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Modus Vivendi is a non-profit publication produced by undergraduate students in the International Studies Department at Rhodes College. Any inquiries regarding the journal should be made to Professor Esen Kirdis, 2000 North Parkway, Memphis, TN 38112.
Letter from the Editor

Dear Readers:

On behalf of the entire editorial staff, photographers, and authors, I am pleased to present to you the 28th edition of Modus Vivendi. This edition would be impossible without the hard work, dedication, and commitment of so many people in the Rhodes community, but there are a few that deserve special recognition.

First, as advisor to both Modus Vivendi and Sigma Iota Rho, Professor Esen Kirdis has played an invaluable part in the production of this edition through her advice and guidance.

Second, I would like to thank the International Studies Department and Sigma Iota Rho for allowing us to continue to showcase student work in this journal. These works would be impossible to achieve without the guidance of the International Studies faculty.

Finally, I want to thank my fellow Rhodes students for all the time and effort they have put into this edition as editors, authors, photographers, and readers. Thank you for continuing to support the incredible work being done by the International Studies students.

I hope this edition and the research contained therein will help to challenge, educate, and inspire all our readers and contributors.

Sincerely,

Smith Duncan
Editor-In-Chief, 2022
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Wataniya V. Qawmiya: The Failure of the United Arab Republic

Salma Abdulrahman ’23

I. Introduction

There has always been a certain sentiment of egoism within the Middle Eastern region that gives rise to prideful nationalist thought. This is mostly due to historical events, such as the revelation of the Islamic religion to the Arab people and the constant interest of the Western world in Arab land, because of its natural wealth and central location. The hindmost era of Arab nationalism has been marked by the goal of uniting all Arab people under a single definition of ethnic nationalism. These ideas of Pan-Arabism were popularized by the Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser in the 1950s. He was seen as the face of the political alliance, known as the United Arab Republic, that united the states of Egypt and Syria. Most conventional accounts of history emphasize the role of Nasser without considering the role of Arab masses, intellectuals, or even the Syrian political actors. In his 1955 manifesto, Egypt’s Liberation: The philosophy of Revolution, Nasser dedicates more than half of his writing to discussing how the Egyptian state and people can progress socially and politically, with barely any mention to the Arab world as a whole.¹ This was only a couple of years prior to the creation of the United Arab Republic in 1958. Why then was Nasser at the front of every mention of Pan-Arabism? Syria and Egypt have lived through many of the same struggles, yet their approach to nationalism can be seen to be vastly different. In this paper, I will outline the events leading up to the creation of the United Arab Republic through a comparative lens, highlighting the contrast between the construction of

nationalism in Syria and Egypt which eventually leads to the failure of their union.

II. Defining Nationalism

The ideas of nationalism in the Arab world have been phenomena within multiple epochs of the Arab people. In “Arab Nationalism: A Bibliographic Essay,” Elie Chalala writes about the three historical stages in which previous historians study and analyze Arab nationalism in their own research. The first stage that is mentioned is the 19th century and its lack of any serious nationalist sentiment within the Arab identity. At this time, the Arab world was engulfed by the Islamic empire of the Ottomans. This formed the common link between the people of the region and the religion of Islam, which they shared with other ethnic groups under Ottoman rule. The second stage in the study of Arab nationalism was after the fall of the Ottoman empire. This period saw the rise of anti-western revolutionary sentiments in the separate Arab states, while they fought for their independence from the colonial and imperialist rule of Europe. It was a period described by Mohamed Hasanyan Haykal—the lead journalist under the rule of Nasser—as a time when “Nationalism and new ideologies swept the once subject peoples. It was a time of turmoil.” Despite the fact that these states were Western creations that would eventually be condemned, at the moment, there was no awareness on the larger scale of the ideas of Pan-Arabism. The final stage of Arab nationalism is what brought that nuanced awareness that the state lines were the Western man’s creation and that there was a wider connection between Arabs. This came after the independence of most of the Arab states from European rule. With this

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3 Ibid
independence came the rise of a newly educated

class of intellectuals that were able to come to

their reformulated ideas of nationalism on the

to the wider scale of Pan-Arabism. These new sentiments

were much more complicated than the previous

demonstrations of nationalism, because they

brought in questions of what constituted the Arab

identity. The main conflict that arises in the

discussion of the Arab identity is whether it is

determined by the shared language, history, culture,
or religion of the people of the region.⁶

Religion was extremely controversial during

this period because secularism was sought after in

the creation of nationalism. Yet, there was no

denying that Islam played a big role in the identity

of the Arab world. Nasser himself recognized that

Islam was a big factor in the Arab world and stated

that “The meaning of unity was never clearer than

when the Christianity of the Arab Orient joined the

ranks of Islam to battle the Crusader until victory.”

However, in his 1958 speech celebrating the

creation United Arab Republic, Nasser does not

make Islam the identity of the so-called Arab

Orient. Instead, he emphasizes the cooperation of

religions in the East as they faced the imperialist

Christian West.⁷ Nasser actually believed that one of

the main sources of strength of the Arab world was

their historical ties to all three of the Abrahamic

religions, not just Islam.⁸ One of the main links

between Egypt and Syria at the time was their

desire for an Arab nation that could be seen

separately from the identity of Islam. Both the elite

leaders in Syria and Egypt were in agreement that

nationalism should be handled away from religion.

This ideology separated them from powerful states

in the Arab world that were ruled by the proponents


⁶ Ibid
⁷ Gamal Abdel-Nasser, “President Gamal Abdel Nasser’s Speech Delivered to the National Assembly on February 5, 1958,” in President Gamal Abdel-Nasser’s speeches and press interviews during the year 1958, (1958) p.8
of Islamic Arab nationalism—the Hashemites. The controversy regarding the religiosity of the nation created an irony within the region by having anti-Western states opposing Islamic nationalism and Hashemite states cooperating with the West. This created an "original contradiction between Islam and Arab nationalism."  

Despite their agreement on what constituted nationalism in the Arab world, the leaders and intellectuals of Syria and Egypt took different approaches to build that spirit of nationalism within their states. Philip Khoury discusses the difference between patriotism (Wataniya) and nationalism (Qawmiya) in regards to Syria. The initial emergence of Arab nationalism was by Arab elites in the post-Ottoman era. It was represented by the second stage of nationalism in the Arab world outlined by Chalala, where Arab leaders within their new borders began to nationalize their citizens according to these new state lines. This stage of political identity was a representation of patriotism more than it was a representation of nationalism since it would be later realized that the nation was defined beyond these borders. Patriotism at the time was a way for these leaders to demand their "natural rights" for ruling their new states, which only validated the Western ideology of statehood. 1933 saw one of the first manifestations of Qawmiya through the secret meetings of young elitist intellectuals who came from different regions throughout the Arab world, to Qaran'il, Lebanon, to discuss the greater Arab nation. While these meetings were attended by the future founders of the Syrian Ba'ath party—Salah al-Din Bitar and

10 Haykal, Opt. Cit (4) p.15
12 Ibid
13 Ibid
Michel Aflaq—who would call for the formation of the union between Syria and Egypt, there was no mention of Egyptian involvement in these discussions of Arab nationalism. Ultimately, there was a lack of connection between the Egyptians and the rest of the Arab world in this era, which was largely a result of patriotism. Like the elite rulers of Syria, Egyptians were engulfed by their own national pride. Especially since, according to Nasser, the Egyptian identity had long existed prior to any exterior interference from the West or the Ottomans.

III. Egypt’s Wataniya

Egypt and Syria’s approaches to nationalism were not the only factor in which they diverged. While they both shared common histories of battles for independence against Ottoman and European rule, their experiences of independence and what followed it were different. Even their experiences under European rule were not the same. Haykal summarizes Egyptian and Syrian encounters with the West during the colonial era:

They were different [colonial] confrontations. The British were more flexible than the French. The British did not retaliate against the Egyptians by bombarding Cairo, whereas the French twice crushed the Syrian uprising by shelling Damascus, one in 1925 and again in 1944.

British flexibility gave Egyptians increased space to develop their own political and social ideas. Nasser himself was noted to have increased political involvement in his youth in the 1930s, while his Syrian counterparts were repeatedly defeated in their own political actions. This period of time was

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15 Nasser, Opt. Cit (1)

16 Haykal, Opt. Cit (4) p.15

17 Jankowski, Opt. Cit (9)
long enough for Egyptians to begin forming strong
bonds within their own people, which will later be
revealed as a persisting sentiment throughout the
following decades.

Egypt was officially independent from any
colonial or imperialist British influence after the
1952 revolution and coup d'etat administered by
the Free Officers – a group of young officers of
which Nasser was a part of. Although they had been
freed from British colonialism as a result of the
revolts of the 1920s and 1930s, there was still
heavy British imperialist influence within the
country until 1952. The interwar period for Egypt
was marked by the leadership of the Wafd party,
who was under the rule of the Monarch King
Farouk, who, in turn, was under heavy influence
from the British.\(^1\) So, when the Free Officers took
over with the help of the revolutionary masses in
1952, there was a great extent of pride and
enthusiasm within the Egyptian people. General
Mohamed Naguib, of the Free Officers, seized power
after the coup and continued to rule the nation
until his assassination during a speech he delivered
to the people of Alexandria in 1954.\(^1\) The
charismatic Nasser was next in line for power,
giving him the position of Premier, until he was
democratically elected in 1956.\(^2\)

As the new hero and leader of the Egyptian
people, Nasser was determined to inspire his people
to realize their potential as one of the strongest
nations. He believed it was important to take the
social ties of the Egyptian people to the next level
through a new definition of nationhood. Only after
this, could they begin their work on advancing as a
political state. Nasser defined these ideas as the
“social revolution,” and the “political revolution” of
any society in Egypt’s Liberation: The Philosophy of
Revolution.\(^3\) In this work, he reminds the Egyptian

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\(^1\) Nasser, Opt. Cit (1)
\(^2\) Ibid
\(^3\) Nasser, Opt. Cit (1), p.40
people that they are already a step behind since they started their political revolution in 1952. However, he still believed that there was time for them, since each step they took from this moment forward would be crucial to the “structure rising stone upon stone,” of the greatness of Egypt.22 His ideas influenced many intellectuals and writers in Egypt at the time. The most notorious of them is Haykal and his pieces in Al-Haram – the lead newspaper at the time. Similar to Nasser, Haykal also emphasized the need for the Egyptian nation to “[discard] its own backwardness,” and work towards a modernized ideal of nationalism.23 Egyptians now had an assignment to work towards that would completely distract them from the greater Arab world’s need for liberation. When Nasser does briefly mention the importance of working with the Arab world in Egypt’s Liberation, he continues to regard the Egyptian people through a more cardinal lens than their surrounding neighbors.24 Even after the United Arab Republic was founded, a writer for The World Today notes that “The Egyptians were disposed to regard the Arabs outside their frontiers with mixed feelings of brotherly love and innate suspicion.” This demonstrates that the Egyptians could not let go of their feelings of wataniya even through acts of union.25

In addition, there was a lack of regard to the Arab world and the international system coming from the political end of Egyptian policy. Jankowski observed that “Through 1952-1953 issues related to Egypt took precedence over Egyptian relations with its neighbors.”26 The elite and politicians, backed by Nasser’s regime, were not unaffected by his wataniya propaganda. Therefore, since they

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22 Ibid
24 Nasser, Opt Cit. (1)
were the main actors in the progression of the political revolution, they mainly focused on the politics that directly affected their people and state.

Eventually, Egyptian politicians began to realize that cooperating with the international system would actually help the development of their new state. However, they were still weary of the world around them, which resulted in the 1954 neutrality policy. These guidelines were “based on the principle that Egypt will not cooperate with anyone unless her rights and sovereignty are recognized.”

These sentiments of cooperation founded only on self-serving principles and superiority also influenced Egypt’s interactions with the Syrian state and people.

IV. Syria’s Qawmiya

To the east of the Egyptian independent state, the Syrian people were struggling to achieve that same independence. Their French colonizers had established and maintained unyielding control of the country, which continuously discouraged the Syrian people from any hopes of independent rule.

Yet, despite this, Syria was still part of the persistent fight against European rule that manifested itself throughout the Arab world. The Syrian revolution of 1925 led to agreements concerning leniency of political control between the Syrian upper class leaders, who ruled through the National Bloc political party, and the French. Unfortunately for the Syrian people, this agreement was only a way for their leaders to create an illusion of political power while the French continued to puppet them. In Khoury’s essay “The Paradoxical in Arab nationalism,” it is made clear that there was a divide within Syrian nationalism between the elitist patriotism, that could only apply to the experiences of upper class, and the rest of Syria, who had to look to the Arab world to find their community.


28 Aulas, Opt Cit. (14).
The main contribution that the Syrian National Bloc offered their people was an increased education initiative that mirrored the French education system. There was also an increase in the number of schools in the country. These new schools were called tajhiz schools. 29 Students of these schools--who still came mainly from middle and upper class families--were taught under a Westernized curriculum, which inspired and became “one of the principal centers of nationalist activity during the 1930s.” These ideologies mirrored the way in which the French went about creating their own nationalism as well. 30 This nationalism was founded on the same ideas of patriotic wataniya that Egypt was exhibiting at the time. However, the relationship between the Syrian masses and their rulers were not as intimate as they were in Egypt, making their sense of internal nationalism weaker.

There was an undeniable struggle throughout the rest of Syria. The Syrian upper class was able to enjoy “leadership” and education, whereas the rest of the country was in economic turmoil, which was a direct result of the French economic depression. The devastation of the Syrian economy inspired sentiments of qawmiya. This new attitude towards nationalism was manifested after Syrians were forced to flee to surrounding Arab countries “expressing by migration a Pan-Arabist solution to the local economic problem.” 31 During that time, the aforementioned Aflaq and Bitar--who were part of the upper classes--were completing their education in France. While they were there from 1929-1934, they formed a friendship based on their shared political ideology--socialism. Their ideals of socialism at the time were completely inspired by the French texts and intellectuals they read. 32 After their return, they both worked under

29 Khoury, Opt. Cit (11)
30 Ibid
31 Ibid, p.279
32 Patrick Seale, “The Ba’th and the Communists,” in The Struggle for Syria: A study of Post-War Arab Politics 1954-
the National Bloc’s tajhiz schools, however, they were able to see the corruption behind these schools because of the theories of socialism that they studied abroad. While they were also influenced by Western ideologies like their students, Bitar and Aflaq were able to weaponize these ideas against their creators. They used the core ideas of socialism in a postcolonial context that would liberate them from the West and started a political magazine to publicize them. In an interview my Marie Aulas, Bitar tells her about publishing the “magazine al-Tali’a [the Vanguard], which expressed our opposition to the situation in Syria at that time.”33 Their writing was mainly aimed at the literate youth and intellectuals of Syria. It succeeded at rousing their students as demonstrated by the student protests of 1935.34 The National Bloc was alarmed by these protests and, in response, declared another treaty with France in 1936. This agreement promised national independence, but was, yet again, never actualized.35 Ultimately, this time period was marked by a never ending cycle of broken promises and deception from both the National Bloc and the French.

Bitar and Aflaq were highly aware of the struggle of the Syrian masses and the Pan-Arab sentiments expressed by surrounding intellectuals. They believed that forming an organization that mirrored western socialist ideas, in addition to Arab ideas of qawmiya, could be a turning point for their nation. While there was a communist party in Syria that intersected with the interests of the student movement lead by Aflaq and Bitar, they believed that the communists were also too westernized for their ideals. They expressed in their writing that “if a great power like the Soviet Union,” –who the Syrian communists looked to for inspiration– “looks

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33 Aulas, Opt. Cit (14)
34 Ibid

only to her own interests, should not we the Arabs
as a young nation, follow her example and pursue
an independent policy.” As a result, Bitar and Aflaq
formed the Ba’th party in 1942, which was
recognized officially in 1947 and allowed them to
participate in parliamentary actions. With their
emerging popularity, they were able to perform a
coup backed by the Syrian people and military
officers in both 1949 and later in 1954.37

In the Arab world, Nasser was seen as a hero
for being able to guide his own nation out of
imperialist control and into a well respected
country recognized by the many members of the
international system. He was also respected by the
advocates of qawmiya—especially Syria—since he
strongly opposed the neoliberal Baghdad Pact of
1955. This agreement supported cooperation
between the West and Iraq along with other Central
states such as Turkey and Iran. In Haykal’s

autobiographical account of Nasser’s life, he
attested to the reality that “the world itself had
found in him [Nasser] the most controversial
statesmen and the Arabs had chosen him as the
symbol of their lost dignity.”38 The mutual
opposition of Syrian leaders and Nasser to the
Baghdad Pact was the incentive behind Syria’s first
attempt in 1955 at collaborating with Egypt in a
defence alliance against the West and Israel.39 This
proposal was declined by Egyptian leaders due to
their confidence that they could single-handedly
defeat the West. To Syrians, the national question
was one of Arab nationalism, which is why they
were eager to collaborate with Egypt. Bitar notes
that after the Ba’th coup in 1954 “[the national
question] remained primary. The proof is that the
Ba’th had been the architect of unity with Egypt in
1958.”40 To Syrians, the national question was one

36 Bitar and Aflaq as cited by Seale (32), p.150
38 Haykal, Opt Cit (4), p.1
39 Jankowski, Opt Cit (9)
40 Aulas, Opt. Cit (14)
of Arab nationalism, which is why they were eager to collaborate with Egypt.

V. Conflicts Within the Emergence of the Republic

After multiple attempts and calls for unification from the Syrian people and parliament, the two states were finally united on February 1st of 1958. Nassar states in his speeches to the newly formed nation\(^41\) that he would embrace the Syrians' optimism and their hope that this union would stray away from the popular individualistic sentiment found in Syrian politics prior to the Ba'th coup.\(^42\)

However, the Egyptian leaders surrounding Nasser were not fond of it. The Syrian Diplomat of Egypt, Mohamed Riyad, attempted to dissuade the Syrian leaders from their union after seeing the Egyptians' lack of enthusiasm.\(^43\) Many, including Nasser, saw this union as an economic and political burden.

When he addressed the general population in Egypt, Nasser spoke of Arab nationalism through a tone of admiration, saying that:

> We [the Arab people] shall look forward, and shall make headway to a bright, prosperous and dignified future. We shall look to Arab nationalism which we have proclaimed, Arab nationalism which we have long dreamt, Arab nationalism which had been a cherished hope, and shall all work with God's help, for the consolidation of its aims, and the consolidation of its foundations.\(^44\)

The words of Nasser's speech contradict his earlier calls for solely focusing on the social and political revolutions in Egypt. It also contradicts his earlier weariness of uniting his forces with Syria in the early fifties, right before finally agreeing to creating the United Arab Republic.

\(^41\) Gamal Abdel-Nasser, "Address by President Gamal Abdel-Nasser on the Ocassion of the proclamation of the United Arab Republic," and "President's second speech on Proclamation of the U.A.R," in President Gamal Abdel-Nasser's speeches and press interviews during the year 1958, (1958) 4-6


\(^43\) Jankowski, Opt. cit (9)

\(^44\) Nasser, Opt. Cit (41).
Nasser’s agreement did not come without limitations to the politics of the union. Nasser only agreed to concede with the Syrian people on two conditions. First, that the Syrian officers could not participate in politics, and, second, that all Syrian political parties would need to be dissolved immediately. These conditions would weaken Syria’s political autonomy, making them dependent on Egypt’s power. Nasser’s compromise on the union also came only after he realized that becoming the face of the anti-Western and anti-imperialist Arab world would serve his own image and agenda. While Nasser was democratically elected, it was clear that “President Shukry el-Kuwatly [was] to take second place to young President Nasser.” The United Arab Republic, which was founded on the principles of Arab nationalism, now put Egyptians politicians at a higher position than their Syrian counterparts.

Syrians quickly realized the individualistic authority Nasser held, which was the exact opposite of what they had hoped for. In 1959, there were many resignations of Syrian politicians from their positions in the Republic which was a result of “Syrian elites [who] felt that they were being relegated to secondary positions and that the Egyptians were trying to run the show.”

In conclusion, Nasser was seen as the face of Arab nationalism because he ruled the politics of the union. However, building a spirit of qawmiya was never his intention as he ruled this new state. The Egyptians were happy to follow Nasser at every step, because they believed he was a reliable leader. The Syrians were also eager to follow Nasser due to his successful track record, despite knowing that Egypt had no loyalty to the greater Arab world. This would only result in disappointment on the Syrian end. Nasser’s military legacy in Egypt would

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45 Nasser as quoted by Palmer, p.52
46 Jankowski, Opt. Cit (9).
48 Palmer, Opt Cit. (42) p.44
also lead to the disillusionment of future generations in the country. Ultimately, Egypt’s pride in their Free Officers was carried into the twenty first century with their pattern of coups and military supremacy in the country. However, none of Egypt’s succeeding rulers were ever as popular as Nasser initially was. Unfortunately, Egypt’s trust in Nasser was misplaced, as he consolidated power into a dictatorship that, regardless of popularity, still remains impenetrable today.

References
Aulas, Marie-Christine. “Salah al-Din al-Bitar’s Last Interview.” In MERIP Reports 110 (Nov/Dec 1982): 21-23; also available online at: https://merip.org/1982/11/salah-al-din-al-bitars-last-interview/
Nasser, Gamal Abdel. President Gamal Abdel Nasser’s speeches and press interviews during the year 1958. (1958)

The rise of the European populist right has been observed over western Europe in recent decades. Some saw great success in the early-mid 2000s, with the likes of the Front National getting its first candidate to the second round of France’s Presidential election in 2003 and the Austrian Freedom Party entering government for the first time as a minority partner in 2000. However, the rise of the populist right in Europe has further cemented its presence around the continent in the 2010s. Two examples of this are Italy’s Lega Nord and the United Kingdom’s UKIP. Upon a closer examination, both share a surprisingly similar exoskeleton in their rise, despite their fundamentally different origins and country contexts. Both parties did not originate in their country’s national far-right scene, though, throughout the 2000s and 2010s, they slowly came to occupy that space, finding significant political success. Since their respective peaks, the party’s differences have left them in different places, with UKIP functionally dead and Lega weakened, but still a political force in Italy.

UKIP’s origins can be traced to the early 1990s and the Anti-Federalist League. The founder, Alan Sked, formed the group in response to the major parties’ widespread support of the Maastricht treaty despite its lack of support among the actual British Public. Shortly after the 1992 General Election, Sked re-organized the party under its current name, the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP). Up to that point, Sked had built a reputation as Eurosceptic, strongly opposing the creation of the European Union. However, unlike
most Eurosceptics one would think of today, his Euroscepticism was not couched in anti-immigration or xenophobia. Some Eurosceptics opposed joining the European Union on xenophobic grounds in the UK, but the BNP primarily occupied this space. UKIP’s party membership form even denounced prejudices against foreigners and the like. He openly states that under his leadership, UKIP was “a liberal – with a small ‘l’ – center, moderate party (Jeffries 2014). In line with this, Sked’s skepticism of Europe was based on concerns about government overreach and a lack of self-governance. His letter to John Major in 1993 makes this, and his opposition to xenophobia, evident, stating that “The UK Independence Party, therefore, pledges itself to use all democratic means to…restore to all British Subjects of all colors and creeds their rights to democratic parliamentary self-governance.” (Payne 2018) Sked did not opt to focus on many other issues in the building of UKIP, leaving it as a largely one-issue party under his tutelage. The character of the party’s Euroscepticism was undoubtedly liberal. However, its one-party nature made it vulnerable to other forms of Euroscepticism, such as that of the far more conservative Nigel Farage. The UKIP that would eventually rise to prominence in the 2000s and 2010s only really brought the party’s name with them, as the 1990s version could in no way be considered a part of the Extreme Right.

While more disputed, Lega Nord was certainly not an agreed-upon Extreme Right party at its origin either. The party was founded in 1991 as an alliance formed between various regionalist groups in Northern Italy. Beforehand, Northern Italy had seen various “Leagues” arise in association with their respective historical regions. The Most notable of these were Liga Veneto and Lega Lombarda, who had won seats in the Italian parliament in the 1980s. The seat won by Lega Lombarda was occupied by Umberto Bossi, who would become the parties’ first leader. Under Bossi, Lega took on a
more unified approach to their regionalism, creating a broader sentiment in favor of Northern Italy under the banner of Padania, a new name and identity invented to describe the region without any true historical roots. This regionalism particularly appealed to people in smaller towns in the region, small business owners, and socially conservative Catholics, as they felt particularly hung out to dry (Ignazi 2005).

As such, Lega exploited frustration at the Central Government, particularly for perceived fiscal neglect of the North in favor of the South. Functionally, Bossi placed Padanians as “a homogenous, hard-working community of people attached to their distinctive traditions.” (Albertazzi, Giovannini and Seddone 2018), while the "elites" in Rome were responsible for corruption and favored the South over the North. This rhetoric shows an obvious populist and regionalist element to early Lega. However, it was not exactly clear in terms of where to place the party on the left-right spectrum. The 1994 European Parliament Election saw the party win six seats, grouping themselves with the ELDR, a parliamentary group generally associated with Liberalism. (European Parliament 2019) However, by the end of the session, the party only had one member in that group, with four unaffiliated and one in Group Union for Europe. While not a perfect indicator, it seems as good as any to demonstrate the eclectic character of the party at this time. Still, the party promoted anti-immigration sentiment, and regionalism can undoubtedly be considered exclusionary, as their rhetoric against other Italians was quite aggressive. Many scholars still considered the party on the extreme right (Spektorowski 2003). However, its distinctly regionalist character meant it could not occupy the same space as Allanze Nazionale did throughout Italy or that the BNP did in the UK. Lega Nord, like UKIP, did not occupy the extreme populist right space that it would come to occupy at their political peaks. Both parties were
founded on entirely different ideologies: Lega Nord on populist regionalism and UKIP on liberal Euroscepticism. However, both parties were limited by these ideologies: Lega Nord by geography and UKIP by its one-issue nature (along with a lack of political appetite for liberal Euroscepticism). This would leave them stuck as relatively niche parties unless they reoriented themselves.

UKIP's slow ascension into the political mainstream began in 1997 after the resignation of the party's founder Alan Sked. There were questions about how the party would grow after this was a series of twists and turns, often flirting with the extreme populist right while never fully embracing it. Almost immediately after Sked left, party leadership began associating itself much more with the right. The new leader, Michael Holmes, showed support for protest groups such as Save Our Sterling, a group run by the extreme right BNP (Wheen 1999). This came around the same time as noted party figure Nigel Farage was seen meeting with BNP figures. While these two things alone mean little more than political gaffes, this would serve as a harbinger for UKIP to emerge from its political peak. The late 1990s and early 2000s would see the party's first major electoral successes, as the party won its first seats in the European parliament in 1999 and would go on to win 16 percent of the vote in the 2004 election. Both times, the party was soon racked with internal strife, stifling any momentum it could have gained from these successes. With a lack of a consistent leader a core identity beyond the single issue of Euroscepticism, the party was primarily seen as a one-issue party until 2006.

However, 2006 saw the leadership fall into the hands of one of the party's most influential figures, Nigel Farage. Farage reoriented the party entirely, as he sought to grow the party into more than a single-issue party. He took stances against the popular narrative of climate change. He attempted to present the party as more adversarial
to the political mainstream than before, indicating a notable shift towards populism. This came along with a renewed focus on anti-immigration, best demonstrated by his support for a five-year freeze on immigration (Lynch, Whitaker, and Loomes 2019). This came on the heels of the UK’s opening borders to immigrants from potential EU members, not just existing ones. The fact that the UK was one of very few EU countries to do this, along with a demonstrated correlation (Evans and Mellon 2019) with a backlash against immigration, led to UKIP having a second-place finish in the EU parliament elections 2009. Momentum for the party would only continue to grow. The party would acquire its first MPs with defections from the Conservative Party soon after, followed by an outright victory in the 2014 EU election and an unprecedentedly strong showing in the 2015 General Election, winning 13 percent of votes. However, more important than all of that was the concession from the mainstream Conservative Party to allow for a referendum on European Union membership. Farage’s reorientation of the party towards populism and anti-immigration proved successful. Outside of the 1990s gaffes, UKIP had never been much else but hostile towards the more radical BNP. This leads us to whether UKIP’s reorientation was indeed a shift to the extreme right or a more mild one. At the very least, scholars agree that they occupied a space on the populist right. Their 2015 manifesto certainly makes that clear, as the language of a pure and innocent people corrupted by the ruling establishment pulsates throughout, along with policy measures advocating for more direct democracy such as “The Citizens Initiative” and a call for a 5-year moratorium on immigration for “unskilled workers.” The rhetoric and direct democracy are clear indicators of populism, and the anti-immigration sentiment certainly places the party on the political right (UKIP 2015). Based on statistical analysis, their support fits in among extreme right parties.
quite well. However, UKIP supporters are far more satisfied and trusting of their political system than the BNP, presenting a standard picture of an extreme right European party. (Widfeldt and Brandenburg 2017) This general satisfaction may indicate that UKIP’s support was far more one-issue than they had hoped, with voters’ opposition to the system being against the EU and not against liberal democracy as it exists today, like in most extreme right parties. However, regardless of whether the party’s character was genuinely extreme right or not, they certainly occupied the space that an extreme right party would during this time.

Despite its best efforts to reorienting itself as a broader right-wing populist party, UKIP never garnered a large enough support base of those profoundly disaffected by the political system. Too many voters aligned closely with the mainstream. So, when its raison d’etre had been fulfilled with the EU referendum (and its success), mainstream parties were more easily able to recalibrate and absorb former UKIP support (Evans and Mellon 2019). The party attempted to recalibrate itself after the referendum, associating itself much more openly with the extreme right. Figures like Tommy Robinson, a former member of the BNP and founder of the English Defence League, were brought into the party in advisory roles. In contrast, the party moved to support Muslim-only prisons in its manifesto and took a much more aggressive anti-Islam stance under Gerard Batten. (Baynes 2018) This sharp turn saw Farage leave the party, and while this strategy seemed to have some short-term success, as membership increased and poll numbers jumped, once Farage came back onto the scene with his party, that success was proven to be hollow. Many of its MEPs left for Farage’s new Brexit Party, and the 2019 European Election saw UKIP’s support fall off a cliff, leaving them with no MEPs and little electoral support.

In some sense, UKIP’s demise seemed to be when and not if. The party had never been able to
successfully infiltrate the National Parliament, even with its large vote shares. This was primarily due to the First Past the Post voting system and the national character of the party. This left the party’s only means for national representation as to the very thing it sought to leave, the EU parliament. Additionally, the data beforehand, and the actual results ever since, have demonstrated that the party was far too heavily associated with its single issue. Without one of their core bases of supporters, internal strife, and a weak institutional base, it was almost inevitable that the party would leave with a whimper compared to the loud bang that the party had made early in the decade.

As the calendar rolled over into the new millennium, the slow transition of both of these parties into what they would become today began to take hold. In Italy, Lega saw their right-wing characteristics take further hold, as the party grew increasingly xenophobic from 1999 onwards, particularly after 9/11. Still heavily couched in regionalist ethos, Bossi and Lega zeroed in on migrants as an existential threat to Northern Italy. They were allowed in by none other than the corrupt elite in Rome. The rhetoric got much harsher against migrants, as demonstrated by Bossi himself insinuating that immigrant boats should have guns fired at them. This did not prove immediately electorally successful, as the party’s support dropped from 10.1% in the 1996 election to 3.9% in 2001 and 4.6% in 2006 (Albertazzi, Giovannini, and Seddone 2018). This can be partly attributed to a shift in Italian political culture, as the chaos of 1990s Italian politics post-Tangentopoli allowed populism like that seen in Lega to thrive. Regardless of the reason, this shift in the early 2000s did solidify the parties’ xenophobic and right-wing character. This is supported by the data as evidenced by a 2003 survey (Ignazi 2005) as a significantly higher percentage of Lega supporters—67 percent relative to the general public’s 42 percent—were “annoyed by the
presence of too many immigrants.” This also significantly outpaced the party’s trajectory broadly considered to be the mainstay of the extreme right throughout Italy, Allianze Nazionale, who only had around 51 percent of supporters answer affirmatively. By the 2000s, Lega had functionally occupied the space left behind by AN as they shifted to the center-right, taking the mantle as the primary extreme right party in Italy. However, their growth potential was halted by the strong regionalism that Bossi insisted on.

However, by 2013, after an internal scandal and another poor election result, the parties’ leadership changed hands to Matteo Salvini. This change of the guard not only marked a change in generation for the party but also in ideology. The xenophobia and correct elements indeed remained. However, what was quietly pushed to the back was the intense regionalism that Bossi has championed for decades. No longer was Rome the object of Lega Nord’s disgust. Instead, it was Brussels, not on behalf of Padania, but all of Italy. Salvini cultivated this image over the next five years, holding rallies in Rome, and even dropping the “Nord” from the party’s presentation instead of framing it around himself. By the 2018 election, the party finally seized its place on the Italian right, strengthening its vote share by 13 points from 4.1 percent to 17.4. For the first time, they overtook Forza Italia, the mainstream Right party, in terms of vote share (Albertazzi, Giovannini, and Seddone 2018). The party is still most robust in its typical strongholds of Lombard and Veneto. However, under Salvini’s all-Italian nationalism, the party went from non-existent in regions such as Tuscany and Umbria to being a full-blown political force. This allowed them to enter government as the primary coalition partner for the first time in history (The party had been in government before but was always one of the smaller members of broader right-wing coalitions). Salvini was appointed Minister of the Interior, giving him a significant degree of power,
particularly over his pet issue of immigration. This, along with a strong performance that saw Lega win a clear plurality in the 2019 European Elections, made it seem as if Lega's momentum was unstoppable. Salvini pulled support for the existing government, hoping to trigger a snap election.

This backfired as a coalition of left-wing parties stepped up to fill Lega's void, avoiding an election and leaving Lega without institutional power. It is too early to tell the long-term consequences of these actions, but, as things stand today, Lega is in a far weaker position than they were two years ago. Before the Government crisis, Lega sat at about 37 percent support nationally. Today, they sit at about 20 percent nationally and risk being overtaken by another party of the Italian right, Fratelli D'Italia. (Politico 13 December 2021)

It is clear from this that Salvini, at the very least, made a major political misstep. However, the party is by no means at risk of disintegrating. Based on the rise of FDI, it is clear that there is still a strong appetite for far-right politics in Italy. Additionally, the Italian election structure is to Lega's benefit, as the combination of proportional representation and First past the post ensure Lega's institutional presence. Bossi has teased a political comeback, and there some factions of the party favor its more regionalist character, but if this happens, then the party likely still has its old strongholds to fall back on. It is too early to tell what the future holds for Lega Nord, but it seems unlikely that the party will fall into irrelevance as UKIP has.

Both UKIP and Lega share a fascinating exoskeleton for their growth over the past few decades. Both parties originated with a much different character than the right-wing populism that they would come to embody. Both parties were outsiders within their country's far-right scene. More institutionalized parties (AN for Lega and the BNP for UKIP) were the main occupier of the extreme right mantle. However, as both of these parties fell by the wayside for their reasons, Lega
and UKIP became unlikely occupiers of the right-wing populist space. Both parties saw a reorientation against immigration throughout the 2000s and a further reorientation pushed by charismatic leaders in the 2010s. The outline almost feels like a mirror image at some points. However, their starkly different bases and environments have left the two parties in today's much different state. While not at its peak, Lega Nord is still able to find political space in Italy, while UKIP is functionally irrelevant in British Politics today. Lega’s regionalist origin, relative internal stability, and a strong appetite for extreme-right politics have given the party a floor to fall back on. In contrast, UKIP’s Eurosceptic origin, along with internal strife and lack of political appetite for extreme-right politics, has taken the rug out from under the party since the success of Brexit. These two parties are just two of many in the European populist right ecosystem. However, their similarities and differences certainly paint a fascinating picture to understanding what those parties need to thrive and the broader political contexts of their host countries.

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Al-Qaeda: A Byproduct of Globalization, Uncertainty, and Insecurity

Miriam Hibah Khayata ’22

Al-Qaeda’s 9/11 attacks on the U.S. shocked the globe, as they revealed that a non-state actor was capable of threatening and harming the world’s superpower. The attacks further posed detrimental implications on the Middle East and the West – namely the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, the U.S. War in Iraq, federal repressive policies against American citizens, and increased Islamophobia within the West to name a few. After 9/11, Al-Qaeda (AQ) received the attention it demanded and was portrayed as an international terrorist network, seeking to “rid Muslim countries of what it sees as the profane influence of the West and replace their governments with fundamentalist Islamic regimes” (Council on Foreign Relations, 2012). By waging its symbolic attacks, AQ introduced the notion of a cosmic war between the Muslim world and the West, suggesting that it was fighting the force of evil. With its various successful operations, Al-Qaeda proved to its members and the world that it was a powerful entity with the capacity to harm the strongest of nations.

As the 9/11 attacks approach their 20th anniversary, it is critical to examine the reasons behind the emergence of Al-Qaeda. Why did this radical organization form? How does it successfully mobilize members across the world? What role does religion play in its recruitment?

To explain Al-Qaeda’s emergence and its sustained membership, this paper is divided into four levels of analysis: (1) global, (2) regional, (3) individual, and (4) religious dynamics. It explores Globalization-Sectarianism theory, Uncertainty-Identity theory, and Islamization of Radicalization theory. It begins with a global analysis of the Cold War, discussing how the Soviet Invasion of
Afghanistan marked the origins of Global Jihad, as the United States reacted to the invasion by mobilizing Mujahideen fighters. Furthermore, by way of Globalization-Sectarianism theory, this paper argues that the increased globalization of the 20th century posed detrimental economic effects onto certain underprivileged members of society which fostered increased religiosity in the Muslim world – and elsewhere – as a way to cope with its material insecurity. During the 1980s, the U.S., Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia capitalized on this increased religiosity, as they mobilized men to fight against the Soviet forces in Afghanistan through an Islamic international solidarity ideology. These fighters would soon consolidate into Al-Qaeda.

Through an individual-level analysis, this paper uses uncertainty-identity theory to explain why Mujahideen fighters joined Al-Qaeda after the war in Afghanistan and how Al-Qaeda continues to receive new members that sustain its organization. Lastly, this paper applies Islamization of Radicalization theory to understand the role of religion in attracting potential AQ recruits and sustaining the notorious organization.

Global Dynamics: Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan

To receive a comprehensive understanding of the emergence of Al-Qaeda, it is essential to begin with a global analysis that observes the Soviet Union’s relationship with Afghanistan in the latter half of the 20th century, for this relationship triggered the genesis of Global Jihad.

As the Cold War motivated new international alliances including close ties between the U.S. and Pakistan, the Soviet Union became increasingly interested in developing its political influence over Pakistan’s neighbor, Afghanistan. As a means to counter U.S. power in the region, the USSR “became Afghanistan’s leading trading partner as well as its leading arms supplier” (Hoodbhoy, 17). This increased trade and arms supply resulted in a strategic alliance between Afghanistan’s Prime Minister Daud and the Soviet
Union in the early 1970s. This alliance, however, was short-lived as a small Marxist party, The People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), emerged. Dissatisfied with Daud’s rule, the PDPA engineered an unsuspected coup in 1978 and ousted Daud. Once in power, the PDPA – which gained the support of the USSR – set to transform the conservative Afghan society by introducing social, military, and land reforms. These reforms were highly unpopular with Afghans and produced extreme civil strife, as they were viewed as liberal policies imposed by Atheist communists. The socio-political unrest in Afghanistan posed a danger to the security of the Soviet state, for the USSR feared that its Muslim Central Asian republics – which are populated by Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Turkmens – would turn against the Union after learning of the violence and strife their Muslim brethren were facing in Afghanistan. As a response to the exceedingly worsening social conditions and as a way to project power and strength to intimidate Muslim Central Asian Republics, “Soviet troops crossed the Afghan frontier…. and forcibly entered the territory of a sovereign Muslim country” in December of 1979 (Hoodbhoy, 19). The USSR invaded Afghanistan in defense of communism and in an attempt to eradicate opposition to the PDPA. The Soviets intended to ensure that Afghanistan remains a strategic ally in its fight against the U.S… Logically, this invasion ignited mass condemnation from Muslim countries around the globe as they viewed it as an attempt to eradicate Islam from Afghanistan.

Similarly, the United States shared the Muslim countries’ condemnation of the Soviet Union’s invasion but for another reason. It believed the Soviet invasion to be “the first move in a grand strategic plan aimed at expanding Soviet power” (Hoodbhoy, 19). Therefore, in an attempt to remove Soviet presence from Afghanistan, the United States joined Pakistan in its effort to resist the Soviet-backed Afghan government. Under the Reagan
Doctrine, the U.S. offered aid to anti-Communist guerrillas fighting the PDPA government. The U.S. support package included "organization and logistics, military technology, and ideological support for sustaining and encouraging the Afghan resistance" (Hoodbhoy, 21). Funneling billions of dollars into the region, the U.S. worked with Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence and Saudi Arabia in organizing and recruiting Mujahideen – holy warriors – who would fight against the Soviet forces. Ironically, the CIA went to the extent of paying for advertisements to be "placed in newspapers and newsletters around the world offering inducements and motivations to join the Jihad" (Hoodbhoy, 22). After years of fighting against the Soviet forces and receiving funding and resources from the U.S., Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan, the Mujahideen prevailed, forcing the Soviet Army to withdraw from Afghanistan in 1988-89 (Institute of the Study of War). Consequently, the U.S., Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan's recruitment of thousands of foreign fighters from over fifty countries created the perfect conditions for the formation of Al Qaeda. Paralleling the victory of the Mujahideen, Al-Qaeda officially emerged in 1988 as an umbrella organization of Muslim fighters committed to continuing the “holy war” beyond Afghanistan.

Regional Dynamics: Globalization-Sectarianism Theory

To understand how Mujahideen fighters were recruited, globalization-sectarianism theory provides a connection between increased globalization and increased religiosity in the Muslim world which explains the successful mobilization of the Mujahideen under an Islamic international solidarity ideology, propagated by the U.S., Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan.

Globalization-sectarianism theory posits that the negative effects that globalization poses on underprivileged members of society exacerbate their feelings of vulnerability and existential anxiety and, thus, cause communities to mobilize...
around their religion as a way to cope with these effects (Kinnvall, 744). As globalization increases the movement of goods, services, technology, ideas, and people, it generates economic growth and increased wealth. Yet only some groups benefit from this success while the majority of society reap the disadvantages that accompany globalization (Lutz and Lutz, 28). The economic dislocations associated with globalization marginalize individuals and produce greater inequality, which ignites mass grievances in society. As they search for existential answers to their quests for security, economically dislocated members of society find comfort in religion, as it provides them with order and clarity regarding who they are.

With an increased religiosity, however, these members of society are prone to influence by religious leaders: “religious leaders may talk about moral or ethical decline by pointing to modern society's lack of morality, loss of ethical values, increased corruption, and so on, where the only answer to the current “decay” is a return to traditional values and religious norms” (Kinnvall, 759). While religion can be used successfully to reduce feelings of existential anxiety and ontological security, it can also create an enemy out of modernity. As seen in the article Globalisation and Terrorism in the Middle East, “globalization by its very nature has the potential to undermine traditional religious values in societies” (Lutz and Lutz, 29). As it introduces new ideas and technological advancements to society, globalization poses a threat to religion by presenting competitive forces that can reduce the need for individuals to remain religious. By undermining religiosity, globalization threatens religions and indigenous cultures, which can further increase religiosity as an effort to reject globalization.

Through an application of globalization-sectarianism theory, it is clear that a connection between the negative effects of globalization,
increased religiosity in Muslim countries, and the recruitment of Mujahideen fighters exists. As globalization reached the Middle East, secular and nationalist governments emerged in the mid 20th century. These governments “proved unable to defend national interests or deliver social justice. They began to frustrate democracy and dictatorships flourished” in their place which exacerbated economic insecurity in these countries (Hoodbhoy, 28). As a consequence of globalization, these failures left a vacuum within Muslim societies which was filled by Islamic religious movements. These movements called their supporters to take up arms, “stop the decay of Muslim civilization and values, and to return to the Golden Age of early Islam” (Hoodbhoy, 29). Initially, these movements’ messages were largely ignored. When the U.S., Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan plotted their strategies to deter the Soviet Union from Afghanistan, however, they capitalized on these movements’ value of Islamic international solidarity as a means to mobilize and recruit fighters. Thus, when advertising the war across the Muslim world, they “emphasiz[ed] Islamic solidarity together with pledges of full financial support” to incentivize fighters to join the holy war (Hoodbhoy, 25). Due to poor economic conditions in Muslim countries coupled with a resurgence of Islamic solidarity, fighters from across the Arab and Muslim world traveled to Afghanistan to fight against the Atheist communists who were corrupting Afghanistan with their liberal social reforms. Thus, the negative aftermath of globalization played a significant role in developing radical religious movements across the Muslim world whose members would eventually mobilize against the Soviet-backed Afghan government in a holy war. As mentioned, this mobilization would eventually lead to the creation of Al-Qaeda.

**Individual Dynamics: Uncertainty-Identity Theory**

For an individual-level analysis of why the Mujahideen joined Al-Qaeda after the war in
Afghanistan and how Al-Qaeda sustains its membership and receives recruits to this day, uncertainty-identity theory presents a relationship between increased levels of self-uncertainty paralleled with increased tendencies to identify oneself with highly entitative groups to effectively reduce these feelings of uncertainty. This suggests that the Mujahideen and potential Al-Qaeda recruits were influenced to join Al-Qaeda out of a psychological need to feel less uncertain about themselves and their place in the world. 

As Michael A. Hogg explains in “From Uncertainty to Extremism: Social Categorization and Identity Processes,” the core tenets of uncertainty-identity theory include the argument that self-uncertainty produces anxiety-provoking thoughts that motivate individuals to take any course of action that will reduce their uncertainty. Additionally, the theory posits that “the process of categorizing oneself and others as members of a group effectively reduces self-uncertainty because it provides a consensually validated social identity that describes and prescribes who one is and how one should behave” (Hogg, 339). In other words, group identification provides individuals with a sense of belonging and purpose, allowing them to feel certain about who they are and what role they play in a greater sense.

Furthermore, uncertainty-identity theory notes that not all groups and identities are equally effective at reducing uncertainty. Rather, “groups that are well structured with clear boundaries, and in which members interact and share group attributes and goals and have a common fate” are the most effective at resolving self-uncertainty (Hogg, 339). This is because highly entitative groups provide a more clearly defined sense of self and often demand loyalty and action on the part of the individual, which successfully creates a sense of decreased self-uncertainty. When analyzing extremist religious organizations – such as Al Qaeda – they qualify as highly entitative,
possessing qualities such as: strong, zealous, intolerant of dissent, rigidly structured, strong directive leadership, all-encompassing exclusionary and ethnocentric ideologies, and the promotion of radical and extreme intergroup behaviors (Hogg, 340). As Hogg explains, these distinctive qualities explain the attractive aspects of fundamentalist ideologies and organizations at times of societal unrest and uncertainty. He notes that under these conditions, uncertain individuals welcome the directive, autocratic leadership of fundamentalist groups, for they benefit from the strict and disciplined direction of extremist leaders. Therefore, uncertainty-identity theory provides a rational explanation of why individuals might join fundamentalist belief systems and behave accordingly.

Applying uncertainty-identity theory when analyzing the emergence of Al-Qaeda allows for a deeper, more nuanced understanding of fundamentalist recruitment on an individual level. As mentioned in the previous globalization-sectarianism theory section, the Mujahideen fighters in Afghanistan were influenced by the negative implications of globalization to mobilize against the Soviets under an international Islamic solidarity ideology. With the establishment of Al-Qaeda accompanying the withdrawal of the Soviet forces, many of these foreign fighters decided to join the organization. As James Watts notes in The Three Versions of Al Qaeda, “Arab foreign fighters [for the most part] were not welcome in their home countries [after the war] and were thus left without direction” (Watts, 2). Unable to return home and facing increased uncertainty, the former Mujahideen fighters were coerced to join Al-Qaeda out of a desire to belong and fill the void of their inability to return to their previous lives. Al-Qaeda, as uncertainty-identity theory predicts, served as the highly entitative group that allowed them to feel like they share group attributes, goals, and a common fate with fellow organization members.
In terms of Al Qaeda's contemporary membership, uncertainty-identity theory continues to provide a rational explanation for the maintenance of its membership. According to a 2010 U.S. Institute of Peace special report on “Why Youth Join al-Qaeda,” it is revealed that potential Al-Qaeda members often actively seek out the organization and its associated movements as opposed to being recruited directly by an Al-Qaeda member (USIP, 1). Based on data collected from 2,032 “foreign fighters” who left their homes to participate in Al-Qaeda-sponsored acts, the report reveals that “potential al-Qaeda recruits... are vectorless energy looking for guidance and direction. They want to understand who they are, why they matter, and what their role in the world should be. They have an unfulfilled need to define themselves, which al-Qaeda offers to fill” (USIP, 8).

Thus, by joining Al-Qaeda, these young men were seeking group identification and the feeling of belonging to a specific entity. It is their extreme self-uncertainty which provokes them into considering joining Al-Qaeda. Moreover, the report mentions that these fighters’ willingness to leave their homeland and travel to another region as opposed to joining an insurgent or separatist movement within their country is evidence of their feeling of not belonging in their respective state. Their ability to leave behind their former lives proves the extent to which they will go for their levels of uncertainty to decrease. They are motivated by the anxiety-enticing self-uncertainty to join a radical organization, fully aware of the risk it poses to their lives. Therefore, it is clear that uncertainty-identity theory is an adequate tool for explaining why Mujahideen fighters joined Al-Qaeda and why Al-Qaeda continues to receive new members from across the world.

Religious Dynamics: Islamization of Radicalization

To further explain Al-Qaeda’s sustained and growing membership, a religious-level analysis...
considers the role Islam plays in attracting potential AQ members from Europe. As the Islamization of Radicalization hypothesis suggests, the root of AQ's ability to mobilize members is not its Islamic ideology; rather, it is the cultural dislocation that these potential recruits face which motivates them to join radical groups such as Al-Qaeda. These potential recruits are already on the path of rebellion and search in Islam for radical aspects to mobilize around.

Attempting to understand why some young European citizens become Jihadists and join radical groups, Olivier Roy – a renowned French thinker – has multiple books, articles, and interviews advocating for what he deems as “Islamization of Radicalization” theory. Contrary to “Radicalization of Islam” theory, Roy argues that “terrorism does not arise from the radicalization of Islam, but from the Islamization of radicalism. Far from exonerating Islam, the “Islamization of radicalism” forces us to ask why and how rebellious youths have found in Islam the paradigm of their total revolt. It does not deny the fact that a fundamentalist Islam has been developing for more than 40 years” (Roy, 2). In suggesting that rebellious youths search for a course of action that promotes revolt, Roy downplays the role of Islam in the radicalization of the Jihadist internationalist youth movement. He does not, however, dismiss Islam’s role entirely – for he recognizes that Al Qaeda’s ideology is rooted in Salafism. As a whole, Roy’s hypothesis argues that the process of violent radicalization of European youth has little to do with religious practice and much to do with the cultural dissociation of some members of society that stems from immigration, globalization, and secularization (Roy et al., 19). By viewing radicalization through this individual-focused approach, Roy focuses less on ideology and more on the conditions that prompt young individuals to entertain the idea of joining a radical group.
Through an application of Islamization of Radicalization theory, we receive a more comprehensive understanding of how Al-Qaeda's efforts have been successfully sustained through new membership and why European Jihadism exists. As this paper's Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan section explains, the origin of Al-Qaeda is traced back to the mobilization of Mujahideen fighters under an Islamic international solidarity ideology. These original fighters were motivated to defend their religion against the "atheist communists;" they fought the Soviets out of a religious obligation. Over the years, however, as Al-Qaeda emerged and the holy war transformed from a defensive war in Afghanistan to a global offensive effort to "seek to free Muslim countries from the influence of Western countries and attack Muslim nations that don't agree with [Al-Qaeda's] version of the Islamic religion," the motivations of incoming Al-Qaeda members have changed (Federal Bureau of Investigation). Although reliable and comprehensive data on Al-Qaeda's membership profile and numbers are not available, reports suggest that European Jihadism, – wherein homegrown radical citizens of Western Europe leave their respective countries to join terrorist efforts – comprises a significant portion of Al-Qaeda's membership (Khosrokhavar). This begs the question: why are Western youth radicalizing and joining AQ? Is it the Islamic ideology that draws them in? Islamization of Radicalization theory points out that, ironically, al-Qaeda recruits "have an inadequate understanding of their own religion, which makes them vulnerable to misinterpretation of the religious doctrines" (USIP, 5). These jihadis tend to have no religious education and radicalize outside of mosques. Thus, what attracts them to Al-Qaeda is its narrative, not its ideology. Potential recruits "find in the Islamist milieus a fraternity free from racism and may recast the anti-racist and anti-colonial struggle in ‘Islamic’ terms; within al-Qaeda they achieve positions of responsibility that they
would not have access to elsewhere” (Roy et al., 17).

European jihadists are attracted to the narrative of Al-Qaeda, which has four components: (1) the concept of a suffering “ummah” – community –, (2) the ability of the potential recruit to be considered a hero and avenge the suffering of the community, (3) religious manipulation that highlights jihad as a personal compulsory duty upon the potential recruit, and (4) the notion that Al-Qaeda is fighting against the global order (Roy et al., 25). This four-part conceptualization of Al-Qaeda motivates young and uncertain individuals who do not feel a sense of belonging to join Al-Qaeda and belong. As they become members, young jihadis see themselves as heroes fighting on behalf of their suffering ummah against the global order in fulfillment of their religious obligation. Furthermore, drawing on uncertainty-identity theory, Al-Qaeda provides these recruits with responsibilities, making them feel like they are contributing to a greater cause which reduces their feelings of uncertainty.

Inclusive of uncertainty-identity theory, the Islamization of Radicalization theory provides a deeper understanding of why Al-Qaeda continues to attract new members, specifically youth from Europe.

Conclusion

By analyzing the emergence and sustenance of Al-Qaeda through a global, local, individual, and religious lens, this paper contextualizes the chain of events that occurred which created the perfect conditions for the creation of Al-Qaeda. Employing Globalization-Sectarianism theory, it is clear that the negative implications of globalization contributed to the increase of religiosity in the Muslim world which allowed the U.S., Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia to capitalize on this religiosity and recruit anti-Soviet Mujahideen fighters through an Islamic international network ideology. These fighters would eventually consolidate their efforts under Al-Qaeda’s title. Furthermore, uncertainty-identity
theory allows for an individual-level analysis of why these fighters would ultimately join Al-Qaeda as well as why non-Mujahideen individuals would be attracted to Al-Qaeda. Lastly, Islamization of Radicalization theory explores the role of Islam in attracting individuals to Al-Qaeda and confirms that religious ideology has little to do with Al-Qaeda’s attractiveness. Rather, it is social dislocations as well as Al-Qaeda’s narrative which influence individuals to seek out membership in AQ. As Al-Qaeda cohorts continue to exist in parts of the world, scholars must analyze Al-Qaeda’s emergence and membership sustenance in order to develop effective counterterrorism policies that will eradicate the conditions that make Al-Qaeda attractive to individuals across the world.

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Comparative Paper: Viet Nam and Lao PDR

Khanh Ton ’23

Research question

What explains the differences in economic development between Laos and Viet Nam?

Introduction

Due to their shared border and similar stages of historical development, at first glance it seems apparent why case studies from Viet Nam and Laos are often juxtaposed with one another. From the late 1880s onward, both countries were former colonies of France for more than half a decade, making up the so-called “French Indochina,” which also included Cambodia and part of China. After experiencing two brutal Indochina Wars, they witnessed the rise of communist parties to power in the mid-1970s. However, the centrally planned economy model was not successful for either of the states, and they started facilitating economic liberalization after the fall of socialism on the Western front. As a result, both states have experienced the fastest economic growth rates in Southeast Asia. And yet, today, Viet Nam has a much bigger economy than Laos. According to the World Bank, even though Viet Nam’s total area was only 30% larger than Laos, its Gross Domestic Product in 2020 was worth 271.2 billion US dollars, while the latter’s was only worth $19.14 billion. This begs the question of what factors potentially explain the differences in the economic development between Viet Nam and Laos. This paper argues that while the two states seemingly share the same historical storyline, the details of their experiences are distinctly different every step of the way. Firstly, their French colonial experiences are distinguished due to their different ethnic makeups. Additionally, even though the Second Indochina War waged by the United States affected both countries, the
Vietnam War garnered more attention than the atrocious Secret War happening on Laotian territory. Lastly, despite having identical economic reform policies in 1986, their solutions to the 1997 Asian Crisis differed and have defined the impacts on their current economic performances.

*An economic comparison between Viet Nam and Laos*

Since 1986, both Viet Nam and Laos have consistently achieved annual economic growth rates between 5% and 7%. Originally dominated by large agricultural sectors, their economies today have shifted and heavily depend on the service and industry sectors, which respectively make up one half and one third of their revenue. In addition, both countries have experienced similar unemployment rates, which have also decreased from 70% to around 2%. However, this is where the similarities end. More than 70% of the Laotian workforce is employed in the agricultural sector and only 6.1% take up higher-earning blue-collar jobs. On the other hand, the labor force is more evenly distributed in Viet Nam. As a result, only 8% of the 98.7 million Vietnamese live under the poverty line, whereas that percentage is 22% in Laos, whose population is only 7.4 million people. Another prominent problem Laos faces is its dependence on natural resource exports such as wood, tin, copper, and gold. With the Mekong River serving as the natural Lao-Thai border, the state is heavily reliant on hydropower projects funded by Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) coming from Thailand. Laos primarily exports within Asia, more specifically, to Thailand, China, Viet Nam, and India. Unlike Laos, Viet Nam entered several free trade agreements at the start of the 21st century and since then has expanded its market to the United States, China, Japan, and South Korea. Its exports include a variety of commodities from garments, to oil, to machinery (The World Factbook - CIA).
The COVID-19 pandemic has emphasized the importance of promoting stronger and more sustainable economic reforms for both Laos and Viet Nam. Such reforms may include the betterment of the business environment, promotion of the digital economy, and the enhancement of public investment effectiveness and efficiency. In the meantime, Viet Nam is one among very few countries that has shown remarkable resilience against a changing global economic landscape. By contrast, Laos continues to struggle with the multifaceted challenges that the pandemic has brought about. While Viet Nam’s macroeconomic and fiscal frameworks endure, Laos is witnessing a fiscal deficit increase between 7.6 and 8.9% due to rapidly declining state revenues and severe structural vulnerabilities (“Lao PDR Overview”).

Furthermore, Viet Nam was one of the few countries to witness GDP growth and not to expect a recession in 2020 (“Vietnam Overview”). Meanwhile, Laos’ growth fell to 0.4% in 2020 as one-fourth of the population became unemployed and still has not shown any sign of rebounding (“Lao PDR Overview”). In addition, the country’s service sector, especially tourism, is most significantly impacted and remittances as well as foreign currency reserves have almost dried up. At first, Viet Nam was certainly perplexed by the pandemic as well, but proactive measures have been taken at both the national and subnational levels, resulting in a low number of cases and deaths, and ultimately allowing its internal economic scene to reopen for a swift recovery.

National ethnic makeups and the French colonial divide-and-rule policy in Indochina

At a first glance, Viet Nam and Laos are both ethnically diverse. Laos is home to 47 official ethnic groups while Viet Nam covers 54. Each country, however, has established a dominant group since the beginning of time, that being the Kinh for Viet Nam and the Lao for Laos. The remaining groups
are mostly located in the so-called Southeast Asian Massif, which is a transnational highland region of 2.5 million square kilometers and 500 meters above sea level. National borders slice through several ancient feudal states and turn these now-split populations into official state minorities. This area also served as buffer zones for regional kingdoms such as Dai Viet, Lan Xang, Champa, and Cambodia in the 16th century; however, modern borders have become “internal peripheries to be controlled, secured, colonized, and exploited” (Michaud 35). In order to combat this, countries sharing the Massif have relocation policies that encourage lowlanders, which typically are of the dominant ethnic groups, to move to the highlands. Besides the evident cultural clashes, these migrants tend to relocate to booming upland cities for their blue-collar or white-collar jobs, whereas the upland majority resides in the countryside working in the agricultural sector. The regional distribution of these ethnic groups means that these policies have not been as effective as expected and highlands remain ethnically distinct (Michaud 27).

Interestingly enough, Viet Nam and Laos’ national ethnic makeups were hardly explored before French colonization. The existence of tribes in the Indochina part of the Massif was first confirmed by early French settlers, and immediately taken advantage of when the French formed their divide-and-rule policy. The colonial experiences of the two states differed tremendously because Viet Nam is incredibly homogenous in terms of ethnic composition. In Viet Nam, the Kinh makes up 85.7% of the total population (“Vietnam”), whereas the Laotian citizenry comprises 53.2% Lao, 11% Khmou, 9.2% Hmong, and more significant percentages of minorities than those in the former state (“Laos”). Seeing the homogeneity of the Vietnamese population, the French mainly focused on the assimilation of the Kinh while keeping the minority groups under “loose but steady” control (Michaud
The French Republic also deemed the country an extraction colony. They invested in rubber plantations, poppy cultivation, and opium production. They also viewed the Vietnamese as superior to the Cambodians and the Laotians and, therefore, gave them better-earning jobs like plantation workers, merchants, artisans, and governmental positions. This false sense of Vietnamese superiority prompted Cambodian and tribal soldiers to fight in Viet Nam out of fear that this country, once becoming independent, would threaten their neighbors (Morrock 138).

France had to tweak their signature divide-and-rule policy in Laos once it realized the Laotian society was more integrated with various minority groups. Due to the country’s diverse ethnic composition, the French employed a cross-racial administrative system which constructed an ethnic hierarchy and pitted different ethnicities against one another (Morrock 139). This policy proved unsuccessful during the First Indochina War (1947 - 1954) when Laotians refused to support France’s suppression of the Vietnamese political and military coalition, Viet Minh (Morrock 140). Additionally, France only viewed Laos as a “colonial backwater” or the buffer state between Indochina and Thailand (Freeman 1). Even though 97% of foreign investment in Indochina at the beginning of the 20th century was made by France, Laos was largely neglected while Viet Nam was the recipient of such capital. Laotians were enraged by this negligence and further united under the anti-France agenda.

United States' bombing campaigns: the Vietnam War versus the Secret War

The 1954 Geneva Accords, signed among France, China, the Soviet Union, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Viet Minh (North Viet Nam’s national independence front), recognized full sovereignty for the Lao People’s Democratic Republic and the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam.
It also determined that Viet Nam would be divided by the 17th parallel until 1956 to accommodate the French retreat and the preparation for a free and fair election. Unfortunately, the Eisenhower administration did not wish for another communist presence in the Asia-Pacific and soon replaced France as Viet Nam’s primary adversary. The United States was not going to interfere with Laos until 1959 when civil war broke out between the neutral Lao royal government and the communist Pathet Lao backed by North Viet Nam and the USSR. Due to Laos’ geographical location being the center of Southeast Asia, the United States deemed its neutrality valuable in the Domino Theory (Leary 76). However, its interference had to remain secretive to respect the Geneva Accords, as well as the 1962 International Agreement on the Neutrality of Laos. The name “Secret War” was hence implemented and absolute confidentiality was established, even from Congress, until 1971 (Khamvongsa and Russell 282). This essay section explores how differently the United States conducted bombing campaigns in Viet Nam and Laos and the long-run impacts of these campaigns on their economies.

Between 1964 and 1973, the United States Air Force dropped over 6 million tons of ordnance in Viet Nam, which is more than that of World War II and the Korean War combined. In terms of impact, it is almost a hundred times more damaging than both the Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bombs, and it remains the most intense bombing period of human history (Clodfelter 225). It is important to note that 70% of the bombs were dropped in only 10% of Viet Nam’s total area; targeted regions are either close to the 17th parallel, along the Ho Chi Minh trail, or Viet Cong’s strongholds (Miguel and Roland 3). This is a result of the United States’ decisions to favor “strategic bombing” in the North to destroy military bases and factories and “interdiction bombing” in the South to disrupt Viet
Cong’s movements (12). Similarly, Laos received over 2 million tons of bombs; with a much smaller population, it became the most heavily bombed country per capita (Riano and Caicedo 8). The United States’ “scorched earth” policy ultimately removed any means of livelihood for communist militants and resulted in the contamination of 37% to 50% of the country. To this day, one-third of the ordnance has yet to explode (UXO) (Khamvongsa and Russell 282).

United States’ bombing could easily have long-run negative impacts on economic development because it destroyed infrastructure, which then discouraged commerce, displaced the population, and disrupted schooling for millions of people. Interestingly enough, among these two states, only Laos fell into poverty, while Viet Nam was barely affected. Miguel and Roland’s study found that there is no correlation between bombing intensity and poverty rates, consumption levels, infrastructure, literacy, or population density in Viet Nam. During the Vietnam War, North Viet Nam was already limiting damage to existing infrastructure either by dispersing industrial operations (Kamps 70) or employing half a million people to constantly rebuild roads and bridges. Therefore, if anything, South Viet Nam was a little behind in recovering, especially after the United States’ withdrawal of massive economic stimulus. As a result of imbalance between these two regions, the postwar central government distributed even more resources into the South for reconstruction, ran large-scale school expansion and literacy campaigns, and mobilized people into less populated areas to ensure food security and a steady labor supply (Miguel and Roland 21). These policies helped stabilize the country and sustained it through another war in 1979, the Sino-Vietnamese War.
Meanwhile, Riano and Ciacedo found that bombings had a significant and negative impact on Laos' nighttime lights, expenditures, and poverty rates. They calculated that one standard deviation of increase in the total pounds of bombs dropped is associated with a 9.3% decrease in its GDP per capita (1). The early Lao government was tangled in similar challenges that it faced during colonialism. Laos had no means to generate revenue other than through its agricultural sector and its lack of infrastructure made it difficult to connect cities with rural mountainous areas. With barely any resources, the country could not afford to educate its citizens or, more importantly, to clean up the UXO, which, to this day, hinders agricultural expansion and infrastructure construction. While the US spent $13.3 million dropping bombs on Laos daily, Laos can only afford to spend $4.9 million annually cleaning them up, and less than 1% has been cleaned thus far (Riano and Ciacedo 8).

Furthermore, only 4% of its land is arable, and half of it is contaminated. This contamination leads to malnourishment among 50% of young children in rural areas, according to the 2008 UN World Food Program report. In addition, Laos' 2005 population census reported 21% of households do not have access to roads, and 50% of the existing 19300 miles of roads are dirt, making it impassable during the rainy season (Khamvongsa and Russell 299-300). Finally, UXO continues to either kill or injure people; 1.2% of the Laotian population have disabilities, which is another significant loss for its labor market (293). The Secret War has left Laos in a devastating condition until this day with much inarable land and little human capital.

Economic reform policies and the Asian Crisis of 1997

After decades of military conflict, both Viet Nam and Laos regained independence in 1975 under the political leadership of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) and the Lao People's
Revolutionary Party (LPRP) respectively. For the next ten years or so, they each flirted with the idea of central planning, especially the obligatory collectivization of agriculture and hence the complete ban of private land ownership. At the time, Laos’ agricultural sector made up half of the national economic output; whereas that of Viet Nam was only a quarter, but 80% of its labor force was employed in the sector (Freeman 3). The Soviet Union was the main backer for both countries and economic interaction with other Western countries was minimal. However, since the collapse of the Eastern Bloc in the Cold War, both states have phased out elements of central planning and enacted transformative economic liberalization policies in the same year, 1986.

Viet Nam’s “Doi Moi” policy (roughly translated as “New Change”) and Laos’ “New Economic Mechanism” initiative promoted the same agenda: they called for the reopening of economies to foreign trade and investment to attract capital and industrial knowledge (Freeman 5). The reopening conditions were on their side: they are located in East Asia, Southeast Asia to be exact, where several economic success stories were happening. Viet Nam alone was a potential market of over 70 million new consumers (Freeman 6). More importantly, they became part of the “flying geese,” a process whereby “Japanese companies - and increasingly those of newly industrialized Asian economies - relocated labor-intensive production in order to cope with the shifting of their comparative advantages towards more technology-intensive production” (Masina 214). Additionally, Viet Nam benefited from the factory relocations from South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan, and Laos inherited several hydropower projects from Thailand. Furthermore, FDI from East Asia played a critical role in distributing technology, business knowledge, and foreign market access, which mimicked the 1920s capital inflow from France to Viet Nam.
Prior to the 1997 Asian Crisis, East Asia was responsible for over 60% of FDI to Viet Nam, and Thailand alone accounted for 40% of FDI to Laos (Ruland 437). Viet Nam joined the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1995 and Laos followed suit in 1997. Membership to this association allowed them more political benefits such as improved relations with China through joint forums, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC), Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APC), and Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) (Ruland 434). In addition, Vietnam normalized trade with China in 1991, and with the United States in 1995, after years of embargoes and following the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War and the Vietnam War respectively.

The 1997 Asian Financial Crisis started when several Thai banks collapsed in July and quickly spread across East Asia. Both Viet Nam and Laos experienced currency depreciation, high inflation, and stagnation in exports and FDI. The Vietnam dong lost 25% of its value and the Lao kip lost 80% against the US dollar (Ruland 436). Furthermore, Viet Nam’s FDI flow from East Asian countries declined by 60% (Masina 200) and that of Laos from Thailand declined by 41% (Okonjo-Iweala 2).

However, the similarities between these two countries end here as the Vietnamese government was able to respond to the crisis in a timely manner while its neighbor was not. Laos’ reforms started to lag behind even before the crisis began due to ineffectual macroeconomic management, lengthy decision-making process, inadequate banking regulations, and weak financial management (2). Its economic growth in 1997 fortunately reached 7% thanks to the good weather that nurtured bountiful harvests. Growth dropped to 4% the following year, and the government’s unsuccessful fiscal and monetary responses were responsible for it. Specifically, Laos wanted its citizens to focus on achieving food self-sufficiency, leading to
“extrabudgetary expenditures through rapid monetary expansion, which further eroded investor confidence” (3). The country had to wait until Thailand recovered and resumed the FDI inflow to fully recover from the crisis.

By contrast, Viet Nam already had two advantages when dealing with the 1997 crisis: its currency’s non-convertibility and its largely informal economy. The former insulated the state from speculative attacks while the latter’s flexibility absorbed the negative impact of the crisis on the poorest population (Masina 207-208). The former’s advantage also allowed the dong to appreciate consistently. By the end of 1999, its value was 20% higher than the Thai baht and the Malaysian ringgit and 60% higher than the Indonesian rupiah (211). In the short run, this appreciation took away the attractiveness of Viet Nam’s supposedly cheap labor force, but in the long run, such attractiveness would return given its large and well-educated working-age population (209). The Vietnamese government also maintained a cautious stance against the crisis and prioritized macroeconomic stability to avoid balance of payments and national fiscal or banking crises. Additionally, it restricted imports and saw an immediate decline of GDP growth rate; yet, it marginally increased again in 1999. The trade deficit fell down to $2.171 billion in 1998 then to only $100 million in 1999, and more importantly, there was no recession (210). Lastly, Viet Nam’s strict monetary response and anti-cyclical interventions were able to reduce the inflation rate from 3.8% in 1997 to 9.2% in 1998 and, finally, 0.1% in 1999 (213). Overall, the implemented policies were well-timed and prudent as Viet Nam came out of the crisis not only stably but also with a lot of economic prospects.

Conclusion

On the surface, Viet Nam and Laos seem to share a long history, from being colonized by the French and being bombed by the Americans, to
becoming fast-growing sovereign states led by Communist governments. Nevertheless, every step along the way they were viewed and handled differently by their foreign influences. They also responded distinctly differently to arising challenges, which results in the stark difference between their economic developments and their sustainability. Viet Nam was certainly less severely damaged than Laos throughout the 20th century, but its strong leadership and proper responses to crises played a vital role in the country’s recovery and growth. Meanwhile, Laos struggles to clean up UXO and escape the poverty trap due to its inefficient policies that still remain today.

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In the heart of Eritrea lies a treasure trove of valuable ores and minerals, known as the Bisha Mine. The Bisha Mine and its riches, however, are nothing but a mirage to the Eritreans who work in the mines. Instead, the local population suffers at the hands of the corporate conqueror, Nevsun Ltd. Nevsun – a Canadian corporation – that has been extracting hundreds of millions of pounds of copper, zinc, and silver from the mineral reserve since its opening in 2010. As the company continued to expand its profit margins, local laborers faced abuse, ecological degradation, and violation of their human rights.

Multinational Corporations located in the Global North, such as Nevsun Ltd, continually distance themselves from the physical harms of their industries while maximizing their own economic gains. This geographical disparity in global socioeconomics, conceptualized by the late German Chancellor Willy Brandt as the Global North-South Divide, is an imperfect but useful tool for understanding global inequality. The North-South divide refers to the phenomenon of wealthier countries being concentrated overwhelmingly in the northern hemisphere while the southern hemisphere has a higher concentration of developing countries (Lees, 2020, 1). This divide is rooted in colonialism and the extraction of raw materials from colonies to support industrialization in the colonizing countries, which were located largely in the northern hemisphere. Today, the projects Nevsun Resources Ltd. and its peer corporation Barrick Gold Corporation in Eritrea and Chile respectively serve as prime examples of the ways in which wealthier countries in the Global North continue to degrade natural resources in the...
Global South and force former colonies to become dependent on export- and extraction-based economies. Because many countries in the southern hemisphere were decolonized after the Industrial Revolution took place in the North or remained economically reliant on their colonizer during the Revolution, the Global South has not had the same opportunities to industrialize as the North. Northern countries, and now multinational corporations (MNCs), take advantage of these regions and monopolize the natural resources, forcing them to become economies of extraction that are dependent on the Global North for any sort of economic gain. Because Northern MNCs have suffocated chances for industrialization in the former colonies, many developing countries in the Global South have found themselves trapped in the “race to the bottom,” where they are economically coerced into driving down labor standards and environmental regulations so that northern industries will invest in and outsource production to them, rather than somewhere with lower, cheaper labor costs (Singh, 2004, 85).

The race to the bottom is a “south-south competition for export market share” spurred by pressures for Northern investments, according to a report conducted at the London School of Economics (Chau and Kanbur, 2006, 193). Because developing countries constantly fear that production and exportation will be shifted to a country with more lenient labor standards than their own, the wellbeing of laborers in the Global South and their physical environments are sacrificed in order to preserve the national GDP (194). This has caused wage stagnation in many developing countries, despite an increase in production rates (Islam, 2015, 3). In much of South America and Africa, the economic wellbeing of workers has declined as a result of these issues over last decade (Singh, 2004, 99).
As production continues to globalize, the Eritrean economy, along with the economies in the Global South, have been forced to endure many environmental and human safety crises to maintain investments by the MNCs of the Global North. Many states in the South, referred to as “peripheral” countries, rely on the “core” states of the Global North, where MNCs are predominantly located, for investment and employment. This relationship is the basis on which the theoretical framework known as “dependency theory” was formed (Farny, 2016, p. 3). Because core states are dependent on the peripheral states’ natural resources for production and consumption, it is within the interest of the core to keep these countries from developing and force them to remain dependent on exportation of resources to earn their national income.

The inequalities created by the cycle of the South’s dependence on Northern exploitation are seen clearly in the environmental effects. Nevsun Resources’ project in the Bisha Mine is responsible for many human rights abuses that are strongly tied to the dismantling of environmental security or sustainability in the area. Most seriously, the mining projects endanger local inhabitants’ rights to access to clean water. In the Human Rights Impact Assessment that was commissioned by Nevsun Resources in 2014, analysts acknowledge that the mining project is putting the Eritreans’ right to safe drinking water at risk, which poses many threats to public health in the region.

However, the same report is also quick to defend Nevsun and clarify that this issue is not yet pressing, and human lives are not truly at risk under the current circumstances (Human Rights, 2014, p. 34). Although the strain on local water sources near the mine was not reported by the company to be of serious concern at the time the assessment, there is a high probability that Nevsun Resources will continue to degrade the area’s water sources. This is particularly concerning given that the Horn of
Africa region has “relatively frequent and catastrophic droughts” (pg. 34). Since water access is already threatened by the region’s proneness to drought, many civilians in the area and human rights analysts fear that the financial interests of the mine could override the locals’ right to water.

Even if the water sources around the Bisha mine are to remain plentiful, pollution from mining would violate the United Nations’ stipulation that the human right to water isn’t solely based on accessibility, but, more specifically, on the accessibility to safe and unpolluted water sources (UNDESA, 2014, par. 1). In the process of mining gold, top priority of the Bisha mine, the use of cyanide, a highly toxic chemical, is all too common given the environmental risks that it poses. When cyanide is discharged into the mines, it is likely to seep into the soil and waterways that are connected to the mine.

If a water source becomes contaminated with cyanide, the health effects of those who consume the water is detrimental (Utembe et al., 2015, pg. 1214). This is because cyanide prevents cells from accessing and using oxygen, which leads to cell death. If someone experiences prolonged exposure to cyanide, it is common that they will experience “breathing difficulties, chest pains ... and enlargement of the thyroid gland” (Toxicological, p. 7). Furthermore, those exposed for prolonged periods will most likely have fatal damage to their most vital organs, including the lungs, the heart, and the brain (Toxicological, p. 6). The effects of chemical pollutants on human life, however, do not stop with mining sites and cyanide exposure.

According to the World Health Organization, an estimated 4.9 million deaths in 2004 could be attributed to chemical exposure (Global, par. 1).

The abilities of Nevsun to distance itself from these crimes and control the narrative surrounding the Bisha Mine was critical for maintaining its economic interests. As stated previously, the Human Rights Impact Assessment of the Bisha Mine which
found that the pollution was not yet pressing to the wellbeing of citizens was sponsored by Nevsun itself, rather than an outside, unbiased surveyor. Additionally, Nevsun has been able to use its financial position to both suppress legal suits and separate itself from the abuses that occur at the Bisha Mine. For example, a suit was filed by 3 Eritreans alleging that Nevsun was complicit in the use of “modern slavery” by a contractor in the region. (Nevsun Lawsuit, 2022, par. 5). According to Human Rights Watch, Nevsun appears “to feel that it has no power to confront” its contractors, specifically one called Segen, due to the political connectivity of the contractors (Albin-Lackey, 2020, 2) Using this logic, Nevsun quickly deflected any and all blame to contractor, giving the corporation a degree of separation from the abuses. Nevsun then settled with the plaintiffs financially, however still claimed no responsibility (Nevsun Lawsuit, 2022, par. 1).

Although it is true that the Eritrean regime has allowed the forced labor practices of Segen and other labor contractors in the country, Nevsun cannot use the government’s unethical behavior to validate its own complicity in the crimes. As evidence to the dependency theory, this behavior by Nevsun and other corporations encourages developing regions to continue keeping labor standards low to maintain investments. If Nevsun and other MNCs were to pull its investments in Eritrea as a response to the government’s role in the abuse, the regime and labor contractors would then be incentivized to raise labor quality and ensure the wellbeing of miners. However, the corporation continues to prioritize the net cost of extraction over the wellbeing of those in the mine. Because many countries in the southern hemisphere, including Eritrea, were decolonized after the Industrial Revolution took place in the North or remained economically reliant on their colonizer, the Global South has not had the same
opportunities to industrialize. Northern countries, and now MNCs, take advantage of these regions and monopolize the natural resources, forcing them to become extractive economies that are dependent on the Global North for any sort of economic gain. Because Northern MNCs have suffocated chances for industrialization in the former colonies, many developing countries in the Global South have found themselves trapped in the “race to the bottom,” where they are economically coerced into driving down labor standards and environmental regulations so that northern industries will invest in and outsource production to them, rather than somewhere with lower, cheaper labor standards (Singh, 2004, 85).

The race to the bottom is a “south-south competition for export market share” spurred by pressures of Northern investments, according to research conducted at the London School of Economics (Chau and Kanbur, 2006, 193). Because developing countries constantly fear that production and exportation will be shifted to a country with more lenient labor standards than their own, the wellbeing of laborers in the Global South and their physical environments are frequently sacrificed in order to preserve the national GDP (194). This has caused wage stagnation in many developing countries, despite an increase in production rates (Islam, 2015, 3). In much of South America and Africa, the economic wellbeing of workers has declined as a result of these issues over last decade (Singh, 2004, 99).

The violation of human rights and the race to the bottom at the Bisha Mine is mirrored in the Barrick Gold Corporation’s project at the Pascua Lama Mine on the Chilean and Argentinian border at the Huasco Valley. As with the Bisha Mine in Eritrea, the main concern of those who live in close proximity to Pascua Lama Mine is how the extraction affects their right to clean and accessible water. Pascua Lama is not only located in extreme proximity to many Chilean and Argentinian
communities, but the environmental abuses by
Barrick have not received the international
attention necessary to curb the effects of water
contamination and inaccessibility. For these
reasons, the detriment of communities in the
Huasco Valley has remained more perverse and
hidden in comparison to the crimes of Nevsun Ltd.
In Eritrea.

One of the most egregious practices of
Barrick Gold Corporation is the use of cyanide
solutions to extract, or leach, gold from the mine
(Environmental Law Alliance Worldwide, 2006, par.
2). This pollutes the water supply and poses a grave
threat to the ecosystems and communities in the
Huasco Valley. In addition to cyanidation, the
corporation engages in a highly wasteful and toxic
process known as “pre-stripping.” Pre-stripping
involves the use of explosives to blast off the tops
of mountains where no valuable ore is found. Not
only does this create noxious dust that workers in
the mine are forced to breathe in, but the dust from
the explosion settles on the glaciers that surround
the mountains (Patterson, 2013, p. 1),
Like the site of the Bisha mine, these
practices pose a particularly pressing threat since
the site of the Pascua Lama mine is highly
susceptible to drought. The surrounding
communities rely on these glaciers for their
drinking water and irrigation systems (Patterson,
2013, p. 1). Because the chemicals from the mine
accelerate the melting of the glaciers and poison
the water sources that are produced, locals fear that
the water will not only be dangerous to consume
but will also be depleted at an alarming speed. The
urgency of this problem is seen in the fact that the
“Toro I, Toro II, and Esperanza glaciers have shrunk
by 50 to 70%” since exploration for the mine began
in 1997 (p. 2). On top of pre-stripping, Barrick has
consistently drilled near the glaciers and “even built
a road through one” (p. 2). The dust created from
the drilling and construction was directly
responsible for the acceleration of heating and
melting of the glaciers (Financial Post, 2012, 8). The construction also violated promises to keep explosives and chemicals away from inhabited areas (10). While civilians continue to fear for their livelihoods and safety, Barrick Gold Corporation continues to use their economic prowess to exploit the resources of the region with very little regard for the effects on human lives.

The Barrick Gold Corporation's activities in the Huasco Valley region have a profound effect on the local farming industry that will suffer as a result of inadequate irrigation. As one of the few fertile places in the vicinity, the Huasco Valley is key to the region's agricultural economy. Farmers who plant olives, grapes, and other kinds of produce rely on water from the glacier to safely nurture their crop and keep the region fertile (Financial Post, 2012, 6). However, because of the toxicity of cyanide solutions and other chemicals that seeps into the water coupled with the rapidity of melting, the livelihoods of more 70,000 small farmers are being directly threatened for the benefit of Barrick Gold Corporation (Environmental Law Alliance Worldwide, 2006, par. 1 and 2). Coalitions of farmers took an active role in reporting the damage and garnering the necessary legal support to halt the mining project by staging protests and attending international conferences, only for the company to release environmental assessments downplaying the importance of the glaciers to citizens' livelihoods (Li, 2018, 109).

Although the legal efforts of Chile and Argentina and public pressure of civilians and in the Huasco Valley display a desire to rise out of their position as a peripheral country in the international economic system that is laid out in the dependency theory, Barrick's corporate legal team has taken advantage of the fact that Chile, as well as Argentina, have not had the opportunities to industrialize that other countries have had. Therefore, the states cannot maintain their economies without the investments Barrick and its
peer corporations. The exploitative relationship between Barrick and Chile and Argentina displays how the Global North and MNCs take advantage of the Global South and periphery states’ lack of alternative sources of income and force them to remain sources of extraction.

Unfortunately, the theme of global enterprises from the North overrunning southern business and limiting their economic development is not limited to the current time period nor the conflicts caused by the Barrick Gold Corporation in the Huasco Valley. As in Eritrea, the trend of exploitation in South American countries dates back to colonization during the 15th and 16th centuries by European countries (Boswell, 1989, 180). The inescapable roots of socioeconomic inequality from the colonial period are extremely clear in the case of the Pascua Lama mine and the communities affected, which tend to be indigenous.

The Huasco Valley region where the Pascua Lama mine is located is not only crucial to the health and survival of indigenous communities, but is held sacred in indigenous tradition and culture. In recent years, “a new generation of Chileans looking for spaces to forge their a political and cultural identity” have embraced ancestral traditions in conjunction with environmentalist movements in the area. (Li, 2018, 113). Groups like the Diaguita tribe, who have only recently received governmental recognition as indigenous communities, are continuing to face the same issues of land usurpation and resource extraction which Native Americans faced in the beginning of the conquest and colonial period (104). Despite decolonization, extraction and oppression of former colonies continue to underlie the success of major MNCs in the Global North.

In addition to a variety of civil protests in the Huasco Valley and across Chile, a grassroots environmental law organization in Chile called Fiscalía del Medio Ambiente (FIMA) worked in conjunction with the Environmental Law Alliance
Worldwide (ELAW) to mobilize against the project in 2006 (Environmental Law Alliance Worldwide, 2006, par. 1). Many indigenous communities also protested the “poor waste management and over-extraction of water” during construction, clear violations of the communities’ public health and right to clean water (Amos-Landgraf, 2021, par. 8). However, it was not until January of 2021 that the mine was legally shut down because of the corporation’s ability to continually challenge and override court orders and investigations. Even still, Barrick has the ability and plans to investigate new projects in the Hausco region (par. 3).

Because the history of Northern dominion over global commons and other countries’ resources is so pervasive in the global narrative, the North has generally been able to keep Southern countries from being able to compete for common goods, including the metals and minerals being mined in Eritrea as well as Chile and Argentina. Some would argue that the neoliberal economic policies that have allowed the Global North to develop without restriction will eventually be beneficial in the South and environmental standards will subsequently rise, especially as markets are increasingly aware of the ethical implications of their consumption. However, despite increasing development in the Global South, the economic between the North and South still very much exist, with GDP growth rates in the south remaining lower in southern states (Lees, 2020, 4).

Furthermore, the implementation of universal labor standards in international law could potentially deter the race to the bottom in developing countries. Fortunately, there is no evidence that raising labor standards negatively effects the foreign investment a country receives (Singh, 2004, 94). However, there two large issues that would prevent this solution from being totally effective. First, labor standards for MNCs and their contractors would likely be difficult to implement across entire economies with agricultural and
commercial sectors, as well as formal and informal employees (Singh, 2004, 101). For this reason, informal laborers would continue to remain exploitable in the global economy. Secondly, without international law to enforce universal labor standards, MNCs are unlikely to act on their own accord to raise their labor standards and therefore production price (Islam, 2015, 9) Therefore, it is necessary to have globalized legislation to hold MNCs accountable in protecting the dignity and rights of laborers, whether employed directly by the corporation or a contractor.

The activity of the global mining industry, as represented by Nevsun Resources and the Barrick Gold Corporation, is exemplary of the Global North’s neoclassical economic conception of limitless competition and development in the global economic sphere. Not only has this led to financial gaps between the North and the South, but it has also exposed the North’s privilege of distancing itself from environmental degradation by outsourcing harmful production practices to the Global South. Preventing the race to the bottom and undoing the economic dependence of exploitation requires large scale shifts workers’ rights, such as increased freedom of association and collective bargaining, as well as cohesive international legislation to check the power of corporations. The imperialistic roots of the international economic order will likely persist as long as the Northen maintains a culture of consumption and the corporate elite continue to benefit from the exploitation. Without an international shift away from neoliberal economic order, the Global North and its MNCs will continue to economically dominate southern states and force them to depend on environmentally degrading industries.

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Comparative Paper: Belarus and Lithuania

Ethan Valbuena ’24

The political systems of Lithuania and Belarus are vastly different due to the differences in each state’s ties with Russia, the level of control each government holds over their economy, and finally, the sense of national identity developed in each state post-Soviet Union. Both states were constituent republics of the USSR until the early 1990s, with Belarus being under Soviet control for 70 years and Lithuania for 50. Both states also have mostly homogenous populations, with 80% of their populations being made up of their nation's race, Belarussian and Lithuanian. Lithuania currently has a democratic political system with free and fair elections. It has a parliamentary system with a president and prime minister; however, it functions based on majorities in Parliament. It is labeled as one of the post-Soviet states that reformed the fastest and most effectively following its independence, contrasted with Belarus, which never truly democratized. Lithuania enjoys several political parties with representation in Parliament, such as the LDDP, the Homeland Union, and the Lithuanian Farmers and...
Greens Union. Lithuania is also a member of the EU, which served as an agreement amongst its political parties to stick to democratic rules as the basis of legitimate government after its independence (Fritz 2007). Lithuania has accountability in its political system, which has been most notably exercised in the form of impeachment. For example, in the 2000s, Paka was elected as a populist-style president but later impeached by Parliament due to his questionable dealings with smuggling and the alcohol industry (Fritz 2007). Another indication of the freedom present in Lithuania’s democracy is observed through Cato’s freedom index, which ranks states’ level of freedom based upon the Rule of law, size of government, security and safety, and others. This index ranks Lithuania 21st in the world, which speaks to the stability of its democracy.

In contrast, Lithuania’s neighbor Belarus has an authoritarian regime with a dictator as their ruler. Lukashenka has been the president in Belarus since the office was established in 1994. While Belarus does hold elections, they are the opposite of the free and fair elections that democracies partake in. Lack of democracy is evident through the US Senate Subcommittee on European Affairs discussions during a 2011 hearing. The chairman states, “The OSCE has repeatedly declared that the country’s elections failed to be either free or fair. Violence against pro-democracy activists and arrests of political opponents have repeatedly the nature of the cruel regime under President Aleksandr Lukashenka” (Shaheen 2011). This proves the harshness that the authoritarian regime rules over its people. The Belarussian political system also has no contestation necessary for a healthily functioning democracy. This was exemplified in the 2010 elections, in which Lukashenka’s party held almost all seats on the election committees. Only .25% percent of the 70,815 seats were allocated for opposition parties, leading to another fraudulent election (Padhol and Marples 2011). This is one instance of the many corruptions in the
The authoritarian regime of Lukashenka in Belarus, which ranks 63/180 on the corruption perceptions index. The regime is repressive towards its citizens and does not allow them to exercise many civil liberties, such as the freedom of speech or the press. For example, in 2006, Lukashenka’s regime tightened sanctions on independent newspapers and denied them distribution rights through the state-owned postal service. Additionally, he denied them access to printing presses, which further hindered citizens’ access to these independent newspapers (Rotberg and World Peace Foundation 2007). The freedom index by Cato ranks Belarus 99th, which makes apparent the regime’s repressive nature. The dependent variable being analyzed through this research question is the political system of both states, which are in direct contrast to one another.

The first independent variable being measured is both countries’ relations with Russia politically and ideologically. This is an important measure to consider because both countries were former Soviet states; therefore, how close of relations they each chose to pursue after independence is imperative in the political system that emerged. Lithuania immediately sought to reform its political system and distance itself from Soviet ideology. This was apparent in the All-Union Congress of People’s Deputies elections of 1989, in which the popular party, Sajudis, won almost every seat. The Sajudis party was the strongest advocate for independence from Russia and established Lithuanian independence very early in 1990.

Following efforts of Soviet troops to suppress the independence movement, they ultimately gave in during the year 1991. The Lithuanian constitution outlined a parliamentary system to avoid consolidation of power like in the Soviet Union, which further portrays an ideological separation from Russia. The most apparent separation from Russia that Lithuania demonstrates is through its membership in the EU. This portrayed Lithuania’s
desire to be a part of Europe again, and membership requires the upholding of democratic norms in the member nation. To gain membership into the EU, Lithuania had to stop relying on Russia for cheap energy, which was agreed upon by the state’s political parties (Fritz 2007). This immediate separation from Soviet ideology and the minimalization of ties to Russia played considerable roles in forming Lithuania’s democratic political system.

In contrast, Belarus elected to maintain close ties with Russia following the collapse of the Soviet Union. This ultimately affected the authoritarian government constituted. While there were efforts to bring about democratic sentiments in post-Soviet Belarus, the opposition to Lukashenka never offered an appealing national alternative to the Soviet totalitarianism ideology. Lukashenka played upon nostalgia and reminded Belarussians of the security and prosperity they enjoyed under the Soviet Union. This was evident in practice as Lukashenka adopted Russian as an official language of the country and restored the Soviet-era flag. Lukashenka also chose to pursue close relations with Russia due to its political readiness to provide security and backing to Lukashenka under any means. Lukashenka used Russia as an asset to legitimize his Belarussian Rule and limit any opposition. He even entertained rumors of Belarus rejoining Russia amongst elites in Russia to seek further the relationship he needed to survive as an isolated authoritarian regime. These ties are continued to be seen today as demonstrated by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s measure of exports and imports of states around the world. This index shows that Russia is the top destination for Belarussian goods, as Belarus exports 42% of their goods to Russia. The Soviet ideological ties and closeness to Russia that Lukashenka pursued following the collapse of the Soviet Union are
crucial indicators of the politically repressive regime in Belarus today.

Another independent variable that has led to the contrasting political systems in Belarus and Lithuania is the sense of national identity present in each country during their independence. Lithuanian nationalism had been very apparent prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union. By the 1980s, many Lithuanians feared that the Soviet Union was destroying the national identity of Lithuania, including their language, history, and environment. These strong nationalist sentiments were also held by elites in Lithuania, who wanted to win their country's independence back. The formation of the Lithuanian Reconstruction Movement or Sajudis in 1988 was the first organized opposition to Soviet Rule. There was initial skepticism from the Catholics in Lithuania about Sajudis' motives. However, after they announced that a cathedral would be returned to the Catholic church on national television, it was apparent that both groups equally wanted to be free of Moscow's Rule and influence in Lithuania (Krickus 1993). This further portrays Lithuania's strong sense of national identity, as they were willing to put political ideologies aside to join under their most pressing cause. Later, Sajudis won 80% of the vote in the first free election in Soviet history, despite multiple efforts to suppress media coverage by the party in power; and later declared Lithuania's sovereignty from the Soviet Union. Upon freedom, Lithuania conducted sweeping reforms for democracy through a parliamentary system. This progression demonstrates how the solid national identity in Lithuania prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union led to the installation of its democratic system. Belarus did not have the same sense of national identity as Lithuania during Soviet times. Belarus did not have a strong sense of national identity or opposition to the Soviet Union upon its independence. Instead, at the collapse of the Soviet Union, Belarusian nationalism was crafted by
"mixing communist doctrine with the glorification of the guerilla resistance during World War II. This was the so-called 'Soviet Belarussian' patriotism, a surrogate national identity that credited the nation's existence to the communist regime that saved it from extermination by the Nazis during World War II..." (Silitski 2006). There were sentiments of Belarussian nationalism that led to Belarussian being instituted as the official language, but they did not sufficiently unite the country under a national identity or cause. Lukashenka played upon this to promote soviet totalitarianism as the most desired way of governance, and due to the lack of alternatives to this ideology, his regime prevailed. This initial prevalence of the regime cemented the authoritarian regime present today as it allowed Lukashenka to consolidate his power early and continue ruling in a repressive way. Even today, Belarus lacks nationalism as it ranks 86th on the Quality of Nationality Index, which could be credited to the initial lack of nationalism almost 30 years ago. The lack of national identity and unity under a common cause or ideology led to the establishment of Lukashenka's regime in Belarus, which continues to rule today.

Each nation's economy and the level of control the government holds over them is another independent variable that leads to the political systems in each state. In Lithuania's reconstruction during the early 1990s after independence, officials realized that they must build a national economy. As outlined in the book Lithuania: The Rebirth of a Nation, "In 1991 it was a decaying relic of a Soviet central planning system that 'bore little resemblance to economic reality and had brought little or no benefit to Lithuania during the course of 50 years of occupation" (Ashbourne 130). Lithuania's economy was 98% state-owned in 1991, and the government realized the necessity of a market economy that would allow them to reintegrate into the international economy. The
Landsbergis administration understood the necessity of re-entering the international sphere after many years of Soviet isolation and put forth bold policy ideas to expedite this process, such as introducing their inter-war currency, transitioning to a western-style economy, and subsequently a western-level standard of living. This allowed Lithuania to institute a market economy with a robust private sector. The main goal in doing these things was to achieve autonomy from Russia, which ultimately led to the institution of democracy in Lithuania because having a free market reinforced the necessity for freedom in all institutions, such as the political system.

On the other hand, Belarus does not enjoy this level of freedom in its economy. Belarus decided against privatization after gaining independence as communist ideology and resistance to privatization were strong. A source speaks to this level of government control when it says, “Indeed, Belarus leads other CIS countries in terms of the public sector’s share in employment, 63.6%” (Ioffe 89-92). It maintained high levels of output and economic success under its command system compared to other former Soviet CIS countries. For example, Belarus ranked the highest of CIS countries on the 2001 UN Human Development report at 53rd (UNDP 2001). While this is impressive, the Belarussian economy remained very isolated, with upwards of 60% of imports and exports going to other CIS countries.

Following the years of independence, Lukashenka realized that he would not be receiving external support for his economic and political policies and therefore had to continue functioning as a command system. In order to maintain this system, he put forth three guiding principles for his political economy structure: nearly full employment, no large-scale privatization, and high levels of social security provision reminiscent of certain aspects of the Soviet Union’s system.
Lukashenka sought aggressive social welfare programs to gain the initial support of his constituents and then used this perceived support to maintain power in his authoritarian system. Implementing total social funding was successful, evident through the Database of United Nations Children’s fund that looked at general government expenditure on education and healthcare in CIS countries. It ranked Belarus 3rd in education spending and 1st in healthcare spending. The economy’s success was utilized to create an idea that authoritarianism is an effective method of governance, which allows it to continue; however, it fails to address the negative social aspects of an autocracy that persist in Belarus. For example, in Belarus specifically, no strong oligarchs emerged after deciding to maintain a command economy, which is linked to Lukashenka’s stark opposition to other potential leaders. Overall, Lukashenka’s insistence on a command economy constructed with the necessity of social programs has caused and maintained the authoritarian system in Belarus by using economic gains and stability as an advocate for this kind of governance.

The three independent variables that have been outlined are interconnected in the political systems of both Belarus and Lithuania, especially ties with Russia and the states’ economies. Lithuania immediately sought to distance itself from the Soviet Union, both ideologically and economically. These two variables worked together to result in a democratic system in Lithuania. The instituting of economic measures to separate ties from Russia is apparent in a source that reads, "Latvia and Lithuania followed Estonia’s path out of the ruble zone, largely for the same reason- to achieve autonomy from Russia" (Abdelal 48). This shows how Lithuania’s economic decision to create its currency was in line with western countries’ norms to distance itself from Russia. Another goal of Lithuania was to join the European Monetary Union, which required an ideological and political
shift from Russia and their currency independent of Russia because he knew their support would be the Russian ruble. These also conjoined with the necessary for a healthy economy, which proved national identity that Lithuania was able to develop effective as Russia offered many subsidies to the to form the nation’s democracy. This national Belarusian government following independence. identity made cutting ties with Russia much easier, These subsidies allowed Lukashenka to develop the as the population was enthusiastic about creating a system he desired and consolidate his power under new political and economic system. They were able the idea of economic prosperity. Belarus continues to unite under their Lithuanian ideology to guide to rely on Russian demand for its goods to maintain the country’s policies in the direction they desired, economic stability, which is necessary to maintain unlike in Belarus, where Lukashenka had complete the level of popular legitimacy to keep the control. Lukashenka regime in power. Their close ties with The connection between independent Russia also formed due to not developing a sense of variables is also apparent in the outcome of national identity that would be necessary to Belarus’ autocracy under Lukashenka. However, the distance themselves. These variables work in variables worked oppositely, with their Russian chronological order as the lack of a national involvement being necessary to have a functioning identity led to the inability to break away from command economy, which led to the authoritarian former Soviet ideologies and its style of economy, government. Belarus wanted to maintain a which ultimately allowed for the Rule of command economy by reintegrating ties with Lukashenka and the institution of an authoritarian Russia to avoid high costs associated with extensive system with a personalistic leader.
Both Lithuania and Belarus experienced similar circumstances as states under Soviet occupation for decades; however, Lithuania functions as a democracy, while Belarus continues to function as a personalistic autocracy. These differences in their political systems are linked to several endeavors that each nation sought-following independence, most notably: each states' closeness to Russia, the development of national identities, and finally, the economic systems of each state. Lithuania urgently worked to distance itself from Russia both ideologically and economically to the extent that allowed it to form the democratic institutions it desired and reintegrate into western society. In contrast, Belarus elected to maintain close relations with Russia without national identity and developed a command economy that allowed for the continued autocratic system. However, in a globalizing world, remaining a relatively isolated autocratic regime relying on a strong power, Russia, is becoming more complex. Not to mention increasing pressure from the west regarding numerous human rights abuses under the Lukashenka regime beg the question of how long his Rule will persist. While the systems present in Belarus and Lithuania are vastly different, they have both managed to create stable functioning governments up until this point. However, with global organizations being more proactive regarding human rights abuses and an international system that sees more states becoming undemocratic, it will be interesting to see how these states navigate new challenges to maintain their stability and ideologies.
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There is a common pattern of restrictionist immigration policy throughout the world. This statement illuminates that borders are important in those cases, and the relationship between countries plays a role in how those are drawn and, in effect, how obstacles toward migration materialize. When studying cases of migration, it is common to expect the receiving country to turn away immigrants and refugees. It turns into a game of which countries can hold out long enough for another country to accept the asylum-seekers, so they do not have to receive them.

Latin America as a region innovates new perspectives to look at policy across the board, so it is not a surprise that there have been accomplishments for immigration policy as well. The sign that signals the border between Venezuela and Colombia states “Colombia y Venezuela unidos por siempre: Bienvenidos a Colombia” which means “Colombia and Venezuela united forever: Welcome to Colombia” (Shen and Yang, 2020). This welcoming gesture sparks the question: could there be another way than a restrictionist stance on immigration policy? A precedent to follow would allow for a more complex study of policy and an actual sign of hope for immigrants. As the world gets smaller due to globalization and the threat of climate change increasingly forces migration, another lens outside of restrictionist policy is necessary.

There have been substantial migration crises in recent years in Latin America following the end of the military dictatorship era and the struggle to find a suitable, legitimate democratic leaders in several different countries. Citizens have fled to escape a multitude of threats; however, these
receiving countries do not always welcome these
refugees with open arms. At times, however, they
do accept refugees and even offer welfare benefits
or protectionist policies for those who seek asylum.
Therein lies the puzzle: what factors lead countries
to implement more restrictive, punitive immigration
policies rather than welcoming ones? This question
is important to study because migration crises will
increase in the coming years due to climate change
and resource depletion, so the study of why
immigration policies are restrictive or welcoming
illustrates a dichotomy – a choice – in how
different countries may react to this change. It
provides an insight into what the future may look
like for refugees seeking asylum in a world where
there may not be a place or, on the other hand,
could be a myriad of choices. In addition, there is a
large gap in Latin American and migration
scholarship that does not account for intraregional
migration. This paper seeks to bridge this gap and
provide a lens that does not cater to the common
discourse of how large of an impact migrants have
on the United States or Europe. It intends to look at
Latin American migration without dependence on
the Global North to complete the narrative.

Literature Review

There is a rapidly expanding literature that
looks at why some immigration policies are more
restrictionist and punitive in some states compared
to others who have more liberal and accepting
policies. However, despite the breadth of
scholarship, there is no universal definition or
consensus regarding immigration policy generally.
The current literature looks through myriad
different lenses that can be categorized into four
theoretical approaches. The globalization approach
(Sassen, 2000) argues that globalization impacts
immigration policy because as the world becomes
more globalized, borders become less important in
a way, so increased mobility results in states being
more restrictive because they see it as a threat to
their national sovereignty. The culture-based approach (Money, 2010) contends that nativism has stemmed from increased immigration which places a strong pressure on the state to use anti-immigration rhetoric to preserve national interest and state security in a fight for survival to preserve the known and keep out the unknown. Other scholars utilize a political economy approach (Freeman and Kessler, 2008; Borjas, 2018) to argue that political science should consider the likelihood that immigration policy decisions connect to economic interests such as labor migration. Lastly, the interest-group approach (Epstein and Nitzan, 2006; Freeman and Kessler, 2008) argue that under effective lobbying measures, interest groups can influence policy to favor the regularization and entry of skilled immigrants over unskilled immigrants because they provide a service and contribute to their interests compared to other types of immigrants. Each investigates the dialogue among scholars of what influences states to implement more restrictive or accepting immigration policy.

**Argument**

The presence of positive bilateral relationships and external hegemonic influences increases the likelihood of a country implementing either more restrictive or more welcoming immigration policies. The approaches the make up the current state of the debate of immigration policy solely look through a domestic lens which explicitly ignores other factors that are equally as important to include in the scholarship to gain a more complex understanding of policy decisions. This paper seeks to analyze the interstate explanatory factors that contribute to whether policymakers decide to implement more restrictionist or welcoming immigration policies. The theory of complex interdependence, developed by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, proposes a wider perspective that takes into account how
states impact each other’s policy which is much different than the previous theoretical perspectives discussed. Scholars of this political thought (Rogerson, 2010; Kohane and Nye, 2000) argue that states and their fortunes are inexplicably tied together. They define interdependence as “reciprocal effects among actors resulting from ‘international transactions – flows of money, goods, people, and messages across international boundaries’” (Rogerson, 2010). They contend that there has been a decrease in military force as a policy tool and an increase in economic and other forms of interdependence which should grow the probability of cooperation among states.

Firstly, with a positive bilateral relationship present, there is more open communication and cooperation with one another which leads to reciprocity. Simply, it is more likely for two countries to help one another if there is already an existing relationship where trust and dialogue exist. Applying this concept to immigration policy, this may look like circular migration where migration flows go from country A to country B and then eventually switches from country B to country A. With an existing positive bilateral relationship, it is more likely to see increased reciprocity which would lead to more welcoming immigration policies. Without this relationship, this may look like vertical migration where migrants travel from country A to country B and not vice versa. There is no incentive for country B, the receiving country, to initiate a compromise that welcomes migrants because this may be an economic or political investment they see as unnecessary. This would lead to more restrictive immigration policy.

Secondly, the influence of an external hegemonic influences plays a significant role in the result of either restrictionist or welcoming policy because some countries may find more incentive to play along with the hegemon’s requests rather than help their neighbor. This is a form of interdependence because the two states are tied
together, and the result is that the interests of the hegemon become the interests of its neighbor. It signifies an increased probability of restrictionist policy if the hegemon is anti-immigration because there are strong economic and political ties to stay in good standing with the hegemon. On the other hand, the absence of one allows for more flexibility for a country to make the decision on their own to help immigrants. The absence of a hegemon eliminates a barrier for welcoming immigration policy.

This argument is more persuasive than the others discussed earlier because it investigates how outside actors play a role in shaping immigration policy rather than simply looking internally. By analyzing interstate relations in addition to domestic factors, the explanatory factors for immigration policy decisions expand. Complex interdependency provides a theoretical lens to expand the literature on immigration policy to focus on these interstate connections and how interdependence impacts migration policy interests and decisions. In addition, some scholars solely focus on the effect migrants have on developed Western nations, such as the United States and Europe, rather than the other way around where these developed countries influence the countries of origin for migrants. This paper seeks to explain how interstate relations affect immigration policy in addition to domestic roles to fill this hole in scholarship and look from a different lens to find alternative conclusions.

Research Design and Methodology

To answer the research question, I selected the immigration policies of Colombia and Mexico as my cases. I chose these cases because they both had the largest migratory movements in the region between 2014-2019. The Venezuelan migration crisis did not hit a peak until 2015, and this is also when the United States amped up their anti-immigration language that impacted Mexico's
implementation of the Southern Border Plan in 2014. Both cases have similar contexts where the neighboring country has substantial emigration flowing into the country of choice for my case, yet both countries vary vastly in their immigration policy goals. Colombia hosts an influx of Venezuelan migrants, and Mexico hosts migrants from the Northern Triangle countries who traverse Mexico as a transit country to reach the United States. However, there is variation in policy because Mexico implements a restrictive, punitive form of immigration control while Colombia carries out more generous, welcoming policies. In this research paper, I will use Mill’s Method of Difference to compare these two cases since they both have similar contexts yet different outcomes.

I will operationalize my variables in a way that allows for an understanding to why each variable plays a role in each country’s decision to be either restrictive or welcoming. The variation in policy will be measured by the number of immigrants detained and the number of detention centers in use. For the first variable, the presence or absence of a positive bilateral relationship will show that a country is more or less restrictive. This will be operationalized by the historical relationship including either circular or vertical migration. With a history of circular migration, there is a higher likelihood for mutual reciprocity which leads to more welcoming immigration policy. If there is only vertical migration, there is no incentive for reciprocity on the side of the receiving country, so this leads to a higher probability for restrictionist policy. The second variable will also be measured by the presence or absence of an external hegemonic actor. Hegemony is defined as the “predominance of one state over its peers” (Stiles, 2009), “dominance of one state over the others” (Cox R. W., 1993), or “preponderance of military and economic capabilities” (Ikenberry and Kupchan, 1990). This variable will be based on the relations between two states to determine the existence of a
hegemonic actor in the relationship and whether their dominance influences the other country's policy.

I. Empirical Evidence

Variations in Immigration Policy

Even though both Colombia and Mexico experience an influx of migrants from their neighbors, they have reacted differently regarding their migration policy. Mexico has taken an aggressive approach to stop migrants; on the other hand, Colombia offers generous regularization programs along with humanitarian assistance. This paper will use a comparative analysis to investigate the explanatory factors that lead to more restrictive, punitive policies compared to more welcoming, inclusive ones. My dependent variable for this research is the extent to which policies are restrictionist or more generous, and these are operationalized by the number of immigrants detained and the number of detention centers in use. This case study provides an interesting perspective to existing literature on immigration policy because it focuses on Latin America which is rarely studied intraregionally in this realm of policy and shows two different reactions to similar conditions.

The Mexican government provides a case example for the more restrictionist country regarding immigration policy. According to the Pew Research Center, Mexico has deported more Northern Triangle nationals than the United States, making up a difference between 95,000 and 74,000 people from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras (Flores et al., 2019). In addition, migrants from the Northern Triangle contribute to the majority of those apprehended in Mexico, making up 85% of the total migrants arriving in Mexico (Flores et al., 2019). This information illustrates that Northern Triangle migrants are the largest concern for the Mexican government when formulating immigration policy. In response to the large
numbers of migrants arriving at their border, Mexico fortified its migration enforcement strategies, resulting in an increase in the number of detention centers and the number of detained migrants. The 2011 Migration Law implemented some means for protecting migrants such as protection from discrimination, access to education and health services, and the right to legal representation, but the law also makes detainments easier and more punitive because it prioritizes administrative detention to process undocumented migrants and allows for indefinite detention in some situations (Mexico Immigration Detention Profile, 2021). This illustrates the lack of options for immigrants along with the priority placed on preventing them from entering this state.

There are currently 54 detention centers open in Mexico, which are more concentrated near the southern Mexico border (Mexico Immigration Detention Profile, 2021). This is not a coincidence; there are more detention centers closer to the southern border to quickly and efficiently prevent migrants from entering the country. According to the Global Detention Project, "Mexico detained more than 180,000 people for migration-related reasons in 2019, one of the highest totals in the world that year and among the highest on record for Mexico" (Mexico Immigration Detention Profile, 2021). There is a clear prioritization on maintaining a strict, punitive approach to immigration in hopes of catching immigrants and preventing them from coming in the first place. Overall, Mexico provides some benefits to protect migrants, but their main goal is to deter any immigration by establishing restrictive policy. It is evident that with more enforcements to detain immigrants and the establishment of a system that seeks to punish those who cross into the country, the Mexican government does not seek to welcome any immigrants in the short or the long-term.

On the other hand, Colombia offers a more welcoming lens for migrants as they lean more into
welfare benefits and integration rather than a punitive, restrictive system. According to the 2020 World Migration Report by the United Nations International Organization for Migration, Colombia accepted more asylum-seekers from Venezuela than the other Latin American nations while the Venezuelan refugee crisis was the second largest migratory crisis in the world, following only the Syrian refugee crisis (Rendon 2020). Colombia hosted approximately 1.8 million Venezuelan migrants out of the total 4.8 million that fled the country between 2015 and 2019, which roughly makes up about 37.5% of the total number of Venezuelan refugees and 4% of the Colombian population (Migration Policy Institute, 2020).

Despite Colombia's weak socioeconomic system, they maintained a positive, welcoming attitude regarding their immigration policy. Emerging from their own decades-long civil war, Colombia's institutions are recovering still. This is interesting because they have invested $228 million for health services in its border areas and have offered citizenship to twenty-four thousand Venezuelan children without questions concerning why or how they fled their home (Rendon 2020). In addition to these generous offerings, Colombia launched a new temporary protective status program called the Special Permission of Permanence (Permiso Especial de Permanencia, PEP) for Venezuelan refugees which grants them refugee status and the potential for a resident visa after ten years and offers an extension to those already on temporary residence (Treisman 2021; Colombia Immigration Detention Profile, 2020). Specifically, there is a plethora of generosities granted to Venezuelans on behalf of the Colombian government despite the consideration that it may not benefit them in the short-term. This is a sharp contrast to the Mexican government's consideration for immigrants; for example, Colombia only has two migration detention centers which have not been in use since 2018, considering they have shifted their outlook.
on immigration policy to work toward the regularization of migrants’ status rather than the expulsion of them (Colombia Immigration Detention Profile, 2020). This implies that the total number of detained migrants in Colombia is negligible because there is no facility for detainment procedures. Overall, Colombia prioritizes accepting refugees from their neighboring country, Venezuela, and continues to offer generous benefits ranging from healthcare to social benefits to citizenship. The difference between these two cases is clear: Mexico institutes restrictionist policy which can be seen through their high number of detention centers in use and number of detainments, and Colombia implements generous, welcoming policy which is evident in their lack of detainment centers and detainments. In addition, Colombia implements a multitude of different social welfare and citizenship programs to prioritize the safety and well-being of the refugees they host.

Positive Bilateral Relationships

The presence of a positive bilateral relationship grants Colombia the foundation to institute welcoming policy because the history of circular migration with Venezuela increases the positive relations between each country based in mutual reciprocity and cooperation. On the other hand, there is an absence of this relationship in the case of Mexico because there is only vertical migration present. The power dynamic between Mexico and the Northern Triangle sides with the country with the power to turn away migrants. There is a form of dependency that Northern Triangle countries rely on in this case because they must traverse Mexico to reach the United States. Since there is only a one-way flow of migration, mutual reciprocity and cooperation are not present.

Colombia:

As mentioned before, Colombia has faced its own challenges in recent years in the form of a
52-year civil war that resulted in more than 220,000 dead, 7.6 million displaced within and outside of the country, and exceedingly high costs to the economy (Carvajal 2017). This accounted for the longest-running civil conflict in the Western world and historically has been an example of large-scale emigration. In the international community, Colombia was seen as a source of conflict and emigrants – never as a receiving country. Considering it is logistically easier to migrate to a neighboring country rather than traversing several, Colombians took refuge in Venezuela which thrived off petrodollars and offered a chance for opportunity (Janetsky, 2019). Approximately 1 million Colombian citizens moved into Venezuela for safety from the ongoing civil war (Frydenlund et al., 2021). Venezuela’s acceptance of refugees during that time period established not only a known route for migration but also established a foundation of trust with Colombia. This exodus of Colombians tied the two countries together as refugees established a life in Venezuela – finding employment, building a family, and living in peace.

When Venezuela fell into a humanitarian, economic, and political crisis in 2015, the trend of migration inversed where Venezuelans now sought refuge in Colombia. Colombians who found refuge in Venezuela also made up a part of this mass migration back to Colombia. The initial reaction of the influx of refugees entering the country during a period of recovery was a mixed bag among the public, mainly focused on anxieties that Colombians would have to compete for jobs, but the country accepted these refugees despite their worries. There is an incentive for war-torn Colombia to accept them as well as they can benefit from the addition of human capital and the opportunity for development (Otis, 2021; Supporting Colombian Host Communities and Venezuelan Migrants During the COVID-19 Pandemic, 2021). With a relationship built on trust already in place, there is an existing
path for migrants to find refuge along with the cooperation between the two states based in reciprocity. The reverse in migration flow completes the qualification for circular migration which increases the likelihood of trust and effectively influences the establishment of welcoming immigration policy.

The history of mass migration between Colombia and Venezuela is key to understanding why Colombia implements more welcoming immigration policies. The mutual trust between the two countries based in historical aid to one another’s people creates a bilateral relationship for migration. The origins of bilateral relationships are usually in crises because states are pressured to act and “multilateral interaction becomes a rational response as they cannot solve the problem individually” (Yonten 2011). Essentially, it is easier to work with the migrants in this context because militarization and preventative strategies are not the ideal answer to this problem; it is the safer option to maintain peaceful relations with their neighbor especially since they have helped them in the past during a similar time. Considering Venezuela took in Colombian refugees during their migration crisis, Colombia is more lenient to receiving Venezuelan refugees. Thus, the positive bilateral relationship between the two countries allowed for cooperation in the process of receiving refugees which has led to more welcoming policies. There is not a strong insider/outsider narrative between Colombian natives and immigrants considering the two nations interplay with one another often and this relationship is ideal for positive, open migration relations.

Mexico

On the other hand, there is no positive bilateral relationship between Mexico and the Northern Triangle countries in the context of reciprocity in migration relations. To contrast the previous case, there is only a single direction,
northward migration from the Northern Triangle to Mexico which can be described as vertical migration (Hanchett, 1994). In vertical relationships, one party holds the power in the relationship which is opposite to positive bilateral relationships that are a result of circular migration, where both parties are on equal playing fields. There is no incentive for Mexico to provide resources and encourage immigration since they sit in the more powerful position in the relationship. It comes down to who has the power when comparing the bargaining power of Mexico and the Northern Triangle states. Migrants must bargain with Mexico to enter; on the other hand, Mexico has no history or desire to migrate to the Northern Triangle, so they have no need to cooperate or compromise. Since there has been no historical relationship, there is no establishment of mutual reciprocity. In effect, there is an attempt to prevent migrants from entering since there is no benefit for Mexico to host them even if they are just passing through, and this can even be a political and economic investment they deem unnecessary.

In addition, migration may contribute to multiculturalism which some countries feel as a threat to their culture and national identity, and if you have the bargaining power in the relationship, you have the means to classify who is an “insider” and an “outsider” (Ellermann, 2008). Therefore, states may be more willing to invest in ways to prevent migrants from entering the country rather than using those funds to give social benefits to “outsiders.” Scholars point out that “migration control policies tend to be formulated unilaterally, many foreign governments have adopted obstructionist tactics that critically threaten policy implementation” (Ellermann 2008). This means that higher migration control policies which are punitive and restrictionist in nature are more likely to be implemented in vertical migration relations since they do not have a positive bilateral relationship. Overall, the essence of the one-sided nature
between the two parties contributes to an insider/outsider narrative that influences the implementation of immigration policies meant to keep migrants out.

**Hegemonic Influence**

The influence of an external hegemonic actor plays a significant role in the result of either restrictionist or welcoming policy because some countries may find more of an incentive to play along with the hegemon's requests rather than help their neighbor. The presence of an external hegemonic actor's influence signifies an increased probability of restrictionist policy if the hegemon is anti-immigration which is the case for this specific research because there is a form of dependency that contributes to this outcome. On the other hand, the absence of one allows for more flexibility for a country to make the decision on their own to help immigrants. The absence of a hegemon eliminates a barrier for welcoming immigration policy.

**Colombia:**

Colombia has no external hegemonic influences that impact its decisions on immigration policy (Torres-López, 2021). The absence of an influential hegemon allows for more flexibility and sovereignty for a country to make its own decisions when it comes to immigration policy. Therefore, they can institute policy based off solely their position on migration. As mentioned earlier, the Colombian government benefits from the arrival of Venezuelan refugees because there gain from their "brain drain" (Supporting Colombian Host Communities and Venezuelan Migrants During the COVID-19 Pandemic, 2021). This form of sovereignty is not present in every case which is evident when making a comparison between Colombia and Mexico. This can be connected to the variation in immigration policy since Colombia does not have any obstacles to implement welcoming, generous policy measure for the refugees arriving.
Mexico:

On the other hand, Mexico exemplifies a strong case for how an external hegemon influences immigration policies outside of its own country. The United States has historically been a regional hegemon that positions itself mainly against immigration and has a strong influence on Mexico both politically and economically to remain in the United States' good graces. There is a strong incentive for the United States to push its anti-immigration sentiments onto Mexico's immigration policy because if Mexico's migration control and enforcement strategies are weak, then there is a high probability for those migrants to reach the United States' border. The graph below illustrates the total number of irregular migrants that are apprehended at the U.S. southwest border between the years 2010-2016. It is clear that in 2014 and 2016, the number of Northern Triangle immigrants surpassed the total number of Mexican immigrants attempting to enter the United States irregularly.

Source: Fernanda (2020)

In effect, the United States' influence on Mexico has led them to act as an extension of the United States when it comes to immigration policy which takes the form of border militarization and structured migration control institutions. The hegemonic power that the United States has over Mexico effectively disincentivizes welcoming immigration policy because the interdependency between the two states instills this precedent. Scholars show that immigration enforcement cooperation between destination states and transit countries has increased in recent years (Fernanda 2020). In effect, there has been a trend of the United States “externalizing its border” to push its border enforcement strategies to Mexico’s southern border.
The incentive for both parties to participate in this dynamic persists despite the restrictionist policy because the hegemonic destination country does not want immigrants passing its first line of defense – the transit state. The United States has successfully worked with Mexico to invest in this so-called first line of defense. Placing pressure on Mexico to enact more restrictive, punitive policies has resulted in what scholars call “expanding the borderland” (Stephen 2009). The hegemon in the scenario has the political influence and power to impact Mexican policy and accomplish its goal to externalize not only its immigration control strategies and influence but also to externalize its immigration policy to other states as well. This goal to “expand the borderland” to the Mexican southern border proved successful as Mexico instituted its Southern Border Plan (Programa Frontera Sur) on July 7th, 2014 as a reaction to the increase in immigration from the Northern Triangle countries. Its stated objective is “to bring order to migration at Mexico’s southern region while protecting the human rights of migrants who enter and travel through the country” (Boggs 2015). The first part of its mission is clear in its enhancement of border control, but the statement of protection seems false since the increase in punitive, aggressive arrests showcases an increase in danger rather than peace. This plan coincides with a sharp increase in deportations from Mexico. In 2014, there were a total of 107,814 deportations, which represents a 35% increase from data in 2013 (Boggs, 2015). Increased enforcement in Mexico, along with enhanced border security efforts and an aggressive public relations campaign to dissuade Central American migrants from making the journey north, increase the difficulty for migrants to make the journey let alone start it. These efforts have been unsurprisingly celebrated in the United States. President Obama, who after meeting with Mexican President Pena Nieto,
credited Mexico’s efforts with contributing to the reduction in the number of migrants arriving at the United States border (Boggs, 2015). This makes sense considering the primary reason for the enhancement in border control strategies was the hegemonic influence of the United States. Although the Mexican migration enforcement officers have done well preventing migrants from catching the train, La Bestia, to the United States border, Northern Triangle migrants are still finding different routes to evade the profusion of checkpoints and raids along Mexico’s southern border. The evidence clarifies that Mexico created the Southern Border Plan out of pressure from the United States to externalize their borders to successfully expand their borderlands.

II. Conclusion

The current literature on immigration policy decisions focuses mainly on domestic factors that do not take interstate relations into account. This paper successfully illustrates that there are clear explanatory factors that are rooted in interdependence between different countries which go past the classic domestic perspective that many scholars in this field of study employ. When there is an absence of a positive bilateral relationship and a presence of external hegemonic influence, there is a high likelihood for a country to institute restrictionist, punitive immigration policy because there is a need to satisfy the economic and political interests of the country that it is dependent on in the dynamic. On the other hand, when there is a presence of a positive bilateral relationship and an absence of external hegemonic influence, the probability for the country to enact welcoming, generous immigration policy is high because it has the independence and political and economic sovereignty to make the decision on their own to enact policy that helps refugees and immigrants. In order to meet the required page limit for this publication, I excluded economic dependency as a
third variable which can be measured by the amount of remittance dollars received. Future research may explore this explanatory factor further to understand the economic links between countries and how it impacts decisions regarding immigration policy. There is a need for future research to look past domestic factors and explore interstate relations to get a firm grasp on all potential factors that impact a state’s stance on immigration policy.

Migration will only continue as the world becomes smaller due to globalization and environmental catastrophes worsen due to the acceleration of climate change and decrease in habitable land, so it is imperative for our immigration policies to be cognizant and open to human mobility. Restrictionist, punitive policy currently dominates immigration policies around the world mainly because there has been a long history of preserving and defining our nations and the identities, institutions, and ideas that are exclusively attributed to the state. However, whether it is seen as negative or positive to a specific actor, globalization has blurred the lines of borders and has encouraged the transfer of people to permeate through to seek a new, better life, establish a home in a country that is politically and economically stable, or essentially find a land that is simply habitable. It will become increasingly difficult to maintain a strong insider/outsider mentality as different cultures and perspectives integrate, so policy should be more accommodating to the future. The world is changing, and immigration policy scholarship should reflect the complex relationships between different states that are developing and how these dynamics impact the reception or rejection of human movement.
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