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Robert Montagne and *The Berbers*: The Persistence of Myth in French Colonial North Africa

Matthew Moore

“Knowledge is not only a means of control and governance for the colonial machine, but it also contains categories by which imaginaries are shaped and colonial relations and attitudes are perpetuated.”

- Abdelmajid Hannoum

French colonial North Africa was one of the largest imperial possessions in history. Stretching across the Sahara from the Sea of Sicily to the Atlantic Ocean, at its height in the early 20th century this collection of territories covered approximately 1.5 million square miles. Its successor states currently have a combined population of around 83 million, almost one third of the Arab world. One of the most crucial figures within this massive empire was the anthropologist Robert Montagne. The historian Alice Conklin has demonstrated that “all European powers... claimed to be carrying out the work of civilization in their overseas territories; but only in Republican France was this claim

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elevated to the realm of official imperial doctrine.”² France, more than any other nation, depended on an official ideology to justify and maintain its foreign conquests. This ideology was articulated and developed in part through the works of academics. Robert Montagne was “the most authoritative scholar of North Africa.”³ Therefore his work was crucial in justifying and maintaining the imperial system.

While Montagne was an expert on all of North Africa as well as the larger Islamic world, his personal research focused primarily on Moroccan Berbers. In his work, *The Berbers: Their Social and Political Organization*, Montagne outlined his understanding of the Moroccan Berbers and his vision for them within the French empire. Montagne’s work reflected and helped define France’s official relationship with Morocco and its Berber tribes. Montagne anticipated and hoped to help facilitate the future independence of Berbers from French rule. In theory, Montagne envisioned France as a benevolent leader serving the interests of the native people and aiding them in their progress. Much scholarship has demonstrated the huge gap between this common imperial vision and France’s exploitative actions. However, there was a deep problem even within Montagne’s text itself. Montagne based his arguments around mythic conceptions of Maghrebi society developed a

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³ Abdelmajid Hannoum, “Faut-Il Bruler L’Orientalisme,” 81.
century earlier in the French colony of Algeria. These colonial myths were forged under a system that sought to fully dominate North Africa, turning it into an extension of France itself. In this paper, I will demonstrate that Montagne’s work was fundamentally structured around the old myths of this different colonial regime. Montagne was therefore unable to create a new, progressive vision for Moroccan Berbers’ independent development. I am not arguing that Montagne unintentionally reproduced Algerian myths. Montagne deliberately drew from the Algerian discourse, accepting and rejecting myths based around their utility for the Moroccan colonial system. Even when he rejected Algerian myths, his replacement formulations still reflected Algerian conceptions. This demonstrates how the persistence of myth within colonial discourse was both a blessing and a curse to colonial leaders like Montagne. Algerian myths retained ideological utility but they also limited Montagne’s ability to formulate the enduring, mutually beneficial relationship that he envisioned between France and Moroccan Berber tribes.

Robert Montagne and the Pacification of Morocco

After the establishment of the Moroccan protectorate in 1911, France set out to consolidate control over the entire country. Through this bloody endeavor, euphemistically termed the “Pacification” of Morocco, France sought to extend its dominance outside a core colonial territory that was largely Arab-speaking into the Berber-speaking
hinterlands. France faced considerable difficulty in its attempts to conquer these regions. During the first three years of the Pacification, France sent out annual expeditions against the Middle Atlas Berbers that always ended in failure. In 1914, it began a particularly violent campaign against the Zayan confederation of Berber tribes that dragged on for four years.4

France was considerably ignorant of Moroccan Berber groups, and was forced to rely heavily on an understanding of the Berbers that it had developed in its older Algerian colony.5 In order to better understand and control Moroccan Berber areas, the governor general, Hubert Lyautey, began to support ethnographic research on Berber tribes. The historian Jonathan Wyrtzen explains that “As the pacification of the countryside proceeded in the protectorate’s first years, an “ethnographic state” became necessary, and field research, publications, and research institutes focused on understanding Atlas Berber tribal society.”6 Wyrtzen’s description of the colonial government as an ethnographic state shows the importance ethnographic analysis to French colonial policy. Early inquiries were

largely successful. By 1919, for example, the complex Thamazight Berber dialect was unraveled. In 1920, Lyautey helped found the *Institut des Hautes Etudes Marocaines*: a group composed of young officers dedicated to studying Moroccan society. It was the most important of numerous other ethnographic organizations that Lyautey fostered. Lyautey gave these organizations great freedom. He believed that one need only to “put the right man in the right place” in order to carry out effective research. He also opposed any distinction between civilians and military. Members of these organizations were often simultaneously experts in their field of study and high-ranking army officers.

This movement towards ethnographic study brought Robert Montagne into the spotlight as a crucial voice within the French colonial discourse. Born in Le Mans, France in 1893, Montagne began his long association with the French military when he entered naval college in 1911. Alongside his martial aspirations, Montagne was interested in philosophy and sociology from an early age. After WWI, he was stationed in Port-Lyautey on the Atlantic Coast of Morocco. During his spare time at the naval base, he taught himself Arabic and Berber while interacting with the local population. He even carried out minor sociological

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investigations, some of which were published. With the increased need for ethnographic experts, Lyautey took note of Montagne and personally recruited him into a team of young officers at the Institut des Hautes Etudes Marocaines.\textsuperscript{11} Montagne provided ethnographic analysis to assist with French military operations against Berbers as the colonial government struggled to establish control. Montagne worked alongside Lyautey and the French military during one of the greatest Berber rebellions against French rule, the Rif War of 1924-1927 in northern Morocco. After the war ended in a French victory, he carried out studies on the Berbers in south Morocco from which he wrote his doctoral thesis in 1930, Les Berberes et le Makhzen dans le Sud du Maroc. That same year, he was appointed Director of the Institut Francais in Damascus and in 1931 he wrote his first draft of The Berbers.\textsuperscript{12} Montagne wrote this work while heavily associated with the colonialist regime. He had deep colonial sympathies and owed all of his personal success to the colonial government. Montagne would revise his work later in 1947, editing it and adding a new conclusion.\textsuperscript{13} Despite crucial historical developments during this period, Montagne still echoed the colonialist understanding of Morocco’s future.

\textsuperscript{12} Ibid., xiv-xv.
\textsuperscript{13} Ibid., xi.
Montagne: Steadfast Colonialist

The last of the traditional Berber tribal resistance groups was defeated in 1934, and the “pacification” of Morocco was complete. However, new forms of resistance began to emerge. An attempt to formalize a separate legal status for Berbers through a royal Dahir, or decree, in 1930 was met with great resistance by many Moroccans. The French were forced to reduce this divide and rule strategy in Morocco. World War II was even more disruptive to French rule, as the turmoil of the French government emboldened Moroccan resistance groups. In 1944, nationalists drafted a crucial manifesto of independence. By 1956, Morocco achieved this independence through the dissolution of the protectorate.

Despite these massive changes, Montagne continued to support colonial endeavors between the time he wrote The Berbers and revised it years later. In 1932 Montagne founded the Centre des Hautes Etudes d’Administration Musulman abbreviated as the C.H.E.A.M., a teaching institution and center for documentation relating to the governance of Islamic colonial territories. WWII and the Vichy regime disrupted the C.H.E.A.M.’s ability to function but Montagne still strived to preserve and expand educational institutions concerned with Islamic studies and effective colonial

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15 Ibid., 157.
16 Ibid., 169-170.
17 Ibid., 172.
18 Ibid., 180.
administration. He persisted in his support for the Moroccan colonial regime when he revised *The Berbers* in 1947. His final work before his death in 1954 argued that Moroccan nationalists would never be able to attain independence.\(^{19}\)

*The Berbers: A Work of Colonial Discourse*

Montagne’s work, *The Berbers* is an anthropological and ethnographic analysis concerned with the political sociology of the Berbers. Montagne constructed a refined argument about the structure and organization of Berber society in Morocco based on first-hand observations and extensive research. Though somewhat outdated, Montagne’s sophisticated work is still read by Modern anthropologists for its theories, particularly on Berber political organization.\(^{20}\) Montagne sought to provide practical information about Berber society for colonial administrators. However, Montagne’s work did not just describe societal organization. Montagne used ethnography to support myths and assumptions about Berbers and formulate a vision for France’s relationship with Berber tribes. These observations fed into the colonial discourse, both justifying and informing colonial policy and dictating conceptions of Moroccan Berber society.

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\(^{19}\) David Seddon, Introduction to *The Berbers*, xv-xvii.

The Algerian Discourse

Montagne’s analysis of Moroccan Berbers drew heavily from the founding myths of colonial Algeria. Algeria was France’s first North African colony. It was therefore where colonial myths about North Africa first originated and the basis for all later French understanding. Morocco and Algeria mirrored each other linguistically and culturally. Arab-speaking and Berber-speaking groups composed the vast majority of the population in both countries, forming two distinct language groups. These linguistic divisions were somewhat countered by religious unity under the Maliki school of Islam, though there were variations in religious practice and significant Jewish minorities. This similarity between the two societies facilitated the imposition of myths from the Algerian discourse onto Montagne’s description of Morocco’s Berbers.

The conquest of Algeria began in 1830, a century before the first draft of *The Berbers* was published. The myths of the Algerian colonial discourse were definitively shaped by the views of its creators and the political circumstances of the early phases of occupation. The historian Lahouari Addi argues that the founding Algerian colonial myths were forged primarily by European settlers that flocked towards Algeria in large numbers after the conquest.21 However, through her extensive examination of the colonial discourse,

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Patricia Lorcin demonstrates that the French understanding of Algeria and the Maghreb was largely crafted by educated members of the military without a professional background in ethnographic analysis. During the first phases of the colony, Algeria was ruled by a military regime and this perspective disproportionately determined the nature of the discourse. The two most important contributors to discourse were officers and military doctors. These officers often organized their studies through institutions dedicated to the study of native groups called Bureaux Arabes. These were the predecessors to later centers of North African research like Montagne’s Institut des Hautes Etudes Marocaines and the C.H.E.A.M. The Bureaux Arabes intended first to provide practical information for the military conquest. However, Lorcin states that “the scientific methodology of their work and their awareness of current philosophical and intellectual currents encouraged officers to enter into the intellectual arena where their work was well received.”

Because the monarchist French government used Algeria as a place to clandestinely exile potential dissent, many of the officers in Algeria were anti-clerical Republican radicals. This meant that Republican and secular values disproportionately determined how they assessed the Algerian colony.

23 Ibid., 150.
24 Ibid., 133.
Military doctors’ studies of native populations drew them into the discourse. Lorcin states that “By the early 1840’s... two trends had been established that would lead members of the medical corps into essentially nonmedical terrain. The first was the creation of official and personal relationships leading to active involvements in colonial politics and society. The second was a pattern of research, often statistical in nature and motivated by the need for reconnaissance that extended beyond the medical realm.”

Through their investigations of non-medical aspects of society, doctors and medical agencies classified and divided Algerian ethnic groups and established a hierarchical conception of the country’s linguistic diversity. As with the officers, the unique political leanings of the field shaped the assessments of physicians. Medical discourse was built upon the Revolutionary idea that doctors should be involved in political endeavors of progress and the Napoleonic linkage of medical and imperial ventures. Many doctors also subscribed to utopian ideals of a society led by an educated elite. These sympathies shaped assessments.

Officers and military doctors were the original contributors to the Algerian colonial discourse. When archaeologists and historians made important contributions later, they primarily complemented existing assessments.

26 Ibid., 654.
27 Ibid., 657.
28 Ibid., 659.
with their own expertise. Lorcin states that intellectual inquiries into Algeria “provided the means of creating an essentially French intellectual space in a foreign land.” The circumstances of conquest meant that this intellectual space was founded on the ideological sympathies of the original myth-makers. These images and categories would endure and dominate conceptions of the Maghreb, whether or not the same ideological sympathies dominated. Thus the immediate conditions of the Algerian conquest had lasting significance.

Myths Accepted by Montagne: The Civilizing Mission

The civilizing mission of France, la Mission Civilisatrice, was probably the most crucial component of the Algerian colonial discourse. This myth functioned as the core logical argument justifying the French presence in Algeria. The myth first claimed that Algerian society was inherently backwards and inferior and then that France had an obligation and right to facilitate progress, often through violence. The members of the French military that helped forge this founding myth justified both components of the argument with their observations and expertise. Patricia Lorcin states that “studies of the indigenous population..."

provided the best opportunities for imposing a French cultural identity... and... to justify the French presence on Algerian soil as a progressive inevitability.”  

31 Intellectual inquiry into Algerian society, therefore, was once again crucial to the construction of myth. Montagne included the same argument within his work, applying it towards Moroccan Berbers and justifying it with his sophisticated analysis.

Lahouari Addi, in his article “Colonial Mythologies: Algeria in the French Imagination,” explains that a “negative vision of the Algerian people was deliberately exaggerated so as to stress the need for assistance to the new colony.”

32 Intellectuals looked to their fields of study to find examples to support this negative vision. For example, French doctors focused on unhygienic Algerian practices. They also moved beyond their focuses to muse on the supposedly inherent dispositions of racial groups. Military doctors and officers constructed broad conceptions of the negative qualities of ethnic groups outside of their area of expertise.

33 Montagne similarly assigned regressive characteristics to Berbers in his analysis of their society. In his attempt as an anthropologist to describe and

34 Ibid., 662.
comprehend an ethnic group, he postulated that the fundamental mode of Berber social organization was either an anarchic oligarchy or a fleeting authoritarianism.\textsuperscript{35} He further established essential racial characteristics stating that “The most pronounced feature then of the Berber ethic will be the existence in every group of a deep conservatism, which is a result of, or possibly the cause of, the existing social fragmentation or atomization.”\textsuperscript{36} Montagne thus argued that the most apparent quality of the Berbers was conservatism. Within a colonial discourse where enlightenment ideals of progress dominate, this was not a positive attribute. Montagne linked this central characteristic to social division within Berber society, claiming that this core quality lead them towards discord. Montagne constructed further examples of Berber inferiority. For example, he criticized Berber society’s creative abilities, stating that their poetry contained little innovation or substance.\textsuperscript{37} These regressive characteristics provided the foundation for the civilizing myth in Morocco just as they had in Algeria by establishing the need for progress.

While the French constructed a myriad of examples of inferiority in Algerian society, violence and disorder were the primary justifications for the civilizing mission. Lorcin stresses that the military perspective of officers and

\textsuperscript{36} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{37} Ibid., 22.
physicians most decisively shaped the civilizing myth.\textsuperscript{38} Concerned with establishing order and imposing their rule, members of the military focused on the aspect of Algerian society that most threatened these ambitions: its violent resistance. The mythologizers interpreted Algerian violence in response to French aggression as a fundamental characteristic of native society. According to these mythologizers, the fractured and disordered organization of the Algerian political system predisposed it towards violence.\textsuperscript{39} Algerian society was little more than a disjointed network of bellicose tribes caught in a cycle of perpetual warfare.\textsuperscript{40} The civilizing myth further linked the violence and disorder of Algeria to a conception of the Islamic faith as fostering fanatical conflict.\textsuperscript{41} Lorcin points out that all officers generally agreed that “Islam was pernicious to French interests and should be handled by force.”\textsuperscript{42} The aspects of Algerian society that made it disorderly and violent were therefore best countered by the organized violence of the French military. Only France could break the stagnant cycles of violence and disorder through an effective show of force.

Montagne constructed a vision of Berber political organization that mimics the chaotic and bellicose society of Algerian myth, arguing as well that only might can break this system. Instead of relying on an image of Islamic

\textsuperscript{38} Lorcin, “Soldier Scholars of Colonial Algeria,” 128.
\textsuperscript{39} Addi, “Colonial Mythologies,” 103.
\textsuperscript{40} Ibid., 101.
\textsuperscript{41} Lorcin, “Soldier Scholars of Colonial Algeria,” 141.
\textsuperscript{42} Ibid., 142.
fanaticism, Montagne supported the idea that violence is the best tool to counter Berber societal atomization with his own interpretation of a trend in Berber society. He observed that local leaders periodically emerged and violently attempted to establish a centralized government. Montagne identified Abd El Krim, the leader of the Berber resistance in the Rif War, as one of the quintessential examples of this type of leader. He supported his argument with further examples of this figure throughout Berber history. These uprisings all ultimately fail and Berber society returns to anarchic tribal oligarchies divided along a checkerboard of alliances. Montagne thus constructed an ethnographic narrative of Berber society in a state of tension between these two forms of government. Montagne situated this anthropological narrative within the argument of the civilizing mission. He claimed that

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The fragmentation of society makes it necessary to use force in order to break the framework of these anarchic states. Nothing of significance can emerge from this mosaic of tribes as long as the frontiers have not been obliterated. It is this task to which, on occasion, secular leaders emerging from the very heart of such mountain republics have turned their efforts in an attempt to build chiefdoms, kingdoms, and empires by force.”
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Montagne argued that violence was uniquely capable of disrupting the political system as evidenced by the fleeting success of local leaders.

44 Ibid., 68.
45 Ibid., 67-68.
46 Montagne, *The Berbers*, 34.
A more effective use of violence, then, was all that was necessary to establish enduring change. Montagne stated that “this patchwork of former states constituted by the subject tribes reveals itself, when tried, to be a poor material from which to construct a Muslim state. A system foreign to the oriental world is required if a lasting empire is to be built in the Maghreb---one like that of Rome, or else like the one that we brought to Algiers a century ago with the fleet of Charles the Tenth, when we arrived in North Africa.”47 Montagne explicitly referenced the Algerian colonial system as a model for the imposition of French rule among the Moroccan Berbers. This would halt a pattern of chaos and belligerence.

Montagne’s reference of Rome as a model was also significant. It drew from another crucial component of the Algerian civilizing myth, its usage of historical comparisons. The myth linked Algeria to Rome and other past societies within France’s imagined heritage. However, the centrality of Rome to the Algerian civilizing myth was not inevitable. Lorcin, in her article “Rome and France in Africa: Recovering Colonial Algeria’s Latin Past,” stresses that “France’s appropriation of Rome and its legacy… was not a predetermined justification of colonization; rather, it was engendered by the circumstances of conquest and occupation.” Officers relied heavily on ancient Roman texts to construct a rudimentary history of Algeria to aid in the early stages of conquest because they could not read or

47 Ibid., 82.
relate to Arab sources. Over time, this Latin connection evolved into an ideological cornerstone of the French occupation. Rome became a cultural idiom for French imperial power and Algeria’s Latin past was stressed over its Islamic heritage. Archaeologists buttressed the Roman identity of Algeria ideologically through discoveries of Latin historical sites in the colony. Lorcin states that “studies of Roman ruins became a way to reclaim a European past for North Africa – interrupted by the invasion of barbarians – that France would take upon herself to recall and reestablish.” French rule, therefore, was not foreign but rather restored an ancient heritage. Some scholars claimed that elements of Berber customary law, language, and culture were Roman, further establishing this connection.

The Roman Empire was a particularly useful comparison because its imperial system directly modelled the foreign ambitions of France.

Rome was not the only past society used to justify France’s civilizing mission. Scholars also connected colonial society to civilizations without a direct history in Algeria that were ingrained in France’s understanding of its own heritage. The scholar Aucapitaine, for example, made parallels between Berber forms of government and the rule of the Merovingian Frankish kings. These connections built upon a prevailing theory among contemporary scholars that

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50 Addi, “Colonial Mythologies,” 104.
non-European societies could illuminate the European past through living parallel. The historical and archaeological theories of prominent Metropolitan historians supported the Mission Civilisatrice abroad. These connections to an imagined past placed native society in a lesser stage of development. They also supported its capability for advancement under French guidance since they were framed within an established conception of France’s progress.

Montagne similarly utilized historical comparisons in his analysis of Moroccan Berbers to support the civilizing mission. Montagne repeatedly linked Berber society with Rome. He claimed that their agnatic systems of kinship were very similar. He cited Latin-speaking St. Augustine as one of the most significant figures in the Berber cultural legacy. He also theorized that many words in the modern Berber language are ancient Latinisms. Montagne’s allusions to the Roman past linked Berber society to France and a vision of French progress. Montagne connected the workings of Berber society with other civilizations considered a part of the France’s national history. Montagne associated Berber groups with various stages of French development saying that:

There are those who... remain even today in the grip of a political structure like that of the Neolithic period. Others... have almost

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51 Lorcin, “Soldier Scholars of Colonial Algeria,” 147.
52 Montagne, The Berbers, 28.
53 Ibid., 86.
54 Ibid., 22.
reached the stage of development attained... during the Roman period. Thus the various Berber regions offer a wonderful field of research for sociologists and ethnographers. Here, better than in our own civilization, agitated and overwhelmed by unceasing progress as it is, we may grasp the interplay of the multiple forces acting upon the lives of men, which push them slowly, without their being aware of it, towards ends that they would not recognize, and which lead them to found cities and states at the cost of infinite effort and of conflicts without number. From the peaks of the Atlas Mountains we may also meditate upon a past that books cannot describe and which must have been somewhat like our own prehistory.\textsuperscript{55}

In this poetic description of Berber groups, Montagne described different Berber tribes as living representations of the various developing stages of Western civilization. Montagne thus situated the Berbers within a romantic narrative of progress, comparing them to France’s own understanding of its own development. Montagne established this connection further and explicitly built upon an Algerian understanding when he stated that:

Fifty years ago Masqueray, showed, in his fine book, \textit{The Formation of the Cities of the Sedentary Peoples of Algeria}, how one can discover in the remote hamlets of the Aures, in the small towns of Kabylia and in the religious towns of the Mzab, the successive stages of the development of urban life... In the same way, it is perhaps possible to see, in Morocco, the successive developmental stages through which the European tribes of the Bronze Age passed... Finally, the minor leaders whom we shall see emerging in the Atlas from among the independent republics will resemble the tyrants who ruled in Greece before the establishment of the empire.”\textsuperscript{56}

\textsuperscript{55} Ibid., 42-43.
\textsuperscript{56} Ibid., 21.
One does not need to assume that Montagne reproduced an understanding formed in Algeria. He claimed outright that he borrowed the ideas of an Algerian scholar named Masqueray. With a sophisticated understanding of Western history and past civilizations, Montagne constructed connections to Berber tribes that he directly observed. Montagne’s statement that Morocco contains “the most humble aspects of our own civilization as it was in the cradle” was more than a patronizing insult.\footnote{Ibid.} It connected Morocco directly to France and justified French guidance. Who better to guide Morocco through the stages of progress than a civilization that had already undergone the same process?

Montagne thus repurposed the myth of the civilizing mission forged to justify French rule in Algeria for the Moroccan Berber context. He repeated the myth’s core components that argued that native society was inferior and that France can and should initiate progress. The myth retained its function as the primary justification for a foreign conquest, applied to the Moroccan Berbers instead of Algerian society. It therefore provided justification at the most basic level for a colonial system.

\textbf{Myths Accepted: Ethnic Diversity and the Moroccan Vulgate}

Another crucial component of the Algerian colonial discourse was the myth of ethnic diversity. Addi states that “this myth served to show that there was no homogenous
society around which to build a nation state.’”\(^{58}\) France thus had not invaded a nation, but a territory. As with other founding myths, the conception of ethnic diversity evolved out of intellectual endeavors to comprehend Algerian society. For example, Lorcin states that “Military practitioners... established a tradition of preparing comprehensive reports processing large quantities of information, often by means of numerical analysis. This led them to look beyond the confines of medical analysis in an attempt to discern the characteristic patterns of society and identify what factors, if any, distinguished one social group from another.”\(^{59}\) This attempt at categorization led to a sectarian vision of Algeria that crystallized over time into an Arab-Berber dichotomy.\(^{60}\) Military scholars crafted visions of the model Berber or Arab. The French designated the Kabyle ethnic group as the archetypal Berber and developed an antithetical vision of Arabs.\(^{61}\) In reality, the boundaries between Arab-Speaking and Berber-speaking Algerians were not so obvious.\(^{62}\) It was thus necessary to demonstrate the clear divisions between Arabs and Berbers as well as the unity within these groups in terms of social and political structure and religious practice. For example, French officers

\(^{58}\) Addi, “Colonial Mythologies,” 102.

\(^{59}\) Lorcin, “Soldier Scholars of Colonial Algeria,” 132.

\(^{60}\) Addi, “Colonial Mythologies,” 103.


\(^{62}\) Ibid., 150.
established distinctions by noting the unique Berber reliance on Marabouts, the descendants of saints, in religious life.\(^\text{63}\)

In his work, Montagne appropriated elements of the myth of ethnic diversity, presenting the Berbers as a clearly defined ethnic group with qualities that distance them from Arabs. He stressed the linguistic harmony of Berber tribes stating that “the numerous Berber dialects of North Africa possess a remarkable grammatical consistency.”\(^\text{64}\) He ascribed certain characteristics, such as ruralism, to all Berber groups “whether they [were] Shleuh, Riffians, or Kabyles.”\(^\text{65}\) He also stressed similarities in political organization stating that “What is most striking when one studies one by one the different regions of North Africa inhabited by settled Berber communities is the almost invariable consistency in size and strength of the canton.”\(^\text{66}\)

As in the Algerian discourse, Montagne focused on Berber religious tradition as a source of their unique identity stating that “their religion has freely assumed a quite particular form.”\(^\text{67}\) Montagne established the myth of ethnic diversity alongside his support for the civilizing myth. Whenever he made a generalized statement in his argument about some retrograde quality of the Berbers, he supported a conception of the Berbers as a unified group with inherent characteristics. Montagne argued that these unique qualities

\(^{63}\) Ibid., 143.
\(^{64}\) Montagne, The Berbers, 21.
\(^{65}\) Ibid., 20.
\(^{66}\) Ibid., 31.
\(^{67}\) Ibid., 9.
distinguished the Berbers greatly from their Arab neighbors.\textsuperscript{68}

Montagne strengthened the divisions of the myth of ethnic diversity through his examination of Moroccan history and geography. In his article, “Faut-Il Bruler l’Orientalisme,” Abdelmajid Hannoum states that “Montagne deepened the chasm created by the school of Algiers, by opposing the Berbers and the Arabs not only as personality types, as is the case in Algeria... but by making their history one of permanent military conflict.”\textsuperscript{69} Montagne constructed a vision of Moroccan history as a perpetual struggle between Arab areas within the control of the Moroccan State, the \textit{Bled el-Makhzan}, and rebellious Berber regions, the \textit{Bled es-Siba}.\textsuperscript{70} Hannoum argues that Montagne’s division between Siba and Makhzen further added geography, alongside a historical argument, to establish Berber-Arab division.\textsuperscript{71} This supported the vision that Morocco was never a unified country, but was always split geographically into two warring sectors.

Montagne thus adopted the myth of ethnic diversity from the Algerian context to argue against the presence of a unified nation-state. Just as with the civilizing myth, Montagne reinforced an old construction with his own categories of analysis. However, for Montagne, the myth of ethnic diversity served a further purpose. In Morocco, the

\textsuperscript{68} Ibid., 22.
\textsuperscript{69} Hannoum, “Faut-Il Bruler,” 82.
\textsuperscript{70} Montagne, \textit{The Berbers}, 12-17.
\textsuperscript{71} Hannoum, “Faut-Il Bruler,” 82.
Berber-Arab dichotomy functioned to support and inform a specific divide and rule policy of the French colonial regime.

French colonial policy in Morocco relied heavily on a dualistic compartmentalization of Moroccan society. Before the Entente Cordiale of 1904, which placed Morocco firmly in the French sphere of influence, French orientalists such as Doutté had a much more nuanced and flexible understanding of Morocco. However, as France became increasingly involved in Moroccan affairs, French thinkers developed a crystallized and dogmatic discourse.\textsuperscript{72} French administrators divided Moroccan society firmly between areas within the control of the Moroccan State, the \textit{Bled el-Makhzan}, and the supposedly chaotic and violent areas outside of its control, the \textit{Bled es-Siba}. This distinction was later connected to an ethnological discourse that connected these categories with Arabs and Berbers, similarly opposed to one another. Edmund Burke terms this discourse of dichotomy the Moroccan Vulgate.\textsuperscript{73}

The French drew upon the dualism of the Moroccan Vulgate to claim and conquer unruly \textit{Siba} areas outside the Sultan’s control, particularly on the border with Algeria, before the establishment of the protectorate in 1912.\textsuperscript{74} With the advent of the protectorate regime, as France faced considerable resistance in its attempts at conquering Berber-speaking regions, it reworked the Moroccan Vulgate into a

\textsuperscript{72} Ibid., 181.
\textsuperscript{73} Burke, “The Image of the Moroccan State,” 152.
\textsuperscript{74} Ibid., 182-183.
policy specific to Berber areas.\textsuperscript{75} This new Berber policy stressed the distinctions of the vulgate further, supporting divergent political regimes in the two areas. This strategy was first implemented when the French found that the Beni Mtir tribe would accept a peace treaty that called for them to submit to French state instead of Sultan.\textsuperscript{76} This approach, which allowed Berbers to maintain their society under the direct authority of the French State, became the default Berber policy. It was formalized in 1914, when the Sultan enacted the First Berber Dahir, establishing a separate judicial system for Berber areas. When officers of the Institut des Hautes Etudes Marocaines unraveled Berber dialects in the middle Atlas in the late 1910s, it served more than a practical purpose. The French based the separation of Berber and Arab society in part on linguistic grounds, and these findings provided information to justify that distinction.\textsuperscript{77}

The last of the traditional Berber tribal resistance groups was defeated in 1934, and the “pacification” of Morocco was complete.\textsuperscript{78} However, new forms of resistance had already begun to emerge before this success. An attempt to formalize the separate legal status of Berbers through a second Dahir in 1930, was met with great resistance by many Moroccans.\textsuperscript{79}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{75} Ibid., “The Image of the Moroccan State,” 189.
\item \textsuperscript{76} Ibid., 191.
\item \textsuperscript{77} Katherine Hoffman, “Purity and Contamination: Language Ideologies in French Colonial Native Policy in Morocco,” Comparative Studies in Society and History (2008), 724.
\item \textsuperscript{78} Susan Miller, \textit{A History of Modern Morocco}, 131.
\item \textsuperscript{79} Ibid., 157.
\end{itemize}
The Moroccan Vulgate, under attack, needed an ideological defender. One year later Montagne wrote *The Berbers*, justifying and informing the Moroccan Vulgate with his categories of distinction. Hannoum argues that Montagne’s conception of the Berber-Arab dichotomy “inspired a whole Berber policy.” This assessment probably gives Montagne too much credit, especially since the strategies of the Moroccan Vulgate were implemented years before he even entered Morocco. However, it does highlight that Montagne’s discourse not only supported a colonial system, but informed and helped determine colonial policy. Montagne appropriated a myth of ethnic diversity forged in Algeria to argue against the presence of a nation-state, repurposing it to additionally support and inform a divide and rule strategy of the Moroccan colonial regime.

Myths Rejected

While Montagne deliberately echoed Algerian myths in much of his argument, he also tried to move beyond the colonial relationship of the Algerian system. Montagne’s new vision for Morocco reflected a crucial shift in official French strategy that had occurred between the Algerian conquest and the establishment of the Moroccan protectorate.

Associationism was the core strategy of the Moroccan colonial system that distinguished it from Algeria. This strategy sought to preserve existing power structures.

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80 Hannoum, “Faut-Il Bruler,” 82.
subordinated to French oversight through indirect rule. This would allow native society to develop on its own. Unlike the Moroccan Vulgate, which was more specific to the Moroccan situation, Associationism was part of a global debate within the colonial discourse on France’s relationship with its colonial possessions. The two sides of this debate were the assimilationists, who wanted to transform colonies into miniatures of France, and the associationists, who sought to preserve and maintain existing cultures in colonial territories.  

Raymond Betts states that “Assimilation can be considered the traditional colonial doctrine of France... it meant that the colony was to become an integral, if noncontiguous, part of the mother country, with its society and population made over—to whatever extent possible—in her image.” Assimilation was the dominant theory during the early stages of the French colonial empire and the establishment of the Algerian colony. Algeria was the quintessential assimilationist colony and was considered an integral part of France by 1848. Assimilationism remained widely unchallenged until around the turn of the century. Morocco became a stage for this great debate and a platform for associationism. The most important leader of the Moroccan colony, Lyautey, was a committed associationist and he sought to show through practice that a policy that

83 Ibid., 9.
recognized cultural distinctions and unassimilability to the Metropole was the appropriate strategy for Morocco and France’s other colonies.  

Lyautey not only sought to support existing political power structures, he supported native religion as well. He believed that Islam was an essential characteristic of the Moroccan “soul” and support for the Islamic faith was a consistent part of his colonial strategy. In Algeria, attacks on Islam were axiomatic. In Morocco, the French might consider Islam an inferior faith, but officials supported it as an existing power structure from which to build further development. In the early stages of the Berber conquest, some French thinkers proposed that there should be a separate religious policy for the Berbers that tried to lessen the role of Islam in their lives. However, in keeping with associationism, this policy was quickly abandoned as the French discovered that the Berbers were just as Islamic as their Arab counterparts.

During the interwar years, Lyautey’s associationist strategy reached the peak of its success. In his 1929 work, The History of French Colonial Policy, the American historian Stephen Roberts echoed the colonial discourse of Lyautey saying that “His indirect rule and his tolerance of native customs left little to be desired; and native development on indigenous lines, especially with the Berber mountaineers,

85 Miller, A History of Modern Morocco, 117.
has been allowed to a degree quite unusual in French colonial history.”  

This shows how well received Lyautey was by contemporary scholars. In 1931, the same year that *The Berbers* was written, Lyautey organized a grand colonial exhibition in Paris that stressed the cultural distinctiveness of France’s colonial possessions, championing the associationist system. 

The Algerian discourse built upon the myth of ethnic diversity and the Arab-Berber dichotomy to argue that the Kabyle Berber ethnic group, already established as the Berber archetype, were superior to Arabs and more similar to the French ideal. This myth postulated that Kabyles were a “sedentarized mountain people, fierce lovers of freedom, Nordic in origin and only superficially Muslim” ascribing positive qualities to the Kabyles that privileged them over Berbers and linked them with France. It built upon the historical connections used in the civilizing myth, stating that Kabyles and Berbers were more connected to the Western past than their Arab neighbors. Some even claimed that the Kabyles had formerly been Christian and held on to certain ecclesiastical traditions. The essential characteristics of Kabyles made them better colonial subjects. The doctor Eugene Bodichon believed that “links should be created with the Kabyles rather than the Arabs, for they were a less

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90 Addi, “Colonial Mythologies,” 104.
91 Lorcin, “Soldier Scholars of Colonial Algeria,” 144.
volatile, less Islamized, sedentary race.”  

A clear image emerged that privileged Berbers over Arabs and questioned the role of Islam in Berber society.

In keeping with Associationism Montagne accepted the centrality of Islam to Berbers, rejecting the Kabylia myth’s assertion that Berbers were only superficial Muslims. He stated that “France had no need to encourage the Islamization of the Berbers for the simple reason that the Berbers had been Islamized centuries ago. Their devotion to their faith is often even more noticeable than that of the Arabs. And they would certainly be astonished if they heard, from the fastness of their mountain retreats, that certain ill-informed Christians or Muslims in the towns hoped, or feared, that they might be converted to the Christian faith.”

Montagne not only accepted that Islam played a crucial role in Berber society, he suggested that Berbers in some ways were more Islamic than their Arab counterparts. However, Montagne also stated that Islam in the Berber regions is of a “particular form.” This view still stressed the distinctions between Berbers and Arabs that originated in the Algerian myth of ethnic diversity while supporting the essential role of Islam in Berber life. Therefore, Montagne still built upon other Algerian myths to craft his alternate understanding. Montagne replaced the Kabylia Myth’s dismissal of Islam

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93 Montagne, The Berbers, 82.
94 Ibid.
with a conception that Berber religious life is Islamic but distinct.

Montagne rejected the Kabylia myth’s hierarchical understanding of Berbers and Arabs. His distinctions between the two did not explicitly privilege Berbers over Arabs. Rather, Montagne adopted a more nuanced view that the groups had divergent strengths and weaknesses. After disparaging Berber creativity Montagne stated that:

if the Berbers are without these gifts of imagination --which Nature has so liberally endowed the peoples of the Middle East-- at least they possess certain sterling qualities which will enable them, it would appear, to achieve pride and place among the peoples of Africa; these are, a robust common sense, a great simplicity of life which often leads them to greed, an often quite genuine modesty and a real willingness to work hard. All these traits serve to distinguish the man of the mountains from the Arab, who will always remain ostentatious, imaginative and a fine orator, even if he is nothing but a ragged herdsman of the Sahara.\footnote{Ibid., 22.}

Instead of privileging Berbers, Montagne claimed that Berbers have certain noble qualities but were inferior to Arabs in other ways. Montagne praised the Arab penchant for creativity in a way that defied the Kabylia myth’s denigration of Arabs. This more nuanced view fit better into the Moroccan colonial strategy because its refusal to praise Berbers over Arabs did not present Berbers as candidates for assimilation. While Montagne rejected the Kabylia myth, his new myth once again built upon the myth of ethnic diversity’s conception that Berbers and Arabs were distinct
groups. The two ethnicities had strengths and weaknesses, but these did not overlap.

The Kabylia myth in Algeria connected Berber superiority with the idea that they were uniquely assimilable. Addi summarizes this view stating that “Having been in contact with Roman civilization, traces of which might be seen in the functioning of their villages, the Kabyles would be predisposed to Western rationality, which would facilitate their assimilation the French nation and perhaps even their conversion to Christianity.” 96 Intellectuals used qualities that connected the Berbers to the French to argue not only for their superiority to Arabs, but also the potential for assimilation to the French nation. Among doctors “There was a growing consensus that the differences between the plain-dwelling Arabs and the mountain-dwelling Kabyles made the latter more suitable for assimilation.” 97 A French magazine “emphasized the potential for Kabyle assimilation by equating the hierarchy of French communal officialdom to that of the Kabyle village.” 98 The goal of Berber assimilation was connected to an ideal that all aspects of Algerian society could be assimilated towards the French goal. The Berbers could be used to spread French values across Algeria. 99 This would eventually lead to the total assimilation of native society.

96 Addi, “Colonial Mythologies,” 104.
99 Ibid., 140.
Montagne did not argue for assimilation as a goal for Berber society in Morocco. Rather he supported a hybrid political system, ultimately independent of France, stating that:

Many Frenchman have thought, for over a century, that it would be easy to assimilate the Berbers, because they were not Arabs; many Arabs have, for twenty years at least, proclaimed the Berbers as their racial brothers, their comrades-in-arms in the struggle against the West because they were Muslims. It is possible that history will prove both these sets of beliefs wrong by producing in North Africa a hybrid political variety: Muslim communities, yet strongly westernized, seeking to achieve a synthesis of the different influences, and placing themselves between civilizations, in an intermediary position, just as they are situated geographically on the shores of the Mediterranean at the interface between Europe and Africa. But for such a development to take place it is necessary, above all, for the old conservative Berber society, as we have described it here, to begin to wither away.\textsuperscript{100}

In place of the Algerian discourse’s goal of assimilation, Montagne advised a hybrid system. He constructed a new myth for the course of Berber society, but this myth was still remarkably similar to the old Algerian conception. Montagne believed that traditional Berber society must “wither away.” The endgame in both cases was a radical change that entailed the destruction of an older society. Montagne clearly saw France as an initiator of this transformation. Montagne still relied on the Civilizing Mission’s conceptions of progress through foreign

\textsuperscript{100} Montagne, \textit{The Berbers}, 86.
intervention. However, unlike the Kabylia Myth, Montagne recognized the Islamic character of Berber society and argued ultimately for independent development instead of assimilation.

Conclusion

In any colonial system, a discourse emerges to define colonial relationships and justify the policies of the colonial regime. This discourse proceeds first from intellectual inquiry. The conquest of a foreign land necessitates study and analysis in order to promote effective rule. The information gained from this analysis is then used to construct colonial myths that support the colonial regime and its policies. In his work, History in Three Keys: the Boxers as Event, Experience, and Myth, Paul Cohen compares myth-making to the work of historians. The crucial difference between the two is that a historian is subject to strict professional guidelines to represent the past whereas the mythologizer aims solely to support some present ideological need. However, like a historian, the mythologizer synthesizes a complex body of data into an intelligible argument. As a historian’s arguments feed into a wider academic understanding, the colonial myth-maker contributes to a discourse that explains an entire colonial situation. Because discourse is so heavily intertwined with the process of intellectual inquiry, this discourse dominates

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all understanding of the colony. The original colonial myths become the basis of further inquiry and their arguments persist over time. Myth builds upon myth. This supports the power of the colonial regime by muzzling any ability to question the colonial narrative. However, it also limits the creative potential within the discourse. The core function of myth is still to inform and support colonial policy. As colonial policy changes, myths must somehow adapt within the domineering discourse.

Montagne’s repetition of century-old myths shows how a discourse can dominate understanding over time while constantly in need of support and renewal. With sophisticated anthropological rhetoric and the reliability of first-hand experience, Montagne revitalized myths for a new era but for similar purposes. These included the Mission Civilisatrice, and distinctions between Arabs and Berbers. Discourse changes when policy changes.

Montagne also rejected certain myths from the Algerian colonial discourse. Montagne’s conception of a hybrid Berber political system as ideal fit into the new official strategy of association. His rejection of the Kabylie myth aligned with official support for Islam and tradition. This shows that a colonial discourse, though enduring, is never static. It is composed of multiple voices joined in their support of a colonial system. Myths can therefore vary from system to system and from voice to voice. Despite this adaptability, the function of the myth within discourse is
always the same and a desire to support the colonialist system warps the analysis of colonial society.

While there is the potential for divergent opinions, colonial discourse fosters the perpetuation of established myths through its control of intellectual inquiry. Montagne’s work demonstrates the perpetuation of colonial knowledge produced during the Algerian conquest. These attitudes were constructed to serve a colonial system but also constrained the way that later colonial systems were able to assess themselves. As the basis of French understanding, all subsequent assessments built upon Algerian myths. Even when Montagne tried to formulate a new relationship, he relied heavily on the Algerian understanding.

In his article, “Faut-Il Bruler Orientalisme?” Hannoum asks “can a discourse exist without an institution that made it possible? Is the end of an institution the end of its discourse?”102 After decolonization, French colonial myths continue to persevere. However, Montagne’s work shows that he only appropriated Algerian colonial myths when they were able to support and inform a specific colonial system. One should therefore examine what systems in the contemporary world foster the perpetuation of colonial myths instead of blindly attributing the persistence of myth to a vague colonial legacy. For example, the Berber-Arab distinctions of the Moroccan Vulgate endure among certain groups in contemporary Moroccan society. This is due to their purpose in supporting both the ideologies of Berber

nationalists as well as a divide and rule policy of the central government that mimics French colonial policy.¹⁰³ French colonial myths endure outside of decolonized French territories as well. Hannoum points out that “French Orientalism is at the base of all Orientalisms.”¹⁰⁴ Therefore all modern understandings of the Middle East build upon French discourse. Discourse persists in the modern world to justify new systems of power. After the American occupation, neo-conservatives stressed the sectarian nature of Iraqi society to disparage its ability to form a coherent nation without continued U.S. intervention. This vision mirrored the Algerian myth of ethnic diversity crafted for the French colonial system. Both stressed ethnic divisions to question the presence of a nation-state and justify foreign involvement. Decolonization does not mean the end of colonial myth. Montagne repeated Algerian myths when he tried to formulate a new relationship one hundred years after the Algerian conquest. Today, one hundred years after Montagne, we continue to build upon a colonial myth.

¹⁰⁴ Hannoum, “Faut-ll Bruler,” 87.
On referendum day, February 22, 1865, Tennessee became the sixth state to enact immediate emancipation at the close of the Civil War, despite the fact that the vast majority of Tennesseans continued to support the institution of slavery.\(^1\) Therefore, far from fading with a whimper, the institution of slavery in Tennessee died “screaming and crawling for survival.”\(^2\) As a Border State, Tennessee numbered among Abraham Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation’s few exceptions, leaving some debate as to who held the smoking gun of emancipation. While self-emancipationist historians focus on the enslaved man, particularly the men who attempted to escape slavery, most black men and women remained at home throughout the Civil War. This is not to say that these slaves did not actively fight for their freedom. The agency of immobile individuals, whose homes defined the institution of slavery in Tennessee,

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\(^2\) Ibid., 4.
proved equally crucial, and equally necessary, in winning emancipation at large. The fifteen men and women around whom this essay is centered attest to the nuanced dynamics within these homes, begging a closer look at the stereotypical mobile-man model of emancipation, as even the sources that align with this mode of thought show varied motivations for service and varied outcomes of that service. These ex-slaves—Frank, Holmes, Joseph, Vergy, Fannie, Reed—and their stories prove the dangers of complacent narratives, and demand that their humanity be restored along with their voices.

John Cimprich argues that without the brave men and women who poured into the contraband camps and past Union lines, the federal crawl towards emancipation may not have escaped sluggish politicians and Unionist opposition. However, he fails to realize that an accurate picture of emancipation in Tennessee cannot be drawn not from tables or camp statistics alone. Slavery was not defeated by a mass, but individually, on varying terms, at varying times often dependent on particular masters’ and slaves’ relationships to the Federal cause. Of course, widespread illiteracy, which was often the result of city law, leaves scholars wanting for a black narrative.3 The narrative presented by Mrs. Ophelia Settle Egypt’s Unwritten History of Slavery contains thirty-seven interviews collected from 1929-1930 in Nashville, Tennessee. These interviews are invaluable. The voices of these men and women preserve not

3Ibid., 10.
only these individual’s experiences as slaves but also their perceptions of the war and their lives after slavery. Egypt meticulously recorded the narrators’ language, colloquial and doubtlessly condensed over years of storytelling into a sort of historically rooted folklore. The oral quality of the text lends it authenticity, but makes an accurate timeline difficult to pinpoint as most narrators jump between events erratically rather than chronologically.

While some narrators know their ages down to the month, many lament the loss of their bibles and with them, their recorded ages. Based upon the timeline of Egypt’s interviews, these individuals were, at best, young adults during the Civil War, and at worst, too young for their accounts to merit a close analysis. These interviews were conducted as a social study that sought to preserve the social dynamics between master and slave, as well as the dynamics between fellow slaves for study before the loss of the last generation of slaves. Therefore, Egypt claims that this body of work’s value lies not in the “accurate recording of historical events,” but in “a fabric of individual memories” and “personal histor[ies]” which weave a collective “social world as recreated and dramatized by these slaves.” After eliminating the interviews that do not provide some insight into Middle or West Tennessee, do not offer any concrete names or dates, and those that purely detail social dynamics, fifteen interviews proved particularly valuable.

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4 Ophelia Egypt, *Unwritten History of Slavery: Autobiographical Accounts of Negro Ex-Slaves* (Nashville: Fisk University, 1968), iii
These fifteen interviews provide an intimate look into the lives of nine men and six women whose experiences demonstrate how diversely emancipation manifested on the ground. Although several of these fifteen former slaves can only guess at their ages, the average interviewee seems to be a young teenager in 1861. Despite their young age, these teenagers and children were consistently acutely aware of their servitude and of their owners’ willingness to wage war to protect it. Although the majority of these fifteen interviews center around Nashville, slaves as far west as Trenton and as far east as Jefferson County knew of the Civil War, despite their often isolated locations and their owners’ best efforts. However, location would prove an important factor in actively realizing emancipation. Of the nine men interviewed, four served in the Union Army, one served in the Confederate army and one experienced the misery of contraband camps while the remaining three men stayed with their owners throughout the war. The women exhibit less mobile variety, only one escaped her home for a contraband camp and one escaped to join her father and brother while the rest remained with their owners. Although it is tempting to overlook the accounts that do not venture beyond the plantation as late as 1865, and in a few cases, until a decade later, these narratives detail individual victories that proved equally varied and certainly equally important as the emancipation events of more mobile accounts.
There are two dominant narratives about emancipation: the traditional, “intellectual” narrative, and a self-emancipationist retelling. Historiography traditionally paints Lincoln as the mythic emancipator of the helpless slave, while self-emancipation theories throw Lincoln out nearly altogether, arguing that his need to retain the goodwill of southern slave-owners slowed emancipation policy within the Border States.5 Pushing this idea further, the slaves, by flooding Union lines, forced Federal officers to admit that placing abolition at the head of the war effort could turn the runaway problem into a realistic asset.6 Therefore, lessons absorbed on the ground compelled Lincoln and even Republican politicians to take steps towards emancipation.7 Following this logic, Washington’s role in emancipation was purely reactionary.

However, neither traditional historiography nor new wave self-emancipationists can fully depict the Civil War or its aftermath without the other. By 1996, historians such as James McPherson struck a balance that acknowledged both the necessary agency of the slave, especially in relation to the Federal army, and the necessary legal backbone only Lincoln and the Republican Party could provide.8 Although Vincent

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6 Ibid., 179.
7 Ibid., 180.
8 James M. McPherson, Drawn with the Sword: Reflections On the American Civil War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 192-207.
Harding and other self-emancipationists condemn Lincoln’s emancipation policy as hesitant at best, Lincoln’s shrewdly timed release of the long-considered Emancipation Proclamation reflected the fragility of the political environment of 1862 and 1863, not his moral agenda. In fact, in August of 1862, Lincoln responded to the accusation that he and his administration lacked resolve in the face of slavery by saying that his “oft-expressed personal wish that all men every where could be free,” could not distort his ultimate purpose, to save the Union. Thus, when slaves, through independent agency, rendered the issue of their freedom and their willingness to fight for it unavoidable, “the moment came when [Lincoln] felt that slavery must die that the nation might live!”9 Andrew Johnson, possibly the most dominant political leader in Tennessee throughout the Civil War, loyally aligned with Lincoln’s view of emancipation as a possible effect of war rather than the purpose of war in his introduction of the Crittenden-Johnson Resolution as early as 1861.10

McPherson also argues that emancipation came at the barrel of Federal guns; however, this analysis too closely links slave agency to slave mobility. This statement harkens back to an old Union march: "It must be now the kingdom coming, in the year of jubilee; old marster run away and the

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darkies stay at home.”11 This march perpetuates an erroneous image of the dependent, inactive slave relying upon the muscle of the Federal army alone to dissipate the institution. However, even in largely federally occupied territories such as Tennessee, it is outrageous to assert that the army, which did not shift from a “paradoxically passive agent of emancipation” until 1863 at the earliest, directly liberated all slaves.12 While the army undeniably served as a runaway magnet, arguing that the institution did not suffer damage “until after the Federals occupied a locality” naively ignores dynamics within the home, and black agency.13

It is essential to note that widespread interest in serving the Federal army began long before the government was equipped to enact a remotely uniform policy, much less promise freedom. By mid 1862, so many slaves flooded into army camps in central and eastern Tennessee that “if the Union army was at war with itself over emancipation,” this was “ground zero.”14 The proof is in the numbers. When Congress finally promised to free slaves mustered in the army, no less than attracted 20,133 black men enlisted by June 1st, 1865, a figure nearly double the twenty percent of white Tennesseans who chose to enlist.15 Thus, black agency certainly necessitated Federal policy even during the conflict’s so-called “soft war” years. Even so, the vast

11 Egypt, 14.
12 Oakes, 194.
13 Cimprich, 18.
14 Oakes, 320.
15 Cimprich, 87-88.
majority of Tennessee’s male slaves did not gain freedom through military service.

Interpreted from a self-emancipationist standpoint, McPherson’s grisly statement that freedom came at the barrel of a gun addresses the dangers black troops faced. Slaveholders came to the conclusion that slaves fraternizing with the enemy should be treated like the enemy, at best.\textsuperscript{16} Therefore, wielding Federal guns against their former masters incited passionate retaliation. Particularly for pro-slavery ideologists who argued that slavery was the natural, comfortable condition of blacks, escapees challenged a pillar of white justification for black subjection. Thus, the audacity of Federal service represented both the ultimate betrayal and the ultimate risk for former slaves.\textsuperscript{17} An unnamed member of the Company B 42\textsuperscript{nd} United States Colored Regiment understood that due to this reality a “heap of slaves was afraid to go to the army.”\textsuperscript{18} It is supremely admirable that despite these dangers, the sheer number of escaped slaves willing to fight necessitated federal policy. However, it cannot be overlooked that black troops in Tennessee represented less than thirty-nine percent of the total enslaved population.\textsuperscript{19} This figure begs crucial questions: why did the majority of enslaved men choose not to serve, what did they do instead, and what factors motivated the black men who did choose to serve in the Federal army?

\begin{footnotes}
\item[16] Oakes, 407.
\item[17] Cimprich, 84.
\item[18] Egypt, 218.
\end{footnotes}
While escapee narratives attract interest because they are exciting and fit snuggly into the accepted idea of black agency, only three of the total thirty-seven interviews conducted by Egypt fit into this category. Even then, these men and their families enjoyed varying degrees of freedom after enlisting. The remaining thirty-four interviewees did not die enslaved, but fought individually to attain equally real freedoms. To conflate agency with mobility, particularly with military mobility, leaves over half of enslaved men’s stories unsung and mutes the other half of any population, women. If slaves could only exhibit agency with their feet, women, who were often responsible for large families, are left with little to no opportunity to actively win freedom. To forget that emancipated slaves were penniless, with many young mouths to feed and little hope of rising within the social strata and work force of a state that accepted their freedom as an unfortunate political necessity, is to forget the human struggle ex-slaves. It is more comfortable to applaud emancipation than to face the grim reality of how little it actually granted freedom. These interviews illustrate how actively the men and women who chose not leave their plantations asserted their own autonomy and the multiplicity of factors they fought against to do so.

The locations of these interviewees’ homes also reflect the statewide demographics within Tennessee’s largest concentrations of slave property.\textsuperscript{20} In 1861, slaves made up about a fourth of the total population, a third of which lived

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\textsuperscript{20} Cimprich, 10.
among fewer than four fellow slaves. A scant eight percent lived among more than twenty slaves.\textsuperscript{21} With the onset of the Civil War, many pro-slavery Tennesseans hoped that these intimate settings inspired a loyalty among their slaves so strong that they would refuse freedom, even when presented with the choice. Unfortunately, Tennessee owners did not rely solely on these abstract justifications. Individual owners and government officials alike may have spoken loftily, but they were not above enforcing loyalty. Home guards, which consistently feature in ex-slave interviews as “paddlerollers,” were authorized to do whatever, whenever to maintain white control over Tennessee blacks. Thus, slaves far from the war still required a pass if they wanted to avoid the wrath of these legalized, violent vigilante groups.\textsuperscript{22} Those men and women who proved too difficult to control, were sold further south.\textsuperscript{23} Owners attempted to discourage their slaves from running away by spreading horrific stories, which vacillated from slightly truthful to greatly exaggerated. Some masters went so far as to tell their slaves that Yankees “had horns” and taught them rebel songs such as “I’ll make my way back home again, if the Lincolnites don’t kill me.”\textsuperscript{24} Black preachers also played a forced but instrumental role in psychologically subduing potentially freethinking slaves by intertwining impending salvation with loyalty to one’s

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{21} Ibid., 7.
\item\textsuperscript{22} Ibid., 12.
\item\textsuperscript{23} Ibid., 29.
\item\textsuperscript{24} Egypt, 16.
\end{itemize}
master. Reed, a former slave from Hartsville, Tennessee recalled: “in slavery they used to teach the Negro that they had no soul. They said all they needed to do was to obey their mistress.”\textsuperscript{25} Some slave-owners were cognizant of the fact that their slaves depended upon them for information about the Civil War. While their slaves crouched at the window, manipulative owners would mock the futility of the war effort.\textsuperscript{26} Others would boldly taunt their slaves, assuring them they had no chance of freedom until they successfully banished all of their slaves’ hopes.\textsuperscript{27}

Some owners attempted to appeal to their slaves’ assumed loyalty, especially loyalty tied to patriarchal dependence. One mistress greeted a former slave on furlough by asking how he could fight, \textit{her}, to which he responded, “I ain’t fighting you, I’m fighting to get free.”\textsuperscript{28} The narrator recognized that his position, although not ideal, was better than most when he witnessed his friend Betty and her mother’s short-lived escape attempt, which was easily thwarted as Betty’s mother tried to run carrying “her daughters with her.”\textsuperscript{29} This slave joined the Union cause but did not escape Confederate propaganda. His most remarkable memory of the Civil War remained the unsubstantiated claim that during the battle of Fort Pillow, the “first battle the colored ever got,” Confederate forces

\textsuperscript{25} Ibid., 45. \\
\textsuperscript{26} Ibid., 4. \\
\textsuperscript{27} Ibid., 5. \\
\textsuperscript{28} Ibid., 253. \\
\textsuperscript{29} Ibid., 260.
under Major General Nathan B. Forrest “buried some of ‘em (colored soldiers) alive.” Proslavery Southerners also took advantage of rumors that the Federal army would force slaves into work crews, which drove blacks just as ruthlessly as the Confederate army. While these rumors were doubtlessly overstated within earshot of eavesdropping slaves, Federal forging expeditions left Union forces with an undeniably unflattering reputation, particularly when troops robbed “everything in sight,” especially in already wanting slave quarters. Clearly, no rumor was too grandiose to pass on if it meant thwarting the now prevalent threat of black agency.

This threat drove some Tennessee slaveholders to depend on less subtle means of subduing their slaves. An unnamed interviewee who spent the war near Nashville travelled as far as Fort Negley before he was carried to jail, where his master, who also happened to be his father, saw to it that he remained imprisoned for eight weeks. When he was finally released, this mulatto slave “looked like a skallin (skeleton)” and was so malnourished that “it woulda took [him] from now till night to walk to Jubilee Hall.” Others counted on the whip to discourage escape attempts, sometimes without success. An unnamed narrator’s

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30 Ibid., 259.
31 Cimprich, 21.
32 Ibid., 21.
33 Egypt, 78.
34 Ibid., 81.
35 Ibid.
determination to join the army compelled him to run to Federal lines at least four times by only nineteen years of age. At least sixty years later, this veteran mocked his owner’s attempts to keep him from fighting for his “mammy and her little children:” “They wouldn’t do nothing but everlasting whip me, my Lord.”

Assuming a slave overcame these obstacles and escaped, his or her options were limited. Because contrabands camps inspired less retaliatory Confederate aggression than enlisting, they were thought of as a haven for runaways. Just as before the war, males between the ages of sixteen and thirty-five dominated successful escapes. However, figures from Memphis, home to one of the largest contraband camps in Tennessee, show that it was children, rather than these runaway males that formed the majority of camp inhabitants. Farley and other single men were the majority of runaways, but only because of the difficulty of attaining freedom while dragging along women and young children. While General Ulysses S. Grant’s blend of humanitarianism and pragmatism encouraged men and women to work in exchange for food and shelter, Memphis’ camp’s highly skewed numbers show that children composed over fifty percent of the total population, while adult females composed 25 percent and adult males the remaining 23 percent. The extraordinary death rates of

36 Ibid., 144.
37 Ibid.
38 Cimprich, 48.
39 Ibid., 23.
these contraband camps may have motivated anyone who had a fighting chance of independent survival to do so. In the winter of 1862-63 alone, at least 1,200 deaths were recorded in Memphis and another 1,400 were recorded in Nashville, motivating an estimated two-thirds majority of escaped slaves in these cities to live on their own.\textsuperscript{40}

However, these camps also provided otherwise listless families with shelter, food, and as seen in the event of Major General John B. Hood’s Confederate invasion of middle Tennessee, a temporary safe haven for those slaves caught in the war zone. Mrs. Moore, a young house slave whose mother worked as a cook, escaped with her mother and father “to a large ranch the Yankees got” by forcing “mean mass’rs give up their plantations and leave.”\textsuperscript{41} Although she never specifically names this contraband camp, her proximity to Nashville before the war leaves the camp in Nashville, Gallatin, Murfreesboro or Hendersonville most likely. Mrs. Moore recalled that its size, “thousands of acres,” enabled “lots of Negroes” even “from Georgia and Alabama and all around” to come with their children.\textsuperscript{42} Moore’s father “was hired to the Yankees,” and while she did not know what he was paid, she was confident that “they sho’ fed [workers] a heap” in exchange for labor.\textsuperscript{43} Although contraband camps did not always provide an ideal

\begin{footnotes}
\item[40] Ibid., 57.
\item[41] Egypt,40.
\item[42] Ibid.
\item[43] Ibid.
\end{footnotes}
situation, this camp sustained the Moore family, which did not move elsewhere until “after the surrender.”

While every interviewee earned freedom at some point, several of these former slaves represented the realities of dependence and listlessness in the wake of the Civil War. Facing such a battle at such a young age often meant a gradual move towards emancipation. One former slave, who refers to himself as “Massa’s Slave Son” was born at the back of Jubilee Hall, when Nashville “was all woods,” was interviewed in his home by Meharry. During the war, the narrator’s father purposely starved him, to ensure he’d be too weak to survive an escape attempt. So, he could not leave bondage until his master died. The narrator heard horror stories of enslaved men murdered for refusing to leave their wives and children to serve in the Confederacy, and heard that “Old General Jackson said that before he would see niggers free he would build up a house nine miles long and put them in it, and burn everyone of them up.”

Still, the narrator and his mother had no choice but to “work for [their former owners] a good while after the War.” He became jaded, denounced God, and found solace “a pint of whiskey at a time.” It seems that the narrator went through the motions, lacking the age or the “sense enough to feel

44 Ibid., 40.
46 Ibid., 83-84.
47 Ibid., 82.
48 Ibid., 80.
anyway about [he and his family’s continued servitude].” 49 When the narrator finally achieved emancipation, his home was still a pseudo-payment that represented his servitude to his mistress “after freedom.” 50 By the end of his life, the narrator’s repressed fighting spirit exploded into resentment towards his “goddamn father,” “a goddamn son-of-a-bitch” who brought him and his fellow slaves “up to be ignorant.” 51 If the narrator could have returned to his lost years after the war and “had [his] way with them all [he] would like to have is a chopping block and chop every one of their heads off.” 52 This narrator and others are not only enraged about slavery before 1864, but also about how little emancipation existed in their lives after it.

Other slaves who were slower to leave their homes used emancipation as an abstract form of power over their masters. One woman who “stayed with [her] white folks” for three years after the Civil War, although “they tried to make me think I wasn’t free,” used emancipation to make life “hot for them.” 53 Her master could be so cruel that slave children would often run away, leaving no traces “cept their skeletons where the varmints had destroyed ‘em.” 54 Even so, the narrator felt that she was safest working in her old home, protected by the threat of asserting her freedom. When the

49 Ibid., 82.
50 Ibid., 80.
51 Ibid., 84.
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid., 267.
54 Ibid., 269.
narrator did remind “marse Tom” that she was legally “just as free as the birds in the air,” “he didn’t say another word” and from then on allowed her the freedom to attend meetings and to pragmatically quit her servitude.55 Another female interviewee, Vergy, gained freedom only through the dogged efforts of her father. Without his persistence, her masters would have taken advantage of her young age to manipulate her into extended servitude for as long as possible. Vergy and her brother, Dave, “stayed with the same white people till the war ceasted” and afterwards, because “of course we didn’t know where to go nor nothing.”56 However, when Dave refused to act free, the siblings’ mistress threatened to send him south. So, Dave ran to the farm where their father worked, presumably leaving Vergy behind because of her young age. When the narrator’s father, Jackson, laid in wait for her by the drinking water, she did not understand that her father needed to circumvent her masters in order to save her.57 Vergy ran back to the house “the happiest child you ever heard of,” until her master, Mr. John, so overwhelmed and manipulated her that when asked if she’d like to leave with her father, Vergy could only hang her head and answer vaguely. At this, “poor pap just burst out crying” and accused the “ole missus” of mistreating Vergy’s mother until Mr. John

55 Ibid., 267.
56 Ibid., 62.
57 Ibid., 63.
consented, and allowed Vergy to rejoin her father and brother. However, this exchange would prove far from Vergy and her former master’s last, as she grew, Vergy grew fond of equally manipulative “little visit[s].”\(^{58}\) Her owners would look down their noses at Vergy’s life with her father, and even threaten to whip her for praising him. When it would come time for Vergy to leave, her mistress would try to bribe her with gifts she could enjoy “if [Vergy] was there much longer.”\(^{59}\) Vergy would feign ignorance then make her way back home, coming “back to the white folks again” only when she felt it was time she “got [her]self some gifts, he, he, he.”\(^{60}\) Although she proved an easy target for free labor in her youth, Vergy’s agency not only allowed her to make a new life with her father and brother, but to actively, and apparently easily, manipulate her previous owners. Other narratives proponed a lifestyle after slavery that was identical to the lifestyle before it, in all but wage. This pseudo-slavery allowed family groups to stay together until they earned enough money to get on their feet as freemen and women. Although most slaves were aware of the war waging around them, many surrounding Murfreesboro “stayed on place (during the War)” counting on the fact that “after freedom was declared they had to pay them.” Another interviewee, Mr. Chapman, from Trenton, Tennessee seemed

\(^{58}\) Ibid., 65. 
\(^{59}\) Ibid., 66. 
\(^{60}\) Ibid., 68.
to consider service and paid servitude equally admirable. He argued that modes of agency were not tiered, or even totally chosen, but circumstantial. Chapman said that while “a heap of colored people would run away to the Yankees” many “didn’t know nothing else but slavery—never thought of nothing else. I just belonged to the man who provided for me and I had to take whatever he give me.” These seemingly obedient men and women, especially those that wanted to keep their children with them throughout the war, hoped that their continued service would translate into expanded freedoms and opportunities post-emancipation.

Reed, formerly a slave in Hartsville, Tennessee, remained on the Hale plantation with his family throughout the war, waiting to assert his freedom after emancipation gained official legality. However, Reed mentioned that many of these “complacent” slaves would tire of their role on the sidelines, and “run to the Yankees” so that they could “bring the Yankees back and take all the corn and meat they had.” While these individual rebellions do not appear in the statistics of runways, enlistments or contraband camps, these stories reveal how the average men and women on the ground accomplished personal independence. These stories show that emancipation was not the result of the former-slave clad in grey, or even the Tennessee election of 1865, but of a process of steady assertion, and steadfast fight that, in

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61 Ibid., 74.
62 Ibid., 44.
many cases, began long before 1861 and lasted long after the Civil War.

One interviewee, Cornelia, was shaped by the steadfastly rebellious example of her mother, Fannie, who defied owner’s expectations for their slaves, particularly their female slaves. Fannie and Cornelia lived in Eden, Tennessee on the Jennings’ family’s small plantation with four other families of slaves. Fannie enjoyed the respect of her owner as she could “outwork any nigger in the country” but commanded the reputation of a “boisterous” “demon” whose husband often fell “prey of her high temper.”63 Fannie instilled Cornelia with the fighting spirit she considered the key to survival as a slave: “Fight, and if you can’t fight, kick; if you can’t kick, then bite.”64 Fannie’s attitude and occasional refusal to work frustrated the lady of the house, who once took advantage of her husband’s absence to strike Fannie with a stick. “Ma struck back and a fight followed.”65 The two women wrestled in the kitchen for half an hour before Mrs. Jennings, “seeing that she could not get the better of ma, ran out in the road, with ma right on her heels.”66 Fannie “caught hold, pulled, ripped and tore” until Mistress’ Jennings was nearly naked in the street. Fannie threatened to kill her, and Mr. Jennings warned Fannie that the law forced him to whip her. Two

63 Ibid., 283.
64 Ibid., 284.
65 Ibid., 286.
66 Ibid.
mornings later, two men came to the gate with “a long lash.” Fannie attacked the men head on, “swoop[ing] upon them like a hawk on chickens.”67 “Strong with madness” Fannie grabbed the lash with one hand and grabbed a handful of the man’s beard in the other. Mr. Jennings intervened as the other man pulled out a gun, catching sight of it, Fannie spat “Use your gun, use it and blow my brains out if you will”.68 Thanks to Master Jennings’ intervention, Fannie escaped the situation with her life, but Eden would “knock [her] down like a beef” for her behavior.69 Less than a week later, Fannie and her husband were “hired out to Tennessee” and forced to leave their children behind. Cornelia spent the next year trying “to be like ma” and “delighted in hearing” their similarities.70 Although her mother nearly died for her refusal to submit, Cornelia idealized her, and took her mother’s parting words, “but don’t be abused,” straight to the heart. Cornelia’s spirit of resistance was further solidified by her parent’s triumphal return. Fannie returned from a year in Memphis “without a whipping or a cross word” wearing new clothes, and “a pair of beautiful earrings.”71 Although Fannie did not live to see the Civil War, her example empowered the generation of slaves in Eden, particularly the female slaves, who would have the chance to fight for their independence.

67 Ibid., 287.
68 Ibid.
69 Ibid.
70 Ibid., 289.
71 Ibid., 289.
This nameless soldier’s story resembles the narrative that is often tied to black agency for the self-emancipationists. After joining the Federal army so young, the narrator served for at least two years. In 1864, he came from Chattanooga by train “because Hood was so near Nashville” and participated in a key Union victory at the Battle of Nashville, which he called “Hood’s Raid.”

The narrator’s experience from the Battle of Nashville through 1865 seems characterized by skirmishes over bridges and other strategic locations rather than full out battles. His description of bridge burning and pontoon construction in spite of Confederate cavalry near Columbia, Tennessee closely resembles the records of General Schofield, General Stanley and Ruger’s division’s efforts to repel Confederate attempts to cross the Duck River and reach the roads and rails in Spring Hill.

Although this soldier mentions firing his last gun on the battlefield of Columbia, Tennessee, during some battles he “would lay stretched on the ground” imagining he “looked like one of these old spreading-adder snakes” while “bullets would fly over [his] head.”

Although this narrator tried harder to enlist than any other veteran interviewed by Egypt, in battle he lost all aggression, which might explain why “sometimes they wouldn’t let [him] fight at all.”

72 Ibid., 143.
73 United States War Department, “Campaign in North Alabama and Middle Tennessee,” 33-34.
74 Egypt, 150.
75 Ibid.
Other slaves behind Union lines also do not fit into the traditional narrative as they did not seek out Federal service, but accepted it as their best option. One source, who lived on a plantation about six miles outside of Sparta, Tennessee said he “woulda been there till yet” had a colored regiment not “come right in my house.” The unnamed narrator then spent the next twenty-two months as a Union soldier of the Company B 42nd United States Colored Regiment, simply by “walk[ing] right out with them, never said a god’s word to nobody.” 76 Under Lieutenant Mittie, the interviewee did not participate “in no real fighting” but “would go and clean up the place and hold the places that had been taken.” 77 Thanks to his unexpected time in the army, a slave who once “never thought about anything like freedom” grew to collect “$900.00 a year from the Government” as a freeman. 78 Although he labored for “a good long while” at the farms where he once worked as a slave, the narrator found independence in working lumber in Nashville and ultimate pride in the success of his entrepreneurial son. 79

One interview revealed that the military did not always provide its black soldiers and their families with a smooth and successful transition into freedom. Holmes boasted that her father ranked among the bold slaves who took advantage of proximity to Federal lines to gain

76 Ibid., 218.
77 Ibid.
78 Ibid., 218, 219.
79 Ibid.
freedom. When Holmes’ owners decided to send her father, Frank, to war in the place of their young son, Frank endured the Confederate army’s camp for three short months before “he stole away and joined the Yankees.” Frank would only live for five years after the war, having developed scurvy during his time in service. Knowing that he did not have long to live, Frank left Holmes “to his white people.” Holmes grew up with the understanding that she owed the privilege of her home to her father, who “was a good nigger; never did but that one thing wrong in his life, and that was when he joined the Yankees.” Frank’s wife remarried in his absence, so although he fought for the winning side, he was forced to leave his child in the same bondage, under the very same family he once served. The seven children Holmes’ mother bore by her second husband met a fate even more unjust. When Holmes’ mother died, she left her house full of children, who “all died like little sheep.” A doctor told Holmes that “the reason these little children died like that was because they were half clad and didn’t have enough to eat.” Although Frank’s escape and service to the Union fulfills the Federal definition of emancipation that endures in army records, his courageous

80 Cimprich, Slavery’s End, 16.
81 Egypt, 175.
82 Ibid.
83 Ibid.
84 Egypt, 176.
85 Ibid.
actions did not win true emancipation for himself or his family. Joseph Farley, another black soldier who served behind Confederate lines spent the rest of his life fighting to ensure that he would never “be under the white folks again.”  

Farley relays a wide range of information about the Civil War, from the first shots at Fort Sumter, to white manipulation of black preachers, to the harsh realities of contraband camps, where he said “men, women and children had to be guarded to keep the Rebels from carrying them back to the white folks.” Farley ran away from life as a slave in Virginia because he “wanted to be free.” Sadly, he only enjoyed temporary independence. Farley travelled through Hopkinsville by killing his horse and spending nights in the woods, only to be “halted” by a “pickett” on the outskirts of Clarksville. Farley recognized these men as rebel soldiers by their grey uniforms, so when asked where he was going he said: “I was going to Clarksville to join the army, so they told me to stay right there, that they needed a thousand men like me.” Farley does not provide many details of his time in the military, aside from mentioning that part of his regiment participated in “Hood’s raid in 1864” although he “was not in it.”  

86 Ibid., 127.  
87 Ibid.  
88 Ibid., 122.  
89 Ibid.  
90 Ibid., 121.
buried colored people alive.’”91 This horrific injustice and the way “some [slave-owners] did not care any more about you than they did for dogs” fueled Farley so much that he said: “I never thought about dying. I never thought about anybody shooting me; I just thought about shooting them.”92 Farley’s aggression would protect his freedom, but his direct, less pragmatic approach made for a dangerous life. After the war, Farley lamented how often “the colored returned to their white folks,” but also admitted that his determination to rebuke white dominance made it difficult for him to hold a steady job. Farley ran a “saloon and livery stable,” worked on a boat and drove a “hack” in Nashville.93 Farley proudly considered himself one of the first black voters in Montgomery County. Montgomery County unanimously voted to join the Confederate States of America in 1861, so when elections resumed, and those who “rebelled against this country” could not vote but the black man could, it should come as no surprise that Farley went to the polls “armed and prepared for fighting.”94 In his eighty-seven years, Farley “never let an election pass.”95 Farley’s narrative is riddled with constant challenges to his status as a free man. Farley seemed to meet to every challenge like he once met a white man who came to his home, years after the war, telling Farley “he was coming to whip me.” Farley

91 Ibid., 125.
92 Ibid., 125.
93 Ibid., 126-127.
94 Ibid., 124.
95 Ibid., 127.
came out to his gate and greeted the man with two pistols, “threw” one in the man’s face and “turned his horse aloose.” Farley’s road to emancipation is inspiring, but it must be noted that to achieve this violent definition of freedom Farley was forced to leave behind a life with people he does not name.

Whether in the home, in the army, or from within contraband camps, ex-slaves in Tennessee needed extraordinary determination to face their individual uphill battles for emancipation. The Tennessee government during and post war, enacted emancipation as an empty political move intended to defeat the Unionists’ enemies, the Conservatives and the secessionists, not the injustices of slavery. Therefore, uniform policy did not represent uniform beliefs or intentions. Only a small minority of Tennessee whites voluntarily released their slaves under the stress of war, while the majority fought all the harder to preserve it. Therefore, each interviewee described a unique journey to freedom in spite of a dogged common enemy—racism. On referendum day, February 22nd, Tennessee’s party politics reduced emancipation to a weapon yielded by whites, for whites, meaning that the average Tennessean did not see “their views of slavery recast in the furnace of war.”

Studying political theory and quantitative historical evidence strips the ex-slaves of their dynamic humanity.

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96 Ibid.
97 Cimprich, 116.
98 Ibid., 4.
99 Ibid., 116-117.
Empirical evidence can serve as a necessary backbone to tie together scattered narratives, but black emancipation in the popular American imagination proves that the overarching approach can cut out the human voice, and with it, the truth. To understand the impossibility of immediate emancipation, historians must turn their ears back to the black individual. Only by acknowledging the nuanced, extraordinarily disadvantaged condition of former slaves, can one begin to imagine the ephemeral nature of emancipation. For any equality to exist on the ground, in their homes, or in their lives at all, slaves needed to win their freedom on a highly individual basis by slowly recasting perceptions of slaves and their emancipation owner by owner.
Qaddafi and *The Green Book*: Manifestations of Authoritarian Ideology

Clayton Christian

"Gaddafi said no sane person would join the protests against him. He then joined the protests against himself."1 –Conan O’Brien

As Muammar al-Qaddafi’s body lay for public display in a freezer in Mistra, Libya, for three days following his death on October 20th, 2011, people from all over the country came to see it, some driving hundreds of miles. Meanwhile, videos and rumors related to his death circulated the Internet for weeks following the incident. His death like so many other aspects of Qaddafi’s life was shrouded in mystery. Today no one is still quite sure how he was killed and who was responsible. Certainly, NATO forces and rebel militants played a role, but it is unknown who specifically from these groups is responsible and how those responsible carried out the killing. His burial occurred on the 25th of October 2011, in an unmarked desert location near his hometown of Sirte. Afterwards, the four Islamic

clerics present swore upon the Koran never to reveal the location.

As the world watched the demonstrations of the Arab Spring that shook Libya in 2011 and as the various reports of state repression came to the public’s attention, the average Western television viewer still understood little about Qaddafi and the Libyan state. The subject of late night comedy sketches and jokes, Western society has frequently attributed the decisions and rhetoric of this notorious Libyan leader to insanity. By examining Qaddafi’s political primer, *The Green Book*, this paper will seek to explore his ideology and reveal the influences behind it. Tribalism with its emphasis on kinship and the direct exchange of goods manifested itself strongly in his ideology laid out in the book. In addition, Arab socialism and opposition to neocolonialism of Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser are seen throughout the text. Qaddafi denounced all political organizations, with a concession to tribes, creating instead the *Jamahiriyya*, his version of direct democracy that eliminates any sort of political accountability in the government. Further drawing from tribal and Arab socialist influences, he eliminated a wage earning system in lieu of direct exchange of goods placing the workforce of the country directly in the hands of the government. Qaddafi’s emphasis on the importance of individuals staying within the social structure of the family and women’s role in society are reflective of the bond of kinship around which tribal structure is centered. Furthermore, this helps discourage
expansion of social organization outside of the family that could lead to solidarity against the government.

From Italy to Idris

An understanding of the influences behind Qaddafi’s ideology begins with the story of Italian colonization. The 1911 Italian invasion of Libya was preceded by years of slow encroachment as Italy set its eyes on the Ottoman Empire’s North African province as a colony. Prior to the invasion, the Ottomans maintained a loose grip on the territory since the sixteenth century and as long as its inhabitants swore allegiance to the sultan and paid their annual tribute they were given a high degree of autonomy in their political affairs. As the British and French grabbed land in North Africa, Italy too wanted a colony to call its own and saw an opportunity in this weakly controlled Ottoman province. In 1911, as Italians increasingly looked abroad for better opportunities, an uneasy Italian leadership made the decision to invade as it told its citizens with increasing enthusiasm that, “emigration was servile, but to conquer colonies is a worthy task for a free and noble people.”

The military invasion was more troublesome than expected for the Italian forces, as they faced a stiff counter-attack and suffered a few defeats. They eventually triumphed over their Ottoman foes however, and established colonial rule in Libya. The colonial system put in place by the Italians

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systematically excluded the native Libyans from any sort of administrative role. Instead, the colonizers chose to import their leadership from Italy. Italy’s colonial administration never succeeded in gaining complete control of the territory. Hence, autonomous governments based around the old Ottoman administration structures rose up throughout the countryside. In 1912, the Ottoman Empire signed a peace treaty with opposing European powers (which included Italy) to end the Balkan War. The treaty mandated that the Ottomans leave Libya, but it granted the local Libyan Arabs “administrative autonomy” in ruling. However, the majority of the Ottoman administrators were native Libyans so they had no reason leave their country.

As Europe erupted into World War I, Italy was forced to focus its efforts away from its Libyan colony. By 1918, as Italian resources in its colony had worn thin, the native Libyans enjoyed a high degree of autonomy. When Italy began to refocus its resources on its colonial endeavor, it discovered that the Libyans were executing a high degree of autonomy through their tribal structure, and they demanded that the local tribal leaders to relinquish power and disarm. When they refused, the Italians were faced with two options, to either withdraw or to take military action. The latter option was chosen.

This military action became essentially a new conquest, and was known in Italy as the *riconquista*, and pitted a modern well-armed nation against groups of tribal people. This process lasted from 1923-1932 and resulted in
the massacre of thousands of Libyans with many of the survivors interned in concentration camps. The Italians achieved complete administrative control of their Italian colony. Just as before, the Italian administration excluded local Libyans from any role in governance and hence this allowed for little Libyan interaction with the state. As fascist leader Giuseppe Volpi remarked about the governance policy, “Neither with the chiefs, nor against the chiefs, but rather without the chiefs.” 3 Leadership was exclusively comprised of Italians, and while initially the Italians had not even wanted to use native Libyans in the unskilled labor force, they eventually integrated into economy for at least this role. 4

Italian colonial control of Libya officially ended, during World War II, following the Italian defeat in 1943, and the country became a temporary protectorate of Britain. The British used the existing tribal structure in order to govern, demonstrating how strongly the tribal system still defined Libyan society, and further defining the politics of the country along these tribal lines. 5 Muhammed Idris was a key leader in the Libyan movement toward autonomy before the end of World War I and the *riconquista*. Following the reconquest, he fled to neighboring British controlled Egypt, and during World War II he aided the British in carrying out raids on the Italians in Libya. Because of his cooperation

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5 Ibid., 254.
with the British, he guaranteed Libyan autonomy following the war. In 1951, under a hastily made international agreement facilitated by the then newly formed United Nations, Idris was given control of the Libyan monarchy, assuming the title of king.

Under the Idris monarchy Libya had extremely close relations with Western countries. During the rule of the monarchy from 1951 to 1969, the United States and Britain maintained military bases within the country. These bases employed 125,000 Libyans both directly and in related services. In addition to the military bases, British and American oil companies had a strong hold on the large oil reserves discovered in the early 1950s. Under the monarchy, corruption dominated all public offices as the country’s infrastructure was failing. By the early 1960s, there were only 250,000 students in primary and secondary school, only 3,000 in post-secondary schools, and 90% of the population was illiterate.

While the Western backed Idris monarchy ruled in Libya, next door in Egypt a revolution raged that sought to change not only Egypt but the entire Arab world. This was the Egyptian Revolution of 1952, led by Gamal Abdel Nasser and a number of other Egyptian military officers. They had grown dissatisfied with the status of the Egyptian

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8 Ibid., 51.
government and the constantly encroaching British into Egyptian affairs. Furthermore, the first war that the Egyptian Army had fought in sixty-five years, the Arab Israeli War of 1948, had been a devastating loss and many of these officers believed that the Egyptian administration was to blame. When Nasser became president of Egypt in 1956 he sought to spread the seed of pan-Arab unity and export the ideals of his revolution throughout the entire Arabic speaking world.9

An Ideology is Born

Qaddafi’s upbringing and the formation of his ideology were defined by the corruption and nepotism of the Idris monarchy juxtaposed with the doctrines of the Egyptian revolution occurring next door. The exact year and date of Qaddafi’s birth is unknown but most place it between 1940 and 1943. Born to a poor, illiterate Bedouin family of a lesser tribe near Sirte, Qaddafi was the first member of his family to ever learn to read and write.10 He had a strong Islamic upbringing as his religious teachers taught him stories of tribal heroes alongside the stories of Koran in weekly lessons. During Qaddafi’s years in secondary school, the ideals of Nasser and his Arab identity began to take root in him and his classmates. In fact, it was said that Qaddafi grew up with the Cairo based Pan–Arab

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radio station, “The Voice of the Arabs” jammed in his ear at all times as it blasted Western imperialism and the presence of foreign bases on Libyan soil. Qaddafi saw Nasser as his mentor and sought to emulate him, especially in his younger years. Next to the Koran, Nasser’s *Philosophy of the Revolution* was the most important book for the young Qaddafi. He read and re-read this short sensational book that detailed Nasser’s 1952 organization and overthrow of the Egyptian government and ensuing revolution. This book contained the inspiration and blueprint for Qaddafi’s revolution to come. Qaddafi met Nasser for the first time in 1970, and this meeting would represent a key moment in the young Qaddafi’s life. While Nasser died soon after this meeting, Qaddafi came to see himself as responsible for carrying his legacy.

Qaddafi enrolled in the Royal Military Academy in 1963 as it offered the best chance at upward mobility for Libya’s lower classes because the monarchy required a special certificate to apply for a university education. By the late 1960’s the majority of the country viewed the monarchy as a corrupt, broken anachronism and the king’s guard unit did not even intervene as Qaddafi and his fellow military officers calling themselves the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) took control of the country. Qaddafi had been the ultimate mastermind of the coup and had not even

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13 Vandewalle, 78.
informed his fellow conspirators the time and date he planned to launch it. The coup was essentially bloodless except one life lost and a few wounded defending the Cyrenaica Defense force in Gurnada. Qaddafi sent one conspirator to inform the radio station in Benghazi of the coup as he and his other confidants prepared to rush the military barracks and to arrest the Crown Prince in his palace. The following day, as Qaddafi and his conspirators discussed the coup in a television chat, their demeanor seemed exuberant and lively, each topping the other’s stories of the coup, like college students discussing a prank. These recent graduates of the military academy all came from lower to middle class backgrounds and were of less prestigious tribes. They represented a clear break from the rich and elitist previous administration and were highly populist with their revolutionary rhetoric.\(^\text{14}\) From the beginning, Qaddafi assumed control of the RCC and it would serve as the states only legislative and executive body during the first few years.\(^\text{15}\) While the RCC officers possessed charismatic appeal and rhetoric, they possessed little programmatic clarity. In an attempt to mobilize the masses of Libyan society the RCC formed the Arab Socialist Union (ASU), which, following Nasser’s example, was to serve as a vanguard party for the government. However, the ASU failed to mobilize the masses and after four years of


stocktaking, in 1973 the RCC was ready to implement a revolution.\textsuperscript{16}

**Codification of “Third Universal Theory”**

Initially following the coup in 1969 the RCC began a process of nationalizing the economy, forcing the British and American companies and military bases out of the country, and removing all remnants of the monarchy from the government. However, in 1973 the government set out to implement Qaddafi’s “Third Universal Theory”, which was to serve as an alternative to capitalism and Marxism. The theory showed a disdain for political parties and bureaucracy and had dramatic social, economic, and political initiatives. The ultimate goal of “Third Universal Theory” was to create a state called the *Jamahiriyya*\textsuperscript{17} that was a nation directly governed by its citizens with no intermediaries.\textsuperscript{18} The theory has been astutely described as a “political religion.”\textsuperscript{19}

Rifts between the leadership of the RCC began to form as the revolution moved forward. On one side, some wanted a course of action with more clarity and a carefully designed economic plan, while the other side, in which Qaddafi fell, wanted to spend the country’s money on activist pursuits that prioritized Arab unity and other radical

\textsuperscript{16} Vandewalle, 78-83.
\textsuperscript{17} Literally translated as “Peopledom”\textsuperscript{17} Vandewalle, 97.
ideologies. In 1975, a coup was planned, but failed to remove Qaddafi from power. Immediately following this coup attempt Qaddafi released his first volume of *The Green Book*. The volumes of the book officially codified Qaddafi’s “Third Universal Theory” and served as a way for the Qaddafi government to rationalize its decisions and initiatives by giving them a reference point. Qaddafi solely authored the three volumes of the book, which were released in differing times throughout Libya’s long revolutionary decade, from 1973-1986, as Qaddafi experimented with the political, economic, and social initiatives of this theory. The first volume called “The Solution to the Problem of Democracy: The Authority of the People” released in 1975. The second, “The Solution to the Economic Problem: Socialism” distributed to the public in 1977. The third entitled, “The Social Basis of the Third International Theory” became available in 1981.

*Political Exclusion and Tribalism*

During the time period of the publication of *The Green Book*, tribalism was at the heart of Libyan society. It was the defining part of every individual’s identity and its influence in Qaddafi’s writing shines clearly through. In a society where tribalism pervades, kinship is the most common method of distributing resources and guaranteeing cooperation. It dominates all aspects of society and determines the social hierarchy. Demonstrating this strong tribal influence, Qaddafi writes, “The relationship that binds
the family together is that same relationship which binds the tribe together, the nation, and the world. He continues and further demonstrates how his worldview is structured around kinship, “The essence of humanity is the national bond of nationalism, the essence of nationalism is belonging to a tribe, and the essence of belonging to a tribe is the familial bond.”

In addition to kinship, the direct exchange of goods was a defining characteristic. In the Libyan context, the pastoral Bedouin tribes like the one to which Qaddafi was born would directly exchange skins and meat with other groups that cultivated agricultural produce. Similarly, Qaddafi advocated for a return of this direct exchange of goods and for the elimination of a wage earning system saying, “One’s income is a private matter to be dispensed personally, and within the limits of fulfilling personal needs.... It should not be in the form of a wage received for production for the benefit of any other party whatsoever.” This return to a direct exchange for goods he calls a reversion to “natural law” and gives his readers the rule that, “he who produces consumes.”

The exclusion of Libyans from governance since the beginning of colonialism strengthened the strong tribal structure within its populace. According to Anderson, when

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22 Anderson, 23.
24 Ibid, 32.
more interaction between the state and its subjects exists and there is more use of clientele systems, kinship declines in importance as an organizing principle. However, in the Libyan case there had never been much interaction between the population and the state. Italian colonial policy excluded the native Libyans. Similarly, during the Idris monarchy, little interaction ensued between the few elite that controlled the state and the general population. Therefore, this exclusion created a society in which individuals had deeply sunken into their tribal roots.

From Boyhood Hero to Ideological Model

The influence of Qaddafi’s boyhood hero on his ideology is strongly reflected throughout The Green Book. Nasser’s political philosophy rejected neo-colonialism and any sort of Western influence in Arab countries. Qaddafi’s rejection of this ideal is clearly stated in The Green Book. He wrote, “Nationalist fanaticism and the use of national force against a weaker nation or national prosperity attained by a nation as a result of overpowering another, is evil and detrimental to humanity.” He continued, “Moreover, it is this state that endures, unless it is subjected to the tyranny of another more powerful nation.” In order to protect the countries of the Arab world from neo-colonial pursuits,

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25 Anderson, 23.
28 Ibid., 62.
Nasser advocated for non-alignment with the East or West during the Cold War. Similarly, he discussed his “Third Universal Theory” in his Zwara declaration of 1973, Qaddafi said, “We call it the Third Theory to indicate that there is a new path for all those that reject both materialist capitalism and atheist communism.”

While the battle against neo-colonialism clearly shined through Qaddafi’s ideology, another tenant of Nasserism that reverberated strongly throughout *The Green Book* was Arab socialism. Qaddafi titled the second volume of *The Green Book*, “Socialism: The Economic Basis of the Third Universal Theory,” and the socialist theme was evident throughout the book, “The aim of a socialist society is the happiness of man. This happiness cannot be realized except in conditions of spiritual and material freedom,” Qaddafi wrote. Qaddafi’s radically socialist society described in the book’s second volume was one in which renting houses and vehicles was illegal, land had no specific owner but was collectively owned, and “Inequality of wealth between individuals is unacceptable.”

*Freedom from Political Organization*

In the first volume about politics, Qaddafi strongly rejected the idea of political parties and the larger principle of political organization altogether. As he declared, “The

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29 Blundy, 87.
31 Ibid., 45.
political party is a contemporary form of dictatorship. It is the latest modern dictatorial instrument of government whereby the part rules the whole.”  

He proceeds to give his rationale behind this critique of the political party’s struggle for power, “The opposition party must defeat the existing instrument of government. .... The opposition must undermine the government’s achievements and cast doubt on its plans, even if these plans were beneficial to society...the interests and programs of society become victims. One of the most defining characteristics of democracy, that being competition for power comprises one of Qaddafi’s strongest critiques of the system.

The following rhetoric surrounding his rejection of parties elaborates about how not only political, but all organizations that desire to have power are detrimental to society. In addition, the underlying tribal influence is seen in his concession that tribes are his preference to other forms of organization. He rejects organization by saying, “If either a class, party, tribe or sect dominates a society then the system of government becomes a dictatorship. Nevertheless, a class or a tribal coalition is preferable to a coalition of parties, since societies are almost invariably descendants of tribes. This rejection of political organization essentially gives the government an open door to carry out whatever they wish with no accountability from the populace. This easily

33 Ibid., 9.
facilitates an authoritarian style of governance by removing all barriers that the government must take into account with regard to decision-making. In fact, Lisa Anderson goes as far as to refer to his political position as the “king” of Libya, and makes the claim that his removal of any sort of political contestation has deepened the tribal social structure of the country.\footnote{Lisa Anderson, “Muammar al-Qaddafi: ‘King’ of Libya,” \textit{Journal of International Affairs}, 54.2. (2001): 1.}

In lieu of political parties Qaddafi advocated for a direct democracy, formed through popular committees. He stated, “\textit{The Green Book} shows the masses the way to direct democracy based on a magnificent and practical system: the Third Universal Theory.”\footnote{Gathafi, \textit{The Green Book}, 17.} He wrote, “The authority of the people has just one face, and this can only be realized by one method – the establishment of People’s Conferences and People’s Committees everywhere.”\footnote{Ibid., 17.} As kinship defines all social organization in a society pervaded by tribalism, organizations outside of the tribe and family, like political parties, Qaddafi rejected as a tool of the government to exploit its people. However, this broad network of committees mainly represented the people “in a rhetorical sense “as Vandewalle states, “The creation of the popular committee system was an attempt by Qaddafi to bypass the more regularized procedures of the ASU.”\footnote{Vandewalle, 100.} Essentially, the elimination of political parties and adoption of Qaddafi’s
direct democracy through popular committees placed the country directly in the hands of those at the top.

The Abolition of Society’s Enslavement to Wages

Qaddafi stressed in The Green Book that an economic system based around monetary wages must be inherently evil and a form of enslavement. This meant that a direct exchange of goods must replace monetary wages, which, as previously mentioned, harkened back to tribal roots. However, it also took Nasser’s Arab socialism to a new extreme. As state commanded businesses define a socialist state, Qaddafi pushed Arab socialism to a new extreme saying, “Even state owned economic enterprises give workers wages and other social benefits which are more like charitable offerings donated by rich owners of private economic establishments to their employees.”

For Qaddafi, the traditional forms of socialism’s shortcoming were that it used wages to compensate its workers. The logic behind his rejection of wages was explained throughout the second volume of the book. He considered the relationship that wage earners have with the entity that pays them their wages to be like that of a master and a slave. “Wage earners are but slaves to the masters that hire them,” he wrote. “They are temporary slaves, and their servitude lasts as long as the duration of their work for which they receive wages from their employers.” He continued, “The ultimate solution is to abolish the wage

system... and revert to the natural laws which defined relationships between workers and employers before the emergence of social classes and the development of government and manmade laws.”\(^{41}\) The abolition of the wage system created an authoritarian regime in which all economic enterprises lay in the hands of the government. Vandewalle explains, “Overnight, the country’s merchants and small businessmen were reduced to onlookers in the country’s economic life.”\(^{42}\) In addition to an easy takeover of all businesses, the abolition of wages places the labor force of the country directly in the hands of the government and the people are directly compensated with only their basic needs. Family First

Qaddafi emphasized the role of kinship and the family and tribe especially forcefully in the third volume of his work about the social aspects of his theory. Particularly pervasive was his persuasion of the reader to stay within his or her traditional role as a part of the family. He began, “To the individual, the family is more important than the state. Humanity recognizes the individual as a human being, and the normal individual acknowledges the family which is his cradle, his origin and which serves as his social umbrella.”\(^{43}\) He further emphasized the importance of the family in his philosophy. He stated, “A thriving society is one in which the family flourishes and the individual grows normally

\(^{41}\) Ibid., 33.

\(^{42}\) Vandewalle, 107.

within its bosom, and is established as a member of the human community... an individual without a family, has no value or social life.”  

His ideas about gender further attempted to persuade his readers to stay within the bounds of their familial role in society. Following an explanation of the biology of the two sexes, he explained the role that women must have in society. He stated, “Men and women must relentlessly adhere to the role he or she was created for. The woman who refrains from childbearing, marriage, and motherhood, and who forsakes her gentleness and dismisses adornment for health reasons is a woman who relinquishes her natural role in life... While on the surface level this statement holds back women from working outside the home, it also further deepened the ability for totalitarianism to exist within the country. This is because when the main social structure that exists in society is the family, there is little room for organizations to form outside of it that could challenge the government. This would be organizations and forms of civil society such as unions, advocacy groups, and even organized protests. There was no pressure against the government, because people were confined within the same social structures that they have been in for hundreds of years and to unite in such a way as to create power in numbers was difficult. His rejection of anything that could pose a threat to the

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44 Ibid., 56.
MANIFESTATIONS OF AUTHORITARIAN IDEOLOGY

government was apparent, and around the time the first volume of *The Green Book* was published, the Qaddafi government began to weed out certain parts of society and the government. These included the legal profession, political parties, the army, the bureaucracy, and the privileged sections of the community. During his administration executions of groups that in any way challenged his authority were frequently aired on national television.47

Another facilitation of authoritarianism is found in the contention that women who work outside the home are forced to do so because of materialism, and that, “Therefore a world revolution is needed to do away with all the materialistic conditions that prevent women from performing their natural role in life and so drives them to carry out men’s duties in order to achieve equal rights.” By blaming materialistic conditions for disturbing a woman’s natural role in a society, it gave further social justification for a state run economy.

**Conclusion**

The manifestation of tribalism and Nasserism shined clearly through the text of *The Green Book* and based on the time period in which Qaddafi was reared and his beliefs developed, these were undoubtedly key building blocks of

46 Blundy, 86.
his ideology. He denounced all political organizations in lieu of the Jamahiriyya, eliminating political contestation and accountability within the government. He reverted back to tribal roots and the influence of Nasser shines through as he called for the elimination of a wage earning system that would place the nation’s workforce in the hands of the government. His insistence upon the individual staying within the family’s social structure and women staying within traditional gender roles reflects tribal roots and has some Nasser-like undertones while discouraging the formation of organizations which could challenge the government. Using these unrelated yet pivotal influences, he created a state with all of its power concentrated at the top.

While Qaddafi’s political philosophy shined strongly through his rhetoric in The Green Book, the political reality of Libya under his rule proved to be quite divergent from the utopian ideals of his political primer. Throughout the reign of Qaddafi in Libya, two different spheres composed the political arrangement of the country. One was the idealized formal structure of government that had been laid out in The Green Book. The other was the informal structure of power and authority made up of a small circle of those closest to Qaddafi. While in principle, the society under the rule of the Jamahiriyya prevailed, the country’s security sectors-- the army, police, and intelligence were outside its control and were rather in the hands of the informal sector of power. In addition, the country’s budget during Qaddafi’s reign was created with no oversight from the committees of the
Jamahiriyya. The understanding of the influences behind Qaddafi’s philosophy and their implications demonstrates how using the rhetoric of *The Green Book* he was enabled to create a society in which he and his elite circle held reigns of the country. Unfortunately for the people of Libya, the government he created was not unlike the Italian colonial rule and the Idris monarchy that his political philosophy was constructed to oppose and diverge the country away from. Once again, the citizenry was left disenfranchised from any sort of role in governance.

As late night comedians continue to search for new material and as the images of the Arab spring and Qaddafi’s mutilated body leave our minds, the larger implications of lessons gleaned from the life of one of the world’s most infamous leaders hopefully will not. Understanding exactly how the Qaddafi regime and the Libyan state came to be what it was without dismissing it as simply insanity is absolutely vital in order to truly make sense of Qaddafi as a historical figure. The hundreds of Internet videos chronicling the death of the man who once considered himself to be carrying the legacy of Nasser, and the many conflicting stories of how the death took place are perhaps a testament to the fact that mysteries still exist in the world in which we live.
“Remember you are German” begins the list of “The Ten Commandments for Choosing a Partner.”¹ This popular Nazis rhetoric, coupled with educational curriculum often taught in racial science classes, expressed ideological beliefs surrounding love, marriage, and racial attraction in the Third Reich. One command admonishes “if hereditarily fit, do not remain single.” In order to remain “pure” in “mind, body, and spirit,” Aryan Germans must “choose a spouse of similar or related blood!” and then “Hope for as many children as possible!” In these Commandments, race

determined attraction and trumped emotion. “Marry only for love!” but “seek a companion in marriage, not a playmate.”2 Furthermore, this message insinuated that love could only exist between Aryan individuals. While these directives did not directly target Jews, they indirectly condemned mixed marriages as invalid, impure, and even treacherous against the state. Although these commands were portrayed in the guise of light-hearted advice, the gravity of their message cannot be ignored. This rhetoric was a part of a systematic effort to regulate marriage according to discriminatory racial, hereditary, and behavioral rules and represented the state’s intentional interference with private choices based on love, personal preference, and attraction.

On September 15, 1935 the National Socialist German Worker’s Party legalized anti-Semitic attitudes in Germany. The Reich Citizenship Law and the Law for the Protection of German Blood and German Honor were introduced at the annual party rally in Nuremberg with minimal public opposition.3 Collectively known as the Nuremberg Race

2 Ibid. The complete list of “The Ten Commandments for Choosing a Partner” is as follows: 1. Remember you are a German! 2. Remain pure in mind and spirit! 3. Keep your body pure! 4. If hereditarily fit, do not remain single! 5. Marry only for love! 6. Being a German, choose only a spouse of similar or related blood! 7. When choosing your spouse, inquire into his or her forebears! 8. Health is essential to outward beauty as well! 9. Seek a companion in marriage, not a playmate! 10. Hope for as many children as possible!

Laws, this comprehensive legislation disenfranchised German Jews and divested them of their political and civil rights. It prohibited individuals classified as Jews from marrying or having sexual relationships with Aryan Germans, and those guilty of interracial relationships committed a crime known as *Rasenschanze*. These laws were designed to not only to remove Jews from active civic engagement, but also to eliminate Jewish blood from the German *Volk*. While the German word *Volk* literally means a folk, a people, or a nation, the Third Reich racialized this word and embedded it with conservative symbols of racial purity, a shared history, and national consciousness. Due to their “undesirable” and racially inferior status, German Jews were “aliens” who threatened the body politic. In order to expel these “undesirables,” the Nuremberg Laws attempted to erase all sense of privacy regarding domestic partnership and open families to state interference, thus blurring the boundaries between public and private realms.

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5 The German word *Volk* during the Third Reich was a national idea that pushed for the creation of a “racial community” of Aryan Germans. While the term *Volk* has been used throughout German history, the Third Reich racialized this word to embody the collective identity of an Aryan German people at the exclusion of other racial and ethnic groups. Renate Bridenthal, Atina Grossman, and Marion Kaplan, *When Biology Became Destiny: Women in Weimar and Nazi Germany* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1984), 18.

6 Ibid.
The blood purity laws differed from other anti-Semitic legislation because they affected non-Jews as well as Jews. If these laws were fully enforced, they would break the sacred bond of marriage, tear apart families, and terminate romantic relationships. As a result, the regime had to approach these interracial relationships with great caution to avoid alarming the public. Yet this cautious attitude towards familial autonomy fundamentally contradicted Nazi ideological goals. Because intimate partnership served as the site where public and private realms of politics, morality, and social order converged, it became a critical arena to implement the regime’s racial ideology. Furthermore, it necessitated the practice of intense regulation and control. Indeed, the Nazi state functioned in a totalitarian manner and attempted to control these personal choices. These interracial relationships were highly politicized because an effective totalitarian system involved the erasure of all boundaries between the family and the state, yet Nazi ideology also held the family as inviolable, creating an inherent contradiction between policy and practice.

The persistence of interracial relationships during the Third Reich represented a direct obstacle to Nazi racial ideology because these unions compromised the legitimacy of the Volk. The Volk had become the quintessential manifestation of Hitler’s idealized vision of a new national

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7 Szobar, 141.
community filled with racially pure Aryans. Yet, due to the sensitive nature of these inter-ethnic unions, bureaucratic officials hesitated to fully enforce the separation of these couples. Separation of spouses would undermine the integrity of traditional institutions such as family, marriage, and religion, and spark fear amongst the general public. As the regime vacillated over appropriate, discreet measures to enforce racial purity, interracial couples seized the opportunity to resist the complete breakdown of privacy. Ultimately, the gap between the regime’s rigid policy and cautious practice created a small, yet crucial, space for couples to preserve their privacy and sense of individualism.

Interracial relationships were not totally repressed or eliminated, but were resilient to governmental intrusion. The couples in these condemned partnerships developed strategies to navigate imposed regulations and reconstruct alternative forms of privacy despite persecution and punishment. The personal narratives of individuals affected by the Nuremberg Laws reveal covert resistance in the form of superficial accommodation necessary for the survival of one’s marriage; these couples appeared to coexist with the state by demonstrating outward cooperation and compliance, yet inwardly affirmed their personal values. This reconstruction of the public and private realms served as a primary coping mechanism that granted all Germans, regardless of ethnicity, a source of agency. On other rare occasions, families exhibited open resistance to Nazi

9 Ibid.
persecution. The *Rosenstrasse Protest* in 1943 serves as the most compelling, explicit act of resistance as wives publically declared their loyalty to their Jewish husbands and inter-ethnic families, and consequently denounced their allegiance to the Nazi state.

*Statistics and Demographics*

Prior to the establishment of the Third Reich, intermarriage between Jew and Gentile was legalized in Germany in 1875.\(^\text{10}\) Jews had naturally assimilated and integrated socially, politically, economically, and in some cases, even religiously, into German society. Had the German population been inherently fervent in its hatred of Jews, it is inconceivable that German Jews would have fared so well, especially compared to Jews in other nations.\(^\text{11}\) Only about one percent of the German population was Jewish. A large proportion of the Jewish population was concentrated in urban areas such as Berlin, Frankfurt am Main, Breslau, Munich, and Dresden.\(^\text{12}\) Cities tended to support more liberal sensibilities than rural communities, and after the Nuremberg Race Laws were passed, urban centers offered an escape for targeted couples. Demographic statistics and marriage registrations attest to the proliferation and ordinariness of these relationships. In 1932, twenty-seven

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\(^\text{11}\) Ibid., 48.

\(^\text{12}\) Ibid., 9.
percent of Jewish men married non-Jews, while eighteen percent of Jewish women married non-Jews.\textsuperscript{13} Then in 1933, thirty-five percent of Jewish men and twenty percent of Jewish women committed to intermarriage.\textsuperscript{14} By 1935, the Nuremberg Race Laws prohibited all new “impure” marriages, but stopped short of nullifying existing mixed marriages due to the strong presence of social and religious sanctity associated with marriage.\textsuperscript{15} This tactic served as an example of the regime’s reluctance to fully enforce party beliefs. In reality, the government could not radically attack marriages at the outset for fear of losing German support. So instead, the State gradually escalated the intensity and intrusiveness of persecution to tackle these internal opponents.

\textit{Polarized Spheres of Race and Gender}

A more comprehensive examination of the relationship between race and gender in the context of Nazi ideology will further explain the treatment of interracial relationships. Nazi ideology attempted to establish a rigid social order based on polarized constructs of gender and

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\textsuperscript{13} Alison Owings, \textit{Frauen: German Women Recall the Third Reich} (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1993), 296.
\textsuperscript{14} Ibid.
\end{flushleft}
race. Nazi gender and race hierarchy intersected at the site of interethnic marriages; according to this misogynistic hierarchy, men were superior to women, whereas Aryans were superior to Jews. Interethnic marriages problematized this schema for social control, especially in the case of Aryan women married to Jewish men. Although Aryan women were not victimized to the extent of Jews, they were marginalized by the patriarchal social structure. This hierarchy meant women were confined to restrictive domestic roles, whereas men trained for the military or pursued civic roles. Likewise, it also implied that all other non-Aryan races were degenerate. While women supervised the small, private sphere of the household with only limited access to the public realm via charitable organizations and the church, men controlled crucial matters such as politics, business and commerce, and military concerns. The Nazi state believed its patriarchal structure promoted and upheld domestic security both inside and outside the home.

Despite the aura of tradition surrounding family and marriage, in reality the Nazi state undermined this private realm with invasive social programs and a persuasive ideological agenda. Hitler’s desire to create a pure, racial utopia further sealed women’s domestic confinement, and their primary role became the creation of genetically suitable Aryan offspring. In a speech to the National Socialist

Women’s Section at the 1936 Nuremberg Rally, Hitler emphasized the centrality of the child to the success of the regime: the movement “… has in reality but one single point, and that point is the child, that tiny creature which is born and must be strong and which alone gives meaning to the whole-life struggle”.17 The pure Aryan child was the foundation of the future Volk and his existence was dependent upon the loyalty of the mother. As Hitler explained, “Every child that a woman brings into this world is a battle, a battle waged for the existence of her people”.18 This language reinforces an essentialist understanding of gender and race: women are destined for motherhood in order to ensure the biological superiority of the state. Each member of the Volk must fulfill his or her assigned role - the men as soldiers and the women as mothers. Racially mixed couples, on the other hand, violated Hitler’s vision for the creation of an ethnically superior nation.

Nazi instructions regarding racial purity became even more radical with the introduction of the Lebensborn program that encouraged racially fit, unwed women to bear children for the Führer.19 Designed to breed the master race, this program projected the message that all racially pure children were valued and welcomed without shame, stigma,

18 Ibid.
19 Patrizia Albanese, Mothers of the Nation: Women, Families, and Nationalism in 20th Century Europe (Toronto: University of Toronto, 2006), 37.
or fear. On the other hand the *mischlinge*, children of mixed marriages, were socially unacceptable targets of criticism and scorn. In the Third Reich, marriage became a utilitarian goal for the maintenance and procreation of the Aryan race, and anyone who opposed this agenda faced grave consequences.

Nazis social policies revolutionized the purpose and function of the private home. Traditionally, Victorian gender ideology had posed marriage and family as the symbolic bastions that insulate its members from the corrosive public sphere. The patriarchal nuclear family was responsible for inculcating children with values of individuality, privacy, and dignity.\(^{20}\) Yet state agencies and educational programs, such as the Hitler Youth, the League of German Girls, and the *Lebensborn* program, replaced the traditional parenting role, and ousted the necessity of the family as a source of educational and emotional support. Although the regime advocated for the revitalization of the traditional family, the ban on inter-ethnic marriages ironically broke familial bonds. According to historian Claudia Koonz, “Despite the rhetoric about the restoration of family life, Nazi policy was deeply revolutionary because it aimed at the creation of a family unit that was not a defense against public invasion, as much as a *gateway* to intervention.”\(^{21}\) Indeed, the fascist state sought to replace individual preferences and loyalty to one’s


\(^{21}\) Ibid., 180.
family with a collective allegiance to the Führer and the nation. In order to coordinate commitment to the Volk, ideological and political unity among the citizens was the key to fomenting solidarity and strength. Families that disrupted the political and social agenda of the Nazis would weaken this collective allegiance. In this schema, interracial families functioned as a direct, internal threat to national aspirations. Ultimately, the heart of the Nazi revolution lay in the destruction of individualism and privacy and the construction of a collective, public racial consciousness.22

Privileged versus Non-Privileged Marriages

The rules and regulations that monitored interracial relations operated according to the limitations of the rigid Nazi patriarchal structure. Two criteria were developed to distinguish between privileged and non-privileged Jews: the religious affiliation of the children and the race of the mother.23 These stipulations reflected the inherent sexist notions of the party because the status of the marriage depended upon the race and religion of the husband.24 The hyper-masculine Nazis erroneously considered children of Jewish fathers more “Jewish” than children of Jewish mothers. Ironically, this flawed standard directly

22 Ibid., 179.
23 Stolzfus, Resistance of the Heart, 70.
24 Ibid., 103.
contradicted traditional Jewish laws.\textsuperscript{25} Treatment towards these couples mirrored the misogynistic standards of the state; German men married to Jewish women were granted preference over German women married to Jewish men. In the latter situation, it was assumed that the Jewish man had seduced the innocent \textit{Frau} because Nazi propaganda portrayed him as a licentious monster.\textsuperscript{26} An image in the anti-Semitic and racist \textit{Dur Stürmer} magazine printed in October 1933 showed a despondent mother who had been seduced by a Jew, only to be left abandoned and alone.\textsuperscript{27} Punished for their ethnic inferiority, Jewish men rapidly lost jobs and civic positions. More importantly, they lost a sense of purpose and value by living in a society that suddenly incriminated them. On the other hand, Nazi laws worked to the advantage of the Aryan husband and allowed for expedient divorces from his Jewish spouse.\textsuperscript{28} Some judges issued unprecedented verdicts that intermarriages could be divorced merely on the ground that the partners represented two different races. Above all, women who married Jews failed to uphold their duty to the \textit{Volk} as Aryan mothers, and their \textit{Mischlinge} were seen as defective.

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Alison Ownings, \textit{Frauen: German Women Recall the Third Reich} (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1993), 453.
\item Claudia Koonz, Fips caricature of a “ruined” woman, \textit{The Nazi Conscience} (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003), 229, Fig. 50. “Das Ende. Vom Juden noch im Tode betrogen,” \textit{Der Stürmer} 15, no. 34 (October 1933).
\item Ibid.
\item Stolzfus, \textit{Resistance of the Heart}, 45.
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The Agency and Empowerment of Interracial Marriages

As opposed to her ideologically submissive counterpart, a German woman aligned by marriage to a Jewish household actively opposed her restrictive gender role. Her “Aryan” name and bloodline functioned as a right of passage to enter the public sphere. She became the visible face of the interethnic household or business, and could retain property, travel freely, and conduct business transactions. These defiant women attained a new level of empowerment and performed active roles as wage earners, representatives of the household, and political dissenters.  

In addition, German women in mixed marriages perfected the art of duplicity and honed their skills of disguise and deceit. Despite the daily challenges, they disconnected their private feelings from their public persona to preserve their commitment to their condemned spouse. Housewives employed various tactics to ease the brunt of Nazi persecution. One woman reported ducking in doorways to avoid greeting the SS officers with the usual “Heil Hitler” salute. Another Aryan woman named Elsa Holzer sought a supplemental income to add to her husband’s meager wage at a forced labor camp. She found work at a local Berlin grocery, but felt pressured by the constant strain to disguise her illegal marriage. The weekly copies of Der Stürme

29 Ibid., 104.
30 Koonz, Mothers in the Fatherland, 407.
31 Owings, Frauen: German Women Recall the Third Reich, 105.
newspaper haunted her and served as a visible reminder of her dangerous predicament. Once, she and the other employees were required to complete a questionnaire that measured their reliability to the Nazis cause. It asked questions regarding the employee’s spouse such as “Where does your husband work? For what income?” Elsa wisely ignored these questions, but was further interrogated by her Personal Director. During this intrusive encounter, Elsa’s answers were allusive and vague, and she never yielded to authoritarian pressure. Her resolve to remain silent in this censored environment was a bold act of agency.

*Individuals as Active Agents*

Each experience for interracial couples and *Mischlinge* in the Third Reich was idiosyncratic and demonstrated varying degrees of covert resistance, accommodation, and direct opposition. The strategies utilized to reconstruct a space of privacy varied from person to person. Religious conversions, secret escapes, emigration, hideaways, baptisms, and even divorce were some tactics used for resistance and survival. Nevertheless, these stories collectively illustrate how interracial couples maintained their commitment to their spouse and their own creed. A further examination of these individual scenarios sheds light on the diverse strategies employed by such couples coexisting with Nazi terror.

Although Frau Verena Groth was classified as a *Mischlinge*, she grew up knowing nothing of her Jewish
background until 1932 at the formative age of ten.  With this realization, Frau Groth felt with crystal clarity the conclusion of her childhood innocence. Her father Dr. Goldmann lost his job as the medical director in Stuttgart and the family moved to a smaller apartment. Her mother’s “Aryan” name thankfully saved the family from the pits of Auschwitz, but failed to protect Dr. Goldmann’s business, reputation, and self-esteem. The impact of this social exclusion was challenging; Frau Groth remembered witnessing her father break down in complete devastation, “And there at his desk sat my father, sobbing like a child. He was so very attached to his profession. It was terrible for him.” Stripped of his citizenship, Dr. Goldman retreated from public and civic life to avoid persecution. Thankfully, his marriage survived despite state pressure to divorce. She recalled, “My mother would have never divorced... she could have gotten a divorce with the stroke of a pen... but not after she knew it would be his downfall.” Obviously, this couple cared deeply about each other and valued their marriage above all else. Without the “cover” of an Aryan spouse, Dr. Goldman would have been immediately deported. Frau Groth remembered that some interracial couples tried to manipulate the Nazi system, divorce pro forma, and then secretly reunite in England or another foreign retreat. Frau Groth’s mother mastered superficial

33 Owings, 102.
34 Ibid., 104.
35 Ibid., 105.
36 Ibid., 105.
accommodation; she projected her public Aryan identity to pass as a loyal citizen, while sustaining her Jewish husband’s morale.

Other underlying social, economic, and relational factors, under external Nazi pressure, threatened interracial relationships. Rita Kuhn, another Mischlinge who lived in Berlin, recalled her father’s instructions to remain invisible.³⁷ Her Jewish identity was not a conscious realization until the Nazi take-over. In January of 1933, her world quickly changed when her Jewish father lost his job and the state confiscated all of his assets. Her mother’s Lutheran, working class background saved the family from total persecution, but this financial burden, in addition to a general atmosphere of fear and terror, placed additional pressures on the couple. Rita remembered that an environment of increasing emotional strain discouraged her family. Like the other Jewish men, her father Herr Fritz Kuhn, came home disheartened and defeated every day.³⁸ She observed a bitter argument between her parents who felt bullied by relatives to divorce or separate. Because Gentile relatives viewed their Jewish son-in-laws as pariahs, and furthermore as threats to their daughters’ safety, Aryan wives were forced to choose between family heritage and marriage vows. Herr Kuhn accused his in-laws of harboring “anti-Semitic feelings” and conspiracy.³⁹ Frau Kuhn countered, “‘They have nothing

³⁷ Ibid., 452.
³⁸ Ibid.
³⁹ Ibid., 455.
against you because you’re Jewish’” but tensions flared and fears intensified.\textsuperscript{40} These tensions escalated when her father pushed her mother into the cupboard, an aggressive action sharply out of character for Fritz Kuhn. Although these tensions evoked unexpected behavior from both spouses, their marriage outlasted the external and internal pressure to divorce.

The Kuhn family also took measures to ensure the safety of their children. Herr Fritz Kuhn decided a proper Christian baptismal ceremony would disguise the children’s racial identity.\textsuperscript{41} Unfortunately, this maneuver failed to insulate the Kuhn family from wartime bombings, limited rations, months of near-starvation, and social exclusion. Rita wore the bright, gold Star of David. Her mother avoided wearing the Star due to her “Aryan” race, yet neighbors and bystanders harassed, cursed, and called her a whore because they considered her marriage to be a disgrace.\textsuperscript{42} These daily insults antagonized German women unwilling to conform to Nazi norms and required a strong inner resolve to ignore these cruel voices.

Another German couple utilized religious conversion as a means to relieve the burden of Nazi persecution and sanctions. On May 22, 1941 the Wally and Gunter Grodka gave birth their son Ranier.\textsuperscript{43} The couple searched relentlessly for an “anti-fascist” Protestant minister to

\textsuperscript{40} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{41} Ibid., 456.
\textsuperscript{42} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{43} Stolzfus, \textit{Resistance of the Heart}, 155.
baptize their newborn son. This strategy proved to be effective and saved their son from the stigma associated with the Star of David. As a result of this religious conversion, the Grodkas were elevated to the status of “privileged” intermarriage, although this policy was not consistently upheld by the state.\textsuperscript{44} Some benefits accompanied this status, such as additional food and cigarette rations and clothing.

On the other hand, Rudi and Elsa Holzer did not receive the same preferential treatment by the Nazi state as privileged intermarriages. Once her neighbors recognized the bright yellow star emblazoned on her husband’s coat, their attitudes transformed into hatred and scorn. Elsa remembered neighbors who spit at her while she strolled her baby. “For us wives of Jews back then it was not easy at all,” Elsa said, because “People made us villains.”\textsuperscript{45} Germans vilified individuals like Elsa because she represented racial treason. Wally Grodka shared a similar experience. Neighbors left hate notes on her door: “Sow---- filthy whore---- swine.”\textsuperscript{46} In their eyes, Wally had deliberately chosen to marry a criminal and involve herself in a tainted relationship. Despite this opposition, these women suffered the jeers, taunts, and humiliation for a greater cause; by remaining loyal to their interethnic marriages, they rescued their husbands from the worst fate, exile or extermination.

\textsuperscript{44} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{45} Ibid., 157.
\textsuperscript{46} Ibid., 85.
Hildegarde Franz as a Jewish woman who lived in Nuremberg, Germany with her Christian husband. His religious and racial identity insulated her from direct Nazi persecution because their marriage was considered “privileged” according to Nazi racial hierarchy. Even so, their retail store was confiscated in 1934. The couple took proactive measures to obtain the necessary paperwork to smuggle their sons to the United States. Amidst the hardships and harassments, her husband became very sick and died before the Allied invasion. After his death, Frau Franz was transported to the Theresienstadt center for Jews. In her interview, she recalled her most terrifying personal encounter with Nazi harassment. SS officials pressured her to renounce her husband’s will, urging her to “declare it void…” but Frau Franz refused to comply. She believed doing so would dishonor her husband’s wishes. The State wanted to confiscate her property that was protected by her husband’s Christian name: “And so they were very eagerly after it in order to distribute it among their Nazis… but they could not do that, because everything was in the name of my husband.” Frau Franz, inspired by the legacy of her

48 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
marriage and loyalty to her husband, actively resisted Nazi requests, and in return the state backed down.

Unfortunately, Edward Adler did not receive the same lenient treatment from the Nazi state. As a Jewish teenager living in Hamburg, Germany, he was reported to the Gestapo for going on a date with a Gentile girl.\textsuperscript{50} The two were out camping and had planned to kayak and picnic for the afternoon. Another young man observed the couple and reported this illegal behavior. Although his interference may have been an act of party loyalty, more likely than not Edward surmised it was merely the result of a rivalry for the girl’s attention. As a result, Edward was arrested by the Gestapo and spent six months in solitary confinement.\textsuperscript{51} This traumatic encounter shattered his boyhood innocence, as Edward experienced first-hand the intrusive surveillance powers of the Nazis.

\textit{Censorship and Surveillance}

For interracial couples, the Gestapo posed a real and perceived threat of intrusion. The highly interconnected relationship between the Gestapo and German society enabled the strict surveillance and regulation of societal behavior; Germans generally perceived the Gestapo to be an


\textsuperscript{51} Ibid.
omnipresent authority, capable of detecting the slightest aversion and antipathy towards the regime. This climate of fear and rumor enabled the relative success of totalitarian policies because it enhanced and exaggerated the Gestapo’s presence amongst the civilians. Daily activity, especially in public space, carried an ominous tone for interracial couples seeking to disguise or conceal their crime. Despite the government’s hesitation to separate families and divorce mixed marriages, civilians were frequently tried for the crime of *Rasenschande* that encompassed actions ranging in severity: lustful gazes, extramarital affairs, and prostitution with Jews. In reality, these reports were rarely a result of underground Gestapo work, but the outcome of neighbors, friends, co-workers, and even relatives who denounced dissenters. The observations and identifications of ordinary citizens, regardless of the validity of the accusations, were vital to maximize the operations of the police state. As a result, “hardly anyone felt safe... even in the privacy of their homes” and this sentiment resonated with interracial couples.\(^{52}\) Top-down administration and bottom-up cooperation enabled the Gestapo to reinforce a system of terror that arbitrarily attacked suspicious individuals.\(^ {53}\) The fact that individuals were willing to report denouncers demonstrates that some Germans had internalized Nazi


\(^{53}\) Ibid., 689.
doctrine, while others had utilized this terror apparatus as a means to their own personal ends.

The Gestapo case files for the region of Dusseldorf in northwestern Germany from 1933 to 1944 exemplify the necessity of cooperation between ordinary citizens and state officials to invade the private sphere. This invasive surveillance relied on the accusations of neighbors, friends, and co-workers. These files contain 137 individuals who had sexual relations with Jews, 40 files on persons who were suspected of having sexual relations, and an additional 225 cases of Jews who were arrested for these reasons. Most cases concerned extramarital affairs. Aryans found guilty were sentenced to approximately one year in prison, while Jews were sent to forced labor camps. These numbers indicate that sexual relations with Jews continued despite its illegal nature, perhaps because these individuals recognized these relationships as valid behavior incriminated by the Nazi state. Those suspected of indecency were often targeted by witnesses for political or personal reasons. According to Gestapo protocol, three or more testimonies were required to denounce an opponent and proceed with charges. If the case lacked conclusive evidence (i.e. three or more confirming testimonies), then the accused were

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55 Ibid., 241.
56 Ibid., 302.
dismissed with a stern warning and the guaranteed promise of future surveillance.\textsuperscript{57}

An analysis of the demographics of the accused in Dusseldorf reveals that the majority of cases concerned men ages 30-39 employed in white-collar jobs or independent, small businesses. Jewish men were often targets of false accusations, but conversely the regime was reluctant to arrest non-Jewish women for the same crime. In this scenario, the patriarchal structure functioned to protect women from arbitrary arrests. The ratio of Jew to non-Jew arrests for males was very similar and can possibly be attributed to the greater mobility afforded to men in the public realm, therefore increasing their opportunities for sexual relations outside the home.\textsuperscript{58} Of course, some interracial unions may have been the result of sexual attraction without a conscious political agenda. In reality an individual’s level of “Jewishness” could not be based solely on outward physical characteristics. Despite the warnings of Nazi pseudo-scientific racial theories, even people who considered themselves loyal to the Nazis party could fall for a French-speaking, blond Jewish woman.\textsuperscript{59} Motivations for opposition varied person to person because “… sexual relations with Jews were much more personal, even idiosyncratic expressions of disagreement with Nazi racial policy”.\textsuperscript{60} The multiplicity of these scenarios and their

\textsuperscript{57} Ibid., 213.
\textsuperscript{58} Ibid., 218.
\textsuperscript{59} Gordon, 212
\textsuperscript{60} Ibid., 236.
underlying motivations cannot be neatly categorized. Allegations of Rasenschanze criminalized highly intimate, private behavior and publicized these activities as the ultimate political insult. Yet the proliferation of these cases proves that Nazi ideology failed to totally abolish the individual agency of German citizens. Ultimately, individuals desired the freedom to choose their romantic partner based on individual preferences rather than comply with the nationally sanctioned partner.

Nevertheless, this highly politicized crime warranted humiliating investigations to punish deviant behavior. Gestapo officers would demand accounts “... so personal and so detailed that they were a positive embarrassment to human dignity, and this was particularly true of cases involving Jewish males.” 61 Arrested individuals experienced severe interrogation techniques that included the use of psychological or physical torture. Although these interrogations were never as drastic as the measures employed in concentration camps, the experience proved to be traumatic and invasive to the individuals discovered by the Gestapo. 62 For example, Nazis Storm Troopers, or SA officers, arrested a prostitute suspected of having Jewish clients and publically ridiculed her as a part of a “cleanup against vice campaign.” 63 She stood in the street wearing a sign around her neck that said, “I am the biggest pig in the

61 Ibid., 237.
62 Ibid.
63 Koonz, Mothers in the Fatherland, 220.
neighborhood and only associate with Jews.” These arrests entailed enormous costs for the individuals who were automatically stigmatized for their alleged behavior, and alarmed family, friends, and neighbors. Serious consequences accompanied these crimes, namely social exclusion, economic repercussions, or detainment in prison. Yet despite these terrible social, psychological, and even physical ramifications for the accusation of Rasenschanze, individuals bravely faced these grim measures without compromise.

**Operation Factory Action: A Plan to Separate Interracial Families in Berlin**

The deportation of intermarried Jews was a highly sensitive and intensely debated matter among top-tier Nazi officials. They feared the deportation of this specific group would antagonize non-Jewish Germans and injure public morale. Because the state to some extent relied on the consent and cooperation of the masses, Hitler closely analyzed public opinion. By 1942, intermarried Jews were the final visible obstacle concerning the “Jew Problem”. The SS, an elite corps of Nazis soldiers who wore black uniforms, and the Reich Security Main Office had been given at least the general instructions, if not the specific directives, by Hitler and Himmler to include intermarried Jews and

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64 Ibid.
Mischlinge in the Final Solution.67 Officer Eichmann, an SS-Obersturmbannführer (Lieutenant Colonel) oversaw the deportation of Jews in Berlin.68 As demonstrated by the Dusseldorf cases, the most cautionary and unobtrusive approach to accomplish this task was the individual arrests and detainments of each suspect. The SS held a majority of suspects of the arrested suspects in protective custody for up to three months.69 By requesting names and addresses of intermarried families from community churches, synagogues, and the Jewish Community Center, the Gestapo pieced together a network of insubordinates. As of September 1942, there were only 4,723 intermarried Jews registered with the Jewish Community Center, but close associates estimate the number was closer to 7,000 individuals.70 These names were then categorized and ranked according to the Nazi racial hierarchy such as “non-privileged” marriages, “privileged” marriages, and “Catholic non-Aryan” or “non-Aryan Catholic.”71 Even conversion to Catholicism could not save those considered racially degenerate from the Nazi persecution that had grown increasingly ubiquitous.

67 Stolzfus, 264.
69 Stolzfus, 203.
70 Ibid., 203.
71 Stolzfus, 207.
Rosenstrasse Street Protest: A Collective Effort of Resistance

But these individual arrests proved inefficient and time-consuming. In a blitzkrieg fashion, SS troops performed operation Factory Action on February 27, 1943 with urgency, confining all of the registered intermarried Jews and Mischlinge in Berlin at temporary collection centers. The Jewish Community Center on Rosenstrasse Street served as the epicenter for this uproar. In reaction to this direct encroachment on privacy and family life, intermarried Aryan wives chose to react. Their non-violent protest known as the Rosenstrasse Street Protest emerged as the most dramatic and public example of these idiosyncratic, highly personalized scenarios. This protest embodied the undercurrent of resistance and activism present amongst interracial couples during the Third Reich. Whatever the various personal motivations that encouraged these women to openly resist Nazi brutality, the outcome was an aggregate act of open resistance.

By 1943, Rita Kuhn was a teenager in Berlin when the Factory Operation occurred. Her mischlinge classification qualified her as part of the round up. On this fateful day, Rita, her father, and brother arrived at the local school to retrieve their ration cards, only to be held hostage with other Jews. Rita heard a woman cry in despair and agony “‘I want to be with them, I want to go with them’” and later realized

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72 Stolzfus, 208.
73 Stolzfus, 261.
74 Owings, Frauen: German Women Recall the Third Reich, 460.
that this voice belonged to her mother, Frau Frieda Kuhn.\textsuperscript{75} Rita described her mother’s face as white, stony, and motionless. Her worst nightmare as a mother and wife had materialized. The Nazi Regime not only disrupted this “Aryan” woman’s sense of peace and security, but also severed her physical contact with her husband and children. Despite the apparent trauma and danger, Frau Frieda Kuhn, along with other Berlin wives, rallied together for the liberation of their loved ones. Women assembled outside the Jewish community center shouting, “We want our husbands back! Let our husbands go!”\textsuperscript{76} Nazi police threatened to shoot the women and aimed their guns, but thankfully no shots were fired. Ultimately, those held hostage were released thanks to the pressure the German housewives bravely exerted on the Nazi state. Should the Nazis had fired at the women in order to enforce racial purity, they would have consequently jeopardized the sanctity of the family. Thus, these women exposed the ideological gap between enforced racial homogeny and the valorization of the family in this totalitarian state. This major protest was the most visible and compelling way individuals collectively combatted and opposed the ruthless regime. These women asserted their rights and risked everything for the sake of privacy and personal agency: the ability to chose their spouse over public obedience.

\textsuperscript{75} Ibid., 461.
\textsuperscript{76} Stolzfus, xx.
The fact that this protest is the only documented occurrence of public, non-violent resistance to Nazi authority during the Third Reich is significant. Since 1933, the Maintenance of Public Quiet and Security Law had banned all public gatherings without prior permission, so naturally the freedom of assembly and protest were non-existent in this fascist state, and any attempts to do so were highly dangerous. Even so, these women stood stoically for an entire week in the face of armed SS troops. It was an unprecedented act of open defiance, and the only incident of notable protest against the deportation of German Jews.\footnote{Stolzfus, xxv.}

\textit{Rosenstrasse Street Protest: Effects and Aftermath}

A closer examination of the Nazi Regime sheds light on their apparent concession to the \textit{Rosenstrasse} Protest. The need to maintain public order, approval, and an aura of secrecy served as possible motivations to comply with the housewives. Despite its totalitarian structure, the ability of the Nazi government to micromanage society depended on the appearance of public approval. For most ordinary citizens, the exact details of the methods employed to implement racial purification were never fully disclosed. Hitler recognized, like any savvy politician, that popular support stabilized power.\footnote{Stolzfus, 264.} Even Gestapo officers and party officials refrained from “shop talk” within the safe retreat of their homes. Programs of racial purification, such as

\footnote{Stolzfus, xxv.}
\footnote{Stolzfus, 264.}
euthanasia and deportations, depended not only upon the secrecy of the Nazi Regime in conducting these operations, but also the consent of the public. Of course, consent in this case must be equated to a general ignorance and apathy amongst civilians due to high levels of government secrecy. Nevertheless, the foundation of this fascist state ironically rested on the stability of popular opinion. Any sign of dissent jeopardized the legitimacy of its programs and policies. Therefore, any interruption to or disclosure of racial purification plans such as Operation Factory Action would rupture the protective insulation of secrecy and uninformed support. Perhaps Nazi authorities were reluctant to fire on the German wives, least they make sympathetic martyrs of their cause.

The release of these intermarried Jews and Mischlinge demonstrates the apparent gap between Nazi racial ideology and implementation. The specific social dynamic of the protest enabled its success. Unarmed Aryan women, as opposed to armed Bolsheviks, Jews, or other “degenerates,” served as the face of public opposition. The urban location of this event increased the likelihood of national and international attention, and any sort of violent measure certainly would have resulted in global outrage. In addition, perhaps the Nazis viewed this incident as a minor setback not worth consideration in the scheme of total war and

79 Stolzfus, 262.
CONDEMNED BUT NOT COERCED

genocide. Nazi officials disguised the release of the Jews from Rosenstrasse as the unauthorized mistake of local Gestapo leaders who had overstepped their duties.\textsuperscript{80} This explanation would seem plausible due to the frequent miscommunication and vague directives ordered by top-level officials to ground-level soldiers. In other words, the Nazi state utilized its highly improvisational structure as protection against accusations of liability. Nevertheless, the compliance of the regime proves their fundamental failure to enforce a directive central to their ideology. This failure between policy and practice allowed dissenters to create a small, yet crucial, space of opposition that undermined the full assault on privacy, individual choice, and personal values.

\textit{Conclusion: A Commitment to Individualism}

The protesters at Rosenstrasse serve not only an immediate example of resistance, but also attest to twelve years of silent, persistent opposition during the Third Reich. Their refusal to comply with legal directives central to Nazi ideology automatically made these individuals active opponents and not passive victims of the state. In other words, the decision to remain married was a continuous, public act of dissent, even if the choice remained secluded in secret.\textsuperscript{81} Ultimately, the Rosenstrasse Protest united a wide array of individual motivations to rescue one’s spouse that

\textsuperscript{80} Ibid., 265.
\textsuperscript{81} Ibid., 269.
extended beyond her own individual cause.\textsuperscript{82} This success, while relatively minor in the scheme of Nazi brutalities, implies that traditions of marriage and family grounded in religious and social customs ran deeper than values imposed by National Socialism.\textsuperscript{83} Ultimately, the Nazi party could not completely sever the social ties grounded on love, honor, family, and unity. The fascist government could not totally eradicate individual choice and agency, or fully penetrate the private sphere, because inner resolve served as a bulwark of resistance. Overall, intermarried individuals actively resisted the regime’s racial ideology and instead lived according to their own conscience.\textsuperscript{84} These individuals demonstrated that personal agency could confront an oppressive social system anchored in ideological and racial lies.

Today, a memorial honors the women of the \textit{Rosenstrasse Protest} in Berlin. The sculpture called “Block der Frauen” resides in a neighborhood park situated near the original site of the Jewish community center.\textsuperscript{85} The women protrude from massive blocks of clay in contorted positions and pained faces. The cohesive clay mold of the sculpture represents the solid, impenetrable force these German

\textsuperscript{82} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{83} Ibid., 272.
\textsuperscript{84} Ibid.

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women created when united in the spirit of protest and the purpose of liberation. The inscription on the sculptures translates: “The strength of civil obedience; the vigor of love overcomes violence of dictatorship; Give us our men back; Women were standing here, defeating death, Jewish men were free.” In simplistic, yet powerful language these words capture the activism of the German women despite an oppressive, masculine force. Their actions were simultaneously motivated by defiance, courage, and love, and demonstrate the significance of this daring reaction to the notorious fascist regime. The legacy of the Rosenstrasse Protest and the relationships it represents serves as a testament to the silent, active opposition, accommodation, and resistance of thousands of Germans who refused to consent to Nazi ideology. Furthermore, the commitment of these interracial couples to each other proves that individual conscience has the fortitude to withstand an influential system of social control and terror.

86 Ibid.
Fig. 1: Ingeborg Hunz