president in particular have made known their stance on climate change. On December 28th, the president tweeted “In the East, it could be the COLDEST New Year’s Eve on record. Perhaps we could use a little bit of that good old Global Warming that our Country, but not other countries, was going to pay TRILLIONS OF DOLLARS to protect against. Bundle up!” It is evident that the current administration of the United States cares very little about the global spectre of a changing climate; however, by ignoring the global rise in average temperature as a security threat, the administration also ignores the growing power of Russia.

In order for the Trump Administration to effectively deter the rise of a near-peer competitor, climate change must be recognized as a national security threat in the Arctic region.

A Changing Climate

In a study published by Cook et al. (2016), in a sample of 11,944 studies regarding climate change, the researchers concluded that there was a consensus within the scientific community: 97% of climate studies agreed that the upward trend in global temperatures is due to anthropogenic causes. Climate change, the shifting of global and regional weather patterns, has been clearly attributed to human industrial and commercial activity by the bulk of the scientific community. The implications of this global change in temperature manifest themselves in many forms, perhaps the most prevalently in the Arctic Circle. The vast plains of sea ice that characterize the Arctic have been receding since the 1980s. According to NASA’s program manager for cryosphere research, Tom Wagner, “we have lost more than two-thirds of the ice that used to be back in the 1980’s” (Ferris, 2016). Scientists tend to agree that the climate is changing, but how does the scientific community know this? The simplest answer comes from direct observation. Satellites have been capturing images of the Arctic since the 1960s. By observing and measuring the yearly patterns of what ice remains in the Arctic, the scientific community has concluded that it has decreased in total land mass.
Researchers also collect samples of ice cores from the region itself to determine climatological changes. Overpeck et al. (1997) used ice cores and other water samples to observe how the Arctic has changed over time, and concluded that “From 1840 to the mid-20th century, the Arctic warmed to the highest temperatures in four centuries” (p.1251).

**The Wealth of the Arctic**

Humanity has long recognized the Arctic as a potential source of wealth and commerce. Upon European discovery of the Americas, explorers began to look for a waterway through or around the continents that would connect the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. The invaluable nature of a commercial passage between the Atlantic and the Pacific drove other explorers to search for routes other than the Arctic. The wealth and successes of the various enterprises that make up the world economy depends on their ability to effectively export and trade their goods across the oceans. As time goes on and the nature of international trade grows and changes, the method by which that trade is conducted must change as well. Since the ice is receding within the Arctic Circle, the waters will become much more navigable for large freighters. The end of the Cape as the predominant mode of commercial travel began with the United States’ construction of the Panama Canal in 1904. By the end of its construction in 1914, the United States had successfully created what would become one of the most trafficked avenues for maritime trade in the world. Every year, about 14,000 ships pass through the canal carrying billions of dollars’ worth of goods being traded internationally (Smith, 2016).

For the bulk of the 20th century, the Panama Canal was the go-to path for international maritime trade. Rather than going around two continents, freighters merely had to traverse a 48 mile long canal. The canal has become less popular in recent years. The globalization of the late 20th and early 21st centuries has drastically increased the volume of trade demanded worldwide. While the ships have grown to meet this demand, the Panama Canal has not. Costs have been increasing to cross the canal as well. Many businesses instead opt to unload their cargo in New York or California and have it shipped on trains to the opposite coast (Fox News, 2014). The Canal will soon undergo renovations; however, the same volume of trade is unlikely to return due to rising costs. Currently, six states share a border with the Arctic Circle: Denmark (by way of Greenland), Norway, Canada, Iceland, the United States, and Russia, all of which have potential stake in travel through the Arctic Circle. The Arctic, devoid of ice, could possibly be the fastest mode of maritime travel available. To understand this, consider Shanghai, one of the foremost Special Economic Zones within China. It is a coastal city, and as such serves as one of China’s main ports. Currently, in order for a Chinese cargo ship to travel to Europe, it has to travel about 14,000 miles across two oceans. If the Arctic were a viable route, a Chinese cargo ship would only need to travel about 9,000 miles. This is an immense difference. A theoretical trip through the Arctic would save a cargo ship not only time, but the cost of fuel, labor, and the ever increasing price of crossing the Panama Canal. A country that can exploit this potential pathway is a country that will ultimately benefit.
The Arctic is not only rich in potential paths for travel. When Frobisher returned from his initial voyages to the Arctic, he carried with him what he thought to be an incredible amount of gold. When it was appraised, all he was left with was an abundance of pyrite, otherwise known as fool’s gold. Today, the Arctic has far more to offer than worthless minerals. In a 2014 report, BP predicted that at current production and consumption rates, the Earth has enough oil to last 53.3 years (DiLallo, 2014). This figure comes from the reserves and consumption available in 2014, and does not include factors such as the discovery of vast new oil sources. A study from the United States Geological survey estimates “that up to 30 percent of the world’s undiscovered gas and 15 percent of oil waiting to be found are inside the Arctic Circle” (Jordans, 2017).

What was once an impossible and expensive task, the extraction of fossil fuels from the Arctic, has grown considerably easier and will continue to do so as the ice recedes. An incredible amount of wealth awaits the nation that can effectively extract these resources. The Geological Survey of Norway also predicts that there is a vast amount of “coal, diamonds, uranium, phosphate, nickel, platinum and other precious minerals” beneath the surface of the ice (Jordans, 2017).

**Russia’s Growing Arctic Influence**

Central to all of these developments is the posturing and actions of Russia. As a state, one of Russia’s oldest foreign policy objectives has been to secure a warm water port. During the reign of Czar Peter the Great, Russia grew to recognize the supremacy of the Western world.

Peter’s reign as czar began at the burgeoning of an industrialized Europe, a Europe that was not only growing faster than Russia, but growing stronger as well. Peter’s solution to this issue was to emulate the progress of the West and learn from its advancements. Through Peter’s subsequent travels through the West, he grew to admire the role a navy played in the advancement and progression of a protoindustrial state. A fleet of ships could travel faster and farther than any other land vessel at the time, while simultaneously transporting many more people and goods. Peter returned to Russia with a knowledge of Western shipbuilding practices; however, he had nowhere to dock them (Nikiforov, 2018). Russia’s geographic position is one characterized by frequent cold. Most of the water surrounding the extent of Peter’s Russia was either frozen in the winter or on the irrelevant and underpopulated Eastern coast.

Today, Russia has three major ports within its borders that it can conduct maritime trade at: the Baltic Sea, the Pacific Ocean, and the Black Sea. These three locations are spread out, and are sparse compared to the world powers Russia wants to compete with. Since the reign of Peter the Great, one of Russia’s implicit foreign policy objectives has been to obtain more warm water ports. The Russian annexation of its exclave after the defeat of the Nazis was obtained solely for this purpose. Russian eastward expansion over the past few centuries and its defense of the far flung Pacific Coast in the Russo-Japanese War were both for the purpose of maintaining and exploiting a potential source of maritime activity. One of the reasons for the 2014 annexation of Crimea was to secure another warm water port (Delman, 2015).
The goal of the Russian state for centuries has been to increase its economic and naval clout abroad so that it may keep up with its neighbors. Due to its border with the Arctic, approximately 65% of the landmass of Russia is covered in permafrost, an unusable layer of the soil that is frozen year round (Climate Change Post, 2018). As global temperatures continue to change, the once permanently frozen soil will continue to melt. The Climate Change Post predicts that by 2050, Northern hemispheric permafrost will decrease by 15% to 25% (Climate Change Post, 2018). Currently, about 7% of Russia’s land mass is arable (Trading Economics, 2014). When the permafrost disappears in Northern Russia, more land will open up for a wider range of agricultural and other economic activities. Ever since sanctions were levied against Russia for their actions in Crimea, agricultural independence has been a key factor in its survival. Any expansion of arable land will ultimately render the sanctions less effective over time.

The mineral wealth that is being exposed by the recession of Arctic ice exists predominantly within the sphere of Russian influence. According to the Russian Geographical Society, “the Russian Arctic is the source for about 80 percent of this oil and virtually all of the natural gas” (The Arctic, 2017). Approximately 16% of Russian gross domestic product is comprised of oil and natural gas extraction and production (World Bank, 2014). Russia is widely considered to be dependent on its oil reserves for growth and development. Russian access to these oil and gas reserves is crucial to its future economic relevance.

The rare resources that exist beneath the once frozen Russian North are also becoming more accessible. As complex devices relying on long lasting, portable batteries become more prevalent, Russian mining operations focused on minerals like lithium and cobalt will become more profitable and competitive internationally. The Northern Russian coastline is longer than any other nation’s with the Arctic Ocean. As ice continues to melt, more of that coastline becomes available for the potential warm water ports that Russia is obsessed with. The viability of the Arctic as an alternative lane for maritime travel to the Panama Canal also increases as well. Russian capitalization on their northernmost coast is an opportunity to gain influence and control over the commerce of the region. The Putin administration understands this, and has been shaping policy in accordance with this potential.

The 48 mile-long canal that stretches through the Isthmus of Panama has attracted billions of dollars in yearly revenue for the governments that have controlled it. Russia is aware of the future power and wealth it may hold as the both the global hegemon and the dominant force in the Arctic. The conservative think tank known as the Henry Jackson Society has described Russia’s actions in the Arctic as a “one-sided arms race” (Mortimer, 2017). The Russian military has recommissioned the 23 Soviet-era military and air bases that pepper the region, built early warning missile systems throughout the region, and have begun building a new fleet of icebreaker vessels.
By 2020, there will be 50 completed Russian airfields in operation within the Arctic Circle. Currently, there are 45,000 military troops stationed within the Circle. Russia is flexing its military muscles and laying claim to control over the region in an attempt to demonstrate to the international community that it will be the dominant actor in the Arctic. A monopoly over the trade of the Arctic region is only the tip of the iceberg. As Russia becomes more resource wealthy and grows more powerful in the Arctic trade network, nations using these shipping lanes will become more dependent upon Russia and vice versa. Economic interdependence sets the stage for future alliances and treaties worldwide. Absolute authority recognized by the international community can also be a path to a Russian claim to sovereignty over the region. After analyzing the continental shelves that extend from the landmass of a country, countries can apply for ownership of the waters surrounding that shelf. In its process of making claims to the United Nations over sovereign possession of the continental shelves that form the Arctic, Russia has had multiple disputes with other nations claiming the same regions. Notably, Denmark is currently claiming the North Pole, which Russia also claims in its reports. In the future, when Russia begins to accumulate more allies and power in the region, claims such as this one will have more international support. Regardless of the influence Russia may garner over its future allies, it still has a virtually uncontested military presence in the region.

The annexation of Crimea shows that Russia is not opposed to using military force to gain territory within its sphere of influence, and the international community seems unwilling to stop it. The United States and NATO have shown almost no regard for the buildup of military forces in the Arctic region, even though the Arctic offers a direct naval route to western North America from the most populous and industrialized region of Russia. Any potential for conflicts that arise between the ascending power of Russia and the U.S with its allies are being ignored by the very actors that have the most to lose.

The Trump Administration’s Stance
The administration of Barack Obama became the first in the United States to list climate change as a primary security threat to the nation. Rapid changes in the climate have been the impetus behind intensifying natural disasters, drastic changes in the planting and harvesting periods that have defined the agriculture of regions for generations, and the consequences and instability that follow these events (NASA, 2005). This change in climate is the driving force behind Russia’s growing stake and power in the Arctic Circle. The Trump administration, in a move that echoes his previous stances on the issue of climate change, has elected to not include climate change in the National Security Strategy. The administration is also creating policy for its bureaucrats that prevent them from using words related to a changing climate, and has recently pulled out from the Paris Accord, a document signed by 175 parties that articulates a commitment to stop the behaviors that ultimately damage the environment.
If the disruptive force of climate change is not even on the radar of the administration, then what is? According to the White House, one of its main concerns is the rise of great power competition, that is, the attempt by other nations to reassert their global dominance in spite of the current hierarchy. By upsetting the current hierarchy, these powers are attempting to “deny America access in times of crisis and to contest our ability to operate freely in critical commercial zones during peacetime. In short, they are contesting our geopolitical advantages and trying to change the international order in their favor” (White House, 2017). Hegemony is built upon a give and take relationship with the other states and actors that populate the world. If a hegemon wishes to assert its policies internationally, they must be advantageous to its allies; otherwise, these allies will not be compliant and will likely support a different world power that gives the state what it needs. The American hegemony ideally promotes peace, economic cooperation, and stability in the world order. This is the crux of hegemonic stability theory and the world order that the Trump administration has deemed the most advantageous to its security agenda; however, the administration has not acted upon these interests in the most effective way. Recently, the Trump administration has taken several steps that do not benefit the allies and institutions instrumental to the survival of the U.S hegemony. Trump’s NSS has made it apparent that United States hegemony is of the utmost importance to the future of the country, but policy outside of the NSS has been counterproductive to this overall goal.

The United Nations is predominantly funded by the United States, and the United States has veto power, thus giving it great influence; however, without any benefit from listening to the U.S, it is possible that other foreign interests will begin to play an increasing role in setting the agenda of the world. After the United Nations condemned the U.S for its recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, Trump cut $285 billion from the budget of the U.N (Goodkind, 2017). Without proper quid pro quo between allies, Trump allows for the U.S to slip in power. If this world order is how the Trump administration would like things to continue, then more emphasis needs to be placed on maintaining relationships rather than losing them.

Hegemonic stability theory also posits the likely result of an upset world order. In the event that the world order is effectively disrupted, there will be an ensuing power vacuum that must be filled. The competition to become the next hegemon in the region will lead to an unpredictable geopolitical landscape. A struggle for dominance and power is what the Trump administration should seek to avoid by attempting to prevent the world order from being upset. By remaining at the top of the global order, the United States not only avoids any serious conflicts, it can also retain its economic security. These are the primary goals of the Trump administration, but can they possibly be met? The National Security Strategy of the Trump administration names two specific great powers that are attempting to upset the global hegemony of the United States: China and Russia.
By ignoring the reality of a shrinking Arctic, the United States is allowing the latter of these two revisionist powers to grow more and more powerful every passing day. Russia is currently in the process of militarizing the Arctic Circle, with no repercussions or opposition. The response by NATO and the United States has been lacking, to say the least. This growing military presence can be for no reason other than preparation for Russia’s attempt at controlling the Arctic Ocean.

Russia’s expansion into the Arctic also deconstructs two other tenets of United States influence abroad: their ability as the global power to create, uphold, and enforce treaties, and the economic interdependence that many states share with the United States. If the United States shrinks in the spectre of a growing Russian superpower, its word and influence abroad will begin to mean less than that of Russia’s. The global dominance that allowed the United States to maintain and assert its policy goals internationally will no longer be as influential. Russia’s future role as a trade giant would also decrease the reliance on the United States for trade and business. Russia will be in control of possibly one of the most trafficked commerce lanes in history and those looking to conduct profitable trade will turn to Russia.

Climate change, although not normally conceptualized as a realist consideration, should be one of the primary concerns of the Trump administration as a threat to the safety of the state. The Obama administration recognized this, and by doing so put the United States in a safer position at home and abroad.

By imposing its military and economic presence in the Arctic, Russia could feasibly assert its influence uncontested as in Crimea. Control over one of the quickest trade routes in the world, coupled with the direct access to an untapped wealth of mineral resource, would allow Russia to engage in unprecedented levels of globalization and interconnectivity that would destabilize the United States hegemony and the world order that it worked to build for the last century.

Conclusion
As the Arctic continues to melt and the Trump administration continues to ignore these developments, Russia will continue to grow in power, putting the United States in a more precarious position globally by the standards articulated in the National Security Strategy. Receding Arctic ice sheets caused by global climate change allow for greater access and movement within the Arctic Circle; both things the Russian state has prioritized for centuries. In the North, the Russians grow in power completely uncontested by those who stand to lose the most from it: the United States and NATO. This growth in Russian power will ultimately upset the world order that the United States hopes to maintain. Climate change is not just a threat in the Arctic Circle; it is a global phenomenon that has already shaped the world and disrupted the lives of millions. While Russian growth in the Arctic may be one particular consequence that upsets the global order, the immense displacement, aggravation, and loss of life that will result will be far more monumental. In order for climate change
and the consequences that come with it to be stopped, global recognition must be made and unilateral change must be instituted - only then can we live in a safer world.

References


Cuilcagh Mountain, County Fermanagh, Northern Ireland
Caleb L. Fowler, Class of 2018
Analysis of the Rose Revolution Through the Value Systems

Approach

Aemal Nafis

The people of Georgia excitedly elected Eduard Shevardnadze to two consecutive terms as president from 1994 to 2003. His corrupt and authoritarian agenda, however, eventually shattered his “reformist” reputation when he attempted election fraud to secure his dwindling power. His actions unleashed the peaceful Rose Revolution in November 2003. The value-systems approach explains how the nation’s economic and political decline developed into systemic disequilibrium. This disequilibrium eventually transformed into the Rose Revolution through the presence of three core accelerators: disarray within President Eduard Shevardnadze’s administration, the leadership of Mikheil Saakashvili and Zurab Zhvania, and the protesters’ strategic decision to refrain from violence against President Shevardnadze’s forces. While acknowledging the weaknesses of the value systems approach—namely its oversight of the role of social movement organizations and international influences in facilitating a revolution—this paper, nonetheless, concludes that the value-systems paradigm is a sufficient and practical model to explain the development and outcomes of the Rose Revolution.

Context of the Rose Revolution

When the Republic of Georgia won its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, the people were prepared to help the first democratically elected president, President Zviad Gamsakhurdia, build their fledgling nation upon the foundation of pro-Western democratic principles. To the people’s dismay, President Gamsakhurdia tried to reignite the country’s failing Soviet institutions instead. Moreover, he oversaw a largely authoritarian rule diseased with “massive unemployment, sudden poverty, and marginalization of the vast majority of the population” (Kukhianidze, 2009, p.218). Eventually, the opposition overthrew President Gamsakhurdia in a violent coup d’état in 1993 and the nation elected President Shevardnadze in the next election in 1995. President Shevardnadze’s bold anti-corruption campaign was largely centered around economic and democratic reform, the nostalgic ideals upon which the nation struggled to achieve its hard-earned independence. He pledged to steer the direction of the nation’s politics away from Soviet-era influenced communist ideology to pro-Western democracy. His presidency ushered in an era of “consistent economic recovery” and “relative monetary stability” fulfilling his promise of economic reform (Papava, 2005). Moreover, to uphold his word on democratic change, President Shevardnadze introduced a “reformist” agenda that oversaw the emergence of almost 3000 NGOs, opposing political parties, and independent-minded media broadcast companies, the most successful being Rustavi 2 (Welt, 2005). Immediately after his election, President Shevardnadze ordered a constitutional commission to formulate a completely new constitution based largely on democratic principles. President Shevardnadze was nationally and internationally applauded for taking such a major step that seemed bound to lead to complete democratization in Georgia. Unfortunately, following the initial years of President Shevardnadze’s term, the country
began to witness both economic and democratic deterioration. The leading cause of this decline was rampant corruption within President Shevardnadze’s administration, despite the fact that his entire presidential campaign was fixated upon the abolition of corruption in government institutions. Georgia’s “budget crisis” illustrates the extent to which corruption infiltrated the administration. The budget crisis began with the nascent government’s inability to collect projected tax and nontax revenues to secure beneficial loans from international financial institutions (Papava, 2005). The IMF drafted a new tax code for Georgia in 1997 to keep it grounded toward democratic and economic reform, but failed to improve the country’s taxation system. Papava explains that this new code “was incompatible with the country’s context and the key inadequacies of which were apparent from the very beginning” (2005, p.12). One of these “key inadequacies” included the government’s failure to control the national borders, leading to high levels of illicit economic activity like smuggling (Papava, 2005). The state passed thousands of amendments to correct the weaknesses in the code, but these attempts further complicated the tax code and made it easier for corruption to flourish in the taxation system. Although President Shevardnadze’s government promised the IMF it would implement free market economic and democratic reforms, it instead resorted to “deceptive accounting techniques” to meet budget revenues (Papava, 2006, p. 660). In response, the IMF suspended its involvement in the state’s affairs in 2002. This setback magnified the nation’s foreign debt to “about 50 percent of GDP” (Papava, 2005, p. 12).

Papava expounds that subsequently the state’s internal debt inflated, and the poverty rate reached 52 percent due to “unpaid salaries and pensions to public sector employees and pensioners” worth around 120 million U.S. dollars (Papava, 2005, p.14). Eventually, the severe financial turmoil incapacitated the government’s ability to provide even the most basic social needs for its citizens, such as the supply of electricity. Eventually President Shevardnadze’s impressive liberal democratic regime devolved into a disappointing liberal autocracy (Welt, 2005). His reforms were less a step toward democratization and more a tool to escape political enemies (Welt, 2005). Although President Shevardnadze surrounded himself with the façade of pro-Western democratic reformers and opposing political parties, he secured his cronies and members of the old corrupt establishment in key policy and decision-making positions. The majority of the NGOs were located near President Shevardnadze’s Presidential Palace, blunting their national outreach. As a result, the NGOs exercised relatively weak influence in policy-making and grassroots politics (Welt, 2005). Furthermore, although it is true that media flourished during this time, President Shevardnadze’s government in 2001 attempted to shut down the highly critical and outspoken media broadcast company Rustavi 2, which set off a national scandal (Welt, 2005). Ironically, President Shevardnadze’s corrupt administration was slowly exposed to the Georgian people through the democratic institutions he created. His corrupt agenda culminated with his attempt at election fraud in 2003.
This sparked outrage within the nation and thousands of indignant protesters swarmed the streets of downtown Tbilisi outside the capital, refusing to leave until President Shevardnadze resigned from office.

**The Value Systems Approach**

The value systems approach is one of the most common paradigms used to study revolutions. It analyzes a revolution through the context of the social system it transpires in. Essentially, the paradigm contends that the economic, social, political, and cultural aspects of a social system are crucial to the study of revolution. The paradigm further argues that revolutions are more likely to occur when people identify deviation between their societal values and their reality. That is to say, conflict brews in an environment where people cannot reconcile their ideal standards of living with economic, political, or cultural realities. This environment is generated by a regime’s constant failure to uphold the expectations of its people. The regime’s legitimacy and authority begin to deteriorate in the eyes of its citizens, and this kindles resentment and opposition. Hence, the paradigm identifies the displacement of a society’s values and norms as the prime causal mechanism for mass mobilization and dissent in a society. The first primary assumption of this approach is the idea that societies are homeostatic and can adjust to variations in their traditional values and norms.

Chalmers Johnson contends, however, that the “division of labor” segment of a society can occasionally fail to adjust itself to changing values and norms (Kamrava, 1992). This causes society to enter a state of “disequilibrium” (Kamrava 1992).

The paradigm assumes, however, that three critical accelerators should be present for disequilibrium to transform into a revolution. These accelerators are disorder amongst the governing elite and “military weakness”, a high level of morale and confidence of the revolutionaries in their efforts to vanquish the ruling elites, and calculated military tactics that revolutionaries employ against the elites’ forces (Kamrava, 1992). Additionally, the elite of the society must express uncompromising behavior toward the requests and demands of their citizens. Because regimes are prone to using force, such as deployment of antagonistic military troops or arrest against dissidents who challenge their legitimacy, the paradigm assumes that the key accelerator that determines a revolution’s victory is the military tactics the revolutionaries employ against the “intransigent elite” (Kamrava, 1992).

**The Value Systems Approach Applied to the Rose Revolution**

Deviation in the Georgian people’s ideal economic, political, and/or social values began with President Gamsakhurdia’s presidency. After independence, the Georgian people aspired to establish a state based on pro-Western democratic values and principles. His authoritarian presidency and Soviet influenced policies failed to reach the people’s democratic expectations, creating a divergence between their values and reality. President Shevardnadze’s election in 1994 began to rekindle conciliation between the people’s values and social reality when he passed measures that fulfilled his promise for economic and democratic reform. These reforms and
freedoms temporarily alleviated the economic and political strife of many segments of the nation. Value deviation again followed with the budget crisis, the increase in poverty rate, the government’s inability to provide basic social needs like electricity, the withdrawal of the IMF, the administration’s scandalous attempt to censor Rustavi 2, the visible increase in corruption, and finally, election fraud. These deviations between the economic and political values of the Georgian nation and the reality in their society proved to be the prime causal mechanism that brewed resentment and mass mobilization. Thus, the Georgian nation entered a state of disequilibrium.

According to the value systems approach, the first accelerator that is crucial to stimulate a revolution is disarray within the elites of a society. In the case of the Rose Revolution, disarray began with the resignations of political officials from President Shevardnadze’s administration in 2001. As stated above, President Shevardnadze created a visible circle of reform-minded politicians to keep his authoritarian and corrupt motivations hidden. Thus, even if the public could not detect his hypocrisy, these resignations demonstrated that reformers around him could. After President Shevardnadze’s failed attempt to shut down Rustavi 2, the Minister of Justice, Mikhael Saakashvili, resigned in protest and organized his own political party called The National Movement Party. Likewise, the speaker of the Parliament, Zurab Zhvania, also resigned and formed his party, the United Democrats Party (Welt, 2005). Saakashvili immediately began to travel around the country to build support for his new party and his campaign as presidential candidate in the upcoming 2003 elections. After the International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy revealed that President Shevardnadze had rigged the elections in November 2003, both Saakashvili and Zhvania immediately organized opposition rallies to protest the elections and demand President Shevardnadze’s resignation. The leadership of these men illustrates the emergence of the second accelerator that the paradigm identifies: high moral and confidence within the revolutionaries. The protests originally brought out a small group of people, indicating low confidence and motivation within the nation to challenge President Shevardnadze. Saakashvili’s and Zhvania’s political influence paired with their prominent national popularity, however, proved to be instrumental in generating a movement that attracted more and more people to the street demonstrations everyday. Both Saakashvili and Zhvania had previously been members of President Shevardnadze’s administration. Additionally, Saakashvili contested the 2003 presidential elections. Thus, both qualified as leaders for much of the population due to their national status. Any disconnect that protesters were feeling between their values and reality was replaced with confidence and reality was replaced with confidence and motivation through the guidance and influence of the leaders of the revolution Saakashvili and Zhvania. The leadership of these men intensified the revolutionaries’ confidence and thus, proved to be a monumental facilitator of the Rose Revolution when Saakashvili peacefully led thousands of protesters, all holding red roses, into the halls of parliament and
boldly demanded President Shevardnadze to resign. This audacious challenge compelled President Shevardnadze to resign the next day. The third accelerator that the value systems approach outlines is the use of strategic military tactics against the elite forces. It should be noted that the phrase “military tactic” does not necessarily imply combat or violence. A tactic is simply a means or a plan. Deception, distraction, and incentive are all considered military tactics, albeit they do not include physical force or combative action. Contrary to traditional perception of revolutions, the protesters in the Rose Revolution did not employ any violence. They chose to appease potential aggressors, the military troops, and police force that President Shevardnadze deployed to contain the protests by taming their behavior during demonstrations and refusing to indulge in violence. These armed forces would have employed violence against the protesters had they engaged in combative tactics instead. The decision to refrain from violence turned out to be the revolutionaries’ most potent weapon against President Shevardnadze. In the Rose Revolution, peaceful engagement proved to be the best military tactic, marking the Rose Revolution as the first bloodless change of power in the entire Caucasus region. The paradigm also emphasizes the significance of an “intransigent elite” that refuses to grant the requests and demands of the opposition. This factor is crucial in perpetuating outrage and exasperation within the opposition. These emotions provide motivation and reason to the opposition to continue to dissent against the elite.

In the case of the Rose Revolution, the refusal of President Shevardnadze to resign churned indignation within the protesters, encouraging them to remain on the streets until he agreed to step down from power. If President Shevardnadze had yielded to the protesters’ demands calling for democratic and economic reforms earlier, the disequilibrium within a small group of people likely would not have transformed into a revolution of the nation. The Rose Revolution followed major economic and political declines in Georgian society. This highlights the significance of the social system that the value systems approach defines as a core factor in explaining revolution. These declines also explain the emergence of discrepancies between the public’s economic and political values and reality. The economic and political declines in Georgia help to affirm the paradigm’s assertion that divergence between a peoples’ values and reality is the causal mechanism of a revolution. Additionally, the three accelerators that the paradigm outlines are core features of the Rose Revolution.

**Weaknesses of the Value Systems Approach**
The value systems approach, however, does not explain the instrumental role of social movement organizations in a revolution. One of the fundamental leaders of the Rose Revolution was the youth resistance movement in Georgia KMARA, which translates as “Enough!” This group conducted major public demonstrations and was thoroughly engaged in activism against President Shevardnadze before his attempt at election fraud, but especially during the Rose Revolution (Welt, 2005).
KMARA’s influence on the nation was so strong that President Shevardnadze began to fear its outreach and took measures to repress KMARA (Welt, 2005). KMARA was exceptional at rallying and recruiting students and young people across the nation, which further strengthened the influence of the group. Students led by KMARA proved to be central figures in the Rose Revolution. The value systems approach should acknowledge the pivotal role that social movement organizations play in facilitating a revolution. The value systems approach also does not recognize the role of foreign countries and institutions in promoting a revolution. The withdrawal of the IMF from the financial activities of Georgia marked a radical economic setback for the country, but more importantly, a political setback. This move demonstrated to the people that President Shevardnadze’s administration was beginning to stray off its promised path towards democratic reform, sparking suspicions and misgivings within the nation. Additionally, many countries, such as the United States and certain western European democracies, expressed solidarity with the protesters and demonstrators during the Rose Revolution, and supported their calls for President Shevardnadze’s resignation (Kandelaki, 2006). When major power-wielding countries like the United States express unity with revolutions in smaller countries, they reinforce the passion of the movement and put pressure on the leaders of the regime. This can ultimately expedite the effects of the revolution. The value systems approach should recognize the supplementary role of countries and international institutions in a revolution.

Conclusion
The value systems paradigm provides a strong framework that defines the core features of the narrative of the Rose Revolution. It explains how President Shevardnadze’s economic amendments and reformist political agenda that he introduced in the initial years of his term reignited the ideals and values the Georgian people had previously fought to achieve after their hard-earned independence from the Soviet Union. It also demonstrates how the inability of the Georgian people to adjust to the economic and democratic failures in the later years of President Shevardnadze’s regime produced discrepancies between their values and reality. The paradigm provides a clear blueprint of three accelerators to predict the course of the revolution, but assumes that the key accelerator that determines a revolution’s success is military tactics the revolutionaries utilize against the elite forces. In the case of the Rose Revolution, the three core accelerators were: the resignation of political officials from President Shevardnadze’s administration, the confidence that revolutionary leaders Mikhaeil Saakashvili and Zurab Zhvania instilled in the revolutionaries, and the protesters’ strategic decision to refrain from military violence during the revolution, marking it the first bloodless transition of power in the region. Just like any other theory, however, the value systems approach has weaknesses. The paradigm fails to consider the role of social movement organizations and international influences, essential contributors to the Rose Revolution. Nonetheless, the value systems approach proves effective in predicting and explaining the development of the Rose Revolution.
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From Partisan to Peacemaker and Back: AIPAC’s Influence on the U.S. Stance in the Israel-Palestine Conflict

Laura Eckelkamp

This paper serves to briefly discuss the causes and development of the Israel-Palestine conflict in light of the United States’ foreign policy on the matter. Additionally, it will address the United States’ role in the ongoing conflict, the influence of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) on the United States government, as well as the implications of AIPAC’s relationship with the United States regarding the current status of the conflict. Specifically, AIPAC appears to have played a highly influential role in dictating United States foreign policy as of late. While AIPAC claims to be committed solely to strengthening, protecting and promoting the United States-Israel relationship, this lobbyist group has likely prolonged the conflict.

Though there have been a number of key players in the Israel-Palestine conflict, the American Israel Public Affairs Committee is particularly intriguing due to its understated influence in the United States’ role in the matter. It has been instrumental in pushing the United States government to choose, once again, a side in the conflict and has made substantial efforts in attempts to ensure the United States maintains its pro-Israel foreign policy. Today, AIPAC plays a key role in United States policy-making and foreign affairs. As Dr. John J. Mearsheimer and Dr. Stephen M. Walt assert in their analysis of the lobby group, “neither strategic nor moral arguments can account for America’s support for Israel... the explanation is the unmatched power of the Israel Lobby” (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2006, p. 88).

This lobby has pushed the United States to take a decidedly pro-Israel stance in the Israel-Palestine conflict, a stance which has effectively halted any efforts at peace negotiations indefinitely, as there does not appear to be a truly unbiased third party to mediate in this drawn-out conflict.

Background of the Conflict

During World War I, an undoubtedly volatile time in international relations, Great Britain needed as many allies as possible. Thus, British officials secretly promised what is now recognized as Israel and its occupied territories first to the Arab people under Ottoman rule before secretly promising the same piece of land to Jews the following year, all the while intending to keep the land under the rule of Great Britain. While Great Britain would soon focus its energies internally, both the Jewish and Arab peoples felt their respective party had a legitimate claim over the land, sparking a conflict which continues today.

Tensions between Jewish Israelis and Palestinians who both feel entitled to sole control of the land ultimately turned violent in 1948. Historical accounts of the war are highly indicative of the respective mindsets of the Israelis and the Palestinians, as Israelis refer to the 1948 military conflict as the “Independence War” while Palestinians refer to it as “The Catastrophe.” From that moment on, each side has declared themselves to be the rightful inhabitants of the land. Though there have been attempts at compromise or a two-state solution over the years, they have largely been halfhearted at best and realistically
doomed from the start. For example, chairman of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), Yasser Arafat, famously declared that he came “bearing an olive branch in one hand, and the freedom fighter’s gun in the other,” and asked that the Israelis not “let the olive branch fall” from his hand (Takruri, 2009). Thus, while both sides would benefit from an end to the violence, neither fully trusts the other to sincerely make efforts toward peace without ulterior motives. As a result, no peace treaty has ever arisen and the conflict still continues.

In the absence of trust between the two states, the leaders of neither state wish to make themselves vulnerable to the other by taking the first meaningful step towards a peaceful resolution. As such, negotiations have typically been brought forth and facilitated by third parties such as the United States. Two important steps towards a peaceful resolution came in the last decades of the 20th century: Oslo II and the Camp David Accords. While the United States has generally taken one side of the conflict or the other at most points in time, Oslo II and the Camp David Accords are examples of moments in which the United States aimed to facilitate peaceful negotiations and resolutions between the two sides of the conflict. These attempts were not successful as no peace treaty was signed and now the United States is not in a position to facilitate these negotiations because it has swayed towards Israel’s side, likely due to the increasing presence of AIPAC’s influence in many facets of the United States government.

**AIPAC and its Influence on the US Government**

No other lobbying group with interests in the conflict compares to the influence AIPAC has had over the United States government. Over the course of the past twenty years, AIPAC has more than tripled its lobbying expenditures from $900,000 to over $3.6 million (CRP, 2017). During that same time frame, AIPAC’s lobbying expenditures have consistently accounted for approximately 80% or more of all pro-Israel lobbying expenditures (see Figures A and B). As a result, AIPAC is effectively the voice of pro-Israel sentiment in the United States legislative scene. One former president of AIPAC, David Steiner, resigned after a recording surfaced in which he boasted of the extent of the lobby’s monetary influence on the United States government.
In this tape, Steiner discussed raising over $1,000,000 in New Jersey for Bill Clinton in his successful 1992 bid for the presidency (WRMEA, 1992-1993). Pro-Israel Political Action Committees have also reportedly raised upwards of $60,000,000 over the course of nearly forty years, compared to a little over $700,000 in pro-Arab fundraising in that same time frame (WRMEA, 2017). Whether intended or not, large sums of money like these can make or break a campaign and tend to artificially sway the government in a manner that is unrepresentative of its constituents. Though the extent of AIPAC’s influence in elections is debated, there have been a number of important elections over the years that appear to be influenced at least in part by AIPAC and its members. Going against AIPAC’s interests “can make life complicated for those in Congress looking toward their reelection” (Newhouse, 2009, p. 80).

One former congressman from Illinois attributes his failed reelection bid, as well as the failed bid of a fellow congressman from Illinois a few years later, to “failing to toe the AIPAC line” (Findley, 2006, p. 19). AIPAC influences these elections both with fundraising and mobilizing pro-Israel voters on voting day. As a result, though a true majority of a politician’s constituents may desire for the United States to take a neutral stance or even favor Palestine in the conflict, if a politician voices those beliefs they run the risk of losing their seat in office. Beyond simply assisting in the election of officials who are amicable to Israeli interests to begin with, AIPAC also dedicates a lot of effort towards directly interacting with officials already in office. These interactions range from scheduling official meetings with members of Congress at the Capitol to hosting kosher dinners at the houses of political insiders.
such as Senator Ted Kennedy or then-Vice-President-to-be Al Gore (Bruck, 2014; WRMEA, 1992-1993). These meetings are not simply efforts to catch up with old friends, but instead have a very specific agenda. In 2014, for example, officials from the lobbying group and officials from Washington met for a “closed meeting” regarding the violence in the Gaza Strip (Bruck, 2014). A fair amount of the organization’s lobbying efforts also takes place at the organization’s annual conference, during which AIPAC provides transportation for lobbyists of all ages to the United States Capitol to voice support for Israel (Takruri, 2016). In an even greater demonstration of AIPAC influence, key members of AIPAC have had their place in the United States government, such as David Ifshin, head of AIPAC general counsel and member of President Bill Clinton’s cabinet (Beinin, 1993). This goes a step above promoting candidates already running, as it places people in the United States government whose political agenda is strongly associated with the agenda of the lobby group as well as the state of Israel. Though the majority of average Americans believe that the United States should not favor either side in the conflict, it is clear that the government supports Israel. A 2014 poll showed that approximately 64% of Americans do not want the United States to lean toward either side in the conflict, consistent with previous years’ polls (Telhami, 2014). This is not reflected in the United States government’s actions. In fact, Israel is the largest recipient of foreign aid from the United States and almost all of this aid comes in the form of military assistance (Sharp, 2016). It is therefore clear that there is a disconnect between public opinion and official policy.

**AIPAC’s Influence on U.S. Foreign Policy**

AIPAC’s influence on the United States has had direct results with regards to United States foreign policy in the Middle East. Specifically, AIPAC’s influence has pushed the United States to take a more pro-Israel stance overall. For example, AIPAC successfully lobbied Congress to pass a bill that would move the United States embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, an occupied territory (Newhouse, 2009). Additionally, as mentioned previously, an obvious demonstration of this bias comes in the form of foreign aid from the United States to Israel. In fact, former AIPAC President David Steiner further boasted in a leaked recording that led to his resignation:

“You know what I got... I met with [United States Secretary of State] Jim Baker and I cut a deal with him. I got, besides the $3 billion, you know they’re looking for the Jewish votes, and I’ll tell him whatever he wants to hear... Besides the $10 billion in loan guarantees which was a fabulous thing, $3 billion in foreign, in military aid, and I got almost a billion dollars in other goodies that people don’t even know about... $700 million in military draw-down, from equipment that the United States Army’s going to give to Israel; $200 million the U.S. government is going to preposition materials in Israel, which Israel can draw upon; put them in the global warning protection system; so if there’s a missile fired, they’ll get the same advanced
notification that the U.S., is notified, joint military exercises—I've got a whole shopping list of things” (WRMEA, 1992-1995).

This financial support of Israel has not subsided over the years. In fact, Israel receives more foreign aid from the United States than any other state: "Washington has provided Israel with a level of support dwarfing that given to any other state. It has been the largest annual recipient of direct economic and military assistance since 1976, and is the largest recipient in total since World War II, to the tune of well over $140 billion... in 2004 dollars... Israel receives about $3 billion in direct assistance each year, roughly one-fifth of the foreign aid budget... This largesse is especially striking since Israel is now a wealthy industrial state with a per capita income roughly equal to that of South Korea or Spain” (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2006). The amount of foreign aid granted to Israel from the United States is particularly surprising given its independent wealth and the desire of the United States public to avoid taking a side in the conflict. As such, the only logical conclusion is that Steiner’s boasts hold water and that AIPAC is responsible for the dramatic and unnecessary financial assistance the United States provides to Israel.

**AIPAC’s Recent Struggles**

It would be wrong, however, to assume that AIPAC is all-powerful, especially as it appears that its recent efforts of persuasion have only succeeded in instilling a sense of pro-Israel sentiment in parts of United States government, as opposed to an anti-Palestine or anti-Arab sentiment among all of Washington. This is not for lack of effort, though. A few failures in recent history to influence United States foreign policy in the Middle East are particularly pertinent in demonstrating the limits of AIPAC’s power over the United States government. Though AIPAC successfully lobbied Congress to pass a bill that would move the embassy from Tel Aviv to the occupied territory of Jerusalem, this move has never officially been carried out. Presidents have generally viewed the move as an overstep of legislative power, viewing the issue as belonging in the realm of foreign affairs which are typically handled by the president alone (Newhouse, 2009). In a December 2017 speech, however, President Trump directed the State Department to act “consistent with the Jerusalem Embassy Act,” claiming that previous presidents may have “lacked the courage” to do so (Trump, 2017). Trump also wrongly claimed in this speech that the United States government has “declined to recognize any Israeli capital at all,” even though his own Secretary of Defense had previously described the United States’s official policy as recognizing Tel Aviv as the capital of Israel (Cortellessa, 2017). The Trump administration, nevertheless, declared in February 2018 that the United States embassy in Israel will officially move to Jerusalem by May 2018 (Wadhams, 2018). The general sense of confusion that looms over the Trump administration, paired with former Secretary of State Rex Tillerson’s recent departure from the administration, casts a great deal of uncertainty on the state of United States foreign affairs in general.
Another example of AIPAC’s recent struggle to influence United States foreign policy came just over a year ago when the United States abstained from voting in the United Nations Security Council’s vote on Resolution 2334 regarding Israeli settlements in occupied territory. The resolution ultimately passed, “reaffirm[ing] that Israel’s establishment of settlements in Palestinian territory occupied since 1967...had no legal validity” (UN Security Council, 2016). This decision has significantly hindered many of Israel’s and AIPAC’s goals, specifically their aim to control Jerusalem.

In addition to its qualms with Palestine, AIPAC has also demonstrated a less than favorable attitude towards Iran. This stance, which aligns with Israel’s official stance on the matter, identifies Iran as “a regional...[and] global threat to peace and stability” (Newhouse, 2009, p. 80). The lobbying group voiced staunch opposition to the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran, but only persuaded a handful of undecided Senators to vote against the deal and ultimately failed to prevent the deal (Demirjian & Morello, 2015). As two reporters for the Washington Post described the event, it was the largest public defeat for AIPAC since George H.W. Bush was president (Demirjian & Morello, 2015). This, paired with the lobby group’s failure to move the Israeli embassy and failed attempt to persuade the United States to veto UN Resolution 2334 suggests that AIPAC’s influence only extends so far.

Conclusion
The American Israel Public Affairs Committee has influenced United States foreign policy and the United States government as a whole more than many Americans likely realize. They have exercised this influence with both money and speeches and have generated overwhelming pro-Israel sentiment amongst many United States politicians. Over the last few decades, AIPAC has grown to be more and more influential in United States government, particularly with regards to the United States’s foreign policy regarding the Israel-Palestine conflict.

AIPAC’s influence on the United States government has ultimately created a conflict of interest for the United States, as the former mediator now has a significant pro-Israel bias. The initial roots of this bias do not appear to have been entirely based in strategy, morality, or even public opinion. The only reasonable explanation for this bias in the United States government is the actions of AIPAC. While initial peacemaking efforts by the United States may not have accomplished all that they had set out to do, they were a necessary first step towards peace. This disproportionate pro-Israel influence has forced the United States away from its former position as mediator in the conflict and the current administration has pushed the United States even further. As such, there is now a gap that will likely be filled by another state or non-governmental organization in order to truly achieve a resolution in the Israel-Palestine conflict.
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The Rise of Private Militaries

Claire Rickard

“This is Fallujah! Who asked you to come here?”

A mob of men, women, and children in Fallujah, Iraq chanted this under the burned, maimed, and broken bodies of four American men. The men were betrayed by their local contact and sent to a planned and fatal ambush (Pleming, 2007). They were shot with guns and rocket propelled grenades, set ablaze inside their car, removed from this car and tied to the back of another, dragged for blocks, beaten, and finally hung from a bridge (Freeman, 2004). Though there were American troops stationed nearby, no help came to these American civilian contractors.

This incident inspired many to ask who these men were that were so hated by the citizens of Fallujah, Iraq? Who were these civilians fighting in the Iraq War? This incident was America’s introduction to the relatively secret but thriving industry of private military and security companies (PMSC(s)), which are private companies that support a multitude of the U.S. military’s needs and functions. Before this horrific introduction to the PMSCs’ role in the American-Iraqi War, many Americans did not know this industry existed. Those four brutalized men in Fallujah, Iraq were American contractors, many ex-military, from a PMSC called Blackwater. Blackwater had been contracted to supervise and protect food delivery in Fallujah, as well as guard the American embassy (Freeman, 2004). After this incident the PMSC industry was thrust into the spotlight and many were concerned about American civilians performing military roles.

Today, the PMSC industry is massive and responsible for a large portion of U.S. national defense and military support, especially in recent wars (Riddell, 1985). A private entity that controls such an important and sensitive part of a nation is worth further research. The phenomenon of the rise of the PMSC industry did not happen overnight or without reason. Understanding the reasons behind the rise of PMSCs in the American military will be the purpose of this paper with the hope that understanding this rise can contribute to an understanding of their projected path.

Private military and security companies have been used by the U.S. armed forces in rapidly increasing numbers. Why are PMSCs used by the nation with the largest and most technically advanced military in the world? Certainly the U.S. could face and defeat enemies in wars such as the Vietnam War, Balkans War, Gulf War, Iraq War, and Afghanistan War without private help, yet private help was enlisted in these conflicts. The U.S. military’s use of PMSCs and their contractors has gone from 16% in the Vietnam War to 50% in the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars (“U.S. Military Use Civilian Contractors in Combat Zones,” 2017; McFate, 2016). This growing usage of PMSCs is a symptom and a result of changes in international norms surrounding the employment of this industry and also the enticing domestic political benefits of PMSCs.
Responding to an increased demand for their services in sectors like infrastructure and weapons consultation, the number of PMSCs began to rise during the Vietnam War. This started a trend in the U.S. military in which PMSCs were deployed in other armed conflicts. PMSCs have been used mostly in non-combatant roles, such as in the Balkans War when a PMSC called Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI), based in Virginia, was cited as being instrumental in the Croatian victory (Singer, 2008). As U.S. troop levels continually dropped after the end of the Cold War, PMSCs became the easy solution due to their availability, easy mobilization, and highly trained and prepared soldiers (Kane, 2004). As stated previously, by the Iraq War, PMSCs became a large percentage of the U.S. armed forces, and by 2006 the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) “estimated the number [of PMSC contractors] to be around 100,000” (Singer, 2008). These PMSCs were used for services beyond infrastructure, like base security and diplomatic protection. These 100,000 contractors are a sizable force when compared to the 140,000 state-based troops present at the same time (“Statistics on the Private Security Industry,” n.d.).

This growth in the number of PMSCs and usage by the U.S. armed forces is explosive and imperative to study because this industry has become a large influence on and participant in the national security of the U.S. Understanding the rise of PMSCs in the U.S. armed forces can allow researchers and policy makers to make more informed decisions surrounding the use of PMSCs and the implications for the growth of the industry.

PMSC effects on the U.S. financially, militarily, and legally, as well as their reputational implications, are influential. In the years since the start of the Afghanistan and Iraq Wars, there have been multiple and serious scandals involving PMSC contractors. Scandals involving underage prostitution, indiscriminate killing of citizens, and fraud have occurred. These events have seriously hurt both the U.S. reputation in the host country and U.S. mission and peacekeeping abilities. The rise of PMSCs hinder the military autonomy of a nation. These effects are consequential and come with the increased usage of the PMSCs industry.

**PMSCs in Scholarship**

The private military industry went from a $49 billion-a-year industry in 1990 to a $161 billion-a-year by 2010 (Isenburg, 2011). This explosive growth has been explained by a few factors, mainly focused around the change in the international and domestic attitudes towards PMSCs. Scholars like Petersohn, Kier, Farrell, and Kaldor attribute the explosive growth of PMSCs to predominantly international factors. Other scholars such as Stranger, Ettinger and Lindemann research the consequences of PMSCs, while Chakrabarti, Vine, and Pilbeam focus on the domestic causes for the industry’s growth.

The studies that exist on this topic usually focus on the effects of the use of PMSCs on the U.S. reputation, soldiers’ morale, financial cost, and regulation, or lack of regulation. The majority of scholarship concerning the bolstering of military might through PMSCs uses either the neorealist paradigm,
specifically the offensive realist paradigm, or an international political economy perspective. However, I contend that sociological institutionalism and new wars thesis explain shifting behavior in international norms, and that rational choice perspective is best at explaining domestic policies regarding PMSCs. Neorealist theory relies on state resources to measure state power, but his theory does not explain how the power of states originates. Neorealists “assume that states will be driven by international competition to organize their militaries functionally to make best use of available resources” (Farrell, 1998, p. 407). More specifically the strand called offensive realism is used to explain military growth. Offensive realists, like Mearsheimer, focus on relative gains and posit that a state can never be assured of its security in an anarchic world of competing, power-maximizing states and must therefore take every opportunity to aggressively expand its power (Snyder, 2002). Waltz (1979) contends that “cooperation is difficult because states are sensitive to how it affects their current and future relative capabilities” (p.105).

Offensive realism cannot be used to explain the rise of private military contractors because it falls short of explaining the need that caused the rise of private military companies in the international arena. Neorealist, specifically offensive realist, theory explains the increase in usage of PMSCs by the U.S. military by positing that the U.S. military’s use of PMSCs derives from power maximizing behavior due to international competition.

International political economy (IPE) is a school of thought concerning the “equity of the globalizing capital system” (Hough, 2015, p. 247). More specifically, the IPE school of thought mercantilism is used to explain the rise of the PMSCs. Mercantilism is described as a philosophy of “looking after number one” (Hough, 2015, p. 248). This IPE theory explains the increased reliance on PMSCs due to the financial benefits of PMSCs. Although there is dispute regarding the validity of the claim that PMSCs are cheaper than state-based military forces, Pilbeam cites the logic that “armies are normally monopolies within their respective states, and so they may have little incentive to be efficient or avoid wasteful expenditure, [whereas] PMSCs exist in a competitive market place which therefore forces them to be cost-efficient” (2015, p. 201). The IPE theory mercantilism supports this explanation of the rise of the PMSC industry because it makes clear the self-interested financial motivation and benefits of the U.S.’s use of PMSCs and their contractors. Pilbeam and other theorists, like Vine (2014) and Stroner (2008), argue that PMSCs are more cost efficient in the long-term because governments do not have to pay for PMSCs insurance, pension, and other expenditures that soldiers require. By privatizing the military industry, fewer jobs are created because of the lack of competition, but this does not mean that PMSCs are not cost efficient for the U.S. government. Using PMSCs may not be conducive to economic growth or competition, but it is financially beneficial to the U.S. government when it comes to long term costs.

Rational choice theory posits that PMSCs allow the U.S. military to maximize their effect and reach. Rational choice theorists assume that self-interested actors have
preferences that are consistent and stable and that their behavior is based on the options available, with their goal being to make choices that offer the best outcomes (Lovett, 2006). Actors participate in optimizing behavior and want to maximize their power and wealth, so they choose the greatest option while expending the least amount of energy (Lovett, 2006). Rational choice scholarship sees the benefits of PMSCs being the industry’s ability to maximize the U.S. government’s power and deployment capabilities. The U.S., as a self-interested actor, wants to expend the least amount of energy and money while reaping the most benefits. The PMSC industry offers contractors a long-term cheaper fighting force than the U.S. military, and gives the U.S. the ability to send troops to a country theoretically overnight due to the quick rate of PMSC mobilization. The rational choice theory explains the PMSC rise by pointing to rationality and optimization of U.S. influence abroad.

Sociological institutionalism does what neorealism cannot; it explains the origin of the use of PMSCs. The sociological institutionalist explanation is particularly persuasive with regard to shifting behavior in domestic and international politics. Sociological institutionalism scholarship studies the link between historical and cultural norms and how these norms can affect actors in the current and future international arena. A norm is defined as a standard or accepted behavior (“Norm,” n.d.). Sociological institutionalism explains why actors take on certain institutional forms and procedures, while also explaining the diffusion of these forms and procedures throughout the international system (Hall and Taylor, 1996). The scholarship regarding norms posits that they are used to understand state behavior in the international arena. Sociological institutionalism began with organizational theory in sociology which began the trend of applying norms to international interactions (Finnemore, 1996). Finnemore and Sikkink’s (1998) research states that there exists what they call norm “life cycles.” This explains the origin and acceptance of international norms. There are three stages: norm emergence, which requires a norm entrepreneur to convince norm leaders to accept new norms; norm cascade, a process by which norms are disseminated down from norm leaders to their followers; and norm internalization, which is when a norm becomes habitual (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998).

Regulatory norms are more applicable than the use of other theories, like neorealism, in understanding the rise of PMSCs in militaries because trends redefine what is appropriate behavior for a state. Kier’s (1997) research exemplifies how powerful norms can be: she describes the situation in pre-World War II France in which the French could not raise conscripts, unlike their German counterparts, due to accepted non-conscription norms. Sociological institutionalism is a strong explanation for the changing international opinion towards PMSCs, but the new wars thesis is also relevant to this discussion because it helps explain the environment in which norms emerged, which caused the rise of PMSCs. The new wars thesis is a contemporary theory first introduced by Mary Kaldor. It argues that modern wars are
fundamentally different from those of the past in terms of who fights in them and for what purposes. New wars are intricate, and they blur the lines between internal and external state borders. Today, wars incorporate warlords, PSMCs, jihadists, etc. (Pilbeam, 2015). In new wars, the capture of territory occurs through political means, and often involves controlling the native population through media, education, and propaganda. New wars are often financed by predatory private means. This new wars thesis explains the evolution of warfare and its conditions which have led to the rise of the use of PSMCs. The new wars thesis aids in the exploration of the reasons behind the growth of the private military industry at the international level due to its explanation of the changed ways in which wars are fought. New wars thesis describes one aspect of the changed environment as the downsizing of militaries worldwide after the end of the Cold War. The downsizing of armies left a gap in national militaries and a state’s ability to mobilize quickly. PSMCs and their contractors fill this void. For this reason, new wars thesis, combined with sociological institutionalism, provides a stronger and more dynamic picture of the international reasons behind the increased usage of PSMCs.

The Norm Life Cycle and PSMCs

Finnemore and Sikkink’s explanation of norm acceptance by the international community is pertinent when explaining the rise in the use PSMCs. This strand of sociological institutionalism explains three levels called the “norm life cycle,” which lead to a norm being accepted. They discuss how a norm begins with a critical actor, which is the state that would be affected most by the new norm. If the critical actor accepts the new behavior, then a cascade effect happens and other states start to accept the norm (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998). Examining the use of PSMCs in this context will exemplify how the use of the industry is becoming an accepted behavior in the international system.

In stage one, norm emergence, the U.S. could be seen as the critical actor for normalization of the legitimate use of PSMCs in the armies of developed states. I use the word “legitimate” because PSMCs were used before (and have been used after) the Vietnam War with malignant and illegal intent, as well as “legitimate” military uses. The Vietnam War was the earliest and most significant theatre of operation in which PSMCs were used legitimately before the normalization of the behavior. As the norm entrepreneur in the case of PSMCs, the U.S. armed forces pursued the use of contractors because they needed to further develop the infrastructure of South Vietnam in order to fight an effective war (Carter, 2004). This use of PSMCs persuaded others that PSMCs could benefit them financially, militarily, and politically and this started the dissemination of the norm of using PSMCs. Norm cascade, the second stage of the norm life cycle, is the current phase the PSMC industry is in. The international arena is currently experiencing a changing of norms surrounding the PSMC industry, making the use of PSMCs more accepted; but this profession is not fully internalized, as is described in the third stage of the norm life cycle. The norm of the use of PSMCs is in stage two because the use of PSMCs is not yet prominent and regular in all regions around the world.
The use of PMSCs is in the norm cascade phase rather than another phase because nations, like the U.S., the U.K., and South Africa use contractors legitimately, but this practice is not true of all states in the world. As the norm proceeds further into this second stage, it reinforces use of PMSCs by the U.S. and bolsters the normalization of the PMSC industry. Once the PMSC industry is accepted, the norm will move into stage three: internalization. Norm internalization will likely come with more regulations and laws concerning the PMSC industry and their use, something that is currently lacking. The table included explains the stages of the norm life cycle and describes the norm cascade stage that was mentioned.

**The Mercenary Question**

However, the PMSC industry has always had an obstacle to growth: the mercenary question. PMSC contractors are sometimes confused with or labeled as mercenaries, but private contractors themselves are vehemently opposed to this label. Mercenaries are typically hired personnel who kill for money and are not usually part of a company (“Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions”, 1977). PMSCs are legitimate companies with shareholders, unlike an assortment of combatants who are paid to kill. This question of label is important because mercenaries are constrained by more regulations and protocols than PMSC contractors. Once labeled as mercenaries, determinations are made about which countries and activities personnel can engage in. The activities of mercenaries are often seen as illegitimate due to the regulations placed on mercenaries, while contractors’ activities are seen as more legitimate.

In order to avoid the penalties surrounding the term “mercenary,” PMSCs use vague language to describe themselves and their services. Erik Prince, the founder of the PMSC Blackwater, made the statement that mercenaries are defined as “professional soldier[s] working for a foreign government” (Stoner, 2008). Prince made it very clear to the House Oversight Committee that his Blackwater employees and PMSC contractors like his are “Americans working for America, protecting Americans” (Stoner, 2008). This careful wording sounds nice, but is not especially true of the industry.
In recent years the demarcation between mercenaries and PMSC contractors has become more complicated. A few years after the Iraq War began, contractors increasingly started coming from Latin American countries instead of the traditional U.S. and Iraqi populations. The reason for the switch was financial. Peter Singer, an expert on the PMSC industry, believes that there were contractors from over thirty different countries who were employed in Iraq during the war. While “ex-soldiers from the Balkans, Fiji, Nepal, the Philippines, South Africa, and Uganda are all common in Iraq, Latin America has proven to be a particularly fertile recruiting ground for these companies” (Stoner, 2008). Adam Isacson, the director of programs at the Center for International Policy, believes that Latin America became a fertile recruitment ground for U.S. PSWPs because, as he points out, “what other region of the world are you going to find reasonably westernized people with military experience, in some cases with combat experience, who will work for low wages, who speak a language that a lot of our own military personnel speak... it’s their natural ground to find people with military experience for whom $1,000 a month is a lot of money” (Stoner, 2008). By 2011, it was estimated that more than 80% of the contractors used in Afghanistan and Iraq were not U.S. citizens, but rather local or third-country nationals (Brand and Dickinson, 2011). This diversion from traditional recruits disqualifies Prince’s definition of PMSCs’ contractors. This transition to cheaper labor force is in line with other major industry outsourcing, but this outsourcing makes the line between “mercenary” and “PMSC contractor” thinner.

Which begs the question: what is the difference between mercenaries and contractors? The answer seems to be subjective and dependent on the companies offering the private military and security services and the entity employing them.

**Background**

In order to have a more complete discussion about the PMSC industry, it is important to understand the current conversation surrounding PMSCs and their contractors. Current conversations about PMSCs are concerned with the regulation, or lack thereof, of PMSCs. As stated previously, the definitional difference between mercenaries and PMSC contractors is vague and subjective. The regulations of contractors has been difficult for this reason. There have been attempts at regulating PMSCs, like the 1977 Protocol I amendments to the 1949 Geneva Convention and the U.N.’s 1989 International Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries, but both of these have failed due to vague wording and lack of international support (Pilbeam, 2015). Protocol I is important because it is ratified and is widely accepted, having been signed by 174 nations, but nations like the United States, India, and Iran have not signed it (“Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977”). The U.N.’s 1989 International Convention came into effect in 2001 (“International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries”). This article (included in the appendix) is important because it
specifically bans mercenaries in the international arena. It also explicitly bans states from recruiting, financing, or training anyone who fits this definition of mercenary, but again, the definition of mercenary is vague enough that PMSCs can argue that their employees do not come under this definition.

In 2000, Congress “sought to rein in civilian contractors by passing the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA)” (Lindemann, 2007, p.87). MEJA would make it possible for PMSC contractors to be liable under U.S. law and able to be tried in federal court for crimes committed while in conflict zones. The act had little to no effect due to the complicated process of a state-side civilian prosecutor going through the proceedings of criminal investigations of crimes committed in an overseas conflict zone (Lindemann, 2007).

In 2007, the U.S. made attempts to regulate PMSCs through the update of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. This outlines the consequences of contractors’ criminal activities and holds contractors accountable to the most basic standards of military behavior and conduct (Lindemann, 2007). PMSC contractors’ behavior and the frustration with the inability to properly punish them is a source of contention in the U.S. military and the in host countries’ citizenries.

Human rights watch groups like the Center for Constitutional Rights complain about contractors’ behavior, stating that “the US Department of Justice (DoJ) is responsible for investigating and prosecuting these incidents...However, the DoJ has too often failed to prosecute even the most serious of human rights abuses by contractors” (“Accountability for Abu Ghraib Torture by Private Military Contractors”). For example, when a civilian interrogator from the PMSC Titan Corporation, and a civilian interpreter from another PSMC, CACI International, were implicated in the torture of prisoners in Abu Ghraib, they “faced no punishment, despite their implication in the official report... These civilians were technically working for the US Department of the Interior, rather than the DoD, thus shielding them from MEJA’s reach” (Lindemann, 2007, p.87). This example shows that despite all of the attempts at regulation, PMSCs have escaped any true regulations constraining their behavior in the field. Another point of contention is the arming of contractors in respect to the Geneva Convention of 1949. The convention ensures immunity for contractors who commit war crimes due to their civilian status, but these rights, along with their P.O.W. status, are forfeited if they are armed. If contractors are armed and fight then they can be labeled as mercenaries under this convention and will lose rights that keep them safe in active combat zones (Lindemann, 2007).

Contractors were used on bases in Iraq to provide infrastructure and consulting services; but with the PMSCs now providing security and protection, PMSCs feel it is necessary to arm their contractors.

It is also necessary to understand PMSC employers and their contractors before having a more in-depth conversation. PMSCs main clients are individuals, businesses, IGOs, NGOs, and states.

Individuals and companies doing business in dangerous places also use the protection of armed contractors.
IGOs, like the U.N. and NGOs, like the Red Cross, use them to keep their aid workers safe in conflict zones. The U.N.’s increased dependence on PMSCs is a marker of the normalization of the use of contractors in the international arena. Their increased dependence is reflected in their budget for PMSCs; the U.N.’s budget for PMSCs went from $44 million in 2009 to $76 million in 2010 (Janaby, 2015). PMSCs have been used by the U.N. in places like post-civil war Somalia to protect relief convoys, "police and military training and capacity building, security training and consultancy, [and] strategic information gathering” (Janaby, 2015). Although PMSC contractors have not been used as peacekeepers yet, the legality of IGOs like the U.N. and NGOs like the Red Cross using PMSC contractors is a grey area. The U.N. specifically has, as previously mentioned, protocols and conventions against hired civilian soldiers, which are endorsed by the Red Cross. Nevertheless, PMSCs have made it easier for post-conflict relief workers to bring aid into dangerous areas with the promise of protection. Even intelligence agencies, like the CIA, DIA and Department of Defense (DoD), use PMSCs to supplement their workforce. The use of private firms and contractors by the intelligence community is very extensive. In a 2007 presentation, a Senior Procurement Executive from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) said that 70% of the intelligence community’s budget is used to contract PMSCs and their employees (Rosenbach and Peritz, n.d.). Another telling figure of the intelligence community’s dependence on contractors is that 51% of the Defense Intelligence Agency’s employees are contractors (Rosenbach and Peritz, n.d.). The contractors in the intelligence community are used in protection, IT, translation, and consultation. There has been no legal doctrine regulating the intelligence community’s use of contractors. As an Army investigation into detainee mistreatment in Iraq stated, “no doctrine exists to guide interrogators and their intelligence leaders... in the contract management or command and control of contractors in a wartime environment” (Rosenbach and Peritz, n.d.). The utilization of PMSCs in the intelligence community is likely to steadily increase due to the lack of regulation.

Introduction to Domestic and International Variables
There are two layers that explain this phenomenon of the rise of the PMSC industry in the U.S. armed forces; changing norms at the international level and political benefits at the domestic level. At the international level, the changing of norms surrounding the use of PMSCs has caused an increase in the number of nations and other official entities using PMSCs, as well as the amount of money spent in the industry each year. These numbers show the the normalization of the use of PMSCs and the changing international arena that incorporates PMSCs. These international variables explain the growth in the U.S. use of PMSCs.

At the domestic level, the political benefits of PMSCs can outweigh those of state-based troops, encouraging the use of PMSCs. The political benefits of PMSCs include: the manipulation of troop numbers, anonymity, low financial cost, choice of soldiers, and interest groups. An example of troop
manipulation is the added benefit of PMSCs to allow nations to superficially decrease the number of soldiers in a theatre of operations while increasing the number of contractors. An example of anonymity is the secrecy surrounding PMSCs and their contracts. Other benefits include their relative low financial cost compared to U.S. state-based soldiers because PMSCs create a market in which the hiring parties have a choice of fighters, unlike traditional military troops. The choice of soldiers that PMSCs offer contractors provides a multitude of advantages to the party who is hiring. Also, the rise in PMSCs can be seen through data like the increased number of lobbying firms advocating for PMSCs and their associations. The number of lobbying firms and associations surrounding the PMSC industry are an indication of the amount of money used to influence Congressmen and women on their behalf. All of these different variables are combined to bolster the explanation behind the rise of PMSCs at the domestic level.

As shown, domestic and international level explanations for the increased usage of PMSCs by the U.S. are numerous and complex. However, both the international and domestic levels of analysis explain the increased reliance on PMSCs by the U.S. military by also combining sociological institutionalism, new wars thesis, and rational choice.

**Variable Measurements**

In order to measure the international and domestic variables that led to the rise of the use of PMSCs, a plethora of measurements will be employed. At the international level, the changing norms will be measured through by the expenditure of international entities on PMSC contractors, the number of states using PMSCs, and the number of PMSC contractors used in the conflict zones. The new wars thesis is operationalized through the measurement of the U.S. military troop numbers before and after the Cold War. These data points were obtained from the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Providers’ Association (ICoC Association), USA spending reports, the Pentagon contractor budget of PMSCs, US CENTCOM, the World Bank, and the Department of Defense.

At the domestic level of analysis, the political benefits of PMSCs, which include the ability to manipulate troop levels, anonymity, lower financial costs, choice of soldiers, and the number of interest groups, are measured through different sets of data. The manipulation of troop levels is measured by cases of the U.S. armed forces using contractors as a proxy force in a nation. Anonymity will be examined through the Pentagon’s spending on PMSCs. Financial cost will be explored through evidence of the long-term benefits of PMSCs compared to state-based soldiers. Choice of soldiers is operationalized through the evidence of their expanded usage and cases of their expedient mobilization. Number of lobbying firms for PMSCs and their impact will be measured through the amount of money spent in support of PMSCs’ agendas. These variable measurements and data collected from USA spending reports, US CENTCOM, the Department of Defense, and the U.S. Department of Labor help explain the domestic level of analysis.
The rise of PMSCs and their contractors in the U.S. military will be looked at on two levels: international and domestic. Evidence suggests that the combination of these two elements provides a more in depth look into this unique industry’s rise.

**International Level Variables**
The evidence behind the changing norms which has led to the rise of the U.S. use of PMSCs is shown through the increased use of PMSCs internationally. As stated previously, based on Finnmore and Sikkink’s stages of norm acceptance, the usage of PMSCs as supplementary military forces internationally is in the second stage called norm cascade. At this stage, the norm is not internalized or normalized and lacks the codified laws and regulations enjoyed by a norm in the third stage of the norm life cycle (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998). The previous discussion of regulations and the lack of their effectiveness is a sign that this norm is still in the second stage. Also in the second stage, norm entrepreneurs encourage and spread the norm to other norm leaders (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998). The Middle East is starting to take on this norm in a vigorous manner. For example, Saudi Arabia’s national armed forces are almost entirely run by PMSCs. The PMSC Vinnell “trains and advises the Saudi National Guard ... working on a contract estimated to be worth more than $800 million” (Singer, 2008, p.13). Vinnell is not the only PMSC used by Saudia Arabia, the country also employs BDM, Booz-Allen Hamilton, SAIC, O’Gara, and Cabla and Wireless to perform tasks ranging from protecting the royal family to running the military college (Singer, 2008).

In Latin America and the Caribbean, governments have deployed PMSCs to fight narcotic traffickers (“Countries in Which PMSCs Operate,” n.d.). In Africa, PMSCs are used enthusiastically to supplement the lacking strength of states with weak state structures and political instability (Singer, 2008). South East Asia has extensively used PMSCs. In Indonesia, for example, PMSCs are used as commandos, for intelligence services, and for combat education (Singer, 2008). Though PMSCs have started to become a worldwide phenomenon, the U.S., U.K., and South Africa still account for over 70% of the world’s market for their services (Chakarbarti, 2008). The depiction included exemplifies the statement that the use of PMSCs is still in the norm cascade stage. The map is sourced from International Code of Conduct for Private Security Providers’ Association (ICoC Association), and shows the number ICoC signatory company headquarters per country. Its findings support the statement that only a handful of nations, like the U.S. and U.K., have truly embraced the PMSC industry and thus, the normalization of PMSCs is still occurring in the international arena. Another element in the international arena that effected the rise of the PSMCs industry was the post-Cold War downsizing of militaries internationally. The end of the Cold War triggered the scaling down of many states’ armies: the Cold War was over, hostilities in the world seemed diminished, and it seemed less necessary to maintain an expensive, large army (Pilbeam, 2015). This downsizing caused an influx of ex-military personnel to the job market. The increased reliance on PMSCs is understandable when the decrease in troop numbers are taken into account.
Number of ICoC Signatory Company Headquarters per Country (Updated 1 February 2013)

Source: International Code of Conduct for Private Security Providers’ Association
Troop levels in the U.S. went from 3,240,668 members in the armed forces at the beginning of the Cold War in 1952 to 1,518,224 members in 1995, just a few years after the fall of USSR (Kane, 2004). David Coleman, a senior research fellow at the National Security Archive, made the graph above with data sourced from the Defense Manpower Data Center, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the U.S. Department of Defense.

This graph buttresses the assertion that U.S. state-based troop levels have been decreasing since the Cold War. There is a slight increase in troop levels after 9/11 in 2001-2003, but by 2004 the numbers of troops began to decrease again. This downsizing in state-based troop levels made PMSCs enticing to politicians and military generals because PMSC troops are highly trained and ready to deploy immediately.
Domestic Level Variables

As stated previously, the domestic variables can be looked at through the lens of rational choice theory and include the manipulation of troop levels, the secrecy of PMSCs, the financial cost, choice of soldiers, and the growth of PMSC interest groups. Rational choice theory views the U.S. government as a rational actor, which participates in goal-maximizing behavior. This behavior can be seen through the domestic variables I have laid out. The U.S. has been engaged in multiple theatres of operations since the end of the Cold War. PMSCs are able to go into nations where the U.S. would like to influence outcomes at times when the U.S. is too occupied in other conflict zones or missions to send their state-based troops. An example of this would be when the State Department hired the PMSC company DynCorp to rebuild the Liberian army after their 2003 civil war because the U.S. was already engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan. The PMSC allowed the U.S. to focus its efforts on other regions while still achieving policy goals (Stranger, 2015). The ability to manipulate and dictate soldiers’ and PMSCs’ roles in conflict zones and the ability to reach multiple conflicts zones make PMSCs attractive to the U.S.

PMSCs also give states the manipulative ability to control troop levels superficially in conflict zones. Obama’s de-escalation of troops in Afghanistan, starting in 2014, has clearly been counteracted with the increase of the presence of contractors (Roberts 2015). The figures of 2016 show nearly 29,000 defense contractors still in Afghanistan, while there are fewer than 9,000 U.S. troops stationed there. This means contractors represented approximately 72% of the total manpower there (Peters, 2017). Two-thirds of these contractors were foreign nationals and only about 10 percent were providing security services, but these numbers are still significant (Shane 2017). The benefit and attraction for governments, as exemplified here, is that they can seemingly decrease their numbers while still maintaining a large presence through contractors. Army General John Nicholson, Commander of the NATO Resolute Support Mission and United States Forces in Afghanistan, told the Senate Armed Services Committee that the DoD has had to “substitute contractors for soldiers in order to meet the force manning levels” in Afghanistan (Peters, 2017). Contractors are able to fill the gaps that politics generate. The PMSC industry is an industry that is growing extremely fast. It went from a sparsely used taboo industry during the Cold War to a $100 billion a year industry by 2004 (Riddell, 6). Annual contracts from the Pentagon can range from $10-$20 billion (Chakarbari, 2008). Yet, finding exact numbers on how much the Pentagon spends on contractors is difficult. The contracts and payments between PMSCs and their employers can be secretive and hidden. The category that gets the most money from the Pentagon is a group of PMSCs labeled “miscellaneous foreign contractors.” To this point, this group gets “almost 250,000 contracts totaling nearly $50 billion, or 12 percent of the total, have gone to recipients that the Pentagon has not identified publicly” (Vine, 2014, p.89). This category is a blanket for all contractor deals that need to remain private, and because of this a
truly accurate look at the firms used by the government is not possible. Another side of the anonymity and secrecy of PMSCs is that politicians are not liable for the death of PMSCs in the same way that they are for soldiers’ deaths.

As discussed earlier, Pilbeam (2015) states PMSC contractors’ financial costs are less than those of U.S. state-based troops. Many question how this is possible since contractors’ salaries are estimated to be around $22,500 per month, while army captains’ salaries are around $4,952 per month (Charpentier, n.d.). Pilbeam argues the financial advantage that PMSCs offer is long-term. Soldiers are cheaper short-term, as shown in the numbers above; but in the long-term they are costlier. Soldiers can cost between $850,000 to $1.4 million a year while in a combat zone like Afghanistan or Iraq (Shaughnessy, 2012). The U.S. government has to pay for a soldier’s clothes, food, essentials, housing, medical bills, etc. while they are on a tour. When they retire, they have to pay for a soldier’s insurance and pension. If a soldier gets injured on tour all of these costs skyrocket. None of these costs come with a PMSC contractor. The PMSC is responsible for housing, feeding, and training their contractors. The paycheck of a contractor might be more than a soldier, but ultimately, they cost less than state-based soldiers.

PMSCs also give states the ability to choose which roles they would like their state-based troops to perform. Major Elliott of the Royal Scots Brigades believes that by using contractors to construct, run, and protect a military base, soldiers focus their maximum effort and attention on the conflict or mission at hand (Vine, 2014). Pilbeam states that the choice of soldiers also encompasses political clout. These benefits of contractors give military generals and politicians more choices, which makes contractors more attractive than state-based soldiers.

A review of the 2010 filed lobbying records shows that the “ten largest defense contractors in the nation spent more than $27 million lobbying the federal government in the last quarter of 2009,” only $7.2 million more than what was spent in the next three months of 2010 (Stein, 2010). The growing force of interest groups in D.C. representing the interests of PMSCs marks a permanent establishment of the industry. Another mark of maturity of the PMSC market is the International Stability Operations Association (ISOA). Its mission is to “codify basic principles for ethical utilization of the private sector through tangible goals for accountability and transparency” (“History of ISOA,” 2016). Another association for PMSCs is the International Peace Operations Association (IPOA), founded in 2001 (“History of IPOA,” 2016). The formation of this association implies that the industry is large enough to support multiple associations. The fact that the industry has spawned multiple interest groups exemplifies the pressures put on politicians to continue to incorporate PMSCs into the U.S. armed forces, as well as the continued growth of the industry.

**PMSCs in the Vietnam War**

After World War II, PMSCs were used in conflicts such as the Vietnam War, Gulf War, Balkans War, Iraq War, Afghanistan War, and other skirmishes and operations on a consistent and increasing level.
In the Vietnam War, there were 0.166 contractors for every U.S. uniformed military personnel, 0.01 in the Gulf War, 1 in the Balkans War, 1.1 in Iraq War, and 1.2 in the Afghanistan War (Zenko, 2015). These numbers show a clear expansion of the number of PMSCs in the U.S. armed forces. In order to display the increased utilization of the PMSCs industry, it is insightful to compare the Vietnam War and the Iraq War.

In the Vietnam War, there were 500,000 U.S. military personnel and 22,230 private military contractors (Gjelten, 2009). In 1965, Business Weekly named the Vietnam War a “war by contract.” (Lindemann, 2007, 84). These contractors were used for construction, technical consulting, and to lesser extent, combat. The Johnson Administration, prior to military engagement, sought to build infrastructure in South Vietnam. Military engagement was impossible without the building up of South Vietnam; it had very few usable roads, only three airports capable of landing jet aircrafts, and many more infrastructure problems (Carter, 2004).

The Johnson administration hired the private American construction companies Raymond International and Morrison-Knudsen to create a network of roads, bases, warehouses, airports, etc. (Carter, 2004). The contracted workers were a mix of American skilled workers and Vietnamese unskilled workers. In one year the Raymond International and Morrison-Knudsen contracts soared from $15 million to $150 million, and by 1965, a significant proportion of the U.S. military spending in Vietnam was directed towards privately contracted companies. The technological advances in weapons and military gear required contractors to also be hired as consultants and educators (Lindemann, 2007). In addition, the company then known as Brown & Root, now KBR, supplied the U.S. with less expensive forces to replace the gap made by the end of conscription and the protest against the Vietnam War (Lindemann, 2007). This war also started the precedent of contractors arming themselves with firearms.

The international variables I have proposed are not present in the Vietnam War and therefore reaffirm that the U.S. was in the norm emergence phase at this time. This experience was positive for the U.S. and therefore encouraged them to use PMSCs in the future. The U.S. was initiating the use of PMSCs in conflict zones in the Vietnam War. Still in the norm emergence phase, the use of PMSCs was more reserved than in later conflicts.

The new wars thesis describes an environment that was not present before the end of the Cold War when the Vietnam War took place. Because of this, the international environment was not conducive to the expansive use of PMSCs during this conflict.

The domestic variables effecting the use of PMSCs in this war were fewer than those present in modern times. PMSCs were used to expand and manipulate the U.S.’s reach in Vietnam; this was exemplified through the mentioned contractors used to prepare South Vietnam for the U.S. military. Also, the contractors were in Vietnam before the U.S. was officially engaged in conflict; however, the secrecy of PMSCs was not as great then as it is now because they were not used on such a great scale.
Contractors still held the same long-term financial benefits in the Vietnam War as have been discussed in modern times. The choice of contractors in the Vietnam War was used by military officials to supplement and control troop numbers and soldiers’ jobs. Finally, interest groups for PMSCs were not as established then as they are now: there was no evidence of a lobby firm existing solely to support the PMSCs industry’s interests. The main congregate for PMSC support and organization, the ISOA, was not founded until 2001. The domestic variables were not as developed in the Vietnam War as they were in the Iraq War, and therefore, the benefits of PMSCs were not as abundant as they are now. So, it would not have been rational for the military to depend on them heavily during this time period because it would not have helped them reach their goals more easily.

**PMSCs in the Iraq War**

In the Iraq War, in contrast to the Vietnam War, contractors were used in large numbers and for a multitude of tasks. By the 2007 surge, there were already 160,000 contractors in various positions in Iraq under U.S. contract (Singer, 2017). This number was almost equal to the number of troops the U.S. had in Iraq at the time. The number of contractors in Vietnam never came close to this amount. Also, unlike the Vietnam War, the contractors readily used weapons and were supposed to follow the Uniform Code of Military Justice, but this did not always happen due to the lack of clear regulation and judicial authority over contractors (Lindemann, 2007, p.83). The extensive use of contractors in the Iraq War is clearly different than in the Vietnam War, showing the increased dependency on military contractors by the U.S. armed forces over time. Internationally, as already stated, the norm of using PMSCs was in the norm cascade phase during the Iraq War. This claim is proven through the previously mentioned expansion of the use of PMSCs by multiple nations. The norm entrepreneur, the U.S., along with the norm leaders, the U.K. and South Africa, encouraged others to take part in the norm. In the time period of the Iraq War, emboldened by the U.S. and the other norm leaders, other nations started to use PMSCs in increasing and multiple ways. Almost every region of the world started to use PMSCs, incorporating them into their traditional armed forces. This move in the international community encouraged the continued use of PMSCs. The domestic variables that influenced the utilization of private contractors in the Iraq War more are concrete and illuminating than those in the Vietnam War. The manipulation of troop levels is clear and present in this war. As the graph shows, the use of PMSCs exploded after the 2007 surge when the Iraq War became unfavorable in the U.S. As shown, the use of PMSCs increased as state-based troops publicly started to decrease. This graph only shows the usage of contractors after the surge, but they were used in robust numbers previous to the surge, too. This graph exemplifies the use of PMSCs as a supplementary force in order to manipulate the number of state troops publicly in the arena. The secrecy that PMSCs provided the U.S. government during the Iraq War is a strong reason for their utilization. As the Pentagon spending reports depict, the “miscellaneous foreign contractors” category provided
anonymity in U.S. spending. This anonymity allowed for the Bush Administration’s actions and caused the extent of engagement in Iraq to remain unknown. The financial benefits of PMSCs in the Iraq War included the relatively cheap price tag of contractors when compared to soldiers. The long-term financial benefits have proven to be effective in making PMSC contractors attractive to the U.S. government. A financial concern raised about the extensive use of PMSCs used in Iraq was lost money. Reports put the amount of money lost by PMSC contractors at least $31 billion to maybe as much as $60 billion (Brand and Dickinson, 2011, p.1). This money was lost due to poor planning and oversight by the U.S. government of criminal activities of PMSCs (Brand and Dickinson, 2011). This crisis of money waste is likely to continue to come to light as we see the long-lasting effects of the Iraq War. Despite these numbers, the U.S. had to “treat contractors as the default option because federal agencies lack[ed] the organic capacity to perform some mission-critical functions, the government also lack[ed] the acquisition personnel and structures needed to manage and oversee an unprecedentedly large contractor force that at times has outnumbered troops in the field” (Brand and Dickinson, 2011, p.2). The cycle could not be broken in the Iraq War because the dependency on contractors was so large that even when PMSC actions were detrimental to U.S.-Iraqi relations and to the U.S. treasury, they could not be dismissed. The Iraq War demanded more contractors than the Vietnam War partly because the U.S. troops were already stretched thin. U.S. troops during the Iraq War were also involved in the Afghanistan War and had longstanding military commitments in South Korea, the Balkans, and multiple other peacekeeping missions throughout the developing world (Kwok, 2006, p.1). Contractors could fill the gaps that the various military commitments of the U.S. created.

Source: The University of Denver complied this data from CENTCOM
In Iraq, the U.S. deployed contractors from about 25 different firms from countries ranging from the U.S. and U.K. to Nepal, Chile, Ukraine, Israel, South Africa and Fiji (Collier, 2004). These PMSCs were employed to perform “tasks ranging from training the country’s new police and army to protecting government leaders and providing logistics for the US military” (Collier, 2004). These domestic variables demonstrate clear benefits that helped the U.S. more efficiently reach their goals in the Iraq War.

**Comparison of the Vietnam War and the Iraq War**

The conditions at the international and domestic levels that encouraged contractors to be used in the Iraq War were numerous. At the international level, the Vietnam War was fought in an international arena that was different than the Iraq War. The use of PMSCs was still in the norm emergence stage in the Vietnam War, but in the norm cascade stage in the Iraq War. This claim is proven through the number of other nations using PMSCs during each war. As the new wars thesis states, wars had changed in the ways in which they are fought and by whom. Also, after the Cold War, state-based armies were diminished, causing an influx of the hiring of contractors to supplement lost troops. The Vietnam War might have been different than wars before it, but the use of PMSCs was still not normalized or accepted. Contractors, unlike in modern warfare, were not readily used in armed conflict to supplement state-based forces. States still used contractors, but mainly for infrastructure and education. Contractors were used in armed positions and in more numbers because the international conditions during the Iraq War supported the use of contractors, unlike in the Vietnam War. At the domestic level, using PMSCs was not as attractive in the Vietnam War as it became in the Iraq War. The former Vice President Richard Cheney owned of the contractor company KBR, and the U.S.’s dependency and use of PMSCs increased heavily when he became President George H.W. Bush’s Secretary of Defense in 1995 (Vine, 2014). During the Iraq War, PMSCs became financially and politically attractive to Congress members, lobbyists, military commanders, Pentagon officials, and politicians because of the rewards and choices they offered (Vine, 2014, p.84). By this time, PMSCs had become an integral part of U.S. foreign policy.

**Conclusion**

Through the combination of international and domestic perspectives, the reasons behind the increase in utilization of PMSCs in state-based militaries like the U.S. military have become apparent. Internationally, the use of contractors in traditional militaries is becoming a norm. This combined with the permissive post-Cold War environment creates an international community that allows and encourages the growth of the PMSC industry in state militaries. Domestically, the variables discussed seem to be only increasing the use of PMSCs. The political clout and relative cheapness that PMSCs offer will continue to be enticing to the U.S. government and others. This growth in benefits can be seen in the contrast of the domestic benefits of
PMSCs during the Vietnam and Iraq Wars. These two wars showcase the expansion of the PMSC industry and reach. The rise of PMSCs in U.S. national defense is only increasing. After President Donald Trump’s announcement in August of the increased surge of troops to Afghanistan, there are about 9,800 U.S. stated-based troops there while there are more than 26,000 PMSC contractors (Brown and Gould, 2017). In a presidential administration that seems to favor quick solutions, PMSCs are likely to continue to be a strong feature of the U.S. national defense. The escalation in Afghanistan offers an opportunity for an increased reliance on PMSCs. The international conditions are favorable: the norm of using PMSCs to supplement state-based troops is heading towards norm internalization from the norm cascade stage. The domestic political benefits are favorable for the Trump administration. PMSCs are enticing because they offer secret, slippery, cheap, and “expendable” forces that would be able to mobilize quickly according to the President’s whims. We should be cautious going forward. This paper only addressed the rise of PMSCs’ use by the U.S. military and not its implications on sovereignty, accountability, state relations, legality, etc. Hiring PMSCs does not come without problems, including their murky separation from mercenaries. The use of PMSCs has increased the amount of scandals the U.S. must control. There are horrific examples of PMSCs’ contractors being barely controlled. Examples like DynCorp being involved “in Bosnian child prostitution, the murder of an Iraqi taxi driver, and [wasting] millions of dollars in Iraq” (Reinhold, 2013, p.1). In another instance, the U.S. employed the PMSC company KBR in Iraq when their president had already been arrested for bribing Nigerians and had to pay $570 million in fines and settlements (Reinhold, 2013). Finally, the most famous case of contractors gone rouge, is when a few Blackwater contractors opened fire on Iraqi civilians for seemingly no reason (Reinhold, 2013). These are only a few scandals, but they paint a picture of reckless behavior and little regard for law. The implications of PMSCs’ impact on the strength of state institutions is concerning and potentially dangerous. PMSCs can “destabilize situations by creating an environment that is intrinsically militarized” (“Countries in Which PMSCs Operate,” n.d., p.1). The expansion of the role of PMSCs in armed conflict has been cited as prolonging and intensifying conflicts. Local contracting can also lead to the propping up of insurgents, organized crime, and even terrorist cells. (“Countries in Which PMSCs Operate”). It is very clear that more research needs to be done in order to understand the industry that is quickly becoming a staple in U.S. national defense. This topic is important because it concerns the safety of the U.S. and its relations with other states. The murky industry of PMSCs needs to be illuminated in order for confidence to be felt regarding their increasing role in the U.S. armed forces.
Appendix

Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977.

The Article 47 -- Mercenaries

1. A mercenary shall not have the right to be a combatant or a prisoner of war.
2. A mercenary is any person who:
   (a) is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed conflict;
   (b) does, in fact, take a direct part in the hostilities;
   (c) is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire for private gain and, in fact, is promised, by or on behalf of a Party to the conflict, material compensation substantially in excess of that promised or paid to combatants of similar ranks and functions in the armed forces of that Party;
   (d) is neither a national of a Party to the conflict nor a resident of territory controlled by a Party to the conflict;
   (e) is not a member of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict; and
   (f) has not been sent by a State which is not a Party to the conflict on official duty as a member of its armed forces.

International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries

Article 1

For the purposes of the present Convention,

1. A mercenary is any person who:
   (a) is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed conflict;
   (b) is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire for private gain and, in fact, is promised, by or on behalf of a Party to the conflict, material compensation substantially in excess of that promised or paid to combatants of similar rank and functions in the armed forces of that Party;
   (c) is neither a national of a party to the conflict nor a resident of territory controlled by a party to the conflict;
   (d) is not a member of the armed forces of a party to the conflict; and
   (e) has not been sent by a State which is not a party to the conflict on official duty as a member of its armed forces.

2. A mercenary is also any person who, in any other situation:
   (a) is specially recruited locally or abroad for the purpose of participating in a concerted act of violence aimed at:
      (i) Overthrowing a Government or otherwise undermining the constitutional order of a State; or
      (ii) Undermining the territorial integrity of a State;
(b) Is motivated to take part therein essentially by the desire for significant private gain and is prompted by the promise or payment of material compensation;
(c) Is neither a national nor a resident of the State against which such an act is directed;
(d) Has not been sent by a State on official duty; and
(e) Is not a member of the armed forces of the State on whose territory the act is undertaken.

References


Rome, Italy
Hamid Shirwany, Class of 2019
Resource Mobilization Theory and the Tulip Revolution

Grady Vaughan

The 2005 Tulip Revolution in the landlocked Central Asian Republic of Kyrgyzstan can be attributed to a wave of local activism in response to a growing sense of authoritarianism in the state. The country’s only president up to that point, Askar Akaev, gradually began to backtrack on his promises and track record of liberal reform by centralizing wealth in the hands of his family and clan members, and by manipulating the parliamentary elections in February of that year. While there may be a tendency to lump this revolution in with other Color Revolutions throughout the post-Soviet space in the early 2000s, a closer examination of the events indicates that mobilization in Kyrgyzstan was inconsistent with other cases in Georgia and Ukraine. Any analysis rooted in diffusion theory fails to appreciate the origins of the Tulip Revolution in the rural oblasts of southern Kyrgyzstan as opposed to the streets of the capital, Bishkek (as had occurred in Tbilisi and Kiev), the role played by informal, “semi-modern” identities and relationships in mobilization, and the exacerbation of negative trends under Akaev’s successor, Kurmanbek Bakiev (Rahmetov, 2008, p.28). Furthermore, any rumors about possible US or Western collusion will not be addressed in this investigation due to the tenuous nature of these claims. Instead, it is necessary to delve into the features of the Kyrgyz system conducive to this movement. Consequently, it is appropriate to investigate the March 2005 mobilization in Kyrgyzstan by utilizing different strands of social movement theory (SMT) to explain the function of Kyrgyzstan’s “communal civil society” in bringing about this change.

According to Sally Cummings, Kyrgyzstan’s “communal civil society” differs from Western interpretations in that the “communal civil societies” are linked to “pre-existing social (kinship or fictive) networks,” while Western civil society refers to self-sustaining networks that exist in between the state and society, and are not based on these primordial bonds (Cummings, 2013, p.79). This distinction is critical, as this revolution lacked permanent networking between protestors of different regions and villages; thus, the revolution failed to eliminate the pre-existing traditional cleavages between village/tribal organizations (uluu). However, many have criticized observers for using the pejorative term “tribalism” to account for the lack of democracy in Kyrgyzstan and for divorcing the term “clan” from its foundation in an “extensive web of horizontal and kin-based relations” (Collins, 2003, p.174). In order to acknowledge slightly broader local interactions that transcend familial ties, this paper will use the term “patronage networks” as described by Temirkoulov (2013). On a structural level, Akaev’s decision to abruptly begin to appoint Northerners to become akims (regional governors) of southern oblasts and to encourage his daughter, Bermet Akaeva, and his son, Aydar, to run in northern oblasts lost him the support of formerly loyal regional elites (Rahmetov, 2008, p. 38). This fostered the collapse of the “clan pact” which had allowed Akaev to balance competing interests, and facilitated the revolution. This paper will employ complex causality to incorporate various ideas within social movement theory to explain the
realization of the Tulip Revolution; specifically, resource mobilization theory will be used to explain the self-interests of local issue entrepreneurs in mobilizing others and how social networks rooted in informal (uluu) identities provided selective incentives for locals.

**Social Movement Theory**

Social Movement Theory (SMT) helps analysts trace the development of a collective social group to a more delimited social movement organization (SMO). For this analysis, a social movement can be considered “informal networks based on shared beliefs and solidarity which mobilize about conflictual issues, through the frequent use of various forms of protest (Della Porta and Diani, 1999, p.16). The goal of any SMO is to mobilize people to achieve its aims. In the past, pundits related social movements to notions of “collective behavior” and turned to strain theories to posit that individuals eventually mobilize to overcome grievances (Ru and Ortolano, 2009, p.144). Nonetheless, this framework has been discarded due to its general inability to actually identify the mechanisms by which issue entrepreneurs mobilize actors. It would be counterproductive to apply any grievance model to a discussion of the Tulip Revolution, seeing that more glaring grievances may exist in the more impoverished bordering state of Tajikistan (Rahmetov, 2008, p.28). Consequently, resource mobilization theory offers a rationalist analysis and political opportunity structure a more structural explanation. Resource mobilization theory will be briefly outlined here before it is applied to the Tulip Revolution.

Resource Mobilization Theory (RMT) simply connects the efficacy and success of a movement to its control over specific resources. McCarthy and Zald (1977) divide these resources into five categories: material resources (money), human resources (actual people), social-organizational resources (strategies), moral resources (solidarity), and cultural resources (individual experiences). In order for resources to be maximized, actors have to manage them (Lim, 2016, p.290). Issue entrepreneurs who head SMOs may assume this responsibility if they see the possibility for gain after completing a rational cost-benefit analysis (Lim, 2016, p.290). This idea is particularly pivotal to any conversation on the conceptualization of participants in the Tulip Revolution and other movements in Kyrgyzstan as “weapons of the wealthy” (Radnitz, 2010). Also, others have sought to understand the involvement of individuals (non-issue entrepreneurs) through the lens of reciprocity and relationship dynamics. Essentially, potential volunteers may be persuaded to join a cause on the grounds that their relatives or friends, who already are invested in the movement, may punish them for not joining (Lim, 2016, p.292). This is arguably the prime explanation for the widespread grassroots activism that occurred during the Tulip Revolution. This social network-based account is apropos in this discussion, as social pressures were labeled as one of the key solidarity (associational) incentives in moving people to act (Temirkoulov, 2013, p.94).

One of the most significant theoretical functions of RMT is to propose solutions to the collective action problem, or the “free-rider problem.”
This conundrum arises when individual rational actors decide that their personal interests do not overlap with the group or the costs of participation are too high and, thus, decide to abstain from contributing to the cause (Lim, 2016, 288). This is a highly inefficient externality that plagues many movements, as the most dedicated activists sacrifice to attain rights or enact a change for a bystander on the sideline. McCarthy and Zald (1977) assert that the objective of some SMOs is to convert members of the “bystander public” (neutral observers of the movement) to adherents (sympathetic activists within a movement) of the campaign (p.1221). As previously mentioned, selective incentives are the main solution to this paradox besides reducing the size of the group. According to Fireman and Gamson (1977), selective incentives are “constraints or inducements which an individual actor may gain or lose contingent upon whether or not the actor contributes to collective action” (p.5). Once again, these possible benefits or punishments need not be monetary in nature. Although these financial concerns are potential carrots/sticks, any study of the Tulip Revolution must address the role of specific cultural characteristics of Kyrgyz society to fully value the ways in which collective action issues were surmounted.

Resource Mobilization Theory and the Tulip Revolution

The first approach within RMT to describe the Tulip Revolution is to outline the top-down authority of powerful local leaders in rallying average citizens. In order to comprehend the importance of issue entrepreneurs in the exploitation of SMOs, a brief overview of Akaev’s policies must be completed. Before the tumult in 2005 transpired, Kyrgyzstan could be considered an outlier in Central Asia with respect to economic liberalization following its attainment of independence from the USSR in 1991. After having become the first state in the region to attain membership in the World Trade Organization in 1998 and witnessing a transfer of powers in the early 1990s to ayil kenesh (deputies) at the local (rayon) level, Kyrgyzstan was on a promising road (Jones Luong, 2004, p.23). However, under the surface, these reforms still paled in comparison to the unofficial, illicit interactions between regional representatives and Akaev. The Northerner President pursued a policy of “clan balancing” in which he apportioned business stakes and political positions to leaders from southern oblasts such as Osh and Jalalabad (Collins, 2006, p.126). This ironically played into the material resource capacity of the opposition against him in 2005. Nonetheless, unlike Kazakhstan and the other resource-rich states of Central Asia, Akaev was not working with a vast amount of resources to appease his different clients. As he began to feel the pressure towards the end of his third-term in the early 2000s, he broke the trust of opposition leaders by centralizing wealth in his family’s hands and sending members of his own northern patronage network, Sarybagysh, to fill governorship positions in Osh (Khamidov, 2002). The number of seats in Parliament was also changed from 105 to 75 and northern politicians were taken off ballots to permit Akaev’s children to win (Rahmetov, 2008, p.37). Leaders from disparate oblasts opted to mobilize local affiliates, who relied on them for material needs, with the goal of preserving their
own self-interests. Resource Mobilization Theory applies in this instance, as disenfranchised politicians became leaders of the anti-government movement and took advantage of their management of human resources through localist and regionalist ties to facilitate mobilization. In addition to calling average protesters “weapons of the wealthy,” Scott Radnitz (2010) has also invented the term “hyper-democracy” to describe this pattern of local mobilization by elites looking to either reacquire ownership of certain sectors of the economy or return to Parliament. Likewise, most issue entrepreneurs such as future President Kurmanbek Bakiev and Azimbek Beknazarov did not necessarily form their own SMOs, but rather built upon pre-existing informal localist networks to push forward their aims. The organic unification of disparate local demonstrations never was rooted in a genuine demand for democratization, but rather as an effort to eliminate the unpopular Akaev who had prohibited them from the privileges of office.

Bakiev, however, was able to consolidate his position as the director of the People’s Movement of Kyrgyzstan (collection of former officials from smaller parties), which became the most well-known formal SMO. Bakiev and others framed the issue in a manner that allowed them to point out Kyrgyzstan’s growing international debts (up to $2.5 billion USD) and brain-drain due to the poor economy (Hiro, 2009, p.304). This successful, highly decentralized strategy underlines the individual citizen’s key goal—to merely replace the disloyal administration of Akaev with a new leader to reinstitute the “clan balancing” system (Cummings, 2013, p.24).

In essence, Bakiev was able to expand his base by attacking the excesses of the Akaev regime. The organizing regional officials provided material incentives to rural Kyrgyz villagers who were suffering due to Akaev’s rampant corruption. Additionally, the cornerstone of democratic change was lacking in Kyrgyzstan compared to other “Color Revolution” cases considering that relatively few NGOs, formal SMOs and student groups were active in March 2005. The issue entrepreneurs, especially Bakiev, merely planned to pillage the state coffers and continue their status as “roving bandits” (steal as much as possible in a short time-frame) as the lack of unity within the Tulip Revolution did not provide Bakiev with a monopoly on governmental control (Engvall, 2007, p.34). Thus, the true intention of these leaders of local mobilization was to enhance their chance to grab a larger chunk of the unprotected state wealth in this system devoid of a rule-of-law framework.

While the previous explanation addressed the primary motivations of self-interest that may have driven the movement, it can be argued that the internal dynamics of traditional tribe-based (uluu) affiliations touched on the most salient selective incentives for the mobilization of average citizens. As mentioned, formal institutions such as unions and student groups did not spark the revolution; instead, informal institutions were the driving force behind the movement. The concepts of tooganchilik (traditional solidarity) and adat (customary Kyrgyz law) bolstered the moral resources of local protests that eventually reached Bishkek (Temirkoulov, 2013). The preeminent component of adat law is based
on tooganchilik, or the need to unite with one’s personal and familial connections in times of crisis (Berdikeeva, 2006, p.6). This social doctrine survived the Soviet years, ironically, because the kolkhoz system allowed many of the pre-existing tribal confederations (ong kanat, sol kanat, ichkilik) to continue, albeit with different titles given to the leaders (Berdikeeva, 2006, p.6). These relationships are rational and provide material incentives because they lower transaction costs for an average villager who cannot negotiate lucrative contracts with state employees from another regional patronage network (Collins, 2003, p.174). Considering that these quid pro quo arrangements defined many citizens’ positions and identity in society, they overcame any qualms about protesting to protect their patron. With respect to solidarity incentives, relationships within these kinship- or friendship-based patronage networks compelled bystanders to become adherents to the movement. Elders of different communities, aksakals (white beards), can sanction the shaming (uais) of individuals who do not fulfill their duties (tooganchilik) within the community (Temirkoulov, 2004, p.97). Traditional assemblies (kurultai) reinforced these cultural obligations. Aksakals not only used kurultais to cement this unwritten rule of horizontal reciprocity, but also to unify various groups under the name of the People’s Union of Oppositional and Patriotic Forces of Kyrgyzstan on March 15 (Temirkoulov, 2013, p.100). Even elites who had won elections in certain districts recognized the unofficial power of aksakals and joined activists at kurultais to call for the removal of Akaev in the Southern provinces of Jalalabad and Osh on March 15 and March 21, respectively (Rahmetov, 2008, p.44). Besides aksakals, ad hoc, anomic Groups of Women for Special Tasks (OBON) mainly consisting of 40-60 year-olds whom chiefs (patrons) mobilized and organized a sit-in on 4 March 2005 in Jalalabad to demonstrate their displeasure with their lay-offs (Temirkoulov, 2013). One other informal source for SMOs was palvan (wrestlers) gyms. Notable southern official Baiaman Erkinbaev did not simply fund the aforementioned People’s Union ($547 USD), but also improved solidarity among younger men by framing the issue in terms of tooganchilik (Temirkoulov, 2013, p.100). These informal SMOs possessed valuable moral resources due to their cultural legitimacy. Aksakals relied on their honored status and successfully centered their message on unity in order to transcend the diverging interests of different clientelist arrangements.

Evaluation of the Resource Mobilization Theory’s Applicability to the Tulip Revolution

The utilization of Resource Mobilization Theory to trace the development of the Tulip Revolution in March 2005 in Kyrgyzstan requires one to abandon an acknowledgement of purely formal social movement organizations in favor of a more profound understanding of traditional structures within Kyrgyz society. McCarthy and Zald’s recognition of more formal institutions within society is based on the assumption that these organizations have leaders who manage a centralized organization (Lim, 2016, p.295). This does not satisfactorily explain the highly localized and communal nature of the Tulip Revolution. To correct for this, it was
necessary to underline the influence of customony institutions and actors, such as kurultais and aksakals. The multitude of existing patron networks along what some would call clan lines established the People’s Union only for the purpose of bringing waves of different local protest SMOs together. Once the bandwagon effect was achieved and Akaev fled the White House on March 24, the battle for control of the riches left behind by the ousted Akaev began and chaos ensued, resulting in over $100 million USD in damage (Dili, 2009, p.297). Therefore, the alliances that empowered the issue entrepreneurs in the revolution to strengthen their chances of regaining access to the highest levers of power were strictly temporary. Bakiev may have emerged as the new president, but the actual Tulip Revolution was not spearheaded by one leader. Instead, an assortment of patrons and respected community authorities sponsored short-term action to challenge the Akaev regime. Therefore, revisions need to be made to McCarthy and Zald’s (1977) conception of RMT in order to rationalize the fluid, decentralized formation of SMOs. One other shortcoming of McCarthy and Zald’s construction of RMT is its inability to integrate non-material incentives into the theory. While it is unfair to ignore the financial benefits to mobilization within these informal, patronage networks, this does not completely sketch out the factors contributing to the movement. Thus, solidary incentives must be taken into account as some such as Temirkoulov do so in order to showcase the most important strength of the movement—its moral resources. Informal issue entrepreneurs such as aksakals were able to prompt those within their villages and communities to act by framing the movement in terms of solidarity (tooganchilik) and shame (uiat). This critical component of Kyrgyz identity may have weakened the ability of individuals to sit out. The sense of togetherness and pride or, conversely, the collective punishment within one’s kinship and local associations brought about by passivity, induced many to join. These intra-tribal bonds (uluu) are indicative of solidary incentives as opposed to the material incentives included in more open patronage networks (Temirkulov, 2013, p.96). Therefore, McCarthy and Zald’s framework has to be adjusted to include traditional identity and solidary incentives for the purpose of discussing limitations on an individual’s rational decision-making process.

Conclusion
The Tulip Revolution that aptly occurred in spring 2005 in Kyrgyzstan cannot be reduced to one cause. While this paper examined this campaign from a resource mobilization theory perspective, one must also look at the events from a political opportunity structure approach in order to more clearly explain why the largely bloodless revolution occurred at that time. Although some of the structural changes that destabilized the coexistence of patronage networks and official government structures in 2005 were mentioned, a deeper investigation of these openings should be conducted in further research. Nonetheless, the worth of resource mobilization theory in explicating mobilization trends and the way in which collective action problems
were overcome through both material and solidarity incentives is not to be discounted. By adapting Resource Mobilization Theory to the less formalized political system within Kyrgyzstan, one can gain a more profound appreciation for the Tulip Revolution.

References


Isle of Iona, Scotland
Sophie Bradford, Class of 2019
Mass Shootings as a Necessary Condition for Reforming Gun Laws: An Australian Case Study

Mitchell Koenig

Gun massacres force politicians to confront an electorate outraged at political spinelessness.
- Simon Chapman, Over Our Dead Bodies

Following the deadliest mass shootings in American history in Las Vegas and Orlando and another school shooting in Parkland, Florida, there has been discourse asking “What will it take?” to enact gun reform in the United States (Cohen, 2018). This paper will attempt to answer this question using the multiple streams approach to examine the policy response to the Port Arthur Massacre in Australia in 1996. It will conclude that gun massacres are a necessary condition for reforming gun laws, but that there are additional considerations as well which have not been met. The multiple streams approach is a way of analyzing policy change. It says that there are three separate streams which must align after the opening of what is called a “policy window:" the problem stream, the politics stream, and the policy stream.

Australia revolutionized gun control in the wake of tragedy. It can be used as a case study to better understand how countries adopt firearm regulation. The government responded to the Port Arthur Massacre of 1996 with several measures of gun control designed to reduce all forms gun violence. The action that the government took radically changed the gun culture in Australia in just one year. Simon Chapman argues that the implementation of gun control is almost always preceded by mass shootings. Although he does not explicitly use the phrase “necessary condition,” his logic suggests that mass shootings are a necessary condition for gun control. The multiple streams approach can provide a theoretical framework from which to examine the implementation of gun control in Australia. In order to support Chapman’s claim, the driving force of the problem stream must be a deviation from the status quo due to a focusing event while the indicators remain fairly stable. The major contribution of a multiple streams perspective of firearm regulation in Australia is its conceptualization of the problem stream, which explains why it is difficult to enact dramatic gun regulation policies of any kind until there is a mass shooting. This phenomenon is exemplified by the Australian reaction to the Port Arthur Massacre.

In 1996, Australia was shocked by the Port Arthur Massacre. It followed a school shooting in Dunblane, Scotland, making it the second mass shooting in two months in the British Commonwealth, and largely changed the mood and discourse on guns in the English speaking world. Over the course of two days in southeastern Australia, thirty five civilians of various nationalities lost their lives and another twenty four were injured in an attack in which motive is still not understood. Twelve days after the shooting, the government headed by Prime Minister John Howard responded with the 1996 National Firearms Agreement which governs most of the gun restrictions in Australia (Hartmann, 2015). Almost twenty years after the attack, John Howard, the then newly appointed prime minister, stated
that his goal at the time was to “curb the possession and use of the type of weapon that killed thirty five innocent people” (2013). In addition, he believes that his legislation lowered the gun-related homicide and suicide rate (Howard, 2013). The legislation banned semi-automatic guns as well as shotguns for the average citizen (the standard example is that farmers were allowed to keep their guns for occupational purposes), and heavily restricted the use of handguns. Other restrictions removed military grade weapons from the civilian population. Additionally, the amount of ammunition that could be bought at a given time was reduced. These three limitations were directly aimed at mass shootings. Other facets of the policy were ownership laws including permits and gun licenses, sales laws including a reason for purchase and waiting periods, and storage requirements. Accompanying the agreement was legislation to implement a year-long buy-back program, after which there would be severe penalties for owning firearms (Buchanan, n.d.). The effectiveness of these policies has been disputed; some say the effects are exaggerated because gun related violence was on the decline, while others point to a sharp dip in the reduction of gun violence and the absence of mass shootings since to argue that the policies worked (Beck, 2017). While this paper won’t argue the effectiveness of the policy, it will show that it was a response to the Port Arthur Massacre and that ending gun violence was its goal.

Problem Stream
The multiple streams approach is composed of three streams, all of which will be examined in the swift implementation of the Australian 1996 National Firearms Agreement. First, the problem stream identifies an issue that needs government attention. It is composed of focusing events, indicators, and feedback. Focusing events are specific incidents to which government responds with legislation. The focusing event, the Port Arthur Massacre, was the most important in identifying and drawing attention to the problem of gun violence. The attack was a focusing event for politicians as well as for the general public. On the political side, Prime Minister John Howard spearheaded the legislation restricting firearms in response to the massacre. Despite the fact that the fatalities that result from mass shootings only make up a small minority of gun deaths each year (3.6% of homicides in 2015 in the US (“Statistics behind US violence,” 2016)), mass shootings are oftentimes the focusing event for the conversation on gun control. Neither the nearly 12,000 homicides nor the 22,000 suicides each year attract media coverage and public attention to the issue (“Expanded Homicide Data Table 1,” 2014; Casselman, Conlen, & Fischer-Baum, 2016). Instead “major advances in gun control depend largely on relatively uncommon but more dramatic killings,” which can be interpreted to mean that focusing events are the independent variables on which “major advances in gun control” depend (Chapman, 2013, p. 22). Chapman is making the claim that, most of the time, gun control cannot come about until there is a mass shooting. In terms of the multiple streams approach, this means that the policy entrepreneur must wait to couple the three streams until the policy window is opened by the problem
stream which, in the case firearm regulation, is contingent on the focusing event. Chapman’s assertion that all forms of gun regulation are dependent on a single type of focusing event – mass shootings – brings the discussion to the role of indicators in the passing of the 1996 National Firearms Agreement. Indicators within the problem stream are generally statistics that identify an issue. John Howard specifically expressed that the legislation was in response to the massacre, and the timing of the legislation further indicates that it was a direct response to the event. On the other hand, certain provisions of the legislation exemplify that the indicators determined many of the policies chosen for the 1996 National Firearms Agreement which could not have been passed prior to the focusing event.

Indicators showed that aspects of gun violence other than mass shootings were the larger issue in Australia: about 560 people were killed through the use of firearms each year, and 81% of these deaths were suicides while 14% were homicides (Cantor & Slater, 1995). The agreement also sought to tackle the problem of suicide. In 1990 Queensland passed a law instituting a 28 day waiting period on the purchase of guns, which is more likely to stop a suicide than a mass shooting because a suicide is generally an impulse decision while mass shootings are often planned (Cantor & Slater, 1995). This law targets those who would commit suicide with a gun but didn’t already own a gun. This group was primarily composed of young men in urban areas, and in this group the suicide rate using guns fell as did the total suicide rate (Cantor & Slater, 1995). Thus, the waiting period helped to prevent the most prevalent form of gun violence, but it could not be nationally implemented on its own. It was not until the most sensational form of gun violence elicited overarching reform of gun restrictions that the more recurrent forms of firearm violence could be addressed. Suicide wasn’t the only problem that the agreement sought to solve after the mass shooting. Some of the aforementioned policies also helped in lowering the rates of homicide and accidental deaths while additional provisions, such as safer storage requirements, also addressed these issues. Suicide, homicide, and accidental deaths are all examples of problems that were addressed because indicators existed, but that had been ignored prior to the focusing event. Even though the focusing event was a mass shooting, an issue whose solutions are distinct from those of suicide and homicide, the legislation addressed the focusing event and the indicators. While the indicators did not cause legislators to turn their attention to the issue of gun restriction, the indicators did direct which policies were adopted to abate gun violence; however, these indicators would not have been addressed were it not for the focusing event. This argument is supported by this case study because the legislation was passed twelve days after the massacre while the indicators of suicide and homicide were fairly stable. The feedback aspect of the problem stream is also important in the passing of gun legislation. In the context of the problem stream, feedback is when government officials are made aware of a problem by the public. In his editorial, John Howard admitted that his party lost seats in his first election as prime minister, which was accompanied by the creation of a new party whose platform was to repeal his gun
legislation (Howard, 2013). However, the gun legislation could not have been possible without the mass support of the population; after he began to outline his legislative plans, the media gave him a strong backing even turning on those who tried to opposed his plans (Peters & Watson, 1996; Chapman, 2013). Australian citizens and media already had the issue of gun violence and gun restrictions on their mind as a result of the mass shooting in Dunblane, Scotland which occurred a month before the Port Arthur Shooting (Chapman, 2013). Prior to the Port Arthur Massacre, media agencies reported receiving high volumes of mail on the issue of gun violence directly following other firearm related focusing events, but after the Port Arthur shooting it remained the number one issue for at least a month with some news sources openly supporting the reform proposed by Howard’s administration (Chapman, 2013). Furthermore, almost all media sources condemned those who argued against the reform (Chapman, et al., 2006).

Politics Stream
The politics stream is concerned with the political climate of the country. John Kingdon reasoned that the three facets of the politics stream are the national mood, government agenda, and interest groups (Herweg, Zahariadis, & Zohlnhöfer, 2017). The politics stream is difficult to identify as converging with the other two streams because these three elements which make up the politics stream as defined by Kingdon don’t necessarily have to align with one another. In other words, one of these elements may be in conflict with the others which is true in this case study, in which the wishes of interest groups were in opposition with the government agenda and national mood.

The first of the three elements, national mood, can be operationalized by public opinions polls (Herweg, Zahariadis, & Zohlnhöfer, 2017). Numerous polls and even a referendum showed that public opinion overwhelmingly supported various forms of gun restrictions even before the Port Arthur Massacre (Chapman, 2013). After the massacre, a public opinion poll found that over 90% of Australians favored additional gun restrictions (Chapman, et al., 2006). The first aspect of the politics stream is favorable for its coupling with the other streams.

The government agenda can be operationalized in multiple ways. Herweg et al. (2017) argue that the government officials are the primary agents in the politics stream because they are the actors who actually implement policy; however, the three facets of the politics stream are not independent. Politicians wish to be reelected so they need to be cognizant of the political mood and powerful interest groups as these are the two primary factors to be considered come election time. In this case study, the government’s decision of which policy to implement can be explained in the context of a political entrepreneur. A political entrepreneur is an actor within the government who, through a position of power, works to adopt legislation, but doesn’t necessarily have to develop the policy (Herweg, et al., 2017). John Howard is a strong example of a political entrepreneur. In his New York Times editorial, he explained that since gun control is a state issue and not a federal issue, he had to
organize the cooperation of all of the Australian states to adopt the same legislation (2013). He describes that the turning point in complete cooperation was when he threatened the holdout states with a referendum to alter the Australian Constitution so that the federal government would have control over guns (Howard 2013). An additional consideration in the politics stream is turnover. John Howard was in his early stages of leadership which is when politicians are more likely to adopt new legislation (Brunk & Minehart, 1984). Many of the policies he adopted were preconceived, but he brought them into Australian legislation. The conception of the political entrepreneur as the actor with agency as well as the increased probability of innovation with political turnover are consistent with the claim of Herweg, Zahariadis, and Zohlnhöfer that the government or officials are the actors that add agency to the politics stream. The politics stream was not ready to be merged with the problem and politics streams after the Port Arthur Massacre. It took the agency of Howard as a political entrepreneur to manipulate the national mood and government agenda so that it was ready to be coupled with the other two.

The last element of the politics stream is interest groups. Some interest groups were proponents of gun restriction, but the main interest group worth noting is the gun lobby. The gun lobby in Australia is not as strong as the NRA in the United States (Chapman, 2013; Howard, 2013). Except for a few outspoken gun lobbyists, most Australian gun owners did not fight the legislation (Chapman, 2013). On the other hand, the Alannah and Madeline Foundation is an example of an interest group created in direct response to the massacre (Martain, 2017). This group came about after the new laws had been passed; however, the story of Walter Mikac, the father of Alannah and Madeline who were killed in the shooting and founder of the foundation, came to be representative of a need for change following the publication of his picture in the aftermath of the shooting (Martain, 2017). The emotional impact on the Australian public was thus felt even before the foundation was fully realized. The other two facets of the politics stream, the national mood and government agenda, highly favored and fought for legislation to restrict guns, and interest groups did not pose an insurmountable threat to the legislation. The result was that the politics stream lent to being coupled with the other streams in the policy window.

Policy Stream
The policy stream is the most difficult to observe. The discussions that determine which policies politicians, agencies, and experts choose often takes place behind closed doors and the public only sees the finished product: the policies they support and the rhetoric they use to generate support. This rhetoric can be different from the reason they genuinely support it. What can be examined is why certain policies are considered in the “primeval soup” while others are cast aside (Herweg, et al, 2017, p. 23). Policies that meet four criteria – financial and technical feasibility, public acquiescence, and value acceptability – as outlined by Kingdon are more likely to be considered (Herweg, et al, 2017). Adherence to these criteria shows that the National Firearms Agreement was viable, but also
demonstrates the persistence of John Howard as a political entrepreneur as well as the public support his policy received. In terms of feasibility, the gun buy-back program was unlike any prior attempt at reducing the number of firearms because it offered full price for guns while also requiring citizens to give up certain guns. This required the compliance of citizens, some of whom were so outraged at the proposal that the prime minister felt the need to wear a bullet proof vest to some events (Chapman, 2013). The feasibility was thus reduced by the uncertainty of the compliance of Australians. Furthermore, the buy-back portion of the legislation was enormously expensive meaning that another criterion, financial feasibility, was not met. The political cost to Howard’s party was high as they not only created enemies with a powerful lobby, but also lost seats in the following election to a new party which Howard believes was a direct result of this legislation (Howard, 2013). Conversely, public acquiescence and value acceptability were met. In regard to the former, the majority of the public did not just accept the legislation – they endorsed it (Chapman, et al., 2006). In terms of the latter, Australia does not have an equivalent to the Second Amendment. As a result, gun restrictions were not an affront to the values of Australians as opposed to those of Americans, for nearly half of whom the right to own guns is an essential freedom (Igielnik & Brown, 2017). In addition to Howard’s persistence, the policy stream was amenable, despite its setbacks, because the uncertainty surrounding feasibility was overcome by the large amount of support for the policy.

Policy Windows and Entrepreneurs

A policy window temporarily opens in either the problem stream or the political stream and is a point when actors can bring attention and solutions to problems facing society (Herweg, et al, 2017). The legislation that followed the shooting is an example of “consequential coupling,” which is when the problem stream opens the policy window (Herweg, et al, 2017, p. 27). During consequential coupling, the policy window is only open for a brief period of time (compared to when a policy window arises from the politics stream) (Herweg, et al, 2017). The fact that the National Firearms Agreement was passed twelve days after the attack gives evidence that the policy window was only open momentarily, therefore giving credence to this case being an example of consequential coupling. Many of the policies included in the National Firearms Agreement were recommended in the National Committee on Violence’s 1990 report “Violence: Directions for Australia” (Chappell, 2004; Australian Institute of Criminology, 1990). The 1990 committee’s multifaceted twenty recommendations comprised the most comprehensive policy on gun restrictions at the time. The committee was also well advised as it was comprised of experts across many disciplines including law enforcement and academia. Because the policy window was so short, John Howard didn’t have much time to create a policy.

The idea that he would choose a policy can be explained by commissioning, which assumes that the decision of which policy to implement belongs to a political figure. By choosing the policy recommendations outlined in the 1990 report, Howard coupled the policy stream of gun control and the
favorable politics stream to the problem stream of gun violence within the policy window opened by the Port Arthur Massacre. The gun legislation is commonly attributed to Howard through discourse, polls, and even his own take on history, showing that he is informally recognized as the policy entrepreneur. He fulfilled the traditional role of a policy entrepreneur by facilitating the convergence of the policy and political streams with the problem stream once the policy window was opened by the focusing event. It is important to remember that the politics stream was not ready to be coupled following the massacre. Howard garnered the necessary governmental support through advocacy and coercion to ensure that the politics stream lent to the implementation of gun restrictions. In this way, he was also a political entrepreneur. His entrepreneurial role demonstrates that agency is a factor within the multiple streams approach. The theory suggests that even when all the streams exist in a state favorable to the passing of a policy, the status quo will remain until a policy entrepreneur couples the three streams.

**Conclusion**
The Australian National Firearms Agreement of 1996 was swiftly implemented after the Port Arthur Massacre. The multiple streams framework adds insight in this case study because of its ability to clearly label the shooting as the focusing event, providing a theoretical explanation to Chapman’s empirical observation that mass shootings often precede gun regulation. In the case of firearm regulation, it normally takes a mass shooting to address more prevalent forms of gun violence such as homicides and suicides. This phenomenon where policy is implemented to solve a problem outside the scope of the focusing event can be explained by the multiple streams framework. The problem stream was the most important part of this policy for two reasons. First, the focusing event opened the policy window allowing for the convergence of the other streams with the problem stream. Second, the indicators pushed the policy choice which also focused on aspects of gun violence other than mass shootings, such as suicide and homicide, and which have had a larger impact on reducing gun violence in Australia. In 2013, John Howard cited that suicides had decreased by 74% per year, which translates to the saving of 336 lives a year, while 9 people were killed each year from 1978-1996 in mass shootings (Howard, 2013). The impact of the laws put into place to solve the problem exemplified by the indicators, suicide and homicide, was clearly greater than that of the policies aimed at ending mass shootings. In regard to the political mood, Australia’s population was receptive to this policy. The multiple streams approach also explains the commissioning of the policy. That is to say that the policy was essentially written, in the sense that the policies were conceived by 1990 committee, prior to the focusing event, and that the entrepreneurs choose the policy that they believe will solve the problem – they do not invent the policy. The multiple streams approach can also account for the public’s influence in the policy process. The final reason that the multiple streams approach is useful in
explaining the passing of this legislation is that individual agency is important. The political entrepreneur accounts for the coordination that John Howard was able to achieve between the separate states without having the federal jurisdiction to force them to adopt the same policy. This case study has interesting implications for the discussion of gun regulation in the United States. Unfortunately, the United States has suffered from a multitude of mass shootings. The lesson learned is not that gun regulation will always follow mass shootings, but that they are often a precondition. In asking why some form of gun control has not been enacted in the United States, it must be that either the politics stream or the policy stream has not successfully been coupled by a policy entrepreneur, specifically by a political entrepreneur. The grim conclusion is that the policy window for gun control in the United States following the shooting in Las Vegas has passed. If Chapman’s assertion is correct, when the politics stream and the policy stream are ready to be coupled to take steps to solve the problem of gun violence, a policy entrepreneur will have to wait for the problem stream to open a policy window to couple all three streams, meaning it will take yet another mass shooting before this is possible. In the United States, the national mood and interests groups in the politics stream and public acquiescence and value acceptability in the policy stream are blocking a similar type of reform from being enacted.

References


