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Letter from the Editor

Dear Readers,

The term “modus vivendi” is used in International Relations to mean “a way of life where opposing parties agree to differ,” or agree to disagree. This term exemplifies the aims of this journal, because we hope to provide a forum for discussion and debate on issues important in international relations. As one of the few undergraduate journals of international relations in the country, *Modus Vivendi* is published by the International Studies Department at Rhodes College, in conjunction with the Rhodes College chapter of Sigma Iota Rho.

This year’s edition includes six essays which investigate various international events, policies, and affairs. Meaghan Waff’s essay explores how indigenous environmental social movements in the United States become radicalized, specifically citing resistance to the Yucca Mountain Project and Dakota Access Pipeline as her cases. Lucy Right applies Punctuated Equilibrium Theory to explanations for U.S. rapprochement in Cuba. Etta Danielson assesses how artificial island construction in China and the U.A.E. [specifically in Dubai] allows these countries to gain territory, create sustained economic growth, and allow for new expression of national identities. Simon Boles examines the problems of the Kafala System in Kuwait and the U.A.E. through the Marxist Revolution Theory. Using Geert Hofstede’s Model on National Dimensions, Kelsea Lewis analyzes the different fertility rates in a developed, democratic country [Germany] versus a relatively poor, authoritarian country [Cuba]. Finally, Anna Maldonado investigates how social movement theory can explain the 2011 revolution in Libya.

Modus Vivendi is a product of the efforts of faculty, staff, and students in the Rhodes College International Studies department. As student writers, we are immeasurably grateful to the faculty of the Rhodes College International Studies Department for not only teaching us the skills necessary to critically evaluate the world around us, but for also instilling in us a passion for attempting to solve and understand international problems. Special thanks to Professor Chen, as well as Kim Stevenson, for their guidance and help with this journal. I would also like to thank our amazing associate editors, Lucy, Michael, Veronica, Dominik, Hallie, Meredith and Jordan for taking the time to edit, read, and discuss the works which appear in this journal. Finally, thank you for taking an interest in international affairs, and I hope you enjoy!

Rosalind KennyBirch, Editor-in-Chief, *Modus Vivendi* 2017

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**To Be or Not to Be:
The Radicalization of Indigenous Environmental Social Movements in the United States**
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Introduction

In 1982, U.S. Congress passed the Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) (Houston, 2013, 417). The nuclear repository site chosen in this act, Yucca Mountain, lies in contested Western Shoshone territory. Thirty-four years later, in January 2016, the Army Corps of Engineers approved the Dakota Access Pipeline (DAPL) (Thorbecke, 2016). DAPL runs through Standing Rock Sioux lands. In both cases, the sanctioning of projects on native territory instigated indigenous environmental social movements concerned with contamination and the desecration of sacred sites. Yet, DAPL transformed into a radical protest that utilized confrontational tactics to achieve its goals, while the Yucca Mountain Project (YMP) presented a reformist movement, or one that chose conciliatory and cooperative strategies to reach its desired outcomes (Kate O'Neill, 2012, 121). Given the similar contexts of both protests as indigenous opposition within the United States, the question emerges as to what factors led to differing levels of radicalization between the Yucca Mountain Project and the Dakota Access Pipeline social movements?

The degree of radicalization between the Yucca Mountain Project and Dakota Access Pipeline movements varies depending on the use of formal institutions, the percentage of media coverage, and the approach to framing their environmental concerns in terms of national interest. While both movements opposed the federal government, the Western Shoshone accessed a number of local and state institutions to challenge the YMP, whereas the Standing Rock Sioux largely relied on informal grassroots organizations. Media attention also shaped their development. DAPL turned to more extreme forms of protesting than YMP because DAPL

appeared in fewer articles early on and thus needed to gain attention. However, the greatest factor explaining these levels of radicalization is how the movements framed their issues. The YMP protest adopted an inclusive “anti-nuclear” narrative that echoed previous mainstream movements, appealing to a shared national interest. On the other hand, the DAPL protest juxtaposed indigenous rights with economic and energy security, dividing potential allies by opposing mainstream interests. Such an approach forced activists to become increasingly confrontational to gain support for a controversial issue. By investigating each of these factors in turn, this paper illustrates why the YMP and DAPL protests developed different levels of radicalization. Due to the transformative nature of social movements, the Standing Rock Sioux protest is only considered before the date of 11 October 2016.

Institutions

The varied radicalization between these two movements can first be understood as the result of tribal access to and trust in institutions. For social movement theorists, institutions articulate concerns into policy and “structure the opportunities for collective action” (Doug McAdam, McCarthy and Zald, 1996, 2). Social movements occur when citizens feel that the institutions cannot or will not adequately interpret their concerns, generally because “the traditional policy-making processes focus on dominant interest groups” (Krauss, 1993, 108). Among Native Americans, movements operate within the historical context of tribal sovereignty being “egregiously and unilaterally limited by the US federal government” (Endres, 2009, 44). Both the YMP and DAPL movements mistrusted the U.S. federal government, but they dealt with that institutional mistrust differently. The Western Shoshone overcame the trust barrier by establishing the Western Shoshone Defense Project (WDSP) and working alongside other formal domestic institutions to combat the YMP. The Standing Rock Sioux, leading the DAPL

movement, instead focused on grassroots protests outside of official networks. Since the Western Shoshone accessed and trusted more institutions, thus having their interests heard in formal channels, their protest developed into a less radical movement than that of the Standing Rock Sioux.

The Western Shoshone articulated their opposition to the federal government through other institutions, allowing it to become reformist. A series of ignored treaties, particularly the 1863 *Ruby Valley Treaty of Peace and Friendship*, prompted the tribe to handle its territorial dispute outside of the Bureau of Indian Affairs (University of Nevada, n.d.). The tribe felt that the U.S. federal government failed to fulfill its Federal Indian Trust Responsibility to “protect tribal treaty rights, lands, assets, and resources” (Indian Affairs, 2016). The Western Shoshone further mistrusted the federal government because of tribal exclusion from the public comment period in the decision process leading up to the authorization of the YMP (Endres, 2009, 47-48). However, in 1991, the Western Shoshone National Council established the WSDP to officially handle land disputes and represent tribal interests (University of Nevada, n.d.). Anti-nuclear at its inception, the WSDP provided an institution that legally argued the illegitimacy of the YMP (University of Nevada, n.d.). The creation of its own institution allowed the tribe to voice concerns through a traditional, less confrontational form of protest, preventing the need for radicalization.

The Western Shoshone further conformed to traditional tactics by allying with the State of Nevada. Once the Nuclear Waste Policy Act was amended in 1987 with the “Screw Nevada Bill”—stating that Yucca Mountain was the only viable repository location—80% of Nevada opposed the project (Schrader-Frechette, 1993, 24-25). While this bill impacted the framing of the issue (to be discussed later), it also led the state to publicly question the validity of the laws and safety regulations surrounding YMP (Nuclear Information and Resource Service, 2016).

This shared sense of victimization across the state not only prompted the tribe and the State of Nevada to trust each other, but also guaranteed access to the state legislature for the tribe to express concerns about the NWPA. Combined with the WSDP, this alliance presented traditional political opportunities for the Western Shoshone to contest the YMP without turning to combative strategies.

While the Standing Rock Sioux had similar opportunities in official channels, mistrust and failed attempts at negotiations prompted the movement towards more radical opposition. The root problem was the violation of Executive Order 13175. The order states that federal agencies must allow for the “meaningful and timely input by Tribal officials” in matters concerning tribal territory (Clinton, 2000). It ensures access to traditional decision-making processes. Yet, that very access was denied to the Standing Rock Sioux. As Chairman Archambault II states, the Army Corps of Engineers “failed to follow the law and... consider the impacts of the pipeline,” which it would have been aware of had there been more communication with the tribe (Archambault, 2016). One of the initial concerns over DAPL was then the lack of access to formal domestic institutions. The DAPL movement attempted to overcome this distrust by participating in federal consultations under the Obama administration following *Standing Rock Sioux v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers* (Dax, 2016). However, these consultations solely reiterated the disrespect towards tribes, given that federal officials addressed all chairmen and leaders as “Dear Tribal Leader,” not knowing their names (Dax, 2016). In a series of consultations intended to reestablish trust, something as simple as honoring other officials by learning their names significantly impacts the negotiation process. This type of disrespect compelled the Standing Rock Sioux and their allies to distance themselves from the federal government, neither trusting nor utilizing established legal channels. Instead of creating a formal

institution like the Western Shoshone, the Standing Rock Sioux turned to independent methods. For example, it sent a petition of 160,000 signatures from North Dakota to Washington, DC via Oceti Sakowin runners (Archambault, 2016). By resorting to interest articulation outside of traditional policy channels, the Standing Rock Sioux were left with fewer ways to voice their concerns. Combined with the lack of a state ally like Nevada for the Western Shoshone, the tribe needed confrontational tactics to “let [the federal government] know that [it] will be heard” (Archambault, 2016).

The use of institutions among the Western Shoshone and the move towards grassroots channels by the Standing Rock Sioux illustrates why DAPL became more radical—it lacked the substantial traditional political opportunities that promote conciliatory behavior. Even the opportunities it did have, it did not trust. However, focusing on the U.S. federal government and other institutions addresses more the initial concern that “Indian tribes must be consulted on a government-to-government basis” than the overall development of the protests (Endres, 2009, 50). Institutions also fail to fully account for the role of societal, non-governmental alliances and public opinion on social movement evolution. That being the case, analyzing the radicalization of the YMP and DAPL protests from an institutional standpoint only partially clarifies their differences.

The Media

The second factor explaining the radicalization of these two movements is the role of the media. The news media, while central to social movements, “are not neutral [,] ... lend[ing] themselves to different rhetorics and images [,] ... rendering the salience and intensity of issues [,] ... and focus[ing] attention” (Zald, 1996, 270). Media bias determines the number of stories in which a movement is depicted and impacts its evolution, because less media recognition

increases the likelihood of confrontational tactics in an effort to draw attention to a protest. The varied radicalization between the YMP and DAPL movements can then be explained based on when and how they obtained media coverage. YMP received relatively more mainstream U.S. commercial media attention due to the number of official proceedings surrounding the protest, whereas the DAPL movement was reported almost exclusively in native and international news sources. The longer period of media silence led DAPL to be more confrontational than YMP.

The relationship between the media and protests is best described by Downs's "issue-attention" cycle. Downs proposes that the limited attention span of the public presents social movement organizations with "a limited window of opportunity during which they must convey their message" (Baylor, 1996, 247). If the movements do not gain coverage within this time period, they lose the opportunity completely (Baylor, 1996, 247). However, activists "can never be sure how long this window of opportunity will last" (Baylor, 1996, 247). That uncertainty, particularly for unreported movements, compels them to radicalize in an attempt to become salient. As shall be discussed shortly, the YMP protest obtained media attention early on in its issue-attention cycle, because the instigating legislation was within mainstream news information channels. While only 1 out of 300 articles about YMP emphasized the Western Shoshone argument, the fact remains that they had enough saliency to warrant at least 300 stories (Endres, 2009, 53). With stories already in circulation, the Western Shoshone were able to focus more on altering the message itself than attracting awareness. On the other hand, the Standing Rock Sioux went for eight months without breaking into mainstream media (Gray, 2016). In fact, the protests were "news to the media" (Gray, 2016). Even the arrival of the United Nations Special Rapporteur for Indigenous Rights in September was overlooked (Germanos, 2016). The media silence, alongside the uncertainty surrounding its 'window of opportunity,' propelled the

DAPL movement to become increasingly radical to gain domestic awareness. Seeing as the YMP protesters received some form of mainstream recognition early on and DAPL saw none, the issue-attention cycle holds that DAPL radicalized more than YMP for recognition.

A subset of the media attention issue concerns official documents. Corporate news media in the U.S. gathers information from “official proceedings, government or agency press releases, and public officials” (Baylor, 1996, 243). One study proved that out of 2,850 articles in *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post*, 78% of information came from such routine channels (Baylor, 1996, 243). That being the case, the higher the number of documents and proceedings associated with a movement, the more likely it is to receive media attention. Implicitly, higher numbers of official proceedings also indicate a lower rate of radicalization. The YMP protest, stemming from the Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA), was more likely to be covered because it started within the routine channels of media information gathering. Following the 1987 amendment of the NWPA, there were at least 15 official proceedings or public statements mentioning the dispute (Nuclear Information and Resource Service, 2016). Such relatively high numbers of official proceedings ensured a consistent presence of news stories for corporate media. The nature of the controversy then provided media saliency without the Western Shoshone becoming confrontational.

DAPL, for its part, saw fewer official proceedings. In July 2016, the Standing Rock Sioux filed a complaint against the Army Corps of Engineers on the federal level (Miller, 2016). Within four months, a petition for an injunction and for an appeal also occurred (Thorbecke, 2016). While there were five official proceedings or statements total, they all concerned that first complaint, *Standing Rock Sioux v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers* (Thorbecke, 2016). With one legal dispute, the media was not likely to cover the Standing Rock Sioux protest because it was

not prominent in the routine channels of information gathering. The media silence also results from the fact that the DAPL protest occurred in an isolated area where “it was often simply unfeasible to maintain a reporter” (Baylor, 1996 250). The Western Shoshone were similarly isolated, but dealt with so many proceedings in D.C. that its actual location did not impede coverage in the same way (Nuclear Information and Resource Service, 2016). Without numerous statements surrounding the movement, nor a location conducive to media access, DAPL received so little attention that only 5% of all articles concerning the pipeline before October 11 were from domestic mainstream media.¹ In such a situation, DAPL was forced to radicalize to garner corporate media interest.

Given the manner in which the media collates sources, the limited number of proceedings surrounding DAPL early in its issue attention cycle explains why it radicalized more than the YMP movement to achieve saliency. Compared to overall news stories, however, mainstream corporations underreported both protests because “covering protesting Indians simply did not make good news” (Baylor, 1996 250). This attitude is not unique to YMP and DAPL. In the 1960s and 1970s, the American Indian Movement developed to advocate Native American civil rights across the country, including the stand at Wounded Knee (Waterman Wittstock and Salinas, 2008). Yet, even this nation-wide protest, commonly interpreted as the height of Native American protests, saw only 50% of its stories covered by NBC (Baylor, 1996, 249). Being indigenous movements, YMP and DAPL were then similarly underreported in the larger picture. That being the case, coverage and official proceedings do not fully explain why YMP saw

¹ A search of “Standing Rock Sioux” news articles, with a sub-search of “Dakota Access Pipeline” on *LexisNexis* showed that out of 204 articles internationally, only 12 articles covered the DAPL protests in mainstream U.S. domestic media. These publications were the New York Times, with 6 articles; the Los Angeles Times, with two; the Washington Post, also with two; and the Chicago Daily Herald, with one. 12/204= .05 or 5%. Math and search performed 11 December 2016 by Meaghan Waff.

relative media success and DAPL did not. Rather, how the movements were framed illustrates why YMP received more attention, and therefore support, than DAPL.

Framing

The distinct levels of radicalization between these two movements is best clarified by framing. Within Social Movement Theory, frames are the “specific metaphors, symbolic representations, and cognitive cues used to render or cast behavior and events in an evaluative mode and to suggest alternative modes of action” (Zald, 1996, 262). Framing rejects one way of thinking in favor of a new interpretation of ideology and culture (Zald, 1996, 262). This new frame causes movements to develop differently depending on how they align with national interest. Those that appeal to mainstream and national interests are more likely to foster support for a movement and allow it to be cooperative than those frames that isolate possible supporters by confronting national interest. Among indigenous movements, “environmental justice as an organizing frame... is absolutely crucial” (Schlosberg and Carruthers, 2010, 17). Environmental justice (EJ) addresses “unbalanced proportions of environmental hazards” among low-income and minority communities (Lester, Allen and Hill, 2001, 1). While both the YMP and DAPL movements were rooted in an EJ framework, YMP protesters appealed to shared injustices through pre-established, overarching “no nuke” narratives that were more inclusive than the DAPL framework juxtaposing indigenous rights with national interests. Thus, DAPL evolved into a more radical protest by isolating itself from wider support with a divisive framework.

Central to the framing of the YMP movement is the fact that it was a nuclear issue. As such, the movement was able to utilize existing “no-nuke” master frameworks from the 1970’s that were familiar to mainstream American society (Rootes and Leonard, 2009, 839). That familiarity established that the YMP protest was trustworthy, lowering the risks associated with

collective action. During the 1970's, the predominately white suburb of Love Canal discovered that their neighborhood was adjacent to a toxic dump site "that endangered their health and their lives" (Krauss, ,1993, 111). Due to the novelty of a white community vocalizing opposition to disproportionate environmental harm, Love Canal put EJ on the mainstream agenda through a "spotlight of publicity on toxic waste" (Rootes and Leonard, 2009, 839). Wider aspects of society, realizing the unbiased health risks associated with nuclear contamination in Love Canal, interpreted this "no nuke" narrative as representative of mutual environmental concerns. Nuclear issues were then incorporated into the interests of mainstream America. Therefore, when the Western Shoshone began protesting the YMP, the fact that it addressed nuclear injustice echoed the Love Canal framing of the 1970's. The use of a "no nuke" narrative readily gained support, because it was in the mainstream environmental 'spotlight' a few years prior. While it is difficult to quantify the prevalence of nuclear concerns in all of mainstream America, the prominence of "no nuke" narratives within environmental circles made it easier for the Western Shoshone to gain support among non-native environmental activists that were already familiar with the issue.

The YMP movement further spoke to widespread support by emphasizing shared health risks. Nuclear injustice was not unique to the Western Shoshone. One could cite the Hanford Nuclear Reservation or hundreds of other cases of contamination on native lands (LaDuke,1993, 105). Nor was this case of nuclear contamination new, given over 600 previous nuclear tests on Shoshone property (LaDuke,1993, 99). What was unique about the YMP was the opportunity to frame it as an overarching injustice against U.S. citizens. As previously noted, 80% of Nevadan citizens were angered by the project, establishing shared victimization (Schrader-Frechette, 1993, 24-25). Additionally, all areas downwind of Yucca Mountain were at risk of increased leukemia, lymphoma, thyroid cancer, and more (Broze, 2016). Even in 1984, while in the

surveying stages of YMP, increased cancer rates in Mormon families across the border in Utah were discovered from previous nuclear testing (Broze, 2016). If the repository were built, storing nuclear waste for the next 10,000 years, the health risks would have expanded even farther beyond the reservation (Zhang, 2015). With the consequences of nuclear contamination already manifesting in the region, the Western Shoshone underlined how an increase in nuclear presence threatened the overall well-being of citizens, embodying the shared interests of tribal and mainstream society. That universality allowed supporters to align personal health interests with the movement, lowering the cost of collective action and providing momentum to the protest.

Moreover, the YMP framework redefined national interest to align with the movement, allowing it to become reformist. Nuclear debates themselves “invoke the national interest, defining opponents as unpatriotic” (Endres, 2009, 46). Generally, American national interest calls for “sacrifices among the communities affected by the legacies of the nuclear production process,” or sacrifice zones (Endres, 2009, 45). Yet, the YMP movement rejected this concept of sacrifice zones as being national interest (Houston, 2013, 431). Instead, it utilized the prominence of nuclear issues on the national agenda to highlight that human security was equally, if not more, important. The United Nations defines human security as the protection of “people from critical (severe) and pervasive (widespread) threats” (Human Security Unit, “Human Security in Theory and Practice,” 2009). Though a vague definition, human security conceptualizes the roles states and institutions as guardians of citizens, first and foremost. One way the movement emphasized human security was the health risk posed to future generations, with exposure of radiation being 30 percent greater for native children (closer to the Nevada Test Site), but 60 percent greater for beings in utero (George Perkins Marsh Institute, “Nuclear Risk Management for Native Communities,” 2016). In doing so, the YMP narrative questioned how a

sacrifice zone could be in the interest of the U.S. if it created such consequences? (Houston, 2013, 421). Prioritizing a nuclear repository above the well-being of citizens, the very people the government is supposed to protect based on the concept of human security, defied the Shoshone's interpretation of national interest. As such, the tribe redefined national interest as the protection of the health and well-being of American citizens. That made way for widespread support and allowed for reformist tendencies, because national interest was then a characteristic of the movement itself.

For their part, the Standing Rock Sioux framed their protest in mutually exclusive terms—indigenous rights or mainstream interests. Since the Standing Rock Sioux constitute a sovereign entity, “they have their own national interest which is often at odds with the national interest of the US” (Endres, 2009, 50). YMP avoided this distinction by creating an overarching national interest framework. However, the Standing Rock Sioux's distinct interest was clean drinking water and the protection of tribal lands, different from that of mainstream society (Archambault, 2016). Seeing as U.S. national interests tend to align with the majority groups, the prioritization of one group over the other puts them in conflict with each other. From the beginning, this dichotomy surrounded DAPL. The pipeline itself moved to the current contested location from Bismarck ““out of concern for the city's safe drinking water”” (Rickert, 2016). If the root of the DAPL protest, possible water contamination, was also the very reason the pipeline moved to native territory, then non-native interests were prioritized over native ones. That prioritization established an ‘us or them’ dichotomy that prompted the tribe to oppose U.S. national interest, because the relocation of the pipeline proved that national interest conflicted with tribal goals. That very challenge to mainstream and national interests defined the Standing Rock Sioux movement as radical.

The DAPL framework also countered mainstream economic interests. The schism in the framework partially stems from the project itself—oil. For the tribe, “no pipe, no possibility of a spill,” and no contamination to the tribe’s water (Stockton, 2016). But, for Energy Transfer Partners and the Army Corps of Engineers, no pipe, no profit from domestic oil sources, and the loss of \$3.8 billion (Stockton, 2016). Being a nation focused on economic growth, any actions against such oil production threatened U.S. national interest. Regardless of environmental concerns, the potential for monetary gain from the pipeline raised the stakes of collective action so that possible allies had to weigh whether human or economic interests were more important. Since the Standing Rock Sioux focused on the tribe’s interests for water over these economic concerns, they did not receive the support from the larger populace that would have permitted conciliatory behavior.

The DAPL movement further juxtaposed national interest by defying national energy security. Energy security constitutes “the uninterrupted availability of energy sources at an affordable price” (International Energy Agency, “What is Energy Security?,” 2016). It traditionally concerns oil and is central to the national agenda because a lack of energy in the short term can affect infrastructure and other sectors (International Energy Agency, “What is Energy Security?,” 2016). With energy security comes the idea of U.S. access to cheap oil. The Dakota Access Pipeline provided that cheap oil. However, the pipeline also threatened the safe drinking water, sacred lands, and sovereign rights of the Standing Rock Sioux tribe. So, by protesting the pipeline, the tribe also protested energy security. The problem with that framework is that in opposing the pipeline, potential supporters would also have to oppose energy security, which might be important to their personal interests. If larger parts of society had to evaluate how they prioritized indigenous drinking rights in relation to economic growth and energy

security, then many possible allies were distanced from the movement because of other interests. The difficulty in fostering support brought on by the direct challenge to national interest transformed DAPL into a radical movement.

By emphasizing indigenous rights, the DAPL movement questioned the priorities of the national agenda. This issue, energy versus rights, summarily determined the increased anti-governmental radicalization of the DAPL protest, as opposed to the relatively more reformist YMP movement. With oil being so tied to national interest and tribal rights being central to the movement, DAPL protesters lacked the basis for an inclusive framework. YMP, being a nuclear threat, could redefine national interest and appeal to mainstream society easily, maintaining a conciliatory posture. It was not the media attention, nor the ability to use institutions that had the largest impact on the development of these two movements; it was how they chose their 'master frames' to appeal to potential supporters in the larger community.

Conclusion

By delving into the development of the Western Shoshone and Standing Rock Sioux protests, this essay illustrated why two indigenous environment social movements within the U.S. developed varied levels of radicalization. The Standing Rock Sioux protest became more confrontational than the Western Shoshone due to lower levels of trust in and use of formal institutions, a lower number of media articles through mainstream companies, and a framework that countered national interest. Though the differing levels of institutional accessibility accounts for some of the reformist tendencies among YMP, it does not fully explain the movement's relationship with larger society. Media, as well, could explain the radicalization of DAPL over YMP, but both were relatively underreported in their early stages compared to all stories on the national level. It is the third factor, framing, that best expounds the differences between the two

movements. YMP protesters attracted widespread support because the “no-nuke” narrative was something that the entire country could embrace. The framework prevented the need for YMP to radicalize against the government and mainstream society, because it easily overcame collective action barriers. DAPL framed economic growth and energy security against indigenous rights, juxtaposing national interest in a way that isolated mainstream support. Therefore, the divisive framework of the DAPL protests compared to the inclusive “no-nuke” narrative used in the YMP movement caused the Standing Rock Sioux to radicalize more than the Western Shoshone to resolve their environmental concerns.

A final note addresses the outcomes of these protests. The Western Shoshone saw victory when Obama shut down the now-abandoned nuclear site in 2011 (Northey, 2011). DAPL is less decisive. Following October 11, the DAPL protest received a significant amount of domestic attention. It also radicalized to the point that security used water cannons, dogs, pepper spray, and tear gas on the protesters (Kruta, 2016). On December 4, the Army Corps of Engineers halted construction of the pipeline under the orders of President Obama (Healy and Fandos, 2016). However, President Trump issued an executive order upon entering the White House that forces all protesters to leave the construction site by February 22 (Preza, 2017). Trump believes that finishing the pipeline would promote “policies that benefit all Americans” (Imbler, 2016). While protesters are leaving the reservation, the tribe continues to challenge the pipeline in court (Helsel and Medina, 2017). It still remains uncertain whether DAPL protesters will successfully shut down the pipeline, and whether they will need to alter their approach to combat Trump’s administration. For now, the lesson remains that the radicalization of these movements rests foremost on how they presented their dissent. The more aligned with national interest, the more support available and the more reformist the movement.

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Understanding U.S. Rapprochement with Cuba through the Lens of Punctuated Equilibrium Theory

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On December 17, 2014, President Barack Obama made a historic announcement shattering one of the last vestiges of Cold War foreign policy: after 53 years of severed ties, the United States was rekindling its relationship with Cuba. The President asserted that, while “rooted in the best of intentions,” the outdated policy of the U.S. towards Cuba had succeeded neither to destabilize the Communist Castro regime nor to ensure democracy (Obama, 2014). The rationale for normalization was made clear: the policy of enmity failed to promote the interests of the American people or the Cuban people; thus, the time had come for America to “cut loose the shackles of the past” and “extend the hand of friendship” to “our family to the South” (Obama, 2014). Such lofty objectives and noble justifications, however, failed to address the obvious question: why now? Why only now, after five decades of policy failure, was the time ripe to re-imagine our policy towards Cuba?

Punctuated Equilibrium Theory (PET), in seeking to explain both stasis and change in the policy process, can shed light on both the factors responsible for the persistence of status quo policy as well as the impetus for significant shifts (Baumgartner, et al., 2014). Emphasizing the role of institutional configuration, specifically that of the “policy monopoly,” and the mechanism of a policy image in both perpetuating equilibrium and sparking occasional dramatic change, the Punctuated Equilibrium framework asserts that status quo policy can be broken up only by a change in the policy monopoly, as caused by either a large-scale exogenous shock or the accumulation of minor small-scale events (Baumgartner, et. al., 2014). In applying the framework of Punctuated Equilibrium Theory to the case of U.S. policy towards Cuba, one can hypothesize a response to the difficult question, why now? After 50 years of status quo policy,

perpetuated by the policy monopoly enjoyed by the Cuba Lobby and its corresponding maintenance of a favorable policy image, a number of small changes in circumstance brought Cuban-American relations to the forefront, which in turn created a window of opportunity in which President Obama could successfully introduce a radical change in policy and set a new equilibrium for bilateral relations with Cuba. The small changes in circumstance, outlined in greater detail below, allowed for a competing policy image questioning the efficacy of the current policy to emerge, undermining the Cuba Lobby's monopoly and introducing new actors with new solutions to the conversation. President Obama's policy shift therefore was neither untimely nor arbitrary—rather, it was a response to the alignment of several factors that permitted the President to direct his attention towards the issue and subsequently enact a previously unfeasible solution.

The following section presents a brief summary of the U.S.'s new strategy and objective for Cuban-American relations as announced in December 2014. Next, I provide a general explanation of the Punctuated Equilibrium Theory and the causal mechanisms that distinguish it from other theories of the policy process. The third section offers an in-depth analysis of the process leading to the U.S.-Cuba rapprochement as understood within a Punctuated Equilibrium framework. Lastly, I evaluate the advantages and limitations of the Punctuated Equilibrium Theory in explaining the departure from status quo in the U.S.-Cuban case, ultimately arguing that, despite certain limitations, the theory provides valuable insight to the essential question—why now?—presented by President Obama's radical shift in policy.

“Charting a New Course on Cuba”²

²Title of Fact Sheet disseminated by Office of the Press Secretary

The updated American policy towards Cuba maintains the former policy's objective—to promote democracy and a greater concern for human rights—through a strategy of direct engagement and the empowerment of the Cuban people. In a frank admission of U.S. failure to install democracy in other spheres, a WhiteHouse.gov fact sheet on the issue reads: “We know from hard-learned experience that it is better to encourage and support reform than to impose policies that will render a country a failed state” (Office of the Press Secretary, 2014). Thus, the new policy of engagement emphasizes the need for the Cuban people to drive democratic and economic reform from the bottom-up. The components of the new approach are designed to strengthen civil society, foster the growth of the private sector, and widen access to communication by increasing the flow of information and resources to the island (Office of the Press Secretary, 2014).

The new strategy to “help the Cuban people help themselves” marks a radical departure from the enmity of the past in four key regards (Obama, 2014). First, it re-establishes the diplomatic ties between the two states which had been severed in 1961, calls for the re-establishment of a U.S. embassy in Havana and of a Cuban embassy in D.C., and initiates an open dialogue between the two countries regarding issues of shared interest (Office of the Press Secretary, 2014). Second, the policy removes some of the limitations on remittances, donations, and travel, allowing for increased “people-to-people” contact and greater monetary support for humanitarian organizations. Third, it permits the exportation of certain goods, including building materials, communication materials, and agricultural equipment, from the U.S. to bolster private sector growth and improve access to information. Lastly, it calls for Secretary of State John Kerry to review Cuba's designation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism (Office of the Press

Secretary, 2014). Consequently, six months later the designation was rescinded (Renwick and Lee, 2015).

Stasis and Crisis in Punctuated Equilibrium Theory

The Punctuated Equilibrium Theory (PET), developed by Frank Baumgartner and Bryan Jones, recognizes the political system as characterized by incrementalism (small, marginal changes in policy) and equilibrium but interrupted by occasional periods of explosive change (Baumgartner, et. al., 2014). To explain the phenomenon of stability and crisis within the same political system, the PET asserts that bounded rationality and the nature of political institutions create a policy process at once conservative and liable to radical change (Baumgartner, et al., 2014). PET relies on several assumptions. First, it assumes that actors (including governments) make decisions according to bounded rationality, such that actors are constrained in choice by time, money, and the ability to process information, as well as by limited attention spans. PET assumes that at the macro-political level, information is processed serially. Political institutions in the public eye, such as Congress or the Presidency, thus process information in the same way as individuals: they can direct their attention to only one issue at a time and are limited in how much time they can allocate to each individual issue. However, policy subsystems, consisting of small communities of issue-experts, enable parallel processing within the political system by addressing multiple issues simultaneously (Baumgartner, et al., 2014). Within policy subsystems exist policy monopolies—epistemic communities or interest groups focused on one issue (Baumgartner, et. al., 2014). Policy monopolies stabilize subsystem politics and defend status quo policy through two mechanisms: institutional structure and policy image. Within a policy monopoly, the institutional structure dictates that actors who have vested interest in the continuation of a policy will attempt to control information and the influx of new actors so to

defend the status quo. The policy image is “the manner in which a policy is characterized or understood” (Baumgartner, et. al., 2014:85). Policy monopolies promote a favorable policy image that reinforces the policy’s stability through the process of negative feedback.

Baumgartner, Jones and Mortensen provide a succinct description of the causal logic underlying PET:

Complexity in political systems, the accumulation of unaddressed grievances, or other political processes can change the “normal” process of equilibrium and status quo based on negative feedback (which dampens down activities) into those rare periods when positive feedback (which reinforces activities) leads to explosive change for a short while and the establishment of a new policy equilibrium (Baumgartner, et al., 2014, p. 61).

Thus, “explosive change” begins when an issue previously captured in a policy monopoly attracts the attention of new actors (policy entrepreneurs, interest groups, subsystems), either as a result of an exogenous shock or a build-up of minor events. These actors present competing policy images and propose new solutions to the discussion, thus undermining the stability of the policy monopoly. If the policy monopoly is unable to curb the entrance of new actors or the creation of new policy images, positive feedback can occur, in which a small initial change in circumstance can lead to a huge blow to stability. Through effective agenda advancement and proper access, the new policy entrepreneurs can propel the issue into the realm of the macro political system. Because the macro-political system processes information serially, if attention shifts to the particular issue, radical change in policy becomes possible. Thus, policy images, serial shifts, and agenda setting are mechanisms that allow policies in an inherently conservative political system to emerge from the realm of the stability-prone subsystem to the volatile macro-level stage, where policymakers can effect significant policy changes disrupting long periods of equilibrium (Baumgartner, et al., 2014).

Applying PET to U.S.-Cuba Rapprochement

The application of the PET framework to the shift in U.S. policy toward Cuba necessitates a direct focus on the policy monopoly that perpetuated the status quo and the factors that permitted the erosion of the monopoly and provided the impetus and opportunity for change. The discussion below is centered on four key components of the U.S. policy toward Cuba from its inception in 1961 to its reimagining in 2014: the persistence of the policy monopoly, the emergence of a competing policy image, the emergence of new subsystem actors, and the shift in attention towards the issue on the macro-level.

Policy Monopoly: The Cuba Lobby's Three Decades of Policy Capture

When diplomatic ties were severed between the US and Cuba in 1961, and the economic embargo was imposed in the subsequent year, the American strategy to isolate Cuba was a direct response to the rise of Fidel Castro's communist regime and its growing relationship with the Soviet Union. However, when Cuba faced a severe economic downturn in 1980, driving over 125,000 Cuban migrants to the shores of Florida with no option of returning home, the policy's base of support grew from security-minded Cold War-mongers to include the burgeoning community of Cuban Americans who had settled in the Miami area. Formed in 1981 with the noble objective of "continu[ing] the struggle for a free Cuba on behalf of their on-island brothers and sisters suffering under the tyranny" of the Castro regime, the Cuban American National Foundation (CANF) became the first exile organization to exert a powerful influence on Washington politics (Cuban American National Foundation: Mission & History, n.d.). Largely through campaign contributions, the CANF pushed several successful pieces of legislation through Congress that tightened U.S. restrictions on Cuba, including the notable 1996 Helms-Burton Act that wrote the economic embargo into federal law (Leogrande, 2013).

While the CANF left the lobbying arena in 1997, replaced in subsequent years by the U.S.-Cuba Democracy PAC, the Cuba Lobby maintained its policy monopoly for a variety of reasons. First, it was the only lobby group concerned with the issue of the U.S. embargo. William Leogrande, who has written extensively about the influence and activities of the Cuba Lobby, aptly notes that the Cuba Lobby benefitted from the privilege of “policy capture” (Leogrande, 2015, p. 477). With the end of the Cold War, Cuba largely exited the stage of macro-politics, allowing the policy to remain outside the public eye on the subsystem level, where its stability could be ensured by the tight control of the policy monopoly (Leogrande, 2015).

Second, the Cuba Lobby’s maintenance of a favorable policy image regarding the effectiveness of the U.S. embargo and policy of disengagement reinforced the policy’s stability. The U.S.-Cuba Democracy PAC (2014) propagated the image of Cuba as a repressive, terroristic state posing a greater threat to its citizens and the United States with every additional US dollar it received. The PAC’s mission to inform legislators “about the true nature of the Castro regime and their anti-American policies and activities worldwide” conveyed the idea that the existing policy was an effective one. The committee drew largely on Cuba’s designation as a state sponsor of terrorism to assert the Castro regime’s threat to U.S. security. Characterizing Cuba as a state that “maintain[ed] close relations with other state sponsors of terrorism” to such an extent that it was “caught red-handed trafficking weapons to North Korea,” the PAC championed the U.S.’s policy of disengagement and enmity as an essential measure in the preservation of U.S. security interests (U.S.-Cuba Democracy PAC, 2014).

Third, through campaign contributions, the Cuba Lobby exercised strong control in excluding or silencing politicians who posed a threat to the status quo. Leogrande (2013) writes

that the Cuba Lobby “combine[d] the carrot of political money with the stick of political denunciation” to prevent wavering policymakers from challenging the status quo policy, finding several instances in which the Cuba Lobby played a decisive role in State Department appointments, most significantly during the Bush Administration (p. 5). In one case, the lobby denounced Clinton’s choice of Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs on the basis that the candidate had once traveled to Cuba, exerting such pressure on the President that the candidate was removed from consideration (Leogrande, 2013). The U.S.-Democracy PAC’s campaign contributions peaked in the 2008 election cycle, during which the PAC spent over \$750,000 financing federal candidates (Center for Responsive Politics, 2016). In addition to being the highest funded election cycle, 2008 also marked the first cycle in which Democratic candidates received more contributions than Republican candidates (Center for Responsive Politics, 2016). The increase in contributions and the shift in party distribution could reflect a growing concern within the Cuba Lobby regarding the campaign promises of presidential candidate Barack Obama. In a 2008 campaign speech to the CANF, Obama announced his intention to update the U.S. policy toward Cuba and engage in direct diplomacy with Raul Castro (Zeleny, 2008). Shockingly, his message resonated with the audience. Jorge Mas Santos, son of the CANF founder, publicly endorsed Obama’s call for a new approach to Cuban-American relations, stating that the current policy “on its own [is] ineffective and plays into the hands of Raul Castro” (Zeleny, 2008). Such radical departure from the political orientation of the CANF a decade earlier reflects a crucial shift in Cuban American opinion that prompts the emergence of an opposition to the status quo policy and invites new policy actors to the conversation of U.S.-Cuban relations.

Breaking the Policy Monopoly: Emergence of a Competing Policy Image

Santos's endorsement of Barack Obama's promise for change represented a larger trend within the Cuban American community. A 2008 poll surveying Miami's Cuban American community revealed that, for the first time in the poll's seventeen-year history, a majority of Cuban Americans (55%) opposed the continuation of the embargo (Gladwin, 2008). Additionally, 65% of respondents supported the re-establishment of diplomatic ties (compared to 43% in 2004), 67% supported unrestricted travel to Cuba (compared to 46% in 2004), and 38% of respondents reported voting for Barack Obama—an unusually high percentage for a community known to be a bastion of Republican support (Gladwin, 2008). The shift of majority support towards a new approach to Cuban relations proved to be a permanent one. The same poll, conducted in 2014, reported similar findings: 52% of Cuban Americans polled opposed the continuation of the embargo, 68% favored re-establishing diplomatic relations, and 69% supported unrestricted travel (Grenier and Gladwin, 2014). In indicating that the Cuba Lobby no longer represented the majority opinion of the Cuban American community, the 2008 and 2014 polls created an opportunity for meaningful opposition to the status quo policy to emerge. In the past, concern for upsetting the Cuba Lobby, and thus losing the Cuban American vote, rendered the risk of re-evaluating the Cuba policy too high for policymakers. The data presented in the polls lowered the risk for macro-level policymakers of enacting a new approach. Previously uninvolved actors on the subsystem level sensed this change in the rational calculus and emerged to present new policy solutions and form a critical image of the current policy. In this way, a marginal shift in opinion within the Cuban American community began a feeding frenzy powerful enough to disrupt 50 years of status quo policy and policy monopoly.

In the context of an emerging unfavorable policy image, it is important to note that Cuban American attitudes were not the only ones changing. Public opinion more broadly in the U.S.

was also shifting toward a more favorable view of Cuba and a less favorable view of the current U.S. strategy. A 2014 Gallup poll found that more Americans than ever before (38%) harbored a favorable view of Cuba (Gallup, 2014). While not a majority, the figure represented a steady 1% per year rise in favorability over the last decade. Similarly, a Pew Research report conducted a month after the new policy was announced found that 63% of Americans approved of the President's decision to re-establish diplomatic ties with the island (Pew Research Center, 2015). The growing support for a new U.S. approach to Cuba in both the Cuban American community and the wider population reflects the increasing salience of the new policy image at odds with the pro-embargo image propagated by the Cuba Lobby.

Breaking the Policy Monopoly: Emergence of New Policy Actors

With the beginning of the Obama Administration's first term, many subsystem policy actors, specifically epistemic communities, turned their attention to the issue of the U.S.'s failed policy toward Cuba. One such actor was the Brookings Institute. Under the "Brookings Project on U.S. Policy toward a Cuba in Transition," Brookings brought together nineteen scholars and diplomats, half of them Cuban American, to produce a proposed policy for a reimagined U.S.-Cuban relationship. The resulting report, released in 2009, contains many of the objectives and initiatives that will appear in the President's strategy and emphasizes the need for engagement that promotes democratic regime change from within (Pascual et al., 2009). The Center for Democracy in the Americas (CDA) also focused its attention on U.S.-Cuban policy in the late 2000s. Starting with its 2007 report entitled "Top Ten Reasons for Changing US Policy towards Cuba," the CDA published four reports between 2007 and 2011 urging a change in policy and outlining possible policy structures. In a 2011 report, the CDA calls on the President to recognize America's "new opportunity to be seen by Cuba's people and its future leaders supporting their

efforts to build a new economy and to help the Cuban people lead prosperous lives” (Lavery, 2011:69). The reports extended by the epistemic community contain the same fundamental policy prescriptions: remove Cuba from the State Sponsor of Terrorism list, open diplomatic relations, loosen travel restrictions, increase remittance limits, support growth of the private business sector, and improve communications technology. These similarities in policy prescription represent the emergence of a cohesive policy option that stands in opposition to the preservation of the status quo. This development, made possible by the rise of new actors to the conversation at the subsystem level, propelled the issue of Cuban-American relations to the macro-political agenda.

A final crucial factor in directing macro-level attention to the issue was the increased coverage of the U.S.-Cuba policy in the press. In fall 2014, the *New York Times*' Editorial Board released an editorial condemning the 50-year-old failed policy of disengagement and calling for an immediate solution (The Editorial Board, 2014). The editorial encouraged the President to remove Cuba from the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism, to restore diplomatic ties, and to take steps towards effecting an end to the embargo, emphasizing (in language strikingly similar to that which appears two months later in the President's own announcement) the need to reorient the policy's objectives to “empower ordinary Cubans” and help Cuba “unlock the potential of its citizens” (The Editorial Board, 2014). It was followed by a series of editorials, a total of eight in October and November, highlighting Cuba's domestic affairs and the adverse effects of the current policy on the lives of the Cuban people. The timing of the intensive coverage was not mere happenstance. The editors had sensed a crucial opening for President Obama to enact significant change in the U.S. policy toward Cuba: Latin American leaders, in spite of serious U.S. objections, had extended to Cuba an unprecedented invitation to the 7th Summit of Americas

scheduled for April 2015. The Obama Administration faced a dilemma: either boycott the conference and threaten U.S. relations with the hemisphere, or use the Summit as venue to begin rebuilding U.S.-Cuban relations. The *Times*, explaining the issue, made their position clear: “Mr. Obama should seize this opportunity to end a long era of enmity” (The Editorial Board, 2014).

The pressures for a change in policy that had been building through a positive feedback process in the subsystem combined to force the issue onto the macro-political agenda. The Summit dilemma forced the issue to the *top* of the macro-political agenda, where it commanded the immediate attention of the President. Through a decision-making calculus, President Obama determined that the “strategic importance of repairing the United States’ frayed relations with Latin America [had] come to outweigh the political risk of reconciliation with Havana” (Leogrande, 2013, p. 8). In this way, President Obama was able to enact a new policy of rapprochement towards Cuba, radically disrupting 53 years of stagnant policy and pushing U.S.-Cuban relations into a new equilibrium.

The Strengths and Limitations of PET

The PET is limited in that it cannot elucidate causal relationships between various factors—it cannot explain if the emergence of a policy image opposing the status quo policy with Cuba led to the emergence of epistemic communities addressing possible new policies, or if the reverse is true. However, it is likely the authors of the theory anticipated the two to be mutually reinforcing by the nature of the “feeding frenzy” of positive feedback. Thus, to question causation between the emergence of new actors and the emergence of new policy images in a “chicken-or-egg” type discussion would likely prove futile.

Perhaps the theory does not emphasize sufficiently the importance of President Obama’s predisposition to altering the policy as articulated in his campaign. One could argue that the

appearance of the U.S.-Cuba policy on the national agenda was less a result of processes occurring in the subsystem forcing the issue into the macro-political realm, and more a result of the President looking for an opportunity to enact a change in policy that he had publicly supported as early as his 2007 campaign. Even if this is the case, it cannot be denied that the changes that occurred at the subsystem level—including but not limited to the decreased Cuban American support for the Cuba Lobby and the creation of new policies proposed by communities of experts—altered the circumstances influencing the President’s decision-making calculus such that the new policy posed increasingly more benefits and increasingly fewer risks.

The greatest strength of PET as applied to the U.S. rapprochement with Cuba lies in its thorough focus on the structural factors that account for the extensive period of stasis in U.S.-Cuba policy, namely the policy monopoly. Additionally, the PET directs one’s attention to the relationship between macro-politics and subsystem politics, which allows one to determine why the U.S. policy towards Cuba reached the macro-political agenda when it did, as well as what factors and actors encouraged the issue’s ascension to the macro-political. PET’s assumption of bounded rationality helps us to understand why, once on the macro-political agenda, the issue captured the attention of the President and led to his introduction of a new policy, by suggesting policymakers have short attention spans and make decisions according to a decision-making calculus. In this way, the PET helps us to understand why the punctuation, in a long period of stasis, occurred when it did—that is to say, it helps us answer the nagging question: why *now*?

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**The New Geopolitics:
A Comparative Analysis of Artificial Island Construction in China and Dubai**
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Between August 2014 and September 2015, China reclaimed a total of 677 acres of land to transform the Fiery Cross Reef into what is now a naval base eleven times the original landmass (Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative [AMTI], 2016). This is a small part of the country's construction activities in the South China Sea: since its start, the Chinese government created a total of 3,200 acres of land (AMTI, 2016). As a cornerstone of civilization, humans mold nature to suit their interests, whether through damming, farming, or building permanent structures. But this anthropogenic environmental development is raised to new heights by technological modernization that bred, for example, the phenomenon of artificial island-building. This modernization is not without fault; construction of the islands has adverse effects on the surrounding ecosystem. Still, worldwide, modern nations construct these landmasses for housing, tourism, airports, naval bases, and ports. International media networks and academics turned their attentions to China's land reclamation activities in the South China Sea because of the region's status as a highly contested territory and its importance to national security. However, not all island building activities are associated with such heavily political and legal implications. Dubai developed its artificial islands solely for real estate. The question is, then, with such different uses, why have both of these states—and many more—turned to the construction of artificial island building? As successfully developing countries, China and the United Arab Emirates concentrated their efforts on nation-building, to which geopolitical tactics are essential. Because these countries exist in a modern and post-colonial society, they adopted the process of land reclamation to obtain the benefits of gained territory, including sustained economic growth

and the distillation and expression of national identities. This method proves the enduring significance of territorial growth for nation-building.

Background

Nation-building is defined as the construction of national identity and institutions in order to concentrate and express the power of the state. As developing states, such as China and the United Arab Emirates, acquire the economic means to gain relevance in the international community, they seek to strengthen and assert their power by expanding militarily, securing political ties, sustaining economic growth, and cultivating a national identity. Further, the centralization of political institutions, particularly economies, in developing nations provides advantages during this process by streamlining a state's policies and their effects, which China and the UAE both enjoy. It is the common interest in nation-building and access to available resources that have led these states to land reclamation.

Territorial acquisition has long been a foundation of nation-building for developing states. This realm of political science, geopolitics, concerns "power at a large scale;...how the world is organized politically, divided into states, blocs, alliances, territories, jurisdictions and administrative regions." It invokes "the big questions of who rules, and political affairs at the planetary scale" (Dalby, 2014, p.2). Precisely defining geopolitics is an elusive task, as it shifts with the norms of the era. From the 15th century to the 20th century, European industrialization and development was aided by the colonization of territories in Africa and North America. Beyond the acquisition of resources and labor, these territorial gains also signified political power to other European nations, and thus evolved into a source of domestic pride. However, since the end of World War II, these nations have freed their colonies and the act of colonization has since become politically unacceptable, as the United Nations has affirmed the inalienable

right to freedom and sovereignty (United Nations, 1960). Yet, geopolitical interests have not disappeared and the acquisition of new territory continues to provide many gifts, economic and otherwise, to developing nations. There are new anthropogenic tactics involving manipulation of the environment for this aspect of nation-building, namely artificial island construction. In China and the United Arab Emirates have used this process as a new geopolitical tactic to secure territory as a part of a nation-building agenda.

China's Interests in the South China Sea

China's national development status influences many of its policies, as it strives to sustain economic growth, continues to modernize, and fosters its power in the international political sphere. The country is interested in nation-building and must continue the growth of its economy to support other nation-building concerns. According to the World Bank, China's GDP growth has averaged 10 percent a year, which is the fastest continued expansion by a major economy in history (World Bank, 2016). This successful development opens many doors for the country—doors that it would like to hold open. The South China Sea holds many promises of resources that could prove economically beneficial. There are multiple island groups in the region, but the largest and most closely contested is the Spratly group, which has more than 230 islands and reefs between the Philippine island of Palawan and the southeastern coast of Vietnam (Denoon & Brams, 2001, p. 200). Significant fisheries exist within this region, and they serve as an inviting resource to China's economic ambitions. Additionally, the region provides the more critical material of oil. Although the islands are tiny, none over a mile in length, "many observers have speculated about potential [amounts of] offshore oil in the Spratlys Region," specifically, seven billion barrels (Denoon & Brams, 2001, p. 199; Kaplan, 2014). Oil is especially enticing to

Chinese officials, as the country is the world's largest net importer of petroleum and other liquid fuels (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2014). Control over a local oil source will allow the country to use the fuel directly or the capital gained by exporting it to invest in other nation-building interests.

China's ability to successfully invest in the region is largely thanks to its consolidated political and economic power, proving the importance of centralized governing to nation-building countries. Although the economy was decentralized after 1978 at the end of Mao Zedong's rule, the state continues to wield a heavy hand in the market—and in all aspects of governing. The Chinese government voted for a policy of readjustment, reform, consolidation, and improvement--all of which called for state intervention to develop industry and distribute capital (Zhuoyuan, 1982, p. 2). As a whole, Deng Xiaoping led the way in transforming Mao's communist economy into a market-based system, resulting in both economic growth and social development, but with continued government intervention. This becomes evident in the South China Sea as the government-owned China National Offshore Oil Corporation invested \$20 billion with the belief that huge amounts of oil do exist (Kaplan, 2014, p.?). In total, China's centralized political economy has stimulated rapid economic growth, which it desires to maintain.

Land development in the South China Sea also more directly affects China's nation-building efforts, especially in developing a national identity. This cannot be fully understood without the concept of China's "superiority-inferiority complex". Judith Shapiro (2016) uses this term to describe an important cultural feature that influences the government's policies. The "superiority" side originates from the concept that "in a prior millennia China was a great, unified Han civilization" (p. 85). It was "the center of civilization, more advanced than other

lands, a ‘Middle Kingdom’” (p. 85). However, in the 19th and 20th centuries, China experienced a number of national humiliations: military defeats that forced the country to import opium (among other goods), unequal treaties, and foreign control of territories (Shapiro, 2016, p. 86-87). Thus, China aims to re-establish its “Middle Kingdom” superiority as part of its national identity. After the annexation and occupation of Chinese territory, the country views sovereignty, especially territorial sovereignty, as a matter of paramount importance to its pride and superior identity. This interest has manifested in the country’s aggressive policies towards territorial disputes in the South China Sea.

There are six claimants to all or part of the Spratly Region: China, Taiwan, and four members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nation (ASEAN). The bases for these countries’ respective claims involve historical uses, geographical features, and past treaties (Denoon & Brams, 2001, p. 202). China itself did not occupy a single island in the Spratly group until March 1988 when it incited conflict with Vietnam and took over the Fiery Reef. Later that year, when Philippine president Corazon Aquino met with Deng Xiaoping, in Beijing, he claimed that the entire South China Sea was Chinese territory. Deng named three components of their position on the islands: “Beijing (1) had sovereignty, which was nonnegotiable; (2) would assure free passage for aircraft and ships; and (3) was willing to participate in joint ventures with other nations to develop the oil and gas deposits” (Denoon and Brams, 2001, 203). Mira Rapp-Hooper, formerly the director of the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, affirms that simply strengthening control over the territory is a main reason for China’s development (Watkins, 2016). Further, the region serves as an important trade route. One-half of the world’s annual merchant fleet tonnage and one-third of all maritime traffic worldwide pass through the South China Sea (Kaplan, 2014). Control of such trafficked trade

routes could help secure China's economic domination and bolster its feelings of national superiority and pride.

Although very different from the United Arab Emirates' nation-building interests, the development and strengthening of a military force is a major part of China's nation-building that evidences itself in the island construction in the South China Sea. These islands have become naval bases with airstrips, surveillance capabilities, and stations for troops. As a whole, island building in the South China Sea has become important for China's nation-building interests because it supplies the capital necessary to continue development and it provides the direct construction of a national identity and a strengthened military presence.

Construction of Luxury Islands in Dubai

Like China, Dubai's artificial island building has the geopolitical benefits of growing the economy and developing national identity. However, these interests evidence themselves in different ways, especially because the area of development for Dubai is not contested and thus lacks major political or legal implications. Dubai's island building has been solely for the real estate and tourism industries. Government investment generated capital that can be deposited back into other nation-building activities, but is also a part of the nation-building tactic of developing a strengthened economic system. The direct economic benefit that can be used for nation-building and the restructuring of the economic system will be examined together for the study of Dubai.

Since the United Arab Emirates was established as a united country in 1971, its leadership rapidly developed its political systems and economic policies. The country has a wealth of natural resources, namely oil, which allowed for the accumulation of capital and rapid

development. Today the country is considered fully developed based on levels of GDP and Human Development Index score (The World Bank, 2016; United Nations Development Programme, 2015) . However, for this study of artificial island building, which dates back to the mid-1990s, the Emirates was still considered a developing nation, though both a successful and a high-income one due to oil revenues. At the time, Dubai aimed for sustained economic development, which led to the restructuring of its economic system. The entire UAE government endeavored to diversify industry to protect against fluctuations in the oil market that began after the shocks in the 1970s (Gause, 2002, p. 63). A study of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, “The political emphasis on diversification seems to have fluctuated inversely with the incomes from oil and gas, such that low oil prices spurred strong political emphasis on diversification”, proving governmental focus on restructuring and market diversification as important nation-building efforts (Hvidt, 2013, p.2).

Dubai, in particular, “led the way in economic diversification away from oil, and its ruling family enjoys a good deal of autonomy within the UAE” (Herb, 2009, p. 41). As the Emirates have opened their economy, the enduring power of the ruling family in Dubai especially is important to note. There has been a historic commitment to a business-friendly environment, openness towards foreigners in business, but a belief in the proactive role of the state. This business is friendly but state controlled economic system is similar to that of China. And like China, the central political economy of Dubai has allowed for successful development and for the use of geopolitical nation-building tactics.

In 1997, Dubai’s Emir, Sheikh Mohammad aimed to raise tourism revenue to diversify the economy. Although the coastline was nearly developed in the mid-1990s, the finite natural environment did not limit the emir’s ambitions, and he requested further beach area

development. Ports boss Sultan Bin Sulayem and concept designer Warren Pickering developed the plans for an island off the coast of the city. The new island, Palm Jumeirah, would give Dubai forty-eight miles of new shoreline (Krane, 2009, p. 153). And with the development of the island, the benefits of a centralized government are evident. In 2000, Sheikh Mohammad launched a new company from the government's department of ports and customs, which came to be known as Nakheel, with bin Sulayem at the head. Nakheel completed Palm Jumeirah in 2006, along with another palm shaped island and an archipelago of three hundred masses representing countries, called The World. Financial limitations, especially after the 2008 recession, curbed a fraction of the emir's ambitions, as some of the originally planned islands were cancelled. Despite these complications, the development still succeeded in achieving capital gains, part of a larger restructuring of the economy. The United Arab Emirates has one of the most diverse economies of the Gulf States based on the percentage of oil that makes up its GDP, with the lowest of the GCC states at 32% in 2011 (Hvidt, 2013, p. 13). The state's incredible construction of manmade geographical area provides capital for the country to invest in other nation-building activities, and this development aided in the improvement of the economic system, an important nation-building interest for Dubai's leadership.

The islands also act as a physical translation of Dubai's identity, another important aspect of nation-building. As stated in the English language Emirati newspaper *The Gulf Today*, "Our leaders have inspired [our] nationals to work hard to develop their motherland into one of the most prosperous and peaceful countries on this planet" (Faria, 2016). This statement reflects the sentiments on national identity and pride in Dubai. The impressive engineering projects in the city, including massive man-made islands, clearly exemplify the prosperity of Dubai. Further, the islands themselves reflect the city's identity, as Sheikh Mohammad requested a design that

would reflect the national symbol of the date palm (Krane, 2009, p. 153). Moreover, willingness to open to the West and the values of the city, or at least the expression thereof, differ from much of the Arab world. Dubai is much more socially liberal than other states in the region. The development of an open and prosperous identity also perpetuates economic growth, as it is these characteristics that attract tourists.

Environmental Effects and Conclusion

Both China and the United Arab Emirates found the geopolitical tactic of land acquisition important for sustaining economic growth and for investing other nation-building interests. Their centralized political economies proved effective in the obtainment of new territory as a means to progress and build their developing states. Unlike the 15th century when undeveloped territory was readily available and the exploitation of such territories was permitted, these states were forced to manipulate the environment, aided by new technologies, to acquire territory. Now, China and Dubai exploit the environment by reclaiming land to meet their nation-building interests.

And as it happens, the process of creating these islands is a costly one for the surrounding ecosystem. The creation of artificial islands requires sediment to be sucked up, transported through a long pipe, and then deposited on the desired area. In the South China Sea, sediment is deposited onto existing reefs, thus effectively destroying them and damaging the surrounding marine ecosystem. China's construction alone resulted in the destruction of 311 hectares of precious reefs (Batongbacal, 2015). In the New York Times, Frank Muller-Karger, professor of biological oceanography at the University of South Florida, contributed that "sediment 'can wash back into the sea, forming plumes that can smother marine life and could be laced with heavy metals, oil and other chemicals from the ships and shore facilities being built'" (Watkins, 2015). Additionally, the occupation of islands in the South China Sea will result in constant pollution

directly into the marine ecosystem from ships and other equipment, as well as day-to-day activities of occupancy. Further, the island will negatively impact food supply for other peoples. China's overfishing already caused major problems for marine ecosystems and other nations that rely on the same fisheries. The Philippines' coastal communities, for instance, are dependent upon fisheries in the South China Sea for subsistence, and thus are sensitive to unchecked Chinese fishers (Batongbacal, 2015). Chinese anthropogenic activities in manipulating the environment to fit the state's interests severely damage the region's ecosystems and results in a multitude of negative impacts.

The same effect occurs off the coast of Dubai, where the island construction and the resulting layers of sediment are "destroying the marine habitat, burying coral reefs, oyster beds and subterranean fields of sea grass, threatening local marine species as well as other species dependent upon them for food." Additionally, these ecosystems that provide food and shelter to marine species also protect the coastline from erosion and storms (Butler, 2005). However, after receiving negative publicity, the development company admitted to adverse environmental effects from the construction and has taken steps towards preventing further degradation of the surrounding ecosystem. Nakheel employed a marine biologist to monitor the islands and surrounding reefs. Further, they plan to develop artificial reefs to replenish the ecosystem (Butler, 2005). The company reportedly signed an agreement with the United Nations University allowing a team of coastal management experts to develop an environmental monitoring program for the Gulf area to maintain the marine ecosystem and study all of Nakheel's marine projects (Jones, 2007, p. 377).

Although the construction of the islands will undoubtedly have adverse environmental effects no matter the "monitoring" activities, it is hopeful that Nakheel, and thus Dubai's

government, expressed concern over environmental degradation and committed to adaptive activities. Of course, China following suit is unlikely. As Dubai developed directly against the coast, its effects can easily be seen by citizens that pressure the company and the government about its environmental consequences, whereas the development in the South China Sea is physically hidden from citizens that may have environmental sympathies. Additionally, as discussed, the South China Sea has national security and military implications, and these themes dominate environmental concerns. It is doubtful, even if environmental protection groups were to advocate against the construction, that China would renounce their territorial claims and cease development in the South China Sea.

As these developments clearly come with a price, the question seems to be, both for China and the Emirates: if geopolitical development remains necessary to their respective interests, economic or otherwise, can it be sustainable? Nakheel claims that it is. The company hired experts to begin developing artificial coral reefs to replace those destroyed by island construction. A group of researchers found that of the areas they studied, artificial reefs had higher coral cover, but lower species diversity and richness. They concluded that while artificial reefs can support coral and fish communities, they differ structurally from natural reefs and cannot be considered a replacement (Burt, Bartholomew, Usseglio, Bauman, & Sale, 2009). Artificial reefs could even aid with Dubai's goals, as abundant coral reefs attract tourists. Yet, these reefs cannot replace the hundreds of acres of real reefs lost, and China has made no indication of interest in developing artificial reefs. Clearly, it is unlikely that either country will halt development in the near future as they invested heavily in development, despite the environmental costs.

In brief, both states stand to reap major benefits from artificial island building. China will gain a military stronghold in a contested region and affirmed importance in the international community. Both China and Dubai will have some economic returns from development, if not massive gains, which may allow further investment in nation-building activities. Yet, the construction of islands themselves is already an effective nation-building tactic, without additional returns. The developing states are able to use land reclamation as a tactic to maintain, grow, and assert their economic and political power as well as their national identity. Further, the situations in China and Dubai prove the benefits of a centralized political economy for a developing nation. And both cases demonstrate the lasting importance of territorial acquisition to developing nations and international affairs in a modern global system. With worldwide technological advancements, geopolitics now involves modern methods of development such as artificial island building. These means of progress mark the shift to the new anthropogenic geopolitics required in a world with an ever growing population and an unceasing desire to develop.

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Exploitation and Denial of Citizenship: Applying Marxist Revolution Theory to the Problems of the Kafala System in Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates

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Introduction

Many states within the Middle East have recently experienced revolt, which has stemmed from governmental instability, political illegitimacy, controversial and exclusionary principles of radical parties, and a general sense of dissatisfaction. According to Marxist Revolution Theory, states are subject to social revolution when the working class (proletarians) becomes unified and realizes that they have the power to overthrow the upper class (bourgeoisie) to change their place within the system. The states of Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) can be used as case studies in the application of Marxist Revolution Theory because both possess built-in mechanisms to ensure the division of citizens in order to guarantee the inability of revolt against the upper classes and regimes of their countries. In an attempt to maintain national order and control, Kuwait and the UAE exploit their migrant workforces so that the number of official citizens remains proportionally low. Kuwait and the UAE are fulfilling Marxist Revolution theory by employing the Kafala system, which includes tactics such as intentional exclusivity in regards to citizenship and divisive naturalization laws that position the working and upper classes against each other to ensure political stability.

The Kafala System

The Kafala system is a clever invention of Middle Eastern states to create exclusive and hostile conditions for both citizens and non-citizens. Desperate workers come from poor regions, namely Southeast Asia, to seek out the work they know is available in the Gulf States. While usually aware that they will be subject to abuse and poor working conditions, migrant workers

comply, knowing that they will make more money in the Gulf States than they would be able to make in their native countries (Auwal, 2010). However, it should be noted that the migrant workers are usually not *fully* aware of the conditions that await them, and they are often misled by their interpreters and recruiters to believe that they will be doing more meaningful work in significantly better conditions (Auwal, 2010). Additionally, the cost accumulated in fees for recruiting agencies, travel expenses, and visas often cause migrant workers to arrive already indebted to their employers, which adds more pressure for the worker to make a substantial sum of money (Rahman, 2015).

A particularly harmful feature of the Kafala system is the tethering of workers to their employers. The harmfulness of this feature is highlighted by workplace disputes, because international sponsorship, which is needed for legal residence, is achieved through the worker's employer. Thus, changing between employers is almost impossible. Even if workers are able to go through a formal legal process of changing sponsorship, the process usually takes far too long, and the worker in question will likely lose his or her job due to absence from the workplace (Varia, 2011). Without work, he or she is ultimately subject to deportation as he or she would technically be an unsponsored expatriate and therefore, subject to harsh legal ramifications (Mahdavi, 2013). Such situations evoke feelings of hopelessness in migrant workers, and place power in the hands of employers, which is exactly where the state wants power to be held. Thus, the state can continue oppress migrant workers, and pave the way for a bourgeoisie-dominated society.

The Kafala System of Kuwait

Kuwait first implemented the Kafala system to provide Kuwaiti citizens with meaningful work while using migrant laborers to fill less desirable jobs (Tétreault 70). Written in 1962, The

constitution of Kuwait guarantees all citizens the right to public-sector work (Tétreault 70). Due to this guarantee, most citizens of Kuwait take advantage of the high-paying state-sector jobs, which keep them from working in less-desirable conditions. This reveals the importance of the Kafala system: lower-paid, less-meaningful labor must still be accomplished, but citizens, because they are able to easily secure high-paying government jobs, do not feel a responsibility to do such work; therefore, to function properly the state of Kuwait is now dependent on the Kafala System.

Kuwait's guarantee of state-sector work for all citizens has resulted in an interesting power of the state: the ability to ensure the position of official Kuwaiti citizens in the socio-economic ladder (Tétreault, 1995). The government's provision of state-sector jobs for citizens creates an inherent environment of elitism among Kuwaiti citizens, which in turn inspires approval of the government. Kuwaiti citizens often feel a sense of importance and accomplishment in their work, while looking at the class of migrant workers with disdain. This attitude of elitism feeds into the severe exploitation of migrant workers within the Kafala system, a climate intentionally created by the state to ensure that the status quo is maintained. This ties into Marxist theory, as the state is systematically oppressing the proletariat to ensure political stability.

The Kafala System of the United Arab Emirates

The Kafala system of the UAE is largely similar to the Kuwaiti system, but migrant workers in the Emirati system have less representation in and protection from the Emirati government. In general, the UAE's foreign policy is dominated by the concern of illegal immigration as a shortage of jobs has caused high levels of competition among potential and

current migrant workers (Mahdavi, 2013). The UAE's Kafala system is an excellent example of the exploitation of migrant workers in Middle Eastern society.

A large portion of migrant workers are formally excluded from the guarantee of labor rights ensured by the government. Articles 3 and 72 of the Emirati labor law state that domestic workers, farmers, and seafarers are excluded from the provisions of labor laws, this exclusion has now come to be applied to workers within most sectors of less-meaningful work (Mahdavi, 2013). Thus, Kafala employers have the dangerous freedom of treating workers however they please. Furthermore, the UAE's labor law contains a clause stating that migrant workers can be immediately deported if they are suspected of committing 'moral wrongdoing' (Mahdavi, 2013). Such a phrase is intentionally vague to continue marginalization of migrant workers while simultaneously solidifying the power of Kafala employers. This contributes to the already deep societal cleavage between the upper and working classes because of tension and power politics between workers and employers.

The governments of both Kuwait and the UAE intentionally further the societal cleavages between migrant workers and employers of migrants in their countries by concentrating power in the hands of unjust Kafala employers. This, in turn, creates regime stability for both Kuwait and the UAE.

Exclusive Citizenship and Naturalization Laws

In addition to the Kafala system, the governments of Kuwait and the UAE intentionally create fringe groups comprised of non-citizens as a method of maintaining control of the population. Both countries use exclusive citizenship laws to maintain a social hierarchy wherein citizens occupy the upper class and migrant workers occupy the working class.

Exclusive Citizenship and Naturalization Laws of Kuwait

In Kuwait, such laws make citizenship almost impossible to achieve, even for those who have been living in the country for upwards of half a century. Most permanent residents of Kuwait are not actually citizens: only 30% of permanent residents are citizens, while an estimated 70% of residents are non-citizens (Tétreault, 1995; Jamal, 2015). Kuwaiti citizens have been in the minority since before the 1960s (Tétreault, 1995). Keeping the number of citizens low has allowed the Kuwaiti government to keep its promise of governmentally-guaranteed state-sector work, but this is soon to change, as the population has recently spiked. Currently, two-thirds of the population of proper citizens are under the age of 20, and the Kuwaiti government is currently at capacity in terms of the jobs it can offer citizens (Gasiorowski, 2011). This means that the government will have to begin denying jobs to citizens, which will be a direct violation of the constitution. This denial could lead to uprising and possibly revolution, a pattern which has been observed in several other Middle Eastern states.

In terms of specific citizenship laws, Kuwait views the family as the primary unit of analysis within society. Citizenship laws are classified as ‘jus sanguinis,’ which translates from Latin as ‘right of blood’ (Vora, 2015). In this context, this means that citizenship is held by families rather than by individuals, as families are defined by the Kuwaiti state as the primary unit of society (Tétreault, 1995). This specification has significant implications for non-citizen residents who wish to naturalize. In accordance with the Nationality Law of 1959, families must adhere to a rigorous set of requirements to be eligible to apply for citizenship: all family members must have lived in Kuwait for at least 20 years, speak fluent Arabic, have a stable source of income, and identify as a Muslim (Tétreault, 1995). Even when families meet these criteria, efforts at naturalization are further hindered by the small but significant caveat specified in the Nationality Law of 1959: only 50 people per year will be granted citizenship (Tétreault,

1995). Such a caveat fosters competition and disunity among the migrant workforce, which is in accordance with Marxist theory in the sense that the state is intentionally creating divisions among the proletariat class to distract from efforts at unifying or expressing common grievances.

Kuwait's creation of such an exclusive system of citizenship has led to several implications that have threatened the government's overall goal of maintaining stability through division of the working class. When the government eventually runs out of jobs, Kuwait will be facing a multi-dimensional issue of public disapproval. The population of permanent non-citizen residents and migrant workers have already begun voicing dissatisfaction with the Kuwaiti government due to feelings of a lack of representation, unsafe working conditions, and the impossibility of achieving proper citizenship. Such frustration is already disturbing societal cohesion, as is predicted in Marxist Revolution Theory.

Exclusive Citizenship and Naturalization Laws of the United Arab Emirates

Similar to Kuwait, the UAE employs a very exclusive and difficult naturalization process. The UAE has maintained the highest annual immigration growth rate in the world: 15.9% from 1960 to 2005 (Jamal, 2015). Such a high rate is indicative of beliefs held by migrants that building a new life for themselves and their families in the UAE is possible. In terms of demographics, the UAE has a comparatively smaller population of proper citizens. In 2015, only 11.5% of the UAE's total population of 8.26 million were proper citizens (Jamal, 2015). However, the classification of 'proper citizen' in the UAE is more complicated than in Kuwait, because the UAE possesses a concrete hierarchy of citizenship classifications (Jamal, 2015). Specifically, there are three types of citizens: full citizens, partial citizens, and Bidoons. Full citizens either possess a so-called 'family book,' which shows a heritage of Emiratis tracing back to at least 1925, or they were officially granted citizenship by the state (Jamal, 2015). Partial

citizens are Emirati passport holders who are citizens for legal purposes but have not been officially granted citizenship (Jamal, 2015). Finally, Bidoons are not citizens, but they possess an Emirati identification card and are officially classified as former nomads (Jamal, 2015). Such an explicitly-defined hierarchy of citizenship contributes to a lack of nationalism, which is already threatened by the cohabitation of citizens and non-citizens.

In addition to the lack of cohesion of Emirati citizens, the state ensures that migrant populations remain disjointed by carefully regulating the flow of migration into the UAE. The state will randomly select migrant communities that will receive preferential treatment in visa renewals, access to better jobs, and generally better humanitarian treatment (Jamal, 2015). Thus, the UAE ensures that the working class remains disjointed enough to remain at its current place in the hierarchical social system. As compared to the intentional distinction between meaningful and non-meaningful work in Kuwait, which ensures that the working class remains humble as a result of the upper class's elitist attitude.

The UAE has built its strict naturalization process upon the claim that granting migrants citizenship would be threatening to the Emirati sense of identity (Jamal, 2015). Many political scientists have discounted such a claim, as the UAE has historically been known to allow masses of migrants to become permanent residents within the migrant workforce, so their 'infiltration' of Emirati culture is already present (Jamal, 2015). The strict naturalization process dates back to the British involvement within the UAE, as the British also wanted to control population growth to also suppress potential uprising (Jamal, 2015). Similar to the requirements of Kuwait, those wishing to obtain Emirati citizenship must fulfill a residency requirement (the length of which is determined by the individual's nationality), a language requirement, and an employment requirement (Jamal, 2015). However, further than that, the process is largely undefined, so

foreigners are rarely granted citizenship at all; when they do, no observable pattern emerges (Jamal, 2015).

As is the case in Kuwait, the UAE is already experiencing a disrupted societal cohesion due to strict citizenship and naturalization laws. Additionally, the engineering of a strategic flow of migration of workers into the UAE is indicative that the state recognizes the threatening nature of unity among the working class.

Marxist Ties

The common thread running through both the Kafala system and exclusive citizenship and naturalization laws in Kuwait and the UAE is Marxist social revolution theory. As previously mentioned, Marxist social revolution theory maintains that the proletariat will band together and overthrow the bourgeoisie. It begins with an emergence of cognitive liberation, wherein the proletariat unifies upon realizing its shared dissatisfaction with the state. After such cognitive liberation is achieved, unity ensues, further leading to mobilization of the masses to overthrow the bourgeoisie.

In the cases of Kuwait and the UAE, the migrant workers are the proletariat. They are continually repressed by the state via the Kafala system so that the state can maintain political stability. The state creates an impossible environment for the migrant workers, diverting their attention from workplace frustrations and instead toward the constant struggle for survival. Furthermore, the state intentionally prevents migrant workers from becoming citizens, as allowing for citizenship would give the proletariat a voice within the political sphere to express dissatisfaction. Citizenship, as viewed by the state, is a slippery slope to unity among the proletariat, as politically-represented citizens have a marginally more established place to challenge the repressive government than migrant workers do.

Conclusion

Both Kuwait and the UAE are using the Kafala system and exclusive citizenship and naturalization laws to prevent social uprising and eventual revolution. Mass frustrations are already brewing among the migrant workforces of both Kuwait and the UAE, where workers are realizing that they are being entrapped within the exploitative Kafala system with no path to eventual naturalization. Tensions experienced as a result of both of these institutions are disrupting societal cohesion, and they will soon likely eventually boil to a tipping point.

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The Impact of Periods of Political Unrest as an Avenue for Low Fertility Rates in a Country

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Introduction:

Regarding fertility rates of a country, totals that fall below the general replacement rate can be detrimental to economic growth through an aging working class (Belsie, n.d.). Developed countries tend to have low fertility rates resulting from lifestyle choices that advocate economic prosperity, while developing countries lean toward high fertility rates due to a lack of effective contraceptives, limited female education, and a vital child labor force (Nargund, 2009). Data has shown, however, that there are some developing and economically low income nations that have relatively low fertility rates despite their developing status. The question arises of what contributes to a country having low fertility rates if not founded on its developed or developing economic ranks. Many anthropologists propose that countries with low fertility rates are heavily affected by economic changes such as higher education attainment, decreasing employment, or increasing poverty rates in that country's working infrastructure ("Economics influence fertility rates," 2013). This assertion is based on low fertility rates being used as a response to both periods of economic stability and instability in a country. These same anthropologists also propose that low fertility rates can be reversed by implementing monetary incentives to the people in that country ("Economics influence fertility rates," 2013). I, however, advocate that pivotal periods of political unrest in a specific point in a country's history can provide the necessary framework for fertility rates to decrease and remain low. Economic status is only one factor for why certain countries have low fertility rates and not the overall underlying reason. The values that are established in the people during these specific times are what continues to support low fertility rates in the present. This comparative analysis will examine the developed,

democratic nation of Germany and the developing, authoritarian nation of Cuba and their respective critical moments in history to prove that the values created during times of political instability have a persisting effect on these country's fertility rate levels. These times of political volatility are the German student protest movement and the Cuban Revolution in the mid to late 20th century. This analysis will use Geert Hofstede's Model on National Dimensions to expound on these evolving values and how they relate to low fertility rates and justify why a cultural instead of incentivized approach is necessary to reverse decreasing rates in a country.

Hofstede's Model on National Dimensions and Pivotal Events of Political Unrest:

Geert Hofstede's Model on National Dimensions measures cultural elements that represent the independent preferences and practices that distinguish countries from each other (Hofstede, 2013). These six dimensions are power distance, individualism, masculinity, uncertainty avoidance, long and short term orientation and indulgence. The dimensions are scored from one to one hundred with the higher the number, the more prevalent the dimension in each case. This analysis will use individualism, power distance and uncertainty avoidance, and long-short term orientation cultural levels and the German student protests and the Cuban Revolution to make a connection between the cultural values created during those historic periods and low fertility rates.

The levels of individualism that countries have are solidified by historical periods that challenge an individuals' sense of worth and self-value (Hofstede, 2010). Power distance showcases how society deals with disparities and inconsistencies among its people and the government and uncertainty avoidance conveys how society feels about ambiguity (Hofstede, 2010). The long-short term orientation dimension shows how a country links its past to its present and how it will deal with future challenges (Hofstede, 2010).

Both the German student protests and the Cuban Revolution resulted in a steep decline in fertility rates in each country within a 10-year timespan. In Germany, the fertility rate moved from a stable 2.5 in 1964 to 1.5 in 1973 (“Fertility Rate, Germany,” n.d.). In Cuba, the fertility rate went from a moderately high 4.6 in 1964 to 1.8 in 1980 (“Fertility Rate, Cuba,” n.d.). Both countries maintained a constant fertility rate below 2 until present day. This rate is well below the world average of 2.4 (“Fertility Rate, World,” n.d.). As of 2014, fertility rates are 1.39 in Germany and 1.61 in Cuba (“Fertility Rate, World,” n.d.). These countries’ dimension scores in individualism, power distance and uncertainty avoidance, and long-short term orientation will provide the necessary correlations that link its current values to its stated periods of political unrest which created present low fertility rates. It is fair to address that although Hofstede’s Model on National Dimensions gave exact numbers for the dimension scores for Germany, it did not give exact dimension scores for Cuba, but rather gave detailed descriptions of the high and low nature of each cultural element.

Individualism Dimension:

Individualism, per Hofstede’s Model, evaluates how self-interested a country’s society is in terms of economic stability and civil society (Hofstede, 2010). People in countries with high individualism scores are “expected to take care of only themselves and their immediate families,” which means financial responsibility lies with familial obligations (Hofstede, 2010). In contrast, countries with low individualism scores encourage collectivist ideas which promote close family and friend relationships and are mindful of each other both emotionally and monetarily (Hofstede, 2010).

Germany, with a score of 67, is very individualistic in both males and females and its low fertility rates are supported through their constant drive for economic success. High

individualism scores show that Germans are more likely to take care of themselves and their proximate families before taking care of people not directly associated with them (Hofstede, 2010). This mentality developed from the student protest movement of the 1960s to 1980s in East and West Germany and is imperative in Germany's increasing vocal activism as a means for expressing certain social displeasures. These social displeasures included unfair and restrictive reproductive rights for women (Medeiros, 2012). This new era of sexual liberation being displayed in the female population in Germany altered societal attitudes about sex and sexual practices in the country. The appreciation for sexual freedom generated the use of more contraceptives and birth control pills to prevent pregnancies. This increasing contraceptive use was very prevalent in Germany as 84.8% of women admitted to using them in a study made in 1992 (Ulrich, 2001). This new mindset in German women, which also involved the realization that they did not need a husband to be financially stable, started the individualistic belief that validated Germany's steep fertility rate decline in the 1960s-1970s and continued supporting its current low fertility rates.

One way sexual liberation influenced Germany's fertility rates is in the number of women waiting later in life to get married. As new legislation was being implemented to limit the societal differences between genders, German women started to plan and prepare their own futures and how they were going to live their own lives. Marriage became a choice rather than a necessity. If a woman happened to get pregnant, she no longer worried about being able to support herself and her baby as more benefits were introduced to help single mothers financially. These benefits include 14 weeks of paid leave at full pay at work (Jenner, 2013) and a claimable child allowance on yearly tax returns (Scheller, 2015). Waiting to get married not only decreases the chances of a woman getting pregnant, but lowers the likelihood of that woman getting

pregnant in that fertility in 30+ year old women is 20% and 5% in 40+ year old women (“Age and Fertility,” 2012). Statistics show that during the time of the student protest movement, marriage rates per 1000 inhabitants in Germany dropped from 9.5 in the 1960s to 7.4 in the 1970s (“Crude Marriage Rate,” 2016). This marriage rate continued to decline in the subsequent decades and is 4.8 as of 2014 (“Crude Marriage Rate,” 2016). First time marriage age numbers also took an increase from an average of 24 in the 1960s to 29.8 at the turn of the century (“Families in Germany,” n.d.). With marriage and fertility rates decreasing and first time marriage age increasing, more woman in Germany became involved in the workforce. Data shows that the 38.4% female employment of 1970 increased to 53.2% in 2012; a statistic that supports low fertility rates in that a working woman will reduce her chances of getting pregnant thereby limiting unnecessary obligations (“Families in Germany,” n.d.). The sexual liberation ideal created during the student protest movement in Germany helped perpetuate their current low fertility rates in a way that promoted individualism and independence over immediately getting married and starting a family as marriage helps to influence women to have children.

Cubans, however, are very allocentric and collectivistic which supports its low fertility rates based on their need to stay financially stable (“Cuban Culture,” n.d.). Their low levels of individualism show that Cubans are willing to put aside their personal economic and social goals to benefit their family, friends, and community (“Cuban Culture,” n.d.). As a collectivistic culture that values cooperation, teamwork and assistance, Cubans are willing to give personal sacrifices if it helps someone else in need. Since Cuba is an authoritarian and developing country with very low income levels, low fertility rates are warranted in that people know that adding one child or more children to their families would be an economic struggle. Their communalism is reflected in Cuba’s communist history stemming from the time before, during, and after the

Cuban Revolution. The Cuban Revolution of the early 1950s was a period of political unrest that included an armed revolt led by Fidel Castro against President Fulgencio Batista's authoritarian regime ("The Cuban Revolution," n.d.). The disdain for the Cuban dictator started when President Batista seized power during the election season of 1952 to maintain control over Cuba. Seeing this as an unfair authority grab, Fidel Castro sought to ostracize President Batista with the help of the 26th of July Movement by his side. Castro increased its arsenal by collecting new weapons and staging guerilla attacks against President Batista ("The Cuban Revolution," n.d.). Although Fidel Castro and his followers eventually overthrew President Batista, Cuba continued to be a non-democratic country under Castro rule as time went on. The Cuban government advocated that the better the state, the better the welfare of the society ("Cuban Culture According to Hofstede," n.d.). Low fertility rates in Cuba are supported in that it is economically dangerous to have many children in such an ambiguous authoritarian regime and their collectivist mindset allows them to put their focus on the present obligations on the individuals around them.

With Germany and Cuba's high and low levels of individualism, it is shown that fertility rates can be constructed on a cultural mindset that supports how individuals feel about the welfare of themselves or their community. Although Germany and Cuba are completely different in Hofstede's individualism model, the way the two countries view themselves in relationship to the economic and social structure of the society around them is what validates these two country's low fertility rates.

Power Distance and Uncertainty Avoidance Dimensions:

Power distance and uncertainty avoidance dimensions collectively contribute to low fertility rates in that political unrest has determined how Germany and Cuba deal with social

indifferences and economic insecurities. High level countries accept hierarchical order with no rationalization while low level countries strive for equal allocation of power and demand explanation for societal inequalities (Hofstede, 2010). These two dimensions cooperatively support Germany and Cuba's current low fertility rates.

Germany's low power distance score of 35 and high uncertainty avoidance score of 65 resulted from the protests of displeasure of many of the reforms and policies college students felt were "undemocratic" and how they lacked a fair voice in how their colleges were being administered in the 1960s and 1970s (Schaefer, 2008). The West German government, in the eyes of the students, was beginning to become more authoritarian, which was displayed in the increased instances of police brutality and press censorship on college campuses throughout several German cities (Medeiros, 2012). Germany's low power distance score is the embodiment of that quest for equal opportunities for all people. Germany's strong middle class is supported by their high individualism, advocates co-determination rights in management, open communication, limited control, and cooperative leadership (Hofstede, 2010). This mindset has reinforced Germany's decreasing fertility rates for over the past 50 years. Low power distance created a high level of self-esteem and confidence in Germans to achieve their fullest potential and succeed economically and socially. High uncertainty avoidance levels only solidify Germany's pursuit to avoid unnecessary responsibilities in having more than one child and remaining financially stable. Although Germans are currently more capable of dealing with uncertain future events based on the democratic and developed nature of the country, Germans maintain a sense of cognizance that allows them to always try to be one step ahead of any situation and low fertility rates are just one of the ways that they showcase this awareness.

Cuba, oppositely, has high levels in both power distance and uncertainty avoidance which are a direct result of the rough political events during the Cuban Revolution and the unjust implications that resulted from it. Since the period during the Cuban Revolution until the present, Cuba remained unfree and completely under an authoritarian rule. High power distance scores entail that any unfair policies that Cubans feel are detrimental to their way of life cannot be resolved with authoritarian rule under a dictator (“Cuba,” n.d.). Cubans have grown accustomed to living under strong state control over civil society in factors such as power, wealth, and laws (“Cuba,” n.d.). High power distance supports low fertility in that Cubans feel it is too risky for them to have more than one child under such powerful governmental rule. Coupled with a high uncertainty avoidance that is based on the strict enforcement of an unchanging societal structure, Cubans citizens do not have much control over what happens in their lives economic and social lives and are accustomed to many things being planned by others (“Cuban Culture According to Hofstede,” n.d.). There is also a strong sense of governmental distrust in the Cuban culture that resulted from Cubans believing that Fidel Castro was going to make their country democratic during the Cuban Revolution and that promise not being fulfilled. Thus, Cubans take very few risks and low fertility is supported.

With Germany and Cuba’s levels of power distance and uncertainty avoidance, it is showcased that fertility rates can be formed on a cultural belief that reinforces how individuals feel about the societal injustices and the ambiguities of the future. Although Germany and Cuba have differences in Hofstede’s power distance and uncertainty avoidance models, how they perceive themselves in association with the power of the government economic and unknown situations about the society around them is what justifies these two country’s low fertility rates.

Long and Short Term Orientation Dimension:

With long and short term orientation, high levels of conclude a more pragmatic country which encourages modern thinking for situational issues (Hofstede, 2010). Low levels showcase normative societies that value cultural traditions while still viewing society under a suspicious lens (Hofstede, 2010). Germany's long term orientation and Cuba's short term orientation is the overall foundation of the different scores they have in their individualism, power distance, and uncertainty avoidance dimensions. Their low fertility stems from how they correlate their history to current events.

Germany, with a very high score of 83, is considered a long term oriented country because citizens can adapt easily to changed conditions and show a strong sense of persistence and perseverance (Hofstede, 2010). This mindset resulting from the student protest movement strongly supports Germany's low fertility rates in that citizens never gave up until they achieved the progress they wanted to see in their country's society. Germans, with their unending drive for economic stability, use their evolving determined and enduring value set to strive to be the best that they can be both financially and socially. This drive supports their current low fertility rates in that they feel more than one child can intrude on any goals that they set for themselves in their lives.

Long term oriented countries also save and invest much of their money and are very thrifty and frugal (Hofstede, 2010). During the student protest movements, Germany was going through a very pivotal moment in its history with the dividing of Germany with the Berlin Wall. This was a time of much economic uncertainty for both East and West Germans. That sense of being wise with their money is an aspect that has decreased fertility rates in Germany over the past 40 years and allowed them to remain low.

Cuba, however, is a short term oriented country that focuses on the present and immediate results. They usually live day to day lives and do not plan much economically for the future. This type of mindset is supported by its low fertility rate in that Cubans leave their futures up to the government and it is against the law to go against it. Cuba, which continues to be under authoritarian even since the Cuban Revolution, is a country that citizens know their place and more children would not be in the best interest under their value set.

Summary, Conclusion, and Importance Relevance:

The initial question drawn at the beginning of this comparative analysis was whether the economic status of developed or developing provided the necessary contribution to why some countries around the world have low fertility under the replacement rate. With this analysis, it is clear economic levels are only one factor in the overall driving force that allow many countries to reach and maintain low fertility status. With the usage of Gerald Hofstede's Model on National Dimensions, we see that low fertility rates can be warranted through values that are solidified during specific periods of political unrest in a country's history. Low fertility rates, as in Germany and Cuba, are the direct embodiment of how individuals voice their concerns about society and how they feel they can remain or achieve economic success. It is more well-known that high fertility rates are economically, demographically, and environmentally unstable, but societies must also advocate how detrimental low fertility rates can be (Consequences of High Fertility," 2010). As with Germany and Cuba, there have been many incentives implemented to try and reverse their low fertility rates. These incentives, however, have not seen any significant changes that allow their rates to rise above replacement. The reasons for why these incentives have not worked in Germany or Cuba are because they are focused solely on monetary benefits and do not reflect these country's specific cultures and values. It is important for countries with

low fertility rates to evaluate pivotal moments of political unrest in their histories to understand the cultural makeup of their citizens in the present to find ways to boost fertility rates. It is extremely difficult to persuade a person to have two or more children based solely on monetary gains. Societies must recognize these cultural characteristics to motivate its people to have more children in a way that will not sacrifice their personal values and aspirations for the future.

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Social Movement Theory Applied to the 2011 Libyan Revolution

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Scholars have been studying mass mobilization and social movements since the middle of the nineteenth century. Social movement actors engage in political and cultural conflicts meant to promote or oppose social change. They look to establish changes in social structures or reward distribution in society. Why do these movements arise? How do they become successful? In this regard, the overthrow of the Gadhafi regime in the Libyan Revolution provides a solid example for the establishment of a new order in society. It originated as one of the many social movements comprising the Arab Spring, yet devolved into internecine civil war (Lim, 2016). The Arab Spring consisted of many dispersed movements in a variety of countries. Some movements, such as those in Tunisia, Egypt, and Yemen, generated immense public support and succeeded in removing dictatorial targeted leaders, while others, such as those in Kuwait, Morocco, Jordan and Oman, led to only minor changes (Lim, 2016). In the case of Libya, civil war led to the ousting of Colonel Muammar Gadhafi's regime. Social movement theory successfully explains the emergence of revolution from the social movement in Libya by bringing attention to the country's center periphery cleavage comprised of pro and anti-Gadhafi forces, to its resource mobilization through social media networking, and to Gadhafi's overbearing power and strength as an authoritarian leader that made the regime difficult to breach.

Gadhafi's regime was not a democratic one. Since its beginning, it proved to be rigid and repressive, a view shared by many of the Arab world leaders (Amoretti, 2016). In both 2009 and 2011, the Freedom of the Press Index showed Libya to be the most-censored state in the Middle East and North Africa (Freedom of the Press 2009-2011). The ruthless nature of Gadhafi's

regime is clearly identified in his 1973 “Five Point Address” where he announced that those who organized against him would face immediate death. He backed his threats with action, showcasing public hangings and mutilations of his political opponents (Eljahmi, 2006). Not only was his regime far from democratic, but it infringed upon the most basic of human rights. Ghadafi used fear and intimidation to enforce cooperation in place of rule of law.

On February 17, 2011, an armed conflict fought between the loyal forces of Colonel Gadhafi and those seeking to oust his government marked the beginning of the Libyan Revolution. The war was preceded by protests in Benghazi beginning on Tuesday, February 15, leading to clashes with security forces that fired at civilians in the crowd, and quickly escalating into a rebellion that spread across the entire country. The protests within Libya quickly gained momentum despite Gadhafi’s violent response, and by March, the country was immersed in a full-fledged revolution (Amoretti, 2016). After months of armed conflict, in September of 2011, the National Transitional Council was recognized by the United Nations as the legal representative of Libya, replacing Gadhafi who was later captured and killed that October. October 23, 2011 marked the official end of the war, with the National Transitional Council officially declaring the liberation of Libya.

What brought about this change? What drove the anti-Gadhafi citizens to finally take action after forty years under his rule? What allowed for the movement to transition into revolution and war? Social movement theory allows for the careful analysis of this transition into revolution, assessing why the initial social movement arose and later why it blossomed into a civil war. However, it is essential to first establish the causal logic and assumptions this theory poses. Firstly, one must understand that ideas of change among actors are essentially generated by factors that create division in a population. These factors can be materialist, in which issues

are related to material goods (i.e. money, capital, wealth, power etc.). They can also be post-materialist, which are prominent after a country has developed economically; a few examples of post-materialist factors include civil rights, morality issues and animal welfare. In the case of Libya, it is evident that post-materialist factors divided the population, in which the anti-Ghadafi forces demanded civil liberties and greater freedoms, and in which the pro-Ghadafi forces suppressed these requests to keep the status quo in their best interest. Social movement theory also establishes the influence of societal cleavages. The center periphery cleavage describes the divide between the political center of the country and the outskirts, producing an anti-establishment attitude in the outliers against the center. As it pertains to the eruption of civil war and the removal of Gadhafi in Libya, it is evident that a center periphery cleavage is in effect, comprising of a group with an anti-establishment attitude towards the regime, and a group loyal to the regime. It was the oppressive, violent ways of the Gadhafi regime and its denial of individual liberties, along with the ongoing corruption and weakening of the economy, that were the factors contributing to the people's grievances towards the government. These factors led to the protests and eventually civil war (Salih, 2013). For example, Gadhafi had enforced a law that forbade group activity based on a political ideology opposed to his own revolution. The hundreds of people who violated the law were imprisoned and even sentenced to death. Thus, in May of 2011, the International Criminal Court's prosecutor pursued him in an attempt to arrest him for crimes against humanity (BBC, 2011).

The act of comparing follows the identification of what divides the masses. Social movement theory suggests that relative deprivation occurs when one group compares themselves to the other and realizes they are worse off. There are three forms of deprivation: deprivation relative to the past, deprivation relative to other people in the form of relative gains or absolute

gains and deprivation relative to one's expectations. As a result of these comparisons, individuals develop grievances and are more likely to participate in social movements to address their grievances. The form of relative deprivation present among the anti-Gadhafi forces was the comparison made of their current situation relative to other nations (Tunisia and Egypt), in which the rebels of Libya dreamed of a successful removal of their dictatorial leader and a possible chance at democracy. This would follow the movements in Tunisia and Egypt. It is at this moment where cognitive liberation comes into play. Brought upon by mass frustration towards the oppressive regime, the Libyan rebels recognized that change was needed and believed that by working together they could accomplish that change.

One vital component of social movement theory, that is central in analyzing the Libyan revolution, is its three pillars: resource mobilization, political opportunity structure and cognitive liberation/framing. Resource mobilization refers to the amount of resources a movement has access to, in which movements with more resources are more likely to arise than movements with less resources. The anti-Gadhafi forces' resource mobilization proved to be advantageous during the social movement stage. Social organizational resources, in the form of social media, were key in the movement's growth, providing instant access and transparency that empowered people and stripped Gadhafi of his tyrannical power (Alqudsi-ghabra, 2012). These resources also acted as a peaceful enhancer that allowed messages to spread at unbelievable speeds, aided by the use of a multiplicity of tools that combatted censorship. For example, if Facebook was censored, Twitter became an alternative, and so on (Alqudsi-ghabra, 2012). Also, shared information sensitized people to their grievances and caused them to take immediate action (Alqudsi-ghabra, 2012). Social media was also responsible for communicating to the rest of the world what was happening during the uprising. Outlets that used bit.ly links were able to spread

information outside of the region, acting as a megaphone (Brown, 2012). Gadhafi had many political enemies during his forty-two years in power, but they were disconnected from each other. It was not until his opponents were able to use social media that they were able to identify collective goals, build solidarity and organize demonstrations (O'Donnell, 2011).

The second pillar, political opportunity structure, proposes that mass mobilization is sometimes contingent upon opportunities that decrease the cost of collective action and increase the costs of repression. It emphasizes resources external to the group and that can be taken advantage of by weak challengers (Lim, 2016). Political opportunity structure helps to explain why Libya transitioned from a social movement to a revolution, while other Arab nations were able to reach their goals at the social movement stage. In order to grasp this understanding, one must first recognize that the structural opportunities among the Arab nations were not equal. This is why Egypt and Tunisia were able to bring about change with ease. The unity of the elite class proved to be fragile in these two cases, allowing for the social movement to overcome these forces. This fragile nature is evident when General Rachid Ammar, chief of staff of the Tunisian army, went against President Ben Ali's orders to fire at the demonstrators (Lim, 2016). With no means to suppress the protest, Ali gave in to the public pressure and fled to Saudi Arabia. (Lim, 2016). Egypt provides a similar case, in which the army also refused to shoot at the protestors, going against President Hosni Mubarak. Mubarak was eventually removed from power by a coup d'état staged by the Supreme Council of the armed Forces (Lim, 2016). In Libya, however, the chain of civil protests evolved into a full-blown uprising against the Gadhafi's regime. Just days after the protests began in February, the protesters seized control of eastern Libya, while Gadhafi remained in control of the cities of Tripoli, Sirte and Sabha (Jazeera, 2011). By March, however, he was able to reclaim more than half a dozen of his lost cities. Gadhafi's success in not only

maintaining his power and authority, but also refusing to succumb to the public's plea during the protests demonstrates how he remained insulated from public pressure. Because the assumed public pressure from the act of protesting did not seem to faze him, a more radical and violent approach was taken by the protestors. Mass frustration as a result of Gadhafi's continual violent suppression to protest was the source of revolution. It is vital to consider this pillar because groups may have the realization and resources to mobilize, but because accessibility and structures are lacking, a movement may not succeed. Initially, Libya's movement for change failed. This was due to the lack of political opportunity in the state, as a result of Gadhafi's overbearing power and strength as a leader.

The final pillar of social movement theory is cognitive liberation. This pillar suggests that individuals in a society will recognize that change is called for (brought upon by cleavages, mass frustration), and will therefore realize that by working together they can accomplish that change. Cognitive liberation makes references to framing, in which a message for the movement is created. It is comprised of the mental aspects that pull people together. Gadhafi began framing the conflict to his advantage as soon as revolutionaries began succeeding cities and taking over state institutions (Bishara, 2011). He painted a picture of serious offenses against the republic, by criminals that must be eliminated, threatening to penalize these "armed gangs" for taking hostages and threatening the country's security. Regardless of Gadhafi's attempts, the regime failed to stop the rebellions, prompting the authoritarian leader to threaten civil war (Bishara, 2011). However, the oppositional forces understood collectively that the majority of the population pursued a free and affluent Libya, while only a heavily-armed and slight minority would benefit from the existing corrupt rule (Bishara, 2011). The rebel group recognized the

odds as in their favor. This is what ultimately leads to social movement and, eventually, revolution in this case.

In regards to limitations, there is a problem in regards to resource mobilization, in that it focuses almost entirely on social movement organizations, and neglects the existence of social movement communities. These communities are exceedingly decentralized and do not fit into the organization framework. As seen in the 2011 movement in Libya, the movement itself was leaderless. There was no particular organization that acted as a driving force for action.

Social movements prove to be complex and inconsistent. However, by applying social movement theory, one can begin to identify the logic behind collective action and even understand the possibility of success. In the case of Libya in 2011, social movement theory successfully explained the emergence of civil war from protests by bringing attention to the country's center periphery cleavage, its resource mobilization in the form of social media networking, and its weak political opportunity structure that made Gadhafi's regime difficult to break.

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